The Virginia Campaign - Parts XIV-XV



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PART XIV
WASHINGTON'S INTENTIONS AND PLANS

During the period from February 10 to August 14, 1781, the Commander in 
Chief was engaged in formulating and executing strategical plans which 
resulted in the French and American Armies being brought together near 
Dobbs Ferry on the 6th of July, and later caused them to be transferred to 
Virginia. Washington's initial purpose was to invest New York, with the 
reservation that this would be impossible if the French admiral refused to 
take his ships inside of Sandy Hook. The alternative was to attempt the 
capture of Cornwallis's army in Virginia.

On the 14th day of August Washington learned that the Count de Grasse 
would operate in the Chesapeake, and this date marks the end of all his 
plans to recover New York. Throughout the period terminating August 14 
Washington's mind had dwelt on the possibility, and even the probability, 
of Virginia becoming the eventual goal. The development of the thought was 
so persistent and cumulative as to considerably lessen in after years 
recollection of an original design to operate against New York. In the 
early part of the revolution the military quality of Washington's mind was 
exemplified in the remark to Lafayette that "I never judge of the 
propriety of measures by after events," but in later years there was one 
occasion when its corollary--not to confuse happenings with intentions--
was overlooked.

On the 14th of July, 1788, Noah Webster, a young and ambitious student and 
lecturer, wrote to General Washington, then at Mount Vernon, that he was 
engaged in preparing a history of the late war and expressed himself as 
follows:

I take the liberty of making an enquiry respecting a fact which I am told 
is commonly misrepresented, & which perhaps no person but the Commander in

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Chief of the late armies in America can set right. An opinion, Sir, is 
very general, that the junction of the French fleet & the American armies 
at York Town was the result of a preconcerted plan between Yourself & the 
Count de Grasse; & that the preparations made at the time for attacking 
New York were merely a feint. But the late Quarter Master General has 
assured me that a combined attack was intended to be made upon New York, & 
that the arrival of the French fleet in the Bay of Chesapeake was 
unexpected, & changed the plan of operations.

Webster said that his sole motive in disturbing Washington with this 
matter was that in writing history--

it is of infinite consequence to know the springs of action as well as the 
events; and a wish to discover & communicate truth.

Washington replied to this communication on the 31st of July, 1788, saying 
that he could only answer the question "briefly, and generally from 
memory." His letter contains the following statement:

The point of attack was not absolutely agreed upon, because it would be 
easy for the Count de Grasse in good time before his departure from the 
West Indies to give notice by express at what place he could most 
conveniently first touch to receive advices, because it could not be 
foreknown where the enemy would be mod susceptible of impression, and 
because we, (having command of the water, and with sufficient means of 
conveyance,) could transport ourselves to any spot with the greatest 
celerity: that it was determined by me, (nearly twelve months beforehand,) 
at all hazards to give out and cause it to be believed by the highest 
military as well as civil officers, that New York was the destined place 
of attack, for the important purpose of inducing the eastern & middle 
States to make greater exertions in furnishing specific supplies than they 
otherwise would have done, as well as for the interesting purpose of 
rendering the enemy less prepared elsewhere: that these means, and these 
alone, artillery, boats, stores, and provisions were in seasonable 
preparation to move with the utmost rapidity to any part of the continent; 
for the difficulty consisted more in providing, than knowing how to apply, 
the military apparatus: that before the arrival of the Count de Grasse, it 
was the fixed determination to strike the enemy in the most vulnerable 
quarter so as to ensure success with moral certainty, as our affairs were 
then in the most ruinous train imaginable: that New York was thought to be 
beyond our effort, and consequently the only hesitation that remained was 
between an attack upon the British army in Virginia or that in Charleston: 
and, finally * * * the hostile post in Virginia, from being a provisional 
and strongly expected, became the

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definite and certain object of the campaign. I only add, that it never was 
in contemplation to attack New York, unless the garrison should first have 
been so far disgarnished to carry on the southern operations, as to render 
our success in the siege of that place as infallible as any future 
military event can ever be made.

The essential points in this extract from Washington's letter are that the 
place of attack was not absolutely agreed upon at the Weathersfield 
conference of May 21, 1781; that nearly 12 months before the conference 
Washington had determined to give out that New York was the destined place 
of attack; that before the arrival of De Grasse the Commander in Chief had 
decided to attack in the most vulnerable quarter; and that finally 
Virginia became the definite object of the campaign. This part of 
Washington's letter can not be interpreted in any light other than that 
there was always the thought that New York might be the objective. Another 
paragraph of the letter reads:

That much trouble was taken and finesse used to misguide and bewilder Sir 
Henry Clinton in regard to the real object by fictitious communications as 
well as by making a deceptive provision of ovens, forage, and boats in his 
neighbor, hood, is certain. Nor were less pains taken to deceive our own 
army; for I had always conceived, when the imposition did not completely 
take place at home, it could never sufficiently succeed abroad.

This paragraph alone lends itself to several interpretations, the most 
extreme being that all of Washington's plans against New York were meant 
to deceive, misguide, and bewilder; all of which are permissible and 
effective stratagems.

The letter closes with the remark that while most of the official papers 
bearing on the campaign are preserved, "yet the knowledge of innumerable 
things of a more delicate and secret nature is confined to the perishable 
remembrance of some few of the present generation." The only individuals 
who shared the most secret thoughts of Washington during these six months 
of uncertainty were the several gentlemen who, at the time, constituted 
his official family.

Preliminary plans for the 1781 campaign had been made at the Hartford 
conference of September, 1780, between Washington and

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Rochambeau. The agreement entered into at the time was that New York was 
to be invested with a combined army approximating 30,000 men, provided the 
allies had a naval superiority on the Atlantic coast during the critical 
part of the campaign. Should the British reduce their total strength in 
and around New York by detaching troops for service elsewhere, a force 
equal to double their remaining strength was viewed as sufficient for the 
operations. It was expected that additional troops would come from France 
as a result of the request made upon the ministry for 10,000 
reenforcements.

The general idea of the plan of operations, if it were possible to procure 
the land force counted on, was to attack simultaneously at two places; the 
Americans against the works on York Island, and the French, in all 
probability, against the works at Brooklyn. In case the allies found 
themselves unable to undertake this capital, enterprise the reduction of 
Charleston would probably become the objective. If the investment of 
Charleston met with success, Savannah, Penobscot, and other places might 
be attempted. This detailed presentation of major and secondary objectives 
was furnished to General Knox, Chief of Artillery, in a letter from 
Washington dated the 10th of February, 1781. Knox was told to prepare for 
the siege of New York, being advised at the same time that any 
dispositions which might be made for the principal object would 
substantially comprehend the lesser.

Meanwhile the spring operations of the French Fleet, which have been 
previously described, got under way. M. de Tilly concluded three ships to 
the Chesapeake in February, and in the same month Washington dispatched 
Lafayette's corps to Virginia. Upon De Tilly's return to Rhode Island, 
Washington proceeded to Newport for another conference with Rochambeau and 
arrived at French headquarters on the 6th of March. Two days later the 
entire fleet set sail for the Chesapeake, carrying a detachment of 1,120 
French soldiers under the command of Baron de Viomesnil. Admiral 
Destouches encountered the British Fleet under Arbuth-

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not off the capes of Virginia on the 16th of the month. After an 
indecisive action the French Fleet returned to Newport.

* * * * * * *

Brief reference has been made to the instructions covering a variety of 
contingencies which had been prepared at Versailles for Rochambeau's 
guidance in the conduct of the 1781 campaign. Such action by the ministry 
was necessary in order that it might exercise some measure of control over 
the movements of this part of the French Army, and of the important fleet 
which was about to sail to cooperate with it. The instructions were not so 
restrictive, however, as to deprive either the general or the admiral of 
the power of initiative, nor to prevent them making alterations within 
certain bounds. Rochambeau was cautioned not to engage in any operations 
which would cause him to abandon Rhode Island at a time when the squadron 
under Destouches might find it hazardous to retire to Boston. A superior 
French naval force under command of Count de Grasse, lieutenant general of 
the marine, would arrive in July or August, at which time it would be 
joined by the squadron then at Newport.

The French Fleet set sail from Brest on the 22d of March, followed by the 
Concorde, a frigate bearing to the United States M. de Barras who was to 
take command of the squadron at Rhode Island, and Viscount de Rochambeau, 
son of the general. The Concorde reached Boston on the 6th of May, and on 
the 8th Rochambeau wrote to Washington from Newport requesting an early 
interview and asking him to fix upon the place for the meeting. 
Washington's reply designated the 21st of May as the date for the 
conference, and Weathersfield as the place. The Commander in Chief set out 
for Weathersfield on the 18th of the month accompanied by Generals Knox 
and Duportail. The day before Ins departure there was confirmation of 
rumors which had persisted for several days to the effect that a heavy 
detachment of British troops had sailed from New York for the South. This 
detachment was the one commanded by Leslie, which had left the harbor 
about the 11th of the month.

