The Virginia Campaign - Parts XI-XIII



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PART XI
CORNWALLIS-LAFAYETTE

The British Army, now under Lord Cornwallis, resumed campaigning in 
Virginia the latter part of May, 1781, and began maneuvers which were 
intended to outwit the Americans under Lafayette. Troops to the number of 
7,724 effectives had been sent by Clinton into the Chesapeake, beginning 
with Leslie's detachment in October, 1780; and at the time Cornwallis 
reached Petersburg there was a corps of 5,305 men under Phillips's orders, 
according to the returns made to Clinton's headquarters. The return of 
troops who marched with Cornwallis in North Carolina on May 1 showed a 
total of 1,435 rank and file, present and fit for duty. The next return 
made by Cornwallis, for June 1, included the army brought from North 
Carolina, the army in Virginia, and several organizations that arrived 
from New York during the latter part of May. The total was 5,312 rank and 
file, present and fit for duty. Lafayette at this time had an army of 
about 3,250 men, composed of 1,200 Continentals, 2,000 militia, and 50 
dragoons.

The information contained in Clinton's letter of May 11 to Phillips, 
relative to the probable movements of the French land and sea forces, 
restrained Cornwallis from engaging in any material offensive operations 
until he received more satisfactory accounts of the two fleets. Assurances 
were given to the commanding officer at Portsmouth that care would be 
taken to reenforce him in case the French Fleet should appear in the bay, 
and the army was placed in readiness to move against Lafayette.

On the 24th of May Cornwallis reached a place on the James River opposite 
Westover and the army started crossing. The ferry

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channel at this point exceeded 2 miles in length, but with the assistance 
of a detachment of sailors the entire army and all its impedimenta made 
the crossing in less than three days. While the passage of the river was 
being made General Leslie arrived with the reenforcements from New York. 
The Forty-third Regiment was directed to remain with the army, and Leslie 
was ordered to proceed with the Seventeenth Regiment and two battalions of 
Anspach to Portsmouth and take command.

General Arnold left the army at this time to return to New York.

With the arrival of these reenforcements Cornwallis felt assured of the 
safety of Portsmouth and put the army in march toward Richmond. It was the 
purpose of the British commander to dislodge Lafayette from Richmond and 
then employ his light troops in the destruction of magazines and stores 
which had been collected for use of the American armies in the South. The 
first camp was made at Turkey Island, and the next, on the 27th of May, at 
White Oak Swamp.

Information having been obtained at this time that Lafayette had abandoned 
Richmond and crossed the Chickahominy, the Royal Army pointed its course 
toward Bottoms Bridge, crossed the Chickahominy on the 28th, and reached 
New Castle on the Pamunkey the following day. Thence the line of march 
turned sharply toward the route of the Americans, and on the 30th 
Cornwallis arrived at Hanover Court House. The main body of the British 
Army halted between the North Anna and the South Anna on June 1, while 
reconnaissance parties were sent northward to patrol for intelligence 
regarding the location of Lafayette's corps.

The role which circumstances now compelled Lafayette to play was that of a 
terrier baiting a bull, and the adventurous young soldier got many thrills 
from the game. His responsibility was heavy, for Greene had directed him 
to take command of the troops in Virginia; and it was no easy matter to 
cope successfully with a tried campaigner like Cornwallis, at the head of 
an army almost twice the strength of his own. His lucky star still 
protected him, 

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however, and the joy of command was tempered by the mature judgment of 
four years' knowledge of American troops and of the needs of the country. 
He confessed to his wife near the end of the campaign that--

it was not prudent in the general to confide to me such a command. If I 
had been unfortunate, the public would have called that partiality an 
error in his judgment.

The country around Richmond became as familiar to him as "Tappan and 
Bergen." His Continentals were--

the best troops that ever took the field. * * * They are far superior to 
any British troops.

The excellent health of Lafayette's command was largely attributable to 
the personal attention which he gave to the men. In a letter to Washington 
he said:

I have turned doctor, and regulate their diet.

The plan of campaign adopted by the marquis was to harass, threaten, 
strike, and retire. Richmond was no longer a magazine of supplies; the 
government of the State had removed to Charlottesville; and the few houses 
left standing in Richmond did not warrant exposing his army for the sake 
of their defense. He wrote to Washington on the 24th of May:

Were I to fight a battle, I should be cut to pieces, the Militia 
dispersed, and the arms lost. Were I to decline fighting, the country 
would think itself given up. I am therefore determined to skirmish, but 
not to engage too far, and particularly to take care against their immense 
and excellent body of horse, whom the Militia fear as they would so many 
wild beasts. * * * Were I anyways equal to the enemy, I should be 
extremely happy in my present command, but I am not strong enough even to 
get beaten.

The Americans carefully observed the progress of the march of the British 
Army northward to the Pamunkey, and Lafayette fell back with marches of 
equal length, always maintaining a position higher up the rivers and 
nearer to the Potomac, so that by no mischance could Cornwallis get 
between him and Philadelphia. From Richmond he moved to the forks of the 
Chickahominy, and when Cornwallis crossed the Chickahominy at Bottoms 
Bridge and

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moved to Cook's ford on the North Anna, Lafayette fell back beyond the 
North Anna in the direction of Fredericksburg.

While the main body of the Royal Army lay encamped in Hanover County, 
Cornwallis learned that General Wayne, commanding a detachment of the 
Pennsylvania line intended for Lafayette's corps, was only a few days' 
march away. The British commander, being afraid to advance farther from 
his base at Portsmouth in the direction of the American Army, decided to 
make a quick dash to the westward, attack the militia protecting the 
temporary seat of the government at Charlottesville, destroy the stores at 
Point of Fork, and then fall back to Richmond. Tarleton was dispatched 
with 180 dragoons, supported by 70 mounted infantry, to break up the 
legislature. At the same time the Queen's Rangers, augmented by the 
Seventy-first Regiment, were sent under Simcoe to harass Von Steuben. The 
main army was to follow as rapidly as possible, and rendezvous points were 
designated on which the light troops could fall back if hard pressed.

Tarleton marched with the dash that characterized all his movements and in 
24 hours covered 70 miles. Upon arriving at Charlottesville on the 4th of 
June a rush attack was made upon the seat of government and seven members 
of the assembly were captured. Tarleton left Charlottesville that 
afternoon with his prisoners and marched down the Rivanna.