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Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Chastellux arrived at 
Weathersfield on the 216t of May. The appearance of the British Fleet off 
Block Island prevented the attendance of Count de Barras. One of the first 
projects to which consideration was given was the proposition made by 
Washington that the squadron at Newport be employed at an early date to 
transport the French Army to the Chesapeake. It was agreed that this could 
not be done in view of the instructions from the ministry to take the 
squadron to Boston in case the army was removed from Newport. As any joint 
plan of campaign would necessitate the removal of the French troops from 
Newport, Rochambeau was very desirous that measures be taken to insure 
retention of the harbor, thereby offering a very essential refuge for the 
ships during the hurricane season. It was further agreed, in view of the 
probable inability of Clinton to detach any considerable body of troops to 
repossess the island, that 500 militia would be sufficient to guard the 
works. The heavy artillery and spare stores having already been removed to 
Providence, it was decided that they could be left there with safety under 
guard of 200 French troops, aided by militia if necessary.

These preliminary matters being disposed of, the major questions involved 
were then discussed. Rochambeau asked Washington what operations would be 
engaged in by the combined armies when the superior French Fleet appeared 
off the Atlantic coast. To this question Washington replied that as the 
British had consider, ably reduced their force at New York by sending 
numerous detachments to the South, he thought it advisable to form a 
junction of the French and American Armies on the North River, and be pre, 
pared to take advantage of any opportunity which the weakness of the enemy 
might afford. The great waste of men which had always occurred in long 
marches to the Southern States; the difficulties and expenses of land 
transportation thither, gave preference to an operation against New York 
rather than to an attempt to send a force to the South. The entry in 
Washington's diary for the 22d of May is as follows:

Fixed with Count de Rochambeau upon a plan of Campaign--in substance as 
follows.--That the French Land force (except 200 Men) should March so soon

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as the Squadron could Sail for Boston--to the North River--& there, in 
conjunction with the American, to commence an operation against New York 
(which in the present reduced State of the Garrison it was thought would 
fall, unless relieved; the doing which wd. enfeeble their Southern 
operations, and in either case be productive of capital advantages) or to 
extend our views to the Southward as circumstances and a Naval superiority 
might render more necessary & eligable.--The aid which would be given to 
such an operation in this quarter--the tardiness with which the Regiments 
would be filled for any other.--the insurmountable difficulty and expence 
of Land Transportation--the waste of Men in long Marches (especially where 
there is a disinclination to the Service--objections to the climate &ca.) 
with other reasons too numerous to detail, induced to this opinion.--The 
heavy Stores & Baggage of the French Army were to be deposited at 
Providence under Guard of 200 Men (before mentioned) --& Newport Harbour & 
Works were to be secured by 500 Militia.--

Before leaving Weathersfield Washington dispatched letters from Rochambeau 
and himself to M. de la Luzerne, in which they give complete information 
of the plans just concluded. The minister was asked to inform Admiral de 
Grasse of the strength and situation of the British naval and land forces, 
and of the intention of the allied commanders after a junction of the 
armies had been made.

While affairs remain as they now are--

Washington wrote--

the West India fleet should run immediately to Sandy Hook if there are no 
concerted operations, where they may be met with all the information 
requisite, and where most likely it will shut in, or cut of Admiral 
Arbuthnot, and may be joined by the Count de Barras.

On the 24th of May Washington set out on the return journey to New 
Windsor, where he arrived the following evening. The next day a letter was 
received from Colonel Laurens giving information of the gift of 6,000,000 
livres from the Kings and telling of the offer of mediation made by the 
Courts of Petersburg and Vienna.

The president of Congress was informed of the plans agreed upon at 
Weathersfield in a letter written by Washington on the 27th of May, 
wherein were presented the reasons that prompted the decisions. Washington 
said in this letter that--

the Continental battalions, from New Hampshire to New Jersey inclusive, 
(supposing them complete,) aided by four thousand French troops, and such a

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reinforcement of militia as the operation after its commencement may seem 
to require, have been deemed adequate to the attempt upon New York with 
its present garrison.

On the 28th of May the Commander in Chief called on the Chief of Artillery 
and the Chief of Engineers (Knox and Duportail) to prepare estimates of 
their wants for the intended operations against New York, and on the 
Quartermaster General (Pickering) to provide a large number of boats and 
other supplies. The entry in the diary for the 31st of the month shows a 
detailed statement compiled by two of Washington's spies in New York of 
the British regular forces in and around that city, estimated at somewhat 
more than 4,500 men, together with their distribution amongst the several 
posts.

Washington wrote to Gen. John Sullivan, in Congress, on the 29th of May to 
inform him of the objective for the armies in the approaching campaign, 
declaring that New York offered the fairest prospect of success, "unless 
the enemy should recall a considerable part of their force from the 
southward." Even if this were done, while it might produce disappointment 
in one quarter, it would certainly afford the greatest relief in another. 
This letter was intercepted by the British, as were several others of 
about the same date, including one written by Lafayette. It was from these 
intercepted letters that Clinton, as previously stated, had learned that 
New York was threatened with a siege, whereupon he dispatched a runner to 
Cornwallis on the 8th of June with the request that 2,000 men be sent to 
New York, "and the sooner they come the better." Another runner left with 
a dispatch dated the 11th of the month, in which Clinton asked for certain 
organizations, saying, "the sooner I concentrate my force the better." The 
effective British force in and around New York at this time was 10,931 men.

A change now occurred in some details of the plan agreed upon at the 
conference. The Count de Barras, after holding a council of war, decided 
to retain his ships at Newport upon the departure

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of the Army from Rhode Island instead of proceeding to Boston. In this 
position the squadron would be in closer touch with De Grasse when he 
arrived in American waters; furthermore, the harbor of Boston was 
unfavorable during the summer months on account of the southwest winds 
that blow almost continually. Rochambeau wrote to Washington on the 31st 
of May that, in order to give the fleet protection at Newport, M. de 
Choisy, of the French Army, was to be left there with 400 men, and 
Washington was asked to provide 1,000 militia for station on the island. 
In replying to this letter the Commander in Chief expressed some views on 
naval strategy not in concurrence with those of the admiral and his 
council, adding:

I would not, however, set up my single judgment against that of so many 
gentlemen of experience, more especially as the matter partly depends upon 
a knowledge of marine affairs, of which I candidly confess my ignorance.

Washington was without a peer in America in knowledge of naval matters. 
The many references to naval strategy and international affairs to be 
found in his writings, indicate a profound knowledge of the effect of sea 
power upon land operations and national interests, far more extensive than 
that of any other American.

On the 5th of June Governor Rutledge of South Carolina came to the 
headquarters of the army for the purpose of representing the situation of 
affairs in the South. Washington told his visitor of the proposed plan of 
campaign and frankly exposed the state of affairs in regard to the allied 
armies and the French Fleet. Governor Rutledge appeared to be convinced 
that no relief could be expected from the northern army while the British 
controlled the sea, as it would be folly to attempt marching a detachment 
so great a distance.

It was particularly important, however, that something be done at this 
time to force the British to give up all or part of the southern territory 
now in their possession, as Washington suspected, "from the most recent 
European intelligence, they are endeavoring to make as large seeming 
conquests as possible, that they may urge the plea of uti possidetis in 
the proposed mediation." Having this

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in mind, a campaign to drive the British from Virginia, North and south 
Carolina, and Georgia was of more importance than dispossessing them of 
the posts around New York Harbor. However, everything depended upon 
whether or not De Grasse would attempt to operate at New York. It did not 
seem probable that he would, for D'Estaing in 1778 had found that it was 
unsafe to take his larger ships across the bar of Sandy Hook, and De 
Grasse would likely be of the same opinion. At the time D'Estaing refused 
to enter New York Harbor, Washington said in a letter dated the 22d of 
July, 1778, addressed to the President of Congress:

Previous to my despatching Mr. Hamilton, from the information I received 
on my inquiries respecting the navigation at the Hook, I was led to 
suspect, however interesting and desirable the destruction or capture of 
the British fleet might be, that it was not sufficient to introduce the 
Count's ships.

Although there is no reference made to this difficulty of navigation in 
Washington's correspondence of 1781, it is certain that he had not 
forgotten D'Estaing's refusal to imperil his ships, and he was justified 
in presuming that De Grasse would be no more willing to place his fleet in 
jeopardy.

In the latter part of May Rochambeau received dispatches from De Grasse 
dated at sea, March 29, saying that he would be off the coast of North 
America about the 15th of July. He asked that everything be prepared for 
the ensuing campaign, as he could stay only a short time in those waters. 
He requested that skillful pilots be sent to join the fleet in the West 
Indies, reminding Rochambeau that the French ships had a larger draft of 
water than those of the British. Count de Rochambeau immediately 
dispatched a vessel for the West Indies with full intelligence concerning 
the proposed plans for the allied armies, giving the strength, situation, 
and apparent designs of the enemy. Rochambeau recommended that the fleet 
enter the Chesapeake on its way up the coast, where there might be an 
opportunity of striking an important blow, and then proceed to New York to 
cooperate in an attack upon that city. Request was made that five or six 
thousand land troops be brought from the West Indies to engage in the 
enterprise.

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The substance of Rochambeau's recommendations to De Grasse was transmitted 
to Washington on the 9th and 10th of June. The Commander in Chief did not 
view with favor the proposition of Stopping at the Chesapeake, and in his 
reply, written on the 13th of the month, he asked Rochambeau, in case the 
frigate carrying dispatches to De Grasse had not yet sailed, to inform the 
admiral that it would be left entirely to his own judgment, based upon 
information he might receive of the situation of the British Fleet upon 
the coast, as to what would be the most advantageous quarter in which to 
appear. Washington reminded Rochambeau that in the letter written to 
Luzerne from Weathersfield--

Sandy Hook was mentioned as the most desirable point; because, by coming 
suddenly there, he would certainly block up any fleet, which might be 
within; and he would even have a very good chance of forcing the entrance, 
before dispositions could be made to oppose him.

No change was made in Rochambeau's dispatches, however, as the frigate 
carrying them was sent away before Washington's letter arrived.

One-half of Count de Rochambeau's army embarked for Providence on the 10th 
of June, followed soon after by the other half. The troops then marched 
from Providence by way of Windham to Hartford. The army was augmented by 
400 recruits who had landed at Boston. In addition to this number there 
were 260 more who were unfit for duty on account of the scurvy. Two 
companies of artillery were left at Providence with the siege artillery, 
which was to be transported by ships as soon as De Barras determined that 
it would be safe to go to sea. Rochambeau arrived at Hartford on the 22d 
with the first regiment, and expected to set out from there three days 
later.

On the 18th of June Washington divided his army into three divisions and 
arranged for the first division to march on the 21st for the new camp at 
Peekskill, the second to march two days later, and the third division on 
the 24th of the month. On the 25th of June Washington left winter quarters 
at New Windsor and joined the Army at its encampment at Peekskill. That 
same day he re-

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ceived a letter from Rochambeau containing information that the first 
French division would be at Newtown on the 28th, where Rochambeau, 
proposed to assemble his forces and march by brigades. The legion of the 
Duke de Lauzun would cover his left flank.

Washington now determined to begin minor operations against Clinton's army 
by exerting pressure upon the more distant posts at the north end of York 
Island. Combined with this purpose was an intention to cut of Delancey's 
provincial troops and other light corps near Kings Bridge. The movement 
was to take place the night of July 2d. General Lincoln would command the 
first detachment and Lauzun, still on the left flank of the French Army, 
the second detachment. Rochambeau was requested to file off from Ridgebury 
to Bedford and hasten the march so that his army would be close enough to 
support the attack in case the action reached unexpected proportions. In 
Washington's instruction to Lincoln on the 1st of July he said:

The success of your enterprize depending absolutely upon secrecy and 
surprise, it will be wrong to prosecute it a moment after you are 
discovered unless the discovery is made so near the works, that you may, 
by a rapid movement, gam, them before the enemy have time to recollect and 
put themselves in a posture of defence.

Lincoln's detachment embarked on the night of July 1st near Tellers Point 
to pass down the North River. At 3 o'clock the following morning the 
Continental Army marched to support the detached troops and to improve any 
advantage which might be gained by them. The army halted at New Bridge 
over the Croton, about 9 miles from Peekskill. Another halt was made at 
the church by Tarrytown, 9 miles from the Croton, and that night the march 
was continued to Valentines Hill, where the army arrived about sunrise the 
following morning.

The length of Duke de Lauzun's march and the fatigue of his corps 
prevented his coming to the point of action at the hour appointed. In the 
meantime Lincoln's party, which was ordered to prevent the retreat of 
Delancey's corps by the way of Kings

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Bridge and to cut of reenforcements approaching by that route, was 
attacked by the Yagers and other troops. Upon the appearance of the 
American Army from Valentines Hill the enemy retired to York Island. That 
afternoon the Americans withdrew to Valentines Hill and lay upon their 
arms, while Washington spent a considerable part of the day reconnoitering 
the enemy's works. The next day, July 4, the march was continued to a 
position on the left of Dobbs Ferry where the army encamped. Washington 
marked a camp for the French Army to the eastward of the American camp.

Rochambeau, was now marching in two brigades, and on the 3d of July the 
first brigade reached North Castle. The second brigade, by a forced march, 
joined that afternoon. The next day Rochambeau wrote to Washington that 
his army was united and ready to execute any orders of the Commander in 
Chief. The letter was received within a few hours at headquarters, and a 
reply was immediately sent directing Rochambeau to march to the camp 
prepared for him about 4 miles southwest of White Plains.

On the 5th of July Washington visited the French Army at North Castle, 
where it was halting to recuperate. The following day Rochambeau led his 
troops to the camp designated for them, and the armies of France and 
America now rested side by side, with a valley between. The Orderly Book 
of July 6 contains the order published by the Commander in Chief in which 
he expresses his thanks to his excellency the Count de Rochambeau--

for the unremitting zeal with which he has prosecuted his march, in order 
to form the long wished-for junction between the French and American 
forces; an event, which must afford the highest degree of pleasure to 
every friend of his country, and from which the happiest consequences are 
to be expected.

Special praise is given to the regiment of Saintonge for the spirited 
manner "with which they continued and supported their march without one 
day's respite." The Abbe Robin says that the Viscount de Noailles 
performed the whole march from Providence to the North River on foot.

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While in camp at Dobbs Ferry, Washington heard from Lafayette of the 
retirement of Cornwallis's army to Williamsburg. This most gratifying news 
added weight to the many impulses which were directing the mind of the 
Commander in Chief to the South. It is probable he now felt almost certain 
that the major objective of the ensuing campaign would be the British Army 
in Virginia. For the first time he put this thought on paper--in a letter 
to Lafayette dated the 13th of July.

I shall shortly have occasion to communicate matters of very great 
importance to you, so much so, that I shall send a confidential officer on 
purpose to you. * * * In the present situation of affairs, it is of the 
utmost importance that a communication by a chain of expresses should be 
opened between this army and that in Virginia. They are already 
established from hence to Philadelphia, and if there is none from you to 
Philadelphia, you will be pleased to take measures for having it done.

In order to determine the number, location, and strength of the British 
posts at the north end of York Island, Washington, accompanied by the 
Count de Rochambeau, General de Beville (quartermaster general of the 
French Army), and General Duportail, crossed the North River on the 18th 
of July to make a reconnaissance. Washington's diary for that day contains 
numerous and detailed entries as to posts, works, encampments, troops, and 
naval vessels pertaining to the British. Possible landing places are 
described and tentative approach roads on the east side of the river noted.

Washington is not yet sure that New York will not be the point of attack.

The diary for the 20th of July gives the information that Rochambeau, in 
the name of De Barras, called on Washington for a definite plan of 
campaign, which was to be communicated to the Count de Grasse.

I could not but acknowledge, that the uncertainties under which we labour--
the few Men who have joined (either as Recruits for the Continental 
Battns. or Militia)--& the ignorance in which I am kept by some of the 
States on whom I mostly depended--especially Massachusetts from whose 
Govr. I have not received a line since I addressed him from Weathersfd. 
the 23d of May last.--rendered it impracticable for me to do more than to 
prepare, first, for the enter-

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prize against New York as agreed to at Weathersfield--and secondly for the 
relief of the Southern States if after all my efforts, & earnest 
application to these States it should be found at the arrivl. of Count de 
Grasse that I had neither Men, nor means adequate to the first object--to 
give this opinion I was further induced from the uncertainty with respect 
to the time of the arrival of the arrival1 of the French Fleet & whether 
Land Troops would come in it or not as had been earnestly requested by me 
& inforced by the Minister of France.

Day after day passed, each hour spent in eager expectancy of more 
intelligence from De Grasse, until finally Washington realized that he 
could no longer delay his decision. It was to his friend and confidant, 
Lafayette, that he wrote of his intentions. In a letter dated July 30th he 
said:

I am convinced, that your desire to be with this army arises principally 
from a wish to be actively useful. You will not, therefore, regret your 
stay in Virginia until matters are reduced to a greater degree of 
certainty, than they are at present, especially when I tell you, that, 
from the change of circumstances with which the removal of part of the 
enemy's force from Virginia to New York will be attended, it is more than 
probable, that we shall also entirely change our plan of operations. I 
think we have already effected one part of the plan of the campaign 
settled at Weathersfield; that is, giving a substantial relief to the 
southern States, by obliging the enemy to recall a considerable part of 
their force from thence. Our views must now be turned towards endeavoring 
to expel them totally from those States, if we find ourselves incompetent 
to the siege of New York.