Baron von Steuben, who commanded at Point of Fork and had under him a 
force composed of the new levies and some militia totaling about 500 men, 
retired with great precipitation upon the appearance of Simcoe's party on 
the 3d of June. The British were left unmolested in their destruction of a 
quantity of arms, powder, and supplies stored there. Von Steuben was 
bitterly assailed by state officials because of his failure to offer some 
resistance before abandoning his position.

Meanwhile Cornwallis was marching toward the Point of Fork and on the 7th 
encamped at the mouth of Byrd Creek, where he made a junction with 
Tarleton's and Simcoe's detachments. The army remained here until the 13th 
of June, sending frequent 

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reconnoitering parties to near-by points. When information was received 
that Lafayette had advanced to a position about midway between the British 
camp and Charlottesville, Cornwallis decided that it was time to return to 
his base on the Elizabeth River.

On the 4th of June Lafayette left his camp at Mattapony Church to march in 
a northerly direction to Ely's ford on the Rapidan, where he arrived the 
same day. This move was made in order to facilitate a union with the 
Pennsylvania troops who were approaching. On the 9th Wayne's detachment of 
600 men reached Raccoon ford, to which place Lafayette had previously 
marched, and on the following day the two corps united at a point some 
distance south of the ford. As these reenforcements, made Lafayette's 
corps strong enough to engage in more aggressive action, he put his troops 
in motion, hastened in the direction of the British Army, and reached 
Boswell's tavern on the 12th. Cornwallis at this time was lying on the 
north bank of the James, opposite Elk Island. During the night of the 12th 
of June the Americans marched by an obscure road to a position on Mechunck 
Creek where they were joined by a party of 600 mountain men under Col. 
William Campbell, of Kings Mountain fame.

The British Army, marching by way of the plantation road on the left bank 
of the James River, passed through Goochland Court House and arrived at 
Richmond about the 18th of June. A halt of several days was made at 
Richmond, Tarleton's legion being posted in the vicinity of Meadow Bridge 
and Simcoe's rangers at Westham to observe the movements of the American 
Army. Lafayette, on the 18th, was encamped about 20 miles northwest of 
Richmond, having marched from Mechunck Creek by way of the ridge road that 
lies between the South Anna and the James. The reconnaissance on which the 
legion was engaged resulted in a movement by Tarleton on the 18th against 
a corps commanded by General Muhlenberg, but Lafayette sent reenforcements 
to the threatened position and the British withdrew.

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The following day Von Steuben arrived at Lafayette's camp with his 
detachment. When the baron abandoned his post at Point of Fork he fled to 
Prince Edward Court House before halting. Orders from Lafayette to join 
the army reached him at that place. With the accession of the recruits 
brought by the baron, the American Army now comprised 2,000 regulars and 3,
200 militia.

Lord Cornwallis abandoned Richmond on the 20th of June and directed his 
course by way of Bottoms Bridge, in the direction of Williamsburg. After 
crossing Bottoms Bridge Simcoe covered the flank of the army toward the 
Chickahominy, and Tarleton performed the same service in the direction of 
the Pamunkey. On the 24th the British were at Bird's ordinary, and 
Lafayette had reached a position on the Mattapony River. The next day the 
British Army took possession of Williamsburg, with the intention of 
holding it until dispatches should be received from Clinton.

On the 26th of June Lafayette was at Rawson's ordinary. At this time 
Simcoe's corps, which had been engaged in destroying a number of boats and 
some stores on their route down the Chickahominy, reached Spencer's 
ordinary where the road forked, one branch leading to Williamsburg and the 
other to Jamestown. Lafayette now saw an opportunity to punish this corps, 
and hastened forward a detachment under Colonel Butler of the Pennsylvania 
line to engage the Queen's Rangers.

Simcoe was moving so rapidly that in order to make contact Major 
McPherson, who commanded 50 dragoons, mounted an equal number of the light 
infantry behind them and galloped in pursuit. A smart action now ensued in 
the vicinity of Spencer's ordinary; and Wayne, who was marching to the 
support of Butler, sent some light troops to relieve the situation. The 
fight continued until reenforcements for Simcoe from the main army arrived 
on the scene, when the Americans retired to Tyree's plantation. The 
casualties on each side amounted to about 30 killed and wounded.



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PART XII
CLINTON-CORNWALLIS CONTROVERSY--ACTION AT GREEN SPRING

During the spring and early summer of 1781 two major considerations 
engulfed the mind of the British commander in chief. Always there was the 
fear that a combined army of the allies would invest the posts around New 
York Harbor, while a French Fleet blocked communication with the sea. When 
later intelligence reports indicated that no such operations were 
imminent, Clinton's mind then turned to an extensive strategical movement 
into the upper Chesapeake of a part of his army, in conjunction with about 
one-half of the troops from Virginia.

As early as the 11th of May Clinton feared that the French Fleet was about 
to sail from Rhode Island, and that probably Rochambeau's army was even 
then en route to join Washington. Two regiments and two battalions of 
infantry, that had previously embarked under Leslie as a reenforcement for 
Virginia, were being held by Arbuthnot outside of Sandy Hook until he had 
additional information relative to the safety of the passage down the 
coast. Clinton was strongly inclined to recall these troops to aid in the 
defense of the posts around New York. The convoy carrying Leslie's troops 
was finally permitted to sail, however, and it was this detachment which 
was mentioned as having joined Cornwallis in the James River about the 
24th of May.

Again fear of the enemy took hold of Clinton when, early in June, he 
learned through intercepted letters that New York was threatened with a 
siege, and immediately a call was made upon Cornwallis for 2,000 troops. 
They were to be sent north at once, unless Cornwallis should be in the 
midst of preparations to engage

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in an enterprise against Baltimore or the Delaware neck, as had been 
previously suggested by Clinton. The transmission of this dispatch, which 
was dated the 8th of June, was of such great importance that it was sent 
by a runner; and Cornwallis was directed to give orders to the officer 
commanding at Portsmouth "to dispatch a runner once a week while they 
last, whether he has anything material to say or not."

General Clinton's decision to reenforce the northern army at the expense 
of the army in Virginia was based upon an overestimation of Cornwallis's 
strength, and an underestimation of Lafayette's command. He interpreted an 
intercepted dispatch written by Lafayette as signifying that his command 
consisted only of the light infantry brought down from the north, and a 
mob of ineffective, unarmed militia. Furthermore, intelligence had reached 
Clinton that the Pennsylvania troops had revolted a second time; and that 
Wayne's men, who were being prepared at York Town, Pa., were involved in 
the mutiny. Cornwallis bitterly resented the implication in Clinton's 
dispatch that the militia were worthless by replying with pungent sarcasm:

I will not say much in praise of the militia of the southern colonies; but 
the list of British officers and soldiers killed and wounded by them since 
last June, proves but too fatally that they are not wholly contemptible.

Changes in plans now occurred with increasing rapidity--much faster than 
it was possible to transmit dispatches from New York to Virginia and 
receive replies; and the confusion which resulted was one of the several 
causes that eventually brought about the surrender of the British Army in 
Virginia. Upon the receipt of a letter from Cornwallis dated the 26th of 
May, Clinton learned that his project for operating in the upper 
Chesapeake was strongly opposed by Cornwallis. On the 11th of June he 
prepared a reply to this communication, in which was repeated his fear 
that New York was threatened with a siege; and he stated that there was a 
force of somewhat less than 11,000 effectives under his command to oppose 
the combined army of more than 20,000 men, which he

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estimated would take part in the investment. He directed Cornwallis, as 
soon as the active operations which might be engaging his attention were 
completed, to take a defensive station at Williamsburg or Yorktown, 
reserving such troops as he might judge necessary for its protection and 
to make desultory movements by water, and to send the remainder of his 
command to New York. A list of the troops desired by Clinton was inclosed 
with the dispatch, the total of which was somewhat less than 3,000 men.

Clinton set forth in this letter his belief that friends could be found in 
Philadelphia who would render invaluable service in operations against 
that city, in which "are collected their principal depots of stores for 
the campaign, an immense quantity of European and West India commodities, 
and no inconsiderable supply of money." He announced his determination to 
give this project a fair trial "whenever it can be done with propriety."

Four days elapsed after the dispatch of the 11th was written, during which 
period a convoy loaded with stores for Virginia was held in the harbor, 
and the dispatch suffered a like delay. Clinton became impatient of this 
delay and on the 15th of June sent a duplicate of the letter by a runner. 
He ordered Cornwallis to embark immediately a part of the troops 
enumerated "and send them to me with all possible dispatch." The remainder 
of the organizations mentioned in the list was to be embarked as soon as 
Admiral Arbuthnot should send more transports into the Chesapeake. Clinton 
reiterated his purpose of not leaving "more troops in that unhealthy 
climate at this season of the year than what are absolutely wanted for a 
defensive, and desultory water excursions."

The runner reached Williamsburg on the 26th of June, the day after 
Cornwallis had established himself there, upon the termination of his 
offensive operations throughout the province. Many of the things written 
by Clinton hurt, and their sting was not mitigated because of the 
misapprehension of conditions in Virginia under which the commander in 
chief labored when he wrote. Cornwallis prepared his reply on the 30th of 
June and in it narrated, without egoism, what his army had accomplished in 
upper 

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Virginia and declared "that until Virginia was to a degree subjected, we 
could not reduce North Carolina, or have any certain hold of the back 
country of South Carolina." The lack of water communication rendered it 
impossible to maintain a sufficient army in either of those provinces at a 
considerable distance from the coast. Commenting on Clinton's proposed 
project of operations against Philadelphia, Cornwallis remarked:

We could not hope to arrive without their having had sufficient warning of 
our approach to enable them to secure specie, and the greatest part of 
their valuable public stores, by means of their boats and shipping, which 
give them certain possession of the river from Mud Island upwards.

Notwithstanding the injustice of Clinton's comments and the fallacy of his 
proposed operations, Cornwallis did not forget that he was only second in 
command, and loyally subordinated his will to that of the commander in 
chief.

Your Excellency being charged with the weight of the whole American war, 
your opinions of course are less partial, and are directed to all parts; 
to those opinions it is my duty implicitly to submit.

Cornwallis lost no time in taking measures to comply with Clinton's 
requisition for troops and ordered the few transports at Portsmouth to be 
made ready. He informed Clinton that as soon as he could pass the James 
and get the convoy prepared, he would embark all the troops the vessels 
would hold and send the others as fast as transports were received. "When 
I see Portsmouth," he wrote in this letter of June 30th, "I shall give my 
opinion of the number of men necessary for its defence, or of any other 
post that may be thought more proper." As Cornwallis did not think it 
possible to render any service in a defensive situation in Virginia, he 
expressed a willingness to repair to Charleston should Clinton give 
permission for the change.

During the several days that elapsed following the dispatching of the June 
15th letter, intelligence reports at the headquarters of the British Army 
in New York were confined to rumors and conjectures as to what the enemy 
contemplated doing. "The

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French Admiral meant to escape with his fleet to Boston," Clinton wrote on 
the 19th of June. It appeared certain that the combined French and 
American armies would attempt the investment of New York. It seemed highly 
probable that De Grasse would appear along the coast during the hurricane 
season in the West Indies. This possibility caused Clinton no great 
apprehension, "as Sir George Rodney seems to have the same suspicions of 
De Grasse's intention that we have, and will of course follow him hither." 
In view of all these conjectures Clinton informed Cornwallis that should 
he have--

any solid operation in the Chesapeake to propose, or have approved of the 
one I mentioned in my former letters [in the region of the upper 
Chesapeake], I shall not, as I have already told you, press you for the 
corps I wished to have sent me, at least for the present.

During the next nine days, however, and before additional intelligence as 
to the situation in Virginia had been received at British headquarters, 
Clinton departed from his usual vacillating policy and came to a definite 
decision that called for immediate action.

Having for very essential reasons come to a resolution of endeavouring by 
a rapid move to seize the stores, etc. collected at Philadelphia, and 
afterwards to bring the troops employed on that service to reinforce this 
post--

Clinton wrote on the 28th of June--

I am to request, that if your Lordship has not already embarked the 
reinforcement I called for in my letters of the 8th, 11th, 15th, and 19th 
instant, and should not be engaged in some very important move, * * * you 
will be pleased, as soon as possible, to order an embarkation of the 
troops specified below.

Then followed a list of the organizations desired by Clinton, which was 
almost the same as the one contained in his previous dispatches.

* * * * * * *

Meanwhile Cornwallis was actively engaged in preparing for the embarkation 
of the troops that had been ordered north in previous dispatches. The 
boats and other naval assistance under Captain Aplin having arrived in the 
river, the Royal Army marched from

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Williamsburg on the 4th of July to a camp which protected the passage to 
James Island. A narrow inlet of water not more than 2 feet deep at ebb 
tide separated the island from the mainland. That evening the Queen's 
Rangers passed to the south bank of the James for the purpose of covering 
the crossing of the army. The legion cavalry and two companies of mounted 
infantry had been directed to protect the rear of the British column 
during its march to the James. With this in view, Tarleton proceeded to 
the vicinity of Lafayette's camp at Tyree's plantation and attacked the 
line of pickets. In the late afternoon he retired with his corps to where 
the British Army was encamped on the left bank of the river opposite James 
Island.