At an earlier hour the same day Washington had written a letter to Greene, 
praising him for the accomplishments of the southern army and declaring 
that he was "unable to conceive what more could have been done under your 
circumstances, than has been displayed by your little persevering and 
determined army." Commenting on the political effect of the withdrawal of 
troops from Virginia to New York, which Washington mistakenly believed to 
have occurred, he said:

This withdraw will probably disappoint their views of conquest in 
Virginia, and will exceeding embarrass the prospects of the British 
ministry in the proposed treaty opened at Vienna. This is a very great 
object, even should anything prevent our obtaining further success in our 
operations against New York.

1. Repetition occurs in original.

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The letter continues with a request for the earliest and most minute 
information of every event occurring in the State of South Carolina, for 
"'a particular reason, which cannot at this time be communicated." The 
reason was communicated to Lafayette, however, and he was directed to 
inform Greene of that part of the letter winch related to Washington's--

expectation of being able to transport put of the army to the southward, 
should the operation against New York be declined.

This communication is the one Washington had expected to send to Lafayette 
by a confidential officer.

But I am really at a loss--

he wrote--

for want of knowing the officers better, to find one upon whose discretion 
I can depend. My own family, you know, are constantly and fully employed. 
however hope, that I have spoken plain enough to be understood by you.

The entry in the diary for the 1st of August furnishes additional evidence 
that at this tame the probability of investing New York was almost 
eliminated from Washington's mind. All small boats, heavy ordnance, and 
supplies were now in perfect readiness and he could commence operations if 
the States had furnished the quotas of men demanded of them. Of those 
called for in the first requisition not more than one-half had joined the 
Army, and only a handful of those asked for in the second requisition. 
Having little assurance of securing the additional men, Washington could 
see no ground upon which to continue his preparations against New York, 
especially as he believed that part of the British troops in Virginia had 
been recalled to reinforce the posts at New York. After commenting in Ins 
diary upon these conditions he continues:

I turned my views more seriously (than I had before done) to an operation 
to the Southward--and, in consequence, sent to make enquiry, indirectly, 
of the principal Merchants to the Eastward what number, & in what time, 
Transports could be provided to convey a force to the Southward if it 
should be found necessary to change our plan--& similar application was 
made in a direct way to Mr. Morris (Financier) to discover what number cd. 
be had by the 20th of this month at Philadelphia, or in Chesapeak bay.
* * *
Measures were also

Page 151

taken to deposit the Salt provisions in such places as to be water born, 
mom than thew, while there remained a hope of Count de Grasse's bringing a 
land force with him, & that the States might yet put us in circumstances 
to prosecute the original plan could not be done without unfolding matters 
too plainly to the enemy & enabling them thereby to Counteract our Schemes.

The culmination of the uncertain and vexatious situation came on the 14th 
of August, when Washington received dispatches from the Count de Barras 
announcing the intended departure of the Count de Grasse from Cape 
Francais, with between 25 and 29 sail of the line and 3,200 land troops. 
De Grasse was to sail on the 3d of the month for Chesapeake Bay, and 
wanted everything in complete readiness to commence operations the moment 
he arrived. Washington's diary of that date contains the following 
decision:

Matters having now come to a crisis. --and a decisive plan to be 
determined on--I was obliged, from the shortness of Count de Grasses 
promised stay on this Coast--the apparent disinclination in their Naval 
officers to force the harbour of New York--and the feeble compliance of 
the States to my requisitions for Men, hitherto, & little prospect of 
greater exertion in future, to give up all idea of attacking New York; & 
instead thereof to remove the French Troops & a detachment from the 
American Army to the Head of Elk to be transported to Virginia for the 
purpose of cooperating with the force from the West Indies against the 
Troops in that State:

The detachment from the American Amy which was to go South was composed of 
the light infantry under Colonel Scammell, two light companies of New York 
to be joined by a like number from the Connecticut line, part of the 
Jersey line, two regiments of New York, Hazen's regiment, the regiment of 
Rhode Island, and Lamb's regiment of artillery with cannon and ordnance 
for the field and siege. General Heath was left in command of all the 
troops remaining in the department, consisting of 2 New Hampshire 
regiments, 10 from Massachusetts, 5 from Connecticut, the corps of 
invalids, Sheldon's legion, the Third Regiment of Artillery, and the 
militia which had assembled. The security of West Point and the posts in 
the Highlands were to be considered the first object of his attention.

Page 152

[image caption: Washington's Diary, August 14, 1781]

Page 153

Hazen's regiment was thrown over the North River at Dobbs Ferry and 
ordered to march, together with the Jersey troops, and take post on the 
heights between Springfield and Chatham, in which position the detachment 
would cover a French bakery that had been set up at Chatham "to veil our 
real movements and create apprehensions for Staten Island." The remainder 
of the American Army marched to Kings Ferry on the 20th of August and 
crossed on that and the following day to Stony Point, where camp was made 
to protect the crossing of the French.

Rochambeau's army began its march from the camp near White Plains on the 
19th of August and passed by way of White Plains, North Castle, Pines 
Bridge, and Crompond to Kings Ferry. The crossing of the river by the 
troops, together with all their artillery, baggage, and supplies, was 
accomplished between the 22d and 25th of the month. While at Stony Point 
Washington mounted 30 flat boats, each with a capacity of about 40 men, 
upon carriages, "as well with a design to deceive the enemy as to our real 
movement, as to be useful to me in Virginia when I get there."

On August 25 the American Army resumed its march, proceeding in two 
columns, one by Paramus to Springfield, the other to Chatham by way of 
Pompton. On the following day the French Army arrived at Suffern's. The 
march of both armies progressed throughout the 28th and 29th, leaving only 
one more day's march during which the intentions of Washington could 
longer be concealed from the British. With the idea of further confusing 
Clinton, on the 30th the left of the three columns in which the allied 
troops were now marching was directed toward Sandy Hook by way of 
Brunswick, as though the intention were to cover the passage of the French 
Fleet within Sandy Hook. The middle column passed through Somerset; and 
the right column, composed of the entire French Army, marched byway of 
Morristown and Somerset Court House. The rendezvous of all three columns 
was to be at Trenton, where transports had been ordered to carry the 
troops down the Delaware River.

Page 154

Washington went ahead of the armies to Philadelphia on the 31st of August 
for the purpose of hastening up to Trenton all the vessels that could be 
procured; but finding the number inadequate to transport both men and 
stores, after conferring with Rochambeau, he decided to let the troops 
march by land to Head of Elk and embark at that point. He remained in 
Philadelphia until the 5th of September, by which time the American Army 
had passed through the city, and the rear of the French Army had arrived 
within its confines. All the stores now being at hand and everything 
pertaining to both armies in a satisfactory condition, Washington left 
Philadelphia for the Head of Elk to hasten the embarkation at that place.

When passing through Chester Washington learned of the safe arrival of 
Count de Grasse in the Chesapeake with 28 sail of the line and 4 frigates, 
together with 3,200 land troops, who were to be immediately debarked at 
Jamestown to form a junction with the American Army under Lafayette. 
Judging it highly expedient to be with the army in Virginia as soon as 
possible, to make necessary arrangements for the siege and to get material 
prepared for it, Washington determined to set out for Lafayette's camp 
without loss of time. On the 8th of September, accompanied by the Count de 
Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Chastellux, the Commander in Chief 
departed from Head of Elk for the South.



Page 155

PART XV
THE SEA BATTLE OFF THE CAPES OF VIRGINIA
DE GRASSE-GRAVES

The French Fleet had made an unusually quick passage across the Atlantic, 
taking only 38 days to sail from Brest to the Windward Islands. Arriving 
off Martinique on the 29th of April, De Grasse found the part blockaded by 
a British fleet of 18 ships under Rear Admiral Sir Samuel Hood. A light 
action ensued, but Hood refused to become seriously engaged with a fleet 
of such superior strength and withdrew. De Grasse pursued for some 
distance without being able to bring on a general engagement and finally 
returned to Fort Royal. The French Fleet spent two days in the harbor and 
then moved against the port of Tobago, which surrendered on the 2d of 
June. From Tobago the fleet proceeded some days later to Santo Domingo 
with a convoy of 200 sail of merchantmen collected at Grenada, Martinique, 
and Guadeloupe, and on the 16th of July arrived at Cape Francais. Awaiting 
the fleet at the cape were the dispatches from America, in which 
Washington and Rochambeau had stated the urgent need for early cooperation 
by the admiral either at New York or in the Chesapeake. De Grasse replied 
to these dispatches an the 28th of the month, this being the letter which 
De Barras received at Newport, and from which extracts came to 
Washington's hand on the 14th of August.