The following day the wheel carriages were sent across to Cobham, and on 
the 6th the bat horses and all the baggage followed. A well-selected 
position to cover the crossing had been chosen for the army. The right of 
the camp was protected by ponds and the center and left by morasses, over 
which passed a few narrow cause, ways. Should Lafayette attempt to contest 
the crossing, his troops would encounter difficulty in effecting a 
deployment of sufficient front to get into action. In truth Cornwallis 
hoped the marquis would venture upon some such enterprise, and that it 
would be possible to entrap at least part of his corps. Tarleton sent 
emissaries in the near locality to disseminate the news that the main body 
of the army had crossed the river, and that the detachment still on the 
north bank was merely a rear guard.

Lafayette lost no time in reestablishing the close contact with the 
British Army which had been temporarily interrupted upon the evacuation of 
Williamsburg, and on the morning of the 5th the Americans left their camp 
below New Kent Court House and advanced to Bird's Tavern. The next day 
Lafayette detached an advanced corps under Wayne with a view to 
reconnoiter the enemy's situation in the vicinity of Green Spring farm. 
That afternoon Wayne's covering party beat back a British patrol over one 
of the causeways on the left, and a body of Continentals and riflemen 
advanced toward the morass. The stubbornness with

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which the British outposts held their ground, tended to verify the 
correctness of the rumors which had come to Lafayette, that the main body 
of the British Army was still north of the river. While Wayne's corps was 
engaged in slowly pushing back the hostile covering forces, Lafayette 
hastened to a tongue of land on the flank from which he could better 
observe conditions. From this vantage point he discovered that the greater 
part of the British Army was in front of him, prepared to offer battle.

Cornwallis held his battalions and regiments quiet in camp, where they 
were concealed from observation while the Americans were engaged in 
driving in the British outposts. The legion cavalry was in close support 
of the line of pickets on the left in order to contain the Americans 
within the woods and prevent their viewing the main body of the army. 
Before sunset Wayne's entire corps of 800 men, composed of Pennsylvanians 
and light infantry, together with three cannon, had effected a crossing of 
the morass and now engaged the line of pickets, in close proximity to the 
camp, as yet unseen by the Americans. The vanguard under Major Galvan made 
a dash to take a cannon in the enemy lines, and at that instant the enemy 
fired a signal gun.

The moment of surprise for which Cornwallis had carefully planned was now 
at hand. Immediately the British troops formed under arms in the position 
assigned to them and advanced to the attack. Tarleton's dragoons fell back 
through the intervals made for them by the infantry. The right wing of the 
army, commanded by General O'Hara, consisted of two battalions of light 
infantry, Colonel York's brigade, and the Hessians. Colonel Dundas's 
brigade, composed of the Forty-third, Seventy-sixth, and Eightieth 
Regiments, with two six-pounders under Captain Fage, constituted the left 
wing. The legion cavalry formed a second line behind the Eightieth, and 
Tarleton's light companies dismounted to reenforce the Seventy-sixth 
Regiment.

The appearance of such a large force on Wayne's front was a complete 
surprise to him. The long line that had risen out of the

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ground with such amazing suddenness was now bearing down upon his corps, 
its flanks far outreaching his own. Quick thinking was necessary, and 
Wayne made the only decision that a daring leader, finding himself about 
to be entrapped, could make--not to retreat and thereby demoralize his own 
corps and endanger the remainder of the army, but to attack fiercely and 
hope that by rash bravery some means would be found to extricate his 
troops. He gave a sharp order to advance, and the response of his troops 
was instantaneous.

At sight of the British the troops ran to the rencontre.

Tarleton says that--

The conflict in this quarter was severe and well contested. The artillery 
and infantry of each army, in presence of their respective generals, were 
for some minutes warmly engaged not fifty yards asunder.

Lafayette hastily returned from his reconnaissance and reached the scene 
of conflict about 15 minutes after the action started. He at once sent 
Wayne orders to withdraw his corps half a mile and form in rear of two 
battalions of light infantry, which by a rapid move had come forward to a 
position on solid ground back of the morasses. Wayne withdrew his corps 
through the woods and across the causeways without undue confusion, but 
two of the guns had to be abandoned, as all the horses were either killed 
or disabled. Darkness was setting in, and the obscurity of the night 
prevented pursuit by the legion cavalry. Cornwallis collected his troops 
and returned to his encampment for the night. The following day he 
completed the crossing of the James and lay with his army at Cobham, there 
to await the arrival of transports on which to embark the troops intended 
for the north.

The right wing of the British Army encountered but little resistance in 
the action at Green Spring. The brunt of the contest fell upon the Seventy-
sixth and Eightieth Regiments in the left wing. In reporting on the 
action, Cornwallis said that "Lieutenant Colonel Dundas' conduct and 
gallantry deserve the highest praise." The King's troops had 5 officers 
wounded and about 70 men killed and wounded.

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The American loss was 28 killed, a few more than a hundred wounded, and 9 
missing. In a congratulatory order published on the 8th of July at 
Ambler's plantation, Lafayette said:

The General is happy in acknowledging the spirit of the detachment 
commanded by General Wayne in their engagement with the total of the 
British army, of which he happened to be an eye witness. He requests 
General Wayne, the officers and men under his command, to receive his best 
thanks.

The action at Green Spring was one of brilliant daring on the part of 
Wayne. An almost instantaneous decision to attack an enemy battle line of 
four times one's own strength could be made only by a bold, adventurous 
leader like Daniel Morgan or Anthony Wayne. The Pennsylvanians and light 
infantry valiantly demonstrated their confidence in their leader, both in 
the attack and in the retreat. Had they failed in the attack or become 
stampeded in the retreat, Lafayette's army might have lost one-half of 
Wayne's command. It is desirable that in every war there be a commander 
like Anthony Wayne, successful because of the apparent reckless 
impetuosity of his leadership, as such gallant conduct is an inspiration 
to the Army and to the Nation.

* * * * * * *

It is not known what had occurred that caused Clinton to write the 
peremptory order of June 28; but whatever it was, the situation, in his 
opinion, immediately became more urgent, for on the 19t of July he sent a 
second mandatory dispatch by a runner, this time placing a tentative time 
limit on the embarkation:

For reasons which I think it unnecessary to mention to you by this 
opportunity, I request, that whatever troops, etc. your Lordship may have 
embarked for this place, may sail forty-eight hours after the departure 
from the Chesapeak of the frigate which carries this letter, and which has 
orders to return whenever your Lordship signifies to the Captain of her, 
that the troops, etc. are all on board, and ready to proceed on the 
intended service.

Cornwallis received this letter without undue delay, and on the 12th of 
July wrote to Clinton that he was making every exertion to get the 
expedition ready without loss of time. On the 17th of the month he was 
able to write from Suffolk, to which place he had

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moved, that the expedition was almost ready to sail from Ports, mouth. The 
halting of the army at Suffolk was caused by Cornwallis having sent a 
strong detachment under Tarleton on the 9th to Prince Edward Court House 
and Bedford Court House, to destroy magazines between the James and Dan 
Rivers that were destined for use by Greene's army in the Carolinas. He 
desired to hold the army at Suffolk as a point of rendezvous for 
Tarleton's detachment.

Three days after Cornwallis had written the letter of the 17th of July a 
bombshell was dropped into his camp. A runner arrived at 1 o'clock in the 
morning of the 20th, eight days by boat from New York, with a dispatch 
that entirely reversed all of Clinton's previous demands for troops. The 
letter was dated the 11th of July and was written in great haste and with 
unusual brevity:

I cannot be more explicit by this opportunity than to desire, that if you 
have not already passed the James river, you will continue on the 
Williamsburg Neck, until she [the dispatch frigate] arrives with my 
dispatches by Captain Stapleton. If you have passed, and find it expedient 
to recover that station, you will please to do it, and keep possession 
until you hear further from me. Whatever troops may have been embarked by 
you for this place, are likewise to remain until further orders; and if 
they should have been sailed, and within your call, you will be pleased to 
stop them. It is the Admiral's and my wish, at all events to hold Old 
Point Comfort, which secures Hampton road.

Lord Cornwallis could not account for the startling requirements of this 
communication. The following day (July 21), however, a delayed dispatch 
from Clinton dated the 8th of July came to hand, which threw some fight on 
the matter. Clinton expressed dumfounded surprise that his lordship should 
so suddenly lose sight of the necessity to hold some position on the 
Peninsula, as to pass the James "and retire with your army to the sickly 
post of Portsmouth." There was then interjected into the correspondence 
for the first time a strategical requirement of great importance, which 
was treated by Clinton as though it had always been a part of the problem. 
Clinton was strongly impressed with the necessity of holding "a naval 
station for large ships as well as small," and was of the opinion that 
Yorktown was of prime importance for securing such a station.

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The crux of the bitter controversy between Clinton and Cornwallis, which 
did not die with them, is found in this letter written by Clinton on the 
8th of July. The British commander in chief had directed the attention of 
every general sent into Virginia to Elizabeth River as a suitable harbor 
for British ships. It had long since been learned, however, that no 
protection for a line-of-battle ship could be found in the Elizabeth 
River, and that even frigates were frequently exposed to danger owing to 
shallow water and the restricted area of the harbor. Now Cornwallis is 
told that a naval station for large ships is required, and the information 
is conveyed to him in a manner reflecting upon his common sense in not 
having anticipated this necessity. The unadmitted and startling about-face 
on the part of Clinton was occasioned by a change in naval policy. On the 
4th of July Vice Admiral Arbuthnot resigned command of the squadron of His 
Majesty's ships in North America, and Rear Admiral Thomas Graves assumed 
direction of naval matters along the Atlantic coast.

The more aggressive Graves had very positive ideas regarding the wintering 
of his ships, a matter of serious consequence to the fleet to which 
Admiral Arbuthnot had not given sufficient consideration.

I need only to say to your Lordship--

Graves wrote to Cornwallis on the 12th of July--

that there is no place for the great ships during the freezing months on 
this side the Chesapeak, where the great ships will be in security, and at 
the same time capable of acting--and in my opinion they had better go to 
the West Indies than be laid up in Halifax during the winter. If the 
squadron is necessary to the operations of the army--Hampton road appears 
to be the place where they can be anchored with the greatest security, and 
at the same time be capable of acting with the most effect against any 
attempts of the enemy. To this end, Old Point Comfort seems necessary to 
be occupied by us, as commanding the entrance to the road.

The wisdom of this decision is readily appreciated if the great freeze 
which occurred during the months of January and February of 1780 is 
recalled. Much fairer treatment would have been

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accorded Cornwallis, however, had Clinton presented the requirement of a 
harbor for big ships as something new, instead of making a quasi-pretense 
of its being a matter that had been discussed for more than six months 
with the several British commanders in Virginia. The previous urgent 
desire to march against Philadelphia was now casually brushed aside by 
Clinton with the declaration that he would probably send to the Chesapeake 
all the troops that could be spared from the different posts under his 
command, "as soon as the season returns for acting in that climate."

Supplemental instructions were dispatched to Cornwallis on the 11th of 
July as a result of a conference aboard the flagship between the general 
and the admiral. After the conference Clinton wrote:

I beg leave to request that you will without loss of time examine Old 
Point Comfort, and fortify it; detaining such troops as you may think 
necessary for that purpose, and garrisoning it afterwards. But it if 
should be your Lordship's opinion that Old Point Comfort cannot be held 
without having possession of York, for in this case Gloucester may perhaps 
be not so material, and that the whole cannot be done with less than seven 
thousand men, you are at full liberty to detain all the troops now in the 
Chesapeak, which I believe amount to somewhat more than that number.

The dispatch concluded with an injunction that as soon as Cornwallis 
finally determined upon the force which would be sufficient for the works 
to be erected at Old Point Comfort, and the number which he might judge 
requisite to cover them at Yorktown, he was to send the remainder to New 
York. Clinton said that he saw no great necessity for holding Portsmouth 
while the British occupied Old Point Comfort, for if a station on 
Elizabeth River were judged necessary for the purpose of covering 
frigates, a post at Mill Point would answer the purpose.

Attention has been brought to the many conflicting orders which were 
largely responsible for the controversy that started immediately after the 
British Army surrendered at Yorktown. The point of greatest contention 
made by Clinton was that Cornwallis did not obey his order to take post at 
Old Point Comfort, but went to Yorktown instead and there permitted 
himself to be bottled up by the French Fleet and the allied armies.

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It would seem that at this critical time the British commander in chief 
might have permitted his orders to stand for at least a few days, but such 
was not his temperament. On the 15th of July Clinton wrote that he thought 
Cornwallis would at least have waited for a line from him in answer to the 
letter written on the 30th of June before finally determining upon "so 
serious and mortifying a move as the repassing James river," and retiring 
with his army to Portsmouth. Clinton concluded this dispatch with further 
modifications of the instructions contained in his letter of July 11, both 
as to the occupation of Old Point Comfort and in regard to sending to New 
York all the troops not needed in Virginia.