I have seen with regret the distress, which prevails on the continent, and 
the necessity of the prompt succours you solicit. I have conferred with M. 
de Lillancourt, who took command of the government here on the day of my 
arrival, and engaged him to furnish from the garrison of St. Domingo a 
detachment from the regiments of Gatinois, Agenois, and Tourraine, 
amounting in all to three thousand men, one hundred artillery, one hundred 
dragoons, ten pieces of field

Page 156

[image caption: De Grasse]

Page 157

ordnance, and several of siege artillery and mortars. The whole will be 
embarked in vessels of war, from twenty-five to twenty-nine in number, 
which will depart from this colony on the 3d of August, and proceed 
directly to the Chesapeake Bay, which place seems to be indicated by 
yourself, General Washington, M. de la Luzerne, and Count de Barras, as 
the best point of operation for accomplishing the object proposed.
I have likewise done all in my power to procure for you the sum of twelve 
hundred thousand livres, which you say is absolutely necessary. This 
colony is not in a condition to afford you such a supply; but I shall 
obtain it from Havana, whither a frigate will be sent for the purpose, and 
you may depend on receiving that amount.
As neither myself, nor the troops commanded by the Marquis de St. Simon, 
can remain on the continent after the 15th of October, I shall be greatly 
obliged to you if you will employ me promptly and effectually within that 
time, whether against the maritime or land forces of our enemy. It will 
not be possible for me to leave the troops with you beyond that period; 
first, because part of them are under the orders of the Spanish generals, 
and have been obtained only on the promise that they shall be returned by 
the time they will be wanted; and, secondly, because the other part are 
destined to the garrison of St. Domingo, and cannot be spared from that 
duty by M. de Lillancourt. The entire expedition, in regard to these 
troops, has been concerted only in consequence of your request, without 
even the previous knowledge of the ministers of France and Spain. I have 
thought myself authorized to assume this responsibility for the common 
cause; but I should not dare so far to change the plans they have adopted, 
as to remove so considerable a body of troops.
You clearly perceive the necessity of making the best use of the time, 
that will remain for action. I hope the frigate, which takes this letter, 
will have such despatch, that everything may be got in readiness by the 
time of my arrival, and that we may proceed immediately to fulfill the 
designs in view, the success of which I ardently desire.

The information contained in this dispatch about the fleet proceeding to 
the Chesapeake Bay was of great importance; but of even more vital concern 
was the statement that the troops borrowed from the West Indies garrison 
could not remain on the continent after October 15, thereby making it 
necessary to begin capital operations immediately upon the arrival of De 
Grasse in Virginia.

The fleet sailed from Cape Francais on the 5th of August, 1781. The ships 
were conducted by Spanish pilots through the Old 

Page 158

Bahama Straits, where they were joined by the frigate which had been 
dispatched to Habana for the money promised by De Grasse. Upon approaching 
the capes of Virginia on the 30th of the month, the frigates Glorieux, 
Aigrette, and Diligente, chasing in the van, discovered the British 
frigate Guadaloupe and the corvette Loyalist anchored off Cape Henry, and 
pursued them to the mouth of York River, where the corvette was taken.

The Glorieux and two frigates anchored at the mouth of the York to 
blockade the river, and the next day the Vaillant and Triton engaged in 
the same duty. The Experiment, Andromaque, and several corvettes were 
stationed in the James River to prevent passage by the British Army should 
it attempt to retreat into the Carolinas. When the fleet came to anchor on 
the 30th Colonel Gimat, whom Lafayette had posted at Cape Henry with 
dispatches for De Grasse, went aboard the flagship Ville de Paris.

The joy that filled Lafayette when he learned of the arrival of the French 
Fleet in the inland waters of the United States can well be imagined. His 
first thought was to send the glorious news to his beloved chief and 
friend. In a letter to General Washington written by him on the 1st of 
September from his camp at Holt's Forge, he said:

From the bottom of my heart I congratulate you upon the arrival of the 
French fleet.

The marquis now awaited with the greatest impatience the arrival in 
Virginia of the allied armies and the earlier appearance of the Commander 
in Chief. The glory of victory would soon be attained by the man to whom 
the country had given its trust for six years, and it was Lafayette's 
great desire that nothing be done which might place the laurels upon 
another's head. He was tempted, but he was too good a soldier not to 
realize the unwisdom of the suggestion made to him. "It appears Count de 
Grasse is in a great hurry to return," he wrote to Washington, "he makes 
it a point to put upon my expressions such constructions as may favour his 
plan." Lafayette could not agree with De Grasse as to the necessity for 
haste, for he felt that "having so sure a game to play, it would be

Page 159

madness, by the risk of an attack, to give any thing to chance." This wise 
decision met with the warm approval of General Duportail, who arrived on 
the flagship the morning of the 2d as an emissary from Washington and 
Rochambeau. After learning of the desire of the admiral for immediate 
action against the British Army, and of Lafayette's stand, Duportail wrote 
to Rochambeau an the matter.

Our young general's judgment is mature; with all the ardor of his 
temperament, I think he will be able to wait for the proper moment and not 
touch the fruit until it is ripe.

On the 2d of September the detachment of 3,200 men under M. de St. Simon 
was put aboard boats and sloops and transported from the anchorage of the 
fleet in Lynnhaven Roads to Jamestown, where they were landed the same 
day. De Grasse sent a letter to Washington at this time giving information 
that he had the York River blockaded at its mouth and the James River 
guarded. With the rest of his command he was at Cape Henry--

ready to engage the enemy's maritime forces, should they come to the 
relief of Lord Cornwallis, whom I regard as blockaded until the arrival of 
Your Excellency and of your army.

The contents of the dispatches from Washington and Rochambeau and the 
information derived from their bearer, Duportail, caused De Grasse to 
accept gracefully the postponement of operations, and he made no further 
attempt to induce Lafayette to lead his own and St. Simon's army against 
the British position at Yorktown.

* * * * * * *

The British sloop Hornet arrived at Sandy Hook on the 19th of July, 
bearing dispatches from the Admiralty dated the 22d of May. The most 
important piece of intelligence contained in the dispatches was that 
Colonel Laurens would sail for America before the end of June with money, 
clothing, and military stores, in a convoy of merchantmen escorted by one 
ship of the line, another armed en flute, and two frigates. The admiralty 
advised Graves that the British Government felt a most serious blow would 
be struck if the colonies were deprived of these essential succors, and 
gave orders to the commander of the North American fleet to keep a sharp

Page 160

lookout for the convoy and to determine upon the most likely places to 
station cruisers for the purpose of intercepting it.

The admiral decided that the views of government were so pressing as to 
require him to go to sea at once with his squadron. The fleet of De 
Barras, then at Newport, might be encountered, but that chance must 
necessarily be taken. Should the French fleet in the West Indies attempt 
to reach New York or the Chesapeake during his absence, he could 
rightfully expect that Rodney would handle the situation. In order to keep 
himself informed of conditions along the coast, he made judicious 
arrangements for his lighter vessels to engage in reconnaissance. The 
frigate Solebay was to cruise from the Navesink to Cape May. The frigates 
Medea, Richmond, and Iris were stationed of the Delaware. The frigates 
Charon, Guadaloupe, and Fowey, and the sloops Bonetta and Loyalist were in 
the Chesapeake. Three coppered ships were ordered to Charleston to cruise 
alternately in search of the expected enemy.

These arrangements having been made, Graves crossed the bar at Sandy Hook 
on the 21st of July with 6 sail of the line and the next day was joined by 
the Adamant of 50 guns. While cruising off St. Georges Bank on the 28th of 
the month the Royal Oak, which was returning from Halifax to New York, 
joined the squadron. With a command of eight ships Graves felt no further 
reluctance to engage M. de Barras, should the French Fleet sail from Rhode 
Island.

On the 27th of July the British sloop Swallow arrived at New York from the 
Windward Islands with dispatches from Sir George Rodney. The admiral's 
letter, dated aboard the Sandwich, Barbados, 7th of July, and addressed to 
Admiral Arbuthnot, gave information that a French fleet of 28 sail of the 
line was at Martinique, a part of which was destined for North America. 
Admiral Rodney said in the letter:

In case of my sending a squadron to North America, I shall order it to 
make the Capes of Virginia, and proceed along the coast to the Capes of 
the Delaware, and from thence to Sandy Hook, unless the intelligence it 
may receive from you should induce it to act otherwise.

Page 161

The British commodore left in command at New York ordered the captain of 
the Swallow to carry Rodney's dispatches to Admiral Graves, then cruising 
of Boston Harbor. Unfortunately for the British the sloop engaged in an 
attack upon a privateer and was in turn attacked on the 16th of August by 
4 privateers and pushed on shore upon Long Island, 11 leagues to the 
eastward of Sandy Hook.

Because of intense fogs of St. Georges Bank, which rendered it impossible 
for Admiral Graves to carry out his mission, the British squadron returned 
to Sandy Hook on the 18th and came up to New York. There Graves learned of 
the intelligence sent by Rodney, but owing to the need of repairs he could 
not go to sea until three of his ships were overhauled. The Robust and 
Prudent were ordered to the dockyard in East River. The Europe was brought 
close into the shore, lightened, and heeled in order to repair her 
sheathing and stop leaks.

Prior to going to sea in search of Colonel Laurens, Admiral Graves had 
discussed with General Clinton the matter of attacking the French post at 
Newport, now that the land defenses were so westkly held, and upon the 
return of the British squadron to New York further consideration was given 
to this enterprise. It was now decided that as soon as the Robust and 
Prudent were repaired joint operations would be undertaken against this 
station. Before the work was accomplished, however, Rear Admiral Hood 
arrived with the greater part of the West Indies fleet and an the 28th of 
August anchored outside the bar off Sandy Hook. Hood's command consisted 
of 14 sail of the line, 4 frigates, 1 sloop, and a fire ship.

Owing to the desire of Sir George Rodney to return home on account of poor 
health, he had given up command of His Majesty's fleet at the Leeward 
Islands to Sir Samuel Hood and on the 1st of August had sailed for 
England. Prior to relinquishing command, Rodney prepared comprehensive 
instructions dated July 24 for the use of the fleet along the Atlantic 
coast, after first providing protection for a valuable outward-bound 
convoy of merchantmen to

Page 162

[image caption: Ville de Paris, Flagship of De Grasse]

Page 163

Jamaica. Hood was directed to make his way toward the coast of North 
America, after seeing the convoy safe, and there employ his ships in such 
manner, should he be the senior officer on that station--

as shall seem to you most conducive to his Majesty's Service, by 
supporting his Majesty's liege Subjects and annoying his rebellious ones, 
and in Counteracting such Schemes as it may be reasonable to conclude are 
formed for the junction of the French Fleet from Cape Francois with that 
already there, or with the Forces of the Rebels in America. Having lately 
sent an Express to Admiral Arbuthnot or the commanding Officer on that 
Station by the Swallow, that the ships I might either bring or send from 
hence would endeavour first to make the Capes of the Chesapeak, then those 
of the Delawar, and so on to Sandy Hook, unless Intelligence received from 
his Cruizers (whom I desired might be looking out off the first Capes or 
Elsewhere) should induce a contrary Conduct; I think it necessary to 
acquaint you therewith, and to direct your sailing in Conformity thereto, 
unless Circumstances you may become acquainted with as you range along the 
Coast, should render it improper; which Service, although not only your 
general Experience and Skill as an Officer, but your particular knowledge 
of that Station, I make no Doubt will enable you with Reputation and 
Effect to perform.

On the 25th of August the British Fleet made the land a little to the 
southward of Cape Henry and, finding that no enemy had appeared either in 
the Chesapeake or Delaware, proceeded off Sandy Hook. Foreseeing that 
great delay and inconvenience might arise from going within the Hook, Hood 
anchored outside. He then got into his boat and met Clinton and Graves on 
Long Island, where they were deliberating upon a plan to destroy the ships 
at Newport. As there was great necessity for immediate action by the 
combined fleet, either to attend Clinton to Rhode Island or to look for 
the fleet of De Grasse at sea, Hood urged Graves to come outside the bar 
with such ships of his squadron as were ready, before the approaching 
equinox should render the crossing of the bar dangerous. Graves readily 
accepted the suggestion and said his ships would be sent out the next day.

That evening intelligence was brought of M. de Barras having sailed on the 
25th of the month with his whole squadron. Graves immediately determined 
to proceed with the two squadrons to the southward, with the hope of 
intercepting either Barras or De

Page 164

Grasse, or if possible of engaging both of them. It was not until the 
31st, however, that the wind served to carry Graves's squadron over the 
bar, and he was compelled to put to sea without the Robust and the 
Prudent, which were still at the dockyard. A junction was made with Hood's 
squadron outside the bar, where a line of battle was delivered to the 
several division commanders.

LINE OF BATTLE OF BRITISH FLEET

The Alfred to lead with the Starboard and the Shrewsbury with the Larboard 
tacks on board.

VAN--REAR ADMIRAL SAMUEL HOOD'S DIVISION

Frigates      |  Ships         Guns     Men     Commanders
              |
Santa Monica  |  Alfred         74      600     Capt. Bayne
(To repeat    |---------------------------------------------------
signals)      |  Belliqueux     64      500     Capt. Brine
              |---------------------------------------------------
              |  Invincible     74      600     Capt. Saxton
------------------------------------------------------------------
Richmond      |  Barfleur       90      768     Adm. Hood
              |                                 Capt. Alex. Hood
              |---------------------------------------------------
              |  Monarch        74      600     Capt. Reynolds
              |---------------------------------------------------
              |  Centaur        74      650     Capt. Inglefield


CENTER--COMMANDER IN CHIEF, REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS GRAVES'S DIVISION

Frigates      |  Ships         Guns     Men     Commanders
              |
Salamander    |  America        64      500     Capt. Thompson
(Fireship)    |---------------------------------------------------
              |  Resolution     74      600     Capt. Manners
              |---------------------------------------------------
              |  Bedford        74      600     Capt. Thos. Graves
------------------------------------------------------------------
Nymphe        |  London         98      800     Adm. Graves
(To repeat    |                                 Capt. David Graves
signals)      |---------------------------------------------------
              |  Royal Oak      74      600     Capt. Ardesoif
------------------------------------------------------------------
Solebay       |  Montagu        74      600     Capt. Bowen
------------------------------------------------------------------
Adamant       |  Europe         64      500     Capt. Child


REAR--REAR ADMIRAL FRANCIS DRAKE'S DIVISION

Frigates      |  Ships         Guns     Men     Commanders
              |
Sybil         |  Terrible       74      600     Capt. Finch
(To repeat    |---------------------------------------------------
signals)      |  Ajax           74      550     Capt. Charrington
              |---------------------------------------------------
              |  Princessa      70      577     Adm. Drake
              |                                 Capt. Knatchbull
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fortunee      |  Alcide         74      600     Capt. Thompson
              |---------------------------------------------------
              |  Intrepid       64      500     Capt. Molloy
              |---------------------------------------------------
              |  Shrewsbury     74      600     Capt. Robinson


N. B. If the Europe cannot keep up she is to fall into the Rear and the 
Adamant to take her station in the line.

Page 165 [blank]

Page 166

The British Fleet continued its course southward without receiving any 
information from the cruisers which had been stationed off the Delaware 
River and Chesapeake Bay, and on the morning of the 5th of September, 
under a favorable north-northeast wind, it approached the capes of the 
Chesapeake. At 9.30 a. m. the frigate Solebay, scouting in advance of the 
fleet, "made the Sigl. for a Fleet in the S. W." The course of the British 
ships at this time was southwest by west, and at 10 a. m. Cape Henry bore 
west by south 6 leagues from the flagship London. A half hour later all 
the cruisers with the fleet were called in and the signal made to prepare 
for action. At 11 a. m. the signal was made for a line of battle ahead at 
2 cables' length asunder, the French Fleet being now clearly visible at 
anchor and seemingly extending across the entrance to the bay, from Cape 
Henry to the Middle Ground. Having the wind, and the westther being fair, 
the British ships maneuvered into position without difficulty and by noon 
all were getting into their stations. The log of the London at this time 
shows that Cape Henry bore west one-half south 4 or 5 leagues.

On the morning of the 5th of September the French Fleet was at anchor in 
Lynnhaven Roads awaiting tidings of the march of the allied armies under 
Washington and Rochambeau, and the return of the boats and crew sent up 
the James River. At 8 o'clock a frigate on the lookout signaled 27 sail in 
the east, steering toward Chesapeake Bay. It was evident from the number 
of sail that the fleet signaled was not that of Count de Barras, which was 
expected hourly. The Count de Grasse immediately ordered all hands to 
prepare for action; he recalled the rowboats that were out for water; and 
signaled the ships to be ready to weigh anchor. The tide by noon 
permitting the fleet to sail, cables were slipped, and the ships were 
maneuvered with such celerity that notwithstanding the absence of nearly 
90 officers and 1,800 men who had not yet returned from landing St. 
Simon's command, the fleet was under way in less than three quarters of an 
hour.