You are at full liberty to employ all the troops under your immediate 
command in the Chesapeak, if you are of opinion they may be wanted for the 
defence of the stations you shall think proper to occupy, securing to us 
at least a healthy one, from whence we may start at the proper time for 
beginning operation, and for the carrying on in the interim such desultory 
water expeditions as you may think of any utility.

Cornwallis did not hesitate to inform the commander in chief of the hurt 
which the severe censure of his conduct caused. He wrote on the 26th of 
July that the contents of Clinton's letters "were to me as unexpected as, 
I trust, they are undeserved." As a subordinate officer he said it was his 
duty to obey orders, or in exercising discretionary powers to act in 
conformity with the apparent wishes of his superior officer, combined with 
the evident good of the service, and he declared that in his late conduct 
he had not deviated from those principles. He added further that he 
discovered nowhere in his own correspondence with the commander in chief--

any trace of the extreme earnestness, that now appears, to secure a 
harbour for ships of the line, and your assent to my engaging in 
operations in the Upper Chesapeak, if I could have brought myself to think 
them expedient, would, if I had doubted before, have convinced me that 
securing a harbour for line of battle ships was not with you a primary and 
immediate object.

A careful survey of Old Point Comfort and Hampton Roads was made by 
Lieutenants Sutherland and Stratton of the Royal Engineers, and the 
impracticability of using this post and roadstead for

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the purposes intended by Clinton and Graves was easily demonstrated. The 
great width and depth of the channel gave ships the opportunity of 
passing, with very little risk, any work that might be erected on the 
ruins of Fort George, which offered the best site for mounting guns. The 
report says:

I apprehend fifteen hundred yards is too great a distance for batteries to 
stop ships, which is the distance here. Ships that wish to pass the fire 
of the fort have no occasion to approach nearer.

The opinions of the commanders of His Majesty's ships in the Chesapeake, 
as to the propriety of defending Old Point Comfort, are expressed in the 
following report dated the 26th of July:

In consequence of a requisition that your Lordship received from the 
commanders in chief of his Majesty's troops and ships, relative to a post 
being established at Old Point Comfort, for the protection and security of 
the King's ships that may occasionally be sent to the Chesapeak: We, whose 
names are hereunto subscribed, have taken as accurate a survey of that 
place as possible, and are unanimously of opinion, from the width of the 
channel and depth of water close to it, that any superior enemy's force 
coming in, may pass any work that can be established there, with little 
damage, or destroy it with the ships that may be there, under its 
protection.

This communication was signed by Captain Charles Hudson, the senior naval 
commander in the Chesapeake, and three other captains of battle ships.

Captain Hudson sent, at the same time, a separate report to Admiral Graves 
confirming the joint report, with the additional statement that as the 
occupation of Old Point Comfort would not give protection to the ships, 
Lord Cornwallis and himself had resolved to remove the troops that were 
then in Portsmouth and its vicinity to "York and Gloucester river, where 
we apprehend a better Port can be established for the protection of the 
King's troops."

In transmitting to Clinton the reports of the engineer officers and the 
captains of the navy, Cornwallis said:

Your Excellency will see, that a work on Point Comfort, would neither 
command the entrance, nor secure his Majesty's ships at anchor in Hampton 
road.

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This being the case, I shall in obedience to the spirit of your 
Excellency's orders, take measures with as much dispatch as possible, to 
seize and fortify York and Gloucester, being the only harbour in which we 
can hope to be able to give effectual protection to line of battle ships. 
I shall, likewise, use all the expedition in my power to evacuate 
Portsmouth and the posts belonging to it, but until that is accomplished, 
it will be impossible for me to spare troops.

All the transports were loaded and on the 30th of July set sail from 
Portsmouth with 4,500 men aboard. The passage was considerably protracted 
by unfavorable winds, and it was not until the night of the 1st of August 
and on the following day that the troops were landed at Gloucester and 
Yorktown. Two frigates remained at Portsmouth for the protection of the 
troops who were left there to demolish the works. The Eightieth Regiment 
and the regiment Du Prince Hereditaire were landed at Gloucester and the 
other troops at Yorktown. Tarleton crossed from Sewall Point to Hampton 
Roads by small vessels on the 6th of August and joined Cornwallis at 
Yorktown the following morning. By the 22d of the month the detachment 
left at Portsmouth had completed its work of destruction and effected a 
junction with the main army.

Work on the defenses on the left bank of the York River was begun as soon 
as the troops were established there. By the middle of August considerable 
progress had been made, and Cornwallis was able to advise the commander in 
chief that Gloucester would require a garrison of 1,000 men to make it 
safe against a coup de main. The works required to make the post at 
Yorktown defensible were much more extensive, and their construction was 
begun as soon as the engineer officer had the plans ready.

Cornwallis estimated that it would require a period of at least six weeks, 
counting from August 22, to put both Gloucester and Yorktown in a fair 
state of defense, due to the difficulty of constructing works in the warm 
season. As Clinton had communicated his intention of recommencing 
operations in the Chesapeake early in October, Cornwallis felt it was 
essential that nothing be done which would tend to retard the 
establishment of these posts, so necessary for the protection of the 
fleet. He asked Clinton to

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decide whether it was more important that a detachment of 1,000 or 1,200 
men, which he thought could be spared "from every other purpose but that 
of labour," should be sent to New York, or that all the troops be retained 
in Virginia and employed in expediting the works.

There was never any need for Clinton to reply to Cornwallis's question 
regarding the disposition of his command. On the 31st of August the French 
Fleet under De Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake. Two days later definite 
information was received at Clinton's headquarters in New York that 
Washington and Rochambeau were moving, "with an appearance of haste," to 
the southward. Clinton communicated this intelligence to Cornwallis in a 
letter dated the 2d of September, in which he said:

I shall either endeavour to reinforce the army under your command by all 
the means within the compass of my power, or make every possible diversion 
in your favour.



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PART XIII
LOUIS XVI--VERGENNES--FRANKLIN

The victories won during the year 1781 by the French Fleet in September 
and by the allied armies in October brought about the termination of the 
War for Independence. These successes were made possible by the liberality 
of Louis XVI and the French Government in providing, during that year, 
more money, ships, and men. America had no more sympathetic and powerful 
friends at the Court of Versailles than were the King and the Count de 
Vergennes, whose sincere interest in the affairs of the United States 
never wavered. Among the Americans who had official dealings with the 
French court, none was held in such high esteem by the ministry as were 
Washington and Franklin. Indeed, it would be permissible to include 
Lafayette within the same category, rather than to name him with the 
French, for his every thought and purpose were those of a citizen of the 
United States.

Upon Lafayette's return to the United States in April, 1780, he had opened 
correspondence with friends at home, in which he presented the interests 
of America in as favorable a light as possible, and solicited aid of such 
magnitude as might insure final success in the war. Even during his 
activities in Virginia there was scarcely any diminution in the number of 
letters which he had found time to send to his friends, the Count de 
Maurepas, the Marquis de Castries, and the Count de Vergennes.

The burden of the negotiations with the Court of Versailles, however, 
rested upon Benjamin Franklin, particularly during the years 1780-81, and 
most devotedly did he serve his country. Congress was fortunate in the 
selection of Franklin as the head of the American mission in France, and 
later in his appointment as minister plenipotentiary to the French court. 
His gentle, lovable spirit

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made friends for the United States and himself in all spheres of political 
and social fife. His age, dignity of character, and innate honesty 
engendered an affection for him on the part of the French people, and a 
confidence in his every word and act on the part of the ministry, far 
greater than that enjoyed by any other American in Europe.

Benjamin Franklin had "engaged in public affairs, and enjoyed public 
confidence, in some shape or other, during the long term of fifty years." 
He had now passed his seventy-fifth year, and due to the infirmities of 
age his health was much impaired. There was nothing wrong with his mental 
faculties, but he was sensible of a great decrease in physical activity 
and was fearful lest matters of state suffer on account of this 
deficiency. His task was made more difficult by the unsympathetic manner 
in which some of his coworkers conducted diplomatic affairs. Of this 
number was John Adams, who complained that America had been too free in 
expressing its gratitude to France, and that if more spirit were shown in 
the applications made to the government greater succor would be obtained. 
Franklin viewed this attitude as ungracious and in a letter to the 
President of Congress said:

I apprehend that he mistakes his ground, and that this Court is to be 
treated with decency and delicacy.

Adams did not change his mental reactions, however, and a time came when 
Vergennes refused to enter into further discussions with him or to answer 
any more of his letters.

The foreign minister took great pleasure, however, in expressing to 
Luzerne his high regard for Franklin, knowing that his views would be 
conveyed to the Delegates in Congress. He wrote that Franklin's conduct 
was as zealous and patriotic as it was wise and circumspect--

and you may affirm with assurance, on all occasions where you think 
proper, that the method he pursues is much more efficacious than it would 
be, if he were to assume a tone of importunity in multiplying his demands, 
and above all in sup, porting them by menaces, to which we should neither 
give credence nor value, and would only tend to render him personally 
disagreeable.

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Louis XVI, then a young man in his twenty-seventh year, was sincerely 
interested in the American States, and desired to see success attend their 
efforts in acquiring independence. In a letter to the President of 
Congress, Franklin said:

The King, a young and virtuous Prince, has, I am persuaded, a pleasure in 
reflecting on the generous benevolence of the action in assisting an 
oppressed people, and proposes it as a part of the glory of his reign.

Franklin felt that it would be only fair to his Government, in view of his 
physical infirmities, to give Congress the opportunity to replace him by a 
younger man, but in response to this suggestion Congress replied that his 
services were too valuable to be dispensed with. Arrangements were made, 
however, to relieve him of some of his duties and at the same time to send 
an emissary, fresh from the fields of conflict, to aid in presenting the 
needs of the United States to the Court at Versailles. On the 9th of 
December, 1780, Alexander Hamilton, John Laurens, Alexander McDougal, and 
Jonathan Trumbull, jr., were nominated in Congress for the office of 
minister to the Court of Versailles. Two days later Lieut. Col. John 
Laurens was unanimously elected to fill the position. The mission on which 
Laurens was about to engage was to proceed to France and represent to

his Most Christian Majesty the present state of our publick affairs, with 
the necessity and mutual advantage of his maintaining a naval superiority 
in the American seas; and also of soliciting from him, and forwarding to 
the United States, certain aids in money and stores according to an 
estimate herewith delivered to you, the better to enable us to prosecute 
the war with vigour, and cooperate with the arms of our ally with effect.

Previous to his departure from the United States, Laurens was directed to 
confer with the Commander in Chief of the American Army, the minister 
plenipotentiary of France, the commanders in chief of the King's Fleet and 
Army at Rhode Island, and the Marquis de Lafayette if he could be reached, 
upon the subject of his commission, and to avail himself of every bit of 
information which it might be possible to obtain from them.

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The substance of the conversations which Washington had with Laurens was 
embodied in a letter prepared at New Windsor on the 15th of January, 1781, 
wherein the Commander in Chief expressed his views--

with that freedom and explicitness, which the objects of your commission, 
my entire confidence in you, and the exigency demand.

The analysis of affairs as set forth in this important paper is a keen, 
incisive presentation of conditions in the United States that adds 
immeasurably to Washington's reputation as a statesman. The paper was 
meant for the eyes of diplomats, adept in searching out hidden meanings. 
It was written with the assertive definiteness and honesty of statement 
that was so typical of Washington. It would impress the French Government 
in the same favorable Manner as did all the statements made by Franklin.

Washington referred to the impeding of commercial development in the 
United States and the inability of a nation, while occupied with war and 
facing a financial crisis, to produce its latent wealth. He represented 
that the method of supplying the army, an evil but necessary substitute 
due to want of money, was "by assessing a proportion of the productions of 
the earth." This had been found ineffectual, and the army was frequently 
exposed to the most calamitous distress. The patience of the troops, as 
the result of an almost uninterrupted series of hardships, was now nearly 
exhausted, and the extreme discontent of some of the organizations had 
only recently resulted in the mutiny of the Pennsylvania line.

There was danger that the people would become dissatisfied with the mode 
of supporting the war, and Washington apprehended that evils actually felt 
in the prosecution of hostilities might weaken those sentiments which 
began it. There was danger that a free and commercial people, "pressed by 
impositions of a new and odious kind," might "imagine they have only 
exchanged one tyranny for another."

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From all these considerations Washington believed that there existed an--

absolute necessity of an immediate, ample, and efficacious succor in 
money, large enough to be a foundation for substantial arrangements of 
finance, to revive public credit, and give vigor to future operations.

It was vastly important that a decided effort be made by the allied armies 
in the ensuing campaign--

to effectuate once for all the great objects of the alliance, the liberty 
and independence of these States.