LINE OF BATTLE OF FRENCH FLEET

Lieutenant General le Compte de Grasse

AVANT-GARDE--DE BOUGAINVILLE, CHEF D'ESCADRE

Ships                Guns       Commanders

Le Pluton             74        D'Albert de Rions 
La Bourgogne          74        De Charitte 
Le Marseillais        74        De Castellane de Masjastre 
Le Diademe            74        De Monteclerc 
Le Reflechi           64        De Boades
L'Auguste             80        De Bougainville & De Castellan
Le St. Esprit         80        De Chabert
Le Caton              64        De Framond


CORPS DE BATAILLE--DE LATOUCHE-TRÉVILLE, CHEF D'ESCADRE

Ships                Guns       Commanders

Le Cesar              74        Coriolis d'Espinouse
Le Destin             74        Dumaitz de Goimpy 
La Ville de Paris     98        De Grasse,
                                De Latouche-Treville,
                                De SaintCezair
La Victoire           74        D'Albert Saint-Hyppolyte 
Le Sceptre            74        De Vaudreuil
Le Northumberland     74        De Briqueville
Le Palmier            74        D'Arros d-Argelos
Le Solitaire          64        De Cice Champion


ARRIERE-GARDE--DE MONTEIL, CHEF D'ESCADRE

Ships                Guns       Commanders

Le Citoyen            74        D'Ethy
Le Scipion            74        De Clavel
Le Magnanime          74        Le Begue
L'Hercule             74        De Turpin
Le Languedoc          80        De Monteil & Duplessis Parscau
Le Zele               74        De Gras-Preville
L'Hector              74        Renaud d'Aleins
Le Souverain          74        De Glandeves 
 

At 12.45 p. m. Admiral Graves, having observed that the French Fleet was 
getting under way, made the signal for the line ahead one cable's length 
asunder. Fifteen minutes later the signal for line ahead was hauled down 
and the signal made to form an east and west line at a cable's length. At 
this time the weather was inclined

Page 167

to be squally, and Drake's division, being out of position, was directed 
to make more sail. The fleet continued on the course west by south for 
about an hour, the distance separating it from the French Fleet decreasing 
gradually, and His Majesty's ships were now on a line nearly parallel to 
the line of approach of the French Fleet. Admiral Hood, commanding the van 
division, impatiently awaited the signal to draw near the van of the 
antagonist and open the action. In the "Sentiments upon the Truly 
Unfortunate Day" which Hood jotted down the day following the battle, he 
said that the enemy's van might have been attacked "with clear advantage, 
as they came out by no means in a regular and connected way," the French 
van being extended beyond the center and rear, and that the whole force of 
the British fleet could have been directed against it.

The log of the London at 2 p.m. says:

Found the Enemy's fleet to Consist of 24 Ships of the line and 2 frigates 
their Van bearing So. 3 Miles standing to the Eastward with their Larboard 
Tacks on board, in a line ahead.

The van of the British Fleet had now advanced as far as the shoal of the 
Middle Ground would admit, and a preparatory signal to wear was made. At 
2.11 Graves wore the fleet and brought it to, in order to let the center 
of the French line come abreast. The British ships were now on the same 
tack with the French and nearly parallel to their line, though by no means 
as far extended as was the French rear. The log of the Barfleur shows that 
at 2.15 P. M. Cape Henry was west by south 2 leagues.

Both fleets were now headed to the eastward, and as the British Ships had 
the wind they were better able to maneuver. At 2.30 the leading British 
ship, the Shrewsbury, was signaled to lead more to starboard so as to 
approach the van of the French Fleet, the signal being repeated at 3.17 p. 
m. to all of the van ships. At 3.30 the ships astern were signaled to make 
more sail, and at 3.34 the signal was again made for the ships in the van 
to keep more to starboard. This lack of contact between the two vans was 
due to the fact that at 3 p. m. the headmost vessels of the French Fleet 
were carried too

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far to windward for a well-formed line, due to the shifting of the wind 
and the movement of the current. De Grasse made the signal for them to 
bear away two points, so as to give all the vessels the advantage of 
fighting together.

At 3.46 Graves made the signal for a line ahead at 1 cable's length, at 
which time the French ships were advancing very slowly. The day was coming 
to an end and the admiral, judging this to be the moment to attack, made 
the signal for the British ships to bear down and engage their opponents. 
The signal for line ahead was hauled down at 4.11 so that it would not 
interfere with the signal to engage close, and four minutes later the van 
and center of the British Fleet commenced the action. The French van, 
commanded by the Sieur de Bougainville, replied with a very brisk fire, 
followed in succession by all of the ships of the main body. The action 
soon became general in the British Fleet as far as the Resolution, now the 
second ship from the center toward the rear, and in the French Fleet as 
far as the rear ship of the center division.

There was considerable crowding in the English van and center when they 
bore down upon the French Fleet, which made it necessary at 4.22 to signal 
for the line ahead in order to extend the van. At 4.27 the signal for the 
line ahead was hauled down and the signal made for close action, this 
signal being repeated at 5.20. Ten minutes later Hood's rear division bore 
up. At different times during the action De Grasse edged away with the 
ships of the center division, thereby increasing the distance from the 
British ships which were opposite to them. This movement left the van 
ships of the French Fleet closely engaged, and they, in turn, were 
signaled to bear away. De Grasse says of the action at the time that at 5 
p. m., due to the continued varying of the wind four points, the van of 
the French Fleet was again thrown too far to windward. Being desirous that 
the engagement become general, he again ordered his van to bear down, and 
the English van was ill treated. The French rear guard was making every 
effort to reach the rear and main body of the English Fleet, but the wind 
was against them.

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The action was not progressing satisfactorily with the British, as several 
ships were much damaged, and at 5.35 the admiral made the signal for the 
frigates Solebay and Fortunee to come within hailing distance to carry 
messages. Darkness was approaching when the frigates reported, and it 
being too late to give any additional battle orders, the Fortunee was sent 
to the van and the Solebay to the rear with instructions to the ships to 
keep in a parallel line with the French and remain well abreast of them 
during the night.

Because of fading light the action could be continued no longer, and at 
6.23 Graves made the signal for the line ahead at a cable's length and 
hauled down the signal for close action. Firing ceased on both sides at 
6.30 p. m. A half hour later Cape Henry bore northwest 3 leagues distant 
from the London. The French Fleet at this time was about 2 miles to the 
leeward of the British. The loss of men sustained by the British in this 
action was 90 killed and 246 wounded. The French reported a loss of about 
200 casualties.

At the time this sea battle was fought the long-continued practice in the 
British Navy of attacking ship with ship was strongly disfavored by some 
officers of the fleet, who held that more decisive results were to be 
obtained by concentrating on several of the enemy's ships until they were 
put out of action. Admiral Hood's caustic comments on the battle, as noted 
in his "Sentiments," indicate how keenly disappointed he was in not 
getting into action with the rear division:

When the van of the two fleets got into action, and the ships of the 
British line were hard pressed, one (the Shrewsbury) totally disabled very 
early from keeping her station by having her fore and main topsail yards 
shot away, which left her second (the Intrepid) exposed to two ships of 
superior force, * * * that the signal was not thrown out for the van ships 
to make more sail to have enabled the center to push on to the support of 
the van, instead of engaging at such an improper distance (the London 
having her main topsail to the mast the whole time she was firing with the 
signal for the line at half a cable flying), that the second ship astern 
of the London received but trifling damage, and the third astern of her 
(the London) received no damage at all, which most clearly proves how much 
too great the distance was the center division engaged.

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[image caption: London, Flagship of Graves]

Page 171

Now, had the center gone to the support of the van, and the signal for the 
line been hauled down, or the commander in chief had set the example of 
close action, even with the signal for the line flying, the van of the 
enemy must have been cut to pieces, and the rear division of the British 
fleet would have been opposed to those ships the center division fired at, 
and at the proper distance for engaging, or the Rear Admiral who commanded 
it would have a great deal to answer for. Instead of that, our center 
division did the enemy but little damage, and our rear ships being barely 
within random shot, three only fired a few shot. So soon as the signal for 
the line was hauled down at twenty five minutes after five the rear 
division bore up, about half a mile to leeward of the center division, but 
the French ships bearing up also, it did not near them.

Admiral Rodney, upon learning of the battle, wrote to the Admiralty from 
Bath on the 19th of October, expressing his opinion of the strategy and 
tactics employed by Graves. His comments on the strategy of the English 
Fleet, preceding its appearance off the Chesapeake, are based upon false 
premises and therefore are of no value. In regard to Graves's manner of 
fighting he said:

He tells me that his line did not extend so far as the enemy's rear. I 
should have been sorry if it had, and a general battle ensued; it would 
have given the advantage they could have wished, and brought their whole 
twenty four ships of the line against the English nineteen, whereas by 
watching his opportunity, if the enemy had extended their line to any 
considerable distance, by contracting his own he might have brought his 
nineteen against the enemy's fourteen or fifteen, and by a close action 
totally disabled them before they could have received succour from the 
remainder, and in all probability have gained thereby a complete victory.

When night came on Admiral Graves sent the frigates to the van and rear 
with orders to the division commanders to push for, ward the line and keep 
it extended with the enemy, his intention being to renew the engagement in 
the morning. The Fortune returned from the van bearing the information 
that the Shrewsbury, Intrepid, and Montagu were unable to keep the line, 
and that the Princessa was in momentary apprehension of the topmast going 
over the side. Admiral Drake shifted his flag from the Princessa to the 
Alcide until the Princessa could make necessary repairs. Captain Robinson 
of the Shrewsbury had lost a leg, and Captain Colpoys of the Orpheus was 
placed in command of

Page 172

the ship. The following day the Terrible and the Ajax were found to be 
leaking badly.