Next to a loan of money, "a constant naval superiority on these coasts is 
the object most interesting." England would be reduced to a difficult 
defensive, and by removing all prospects of extending her acquisitions she 
would lose all motives for further prosecution of the war. Furthermore, 
her army could not be maintained in the United States "if we had the 
command of the seas, to interrupt the regular transmission of supplies 
from Europe." Washington considered that the allies of the United States, 
France and Spain, could well afford "'to transfer the naval war to 
America." At the Hartford conference in 1780 the first principle upon 
which the conversations had been based was that "a constant naval 
superiority is essential in order to proceed in America in a decisive 
manner."

Supplementing money and ships, "an additional succor in troops would be 
extremely desirable," and Washington inclosed minutes of a conference 
between Count de Rochambeau, the Chevalier de Ternay, and himself, wherein 
was stated the desirability of an augmentation to 15,000 men for the 1781 
campaign.

If the sending so large a succor in troops should necessarily diminish the 
pecuniary aid, which our allies may be disposed to grant--

Washington stated in his instructions to Laurens--

it were preferable to diminish the aid in men; for the same sum of money, 
which would transport from France and maintain here a body of troops with 
all the necessary apparatus, being put into our hands to be employed by 
us, would serve to give activity to a larger force within ourselves.

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Notwithstanding the difficulties under which the country labored, and the 
unrest prevailing among the people, there was "still a fund of inclination 
and resource in the country, equal to great and continued exertions," 
provided the country had it in its power "to stop the progress of disgust" 
which many felt for existing conditions. Washington declared that a large 
majority was "firmly attached to the independence of these States, abhor a 
reunion with Great Britain, and are affectionate to the alliance with 
France," but that this disposition could not supply the place of the 
succor customary and essential in war.

As a climax to the picturization of conditions, Washington asserted that 
no nation was more able to repay what it borrowed than was the United 
States.

The vast and valuable tract of unlocated lands, the variety and fertility 
of climates and soils, the advantages of every kind which we possess for 
commerce, insure to this country a rapid advancement in population and 
prosperity, and a certainty, its independence being established, of 
redeeming in a short term of years the comparatively inconsiderable debts 
it may have occasion to contrast.

On the 13th of February, 1781, Franklin received a packet of dispatches 
from the United States which included a letter to the King and a copy of 
the instructions given to Laurens, who had not yet arrived in Paris. 
Franklin immediately prepared a memorial, enforcing as strongly as he 
could the requests contained in the instructions to Laurens and himself, 
and delivered it to the minister of state. In concluding his letter to 
Vergennes he said:

I am grown old. I feel myself much enfeebled by my late long illness, and 
it is probable I shall not long have any more concern in these affairs. I 
therefore take this occasion to express my opinion to your Excellency, 
that the present conjuncture is critical, that there is some danger lest 
the Congress should lose its influence over the people, if it is found 
unable to procure the aids that are wanted; and that the whole system of 
the new government in America may thereby be shaken.

No answer being given by the ministry to the memorial within the next 
week, Franklin wrote again and pressed for a decision on the subject, and 
on the 10th of March the foreign minister made

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an appointment for a meeting. Vergennes assured Franklin of the King's 
good will toward the United States, but at the same time asked him to 
consider the great expense under which France labored in the conduct of 
the war, and expressed the hope that he would understand why it would be 
impracticable to comply with the request made by Congress for a loan of 25,
000,000 livres. However, in order--

to give the States a signal proof of his friendship, his Majesty had 
resolved to grant them the sum of six millions, not as a loan, but as a 
free gift.

This sum was to be exclusive of the 3,000,000 livres tournois which 
Franklin had previously obtained to pay the drafts of Congress in the 
current year. The gift from the King was to be used partly in purchasing 
military clothing in France, and the remainder was to be held to the order 
of General Washington, or of any other person authorized to receive it.

During the conference another matter was discussed which, when Washington 
learned of it several months later, proved to be a factor of considerable 
moment in determining matters of strategy. Vergennes informed Franklin 
that the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna had offered their mediation. The 
King assured both their Majesties that personally he was agreeable to the 
proposition, "but that he could not yet accept it, because he had allies 
whose concurrence was necessary." His Majesty desired that Franklin inform 
Congress of the offer and request their answer. Franklin's letter of the 
12th of march on the matter was received by Congress on the 28th day of 
May.

At the time of the conference between Vergennes and Franklin, France had 
reached a decision as to the assistance which she would give to the United 
States for the 1781 campaign. On the 7th of March the minister of war 
prepared detailed information and instructions for Rochambeau's guidance 
when a superior naval force should arrive in American waters, and on the 
9th of the month Vergennes wrote to Luzerne regarding the action decided 
upon by the ministry in answer to the several requests made by the 
President

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of Congress. Luzerne was told that it would be impossible to send 10,000 
reenforcements due to the expense of pay, the cost of transporting and 
supplying the troops, and the lack of need for them in the United States. 
Vergennes commented on the fact that in all previous official demands made 
upon the French Government, either through Luzerne or Franklin "there has 
never been a reference of any kind to the sending of reinforcements of 
troops; we have been asked only for money and for ships."

In regard to the request made by Congress that His Majesty guarantee a 
loan of 25,000,000 livres, Vergennes called attention to the sums already 
advanced and promised. A loan of 3,000,000 tournois had been made prior to 
1780, and in the year just past 4,000,000 was provided, together with an 
additional 1,000,000 in December.

Add to that six millions tournois which the King has given them purely as 
a gratuity, and it follows that Congress has received from us in the space 
of two years fourteen millions.

The assistance rendered in, ships was fully as important as the grant of 
money. M. Le Comte de Grasse, who was about to sail to the Antilles with a 
large fleet, was ordered to conduct it to the coast of North America, or 
to detach a number of ships to sweep the coast and cooperate in any 
undertaking that might be projected by the French and American generals. 
The number of ships to be sent would--

depend upon the need which the Spaniards have of our assistance, and can 
be determined only when M. de Grasse shall have reached Santo Domingo, 
after having distributed the supplies to the Antilles, and after he shall 
have conferred with the Spanish commanders as to their projects.

If the Spanish admiral and general had already made preparations for some 
great enterprise, De Grasse would have to lend them a hand, for if a 
serious blow could be struck at the English Fleet wherever it might be 
found, the advantage would be equally great for all the allies. Vergennes 
wrote:

The important point is to weaken the enemy, to crush him if possible; the 
locality is a matter of little consequence.