During the morning of the 6th Captain Everett went aboard the Barfleur 
with a message to its commander from Admiral Graves, desiring Hood's 
opinion as to whether or not the action should be renewed. Hood's answer 
was:

I dare say Mr. Graves will do what is right; I can send no opinion, but 
whenever he, Mr. Graves, wishes to see me, I will wait upon him with great 
pleasure.

A conference between the three admirals was held that after, noon aboard 
the London. Admiral Graves decided that it would be too hazardous to renew 
the action, in view of the large number of ships disabled, but he was not 
inclined to accept the suggestion made by Hood of returning to the 
Chesapeake, where the French ships left at the York and James might be 
destroyed and some measure of succor rendered Cornwallis.

On the 7th of September Captain Duncan of the Medea, while on 
reconnaissance duty of the capes of Virginia, ran into the Chesapeake and 
was able to observe that the French Fleet had left their anchors. He 
directed the Iris to cut away the buoys, after taking bearings upon them 
so that the anchors might be recovered later.

During the 7th and 8th the two fleets kept from 2 to 5 leagues apart, each 
endeavoring to take advantage of a shift in the wind to get the weather 
gage of the enemy, but neither commander being disposed to force an 
action. Meanwhile the wind, which was generally from the northeast, was 
carrying both of the fleets far to the south, they being below Albemarle 
Sound on the 9th, and the British fleet of Cape Hatteras the day 
following. In the evening of the 9th De Grasse lost sight of the English 
Fleet; and fearing lest some change of wind might enable it to get into 
Chesapeake Bay, he resolved to return there himself to continue operations 
at that point and to take aboard the part of the crew left in James River. 
On the 11th the French Fleet came to anchor inside of Cape Henry, where a 
junction was made with the squadron of De Barras, which had arrived in 
those waters the preceding day.

Page 173

A council of war was held aboard the London on the 11th to determine what 
should be done with the Terrible. She had been so seriously damaged during 
the action of the 5th that water was gaining on her pumps, and there 
seemed little probability of being able to get her to New York or to any 
other port. The council recommended that the crew be removed and the 
vessel sunk. Fire was set to her on the night of the 11th, and in a few 
hours she disappeared beneath the waves.

The movement of De Grasse in the direction of the Chesapeake had been 
observed by Hood, and on the morning of the 10th of September he sent a 
note to Admiral Graves asking if he had any knowledge as to where the 
French Fleet was. Hood said in the note that the press of sail which De 
Grasse carried the day before, and which he mug have carried during the 
preceding night to have been where he was at daylight on the 9th, seemed 
to indicate that the French Fleet was making for the Chesapeake. This 
letter occasioned another summons of Hood and Drake aboard the London, 
when much to Hood's astonishment he learned that Admiral Graves was as 
ignorant as himself as to the location of the French Fleet. No frigates 
had been given the specific duty of observing the enemy's movements. The 
last entry in the log of the London, of the French Fleet being in sight, 
was dated 7 p. m. on the 9th. The question was put to Hood as to what 
should be done. He replied that he had previously explained his views, 
adding:

If it was wished I should say more, it could only be that we should get 
into the Chesapeake to the succour of Lord Cornwallis and his brave troops 
if possible, but that I was afraid the opportunity of doing it was passed 
by, as doubtless De Grasse had most effectually barred the entrance 
against us, which was what human prudence suggested we ought to have done 
against him.

Admiral Graves realized that he had permitted the situation to get out of 
hand and now turned his ships northward, with the hope that it was not yet 
too late to gain the Chesapeake ahead of the French. The fleet made little 
headway on the 11th, but the wind shifting to the southward that day, it 
reached a point southeast of Cape Henry by noon of the 12th. On the 
following morn-

Page 174

ing the captain of the Medea signaled that the French Fleet was at anchor 
above the Horse Shoe in Chesapeake Bay. Graves transmitted this 
intelligence to Hood and again asked his opinion as to what should be done 
with the English Fleet. Hood's reply is characteristic:

Sir Samuel would be very glad to send an opinion, but he really knows not 
what to say in the truly lamentable state we have brought ourselves.

Another council of war was held on board the London on the afternoon of 
the 13th. The recommendations of the council, based upon the position of 
the French Fleet within the Chesapeake, the condition of the British 
Fleet, the season of the year so near the equinox, and the 
impracticability of giving any effectual succor to General Cornwallis, 
were as follows:

It was resolved, that the British Squadron under the command of Thomas 
Graves Esqr. Rear Admiral of the Red--Sr. Samuel Hood Bart. and Francis 
Samuel Drake Esqr. Rear Admirals of the Blue, should proceed with all 
dispatch to New York, and there use every possible means for putting the 
Squadron into the best state for service, provided that Captain Duncan who 
is gone again to reconnoitre shoud confirm his report of the position of 
the Enemy and that the Fleet should in the mean time facilitate the 
junction of the Medea.

The additional report made by Captain Duncan confirmed his previous report 
that the entire French Fleet was anchored inside Cape Henry so as to block 
the passage, whereupon Admiral Graves determined to follow the resolution 
of the council of war, that the ships be secured at New York before the 
equinox. The British Fleet sailed from the coast of Virginia on the 14th 
of September and arrived at Sandy Hook six days later.

* * * * * * *

When the English Fleet sailed from Sandy Hook on the 31st of August, 
Admiral Graves realized fully the seriousness of its mission. Nothing was 
to be feared from an encounter with the small squadron of De Barras, but 
there was much uncertainty as to the number of ships that were coming from 
the West Indies and the place where they might be encountered. On the 5th 
of September, when

Page 175

Graves saw the enemy inside the capes of Virginia, he promptly decided to 
attack and lost not a moment in forming for action. Had he attempted to 
engage the French van shortly after it passed Cape Henry, and before 
wearing his own ships, he would have become involved in a very restricted 
area without the cape, and there would have been no opportunity to adopt 
the battle tactics of ship against ship which he contemplated employing.

Having had six ships seriously damaged in the action of the 5th, it was 
impracticable for Graves to take the offensive the following or any 
succeeding day until repairs were made. As long as the wind remained in 
the northeast the best he could hope to do was to remain to the windward 
of the French Fleet, and beat them back to the Chesapeake in case the 
French showed any intention of seeking that harbor.

The French Fleet, as soon as the enemy appeared, prepared to come out and 
fight, which was the only thing for it to do in view of its mission in 
America, its superior strength, and the necessity to provide a safe entry 
into the harbor for the squadron of De Barras. After the battle, however, 
De Grasse also was disinclined to force a second engagement. As long as he 
was to the southward of the English Fleet and the wind was from the 
northeast, he could not maneuver to bring on an engagement except by first 
tacking a great distance to the southeast. The initiative would have to be 
taken by his antagonist unless the wind shifted to the southward.

On the night of the 8th, realizing that both fleets had been carried about 
60 nautical miles south of Cape Henry, De Grasse became fearful lea the 
British attempt to make the Chesapeake, and he decided it would be wiser 
for himself to attempt the move. That night he changed his course to the 
eastward, and with full sail made for Cape Henry.

Either fleet, having possession of Chesapeake Bay and holding the ships at 
anchor on a curved line from a point inside Cape Henry to the shoals at 
the southeast end of the Middle Ground, a distance of 2 nautical miles, 
could have kept the enemy ships out of the bay, irrespective of the 
relative strength of the two fleets, The

Page 176

blockading fleet could not be attacked, unless the attacker was willing to 
engage in a very hazardous movement. He would be compelled to pass inside 
Cape Henry in a line ahead, approaching from the east or southeast, in 
which formation his van ships would become engaged successively, and it 
would be tempting fate too much to expect a favorable outcome for the 
enterprise. Once inside Cape Henry the attacking fleet would have no 
opportunity to maneuver, on account of the shoals, or to withdraw from the 
action. The battle would be to a finish, with all the advantages with the 
blockading fleet.

Had the English Fleet succeeded in reaching an anchorage inside of Cape 
Henry, its position there might have resulted in saving Cornwallis's army, 
but the fleet itself would probably have been lost. No assistance of any 
moment could have been given to the British Army as long as it occupied 
Yorktown, other than to share the food of the crew with the army; but the 
fleet could have covered a crossing of the York or James River by the 
troops, thus enabling Cornwallis to lead his army to safety. The war would 
thereby have been prolonged; but with the combined squadrons of De Barras 
and De Grasse on the outside, the English Fleet in time would have been 
taken, unless the French should have found it impracticable to maintain 
their station.

If the move begun by De Grasse on the night of the 8th to recover the 
anchorage at Lynnhaven Roads had been circumvented by the English, De 
Grasse would have been compelled to remain outside the harbor and there 
continue his part of the joint operations. His return to the West Indies 
by the 15th of October would necessarily have been delayed, for he could 
not go back without the army of St. Simon now at Williamsburg, nor the 1,
890 officers and men of his crew left in the James River.