The Virginia Campaign - Parts VIII-X



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PART VIII
ROCHAMBEAU 

In 1780 the revolt of the thirteen colonies against the mother country 
entered its sixth year. How much longer it would continue before England 
tired of the conflict depended less upon internal conditions in America 
than upon the assistance to be received from France. In considering the 
kind and quantity of aid to be rendered its ally, it was necessary for the 
French ministry to give careful thought to the constantly changing 
economic and military conditions, not only in Europe but in the Far East 
and the West Indies as well.

The United States needed money, ships, and men in large amount and great 
number if a decided attempt were to be made to bring the conflict to a 
successful termination during the year. Of the three essential factors, 
money and ships ranked first and were of equal importance. Without foreign 
loans, to be used in paying the Army and purchasing food, supplies, 
clothing, and munitions, the number of revolutionists willing to continue 
the hardships of campaign would have decreased almost to the vanishing 
point. Such opposition to the complete restoration of British sovereignty 
as might continue would be in the nature of guerrilla warfare. Without 
ships, no matter how many patriots were kept under arms, success on land 
would not be so great as to compel a discouraged England to make peace. 
Should England lose control of the sea and no longer be able to shift her 
troops at will along the Atlantic coast line, her final defeat would be 
assured if an allied army of equal strength were put in the field. 

At no time was there unanimity of opinion in the French council as to the 
amount of aid that should be given to their allies. The 

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[image caption: ROCHAMBEAU]

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ministry favored aggressive action in the conduct of the war, now that the 
combined fleets of France and Spain were superior to that of England, but 
whether to engage in major operations in Europe, the West Indies, or the 
United States was difficult to decide. Necker tried to discourage all 
projects that were costly and never ceased to warn of the increasing 
burden of debt. Maurepas had become conservative through age and long 
service to his government, although his slow pulse was quickened by the 
youthful enthusiasm of Lafayette. Vergennes favored waging war upon 
England through the colonies, and in this had the support of the King. 

The individual in Europe of most value to the United States at this period 
was Benjamin Franklin, minister plenipotentiary to the Court of France. 
The greatness of his character, his instinctive honesty, the confidence 
inspired in all with whom he became acquainted, and his thorough 
understanding of America were the qualities which enabled him to render 
service to his country of incalculable value. Conditions in the colonies 
were never pictured by him in an exaggerated manner, nor were the 
embarrassments of Congress and the dire necessities of the Army overdrawn. 
Officials of government always accorded full value to his statements, and 
his genius gave a stability to the cause he represented that completely 
obliterated the inefficiency of some of those associated with him. 

Next to Franklin in value and largeness of accomplishment came Lafayette. 
A voluminous correspondent and earnest conversationalist on subjects which 
engaged his serious attention, he never permitted a day to pass without 
making some effort in behalf of the country he loved and the commander he 
adored. His enthusiasm and perseverance broke down resistance and 
smothered the objections of those who opposed his views. His position in 
France would not have been strengthened had his years been doubled. His 
honorable conduct and experiences in America were gladly acclaimed by his 
countrymen. The President of Congress had sent 

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a complimentary letter to the King about the young veteran, giving a full 
measure of praise for the prudent and spirited conduct which manifestly 
justified his appointment as major general in the American Army. The 
president said: 

His devotion to his sovereign hath led him in all things to demean himself 
as an American, acquiring thereby the confidence of these United States, 
your good and faithful friends and allies, and the affection of their 
citizens. 

In writing to Vergennes before Lafayette's departure, M. Gerard said: 

I ought not to terminate this long despatch without rendering to the 
wisdom and dexterity of the Marquis de la Fayette, in the part he has 
taken in these discussions, the justice which is due to his merits. He has 
given most salutary counsels, authorized by his friendship and experience. 
The Americans strongly solicited his return with the troops, which the 
King may send. * * * I cannot for, bear saying; that the conduct equally 
prudent, courageous, and amiable of the Marquis de la Fayette, has made 
him the idol of the Congress, the Army, and the people of America. 

When Lafayette returned to France in the early part of 1779 he joined his 
family at Versailles and there awaited the outcome of the mediation 
conducted by his friends with the prime minister to determine what 
punishment would be inflicted for his disobedience of the King two years 
before. He was ordered to spend a period of eight days' arrest in the 
Hotel de Noailles in Paris before presenting himself at court. Shortly 
after the arrest terminated the King gave him command of his own regiment 
of dragoons. During the summer an army was assembled on the French coast 
from Havre to St. Malo which was to be led by the Count de Vaux in an 
attack on England, and Lafayette was given an appointment on the staff of 
the commander. The campaign was later abandoned, and in October the army 
was dispersed. While at Havre Lafayette assailed his friend, the minister 
for foreign affairs, with countless letters bearing upon the quantity of 
aid to be given the United States. In one of these many letters to 
Vergennes he said:

I solemnly affirm, upon my honour, that if half my fortune was spent in 
sending succours of troops to the Americans, I should believe that, in so 
doing, I rendered to my country a service more important than this 
sacrifice. 

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The French Government finally concluded that the most favorable place to 
prosecute war against England would be in America, and in the early part 
of 1780 definite plans were made to send an array and fleet of sufficient 
size to end the conflict that year. Command of the army was given to Count 
de Rochambeau, and the fleet was placed under the Chevalier de Ternay. The 
prime minister remarked in council on one occasion: 

It is fortunate for the King, that Lafayette does not take it into his 
head to strip Versailles of its furniture, to send to his dear Americans; 
as his Majesty would be unable to refuse it. 

The French ministry prepared the instructions for the guidance of 
Rochambeau with great care, and three of the most essential points 
reflected the views of Lafayette. One was that the French Army in America 
would be subject to the orders of General Washington. Another, that when 
French and American troops were united, the latter would be given the 
position of honor. The third point was that when French and American 
officers were united, the Americans of equal grade and the same date of 
commission should rank the French officers. 

The essential features of these instructions, which were signed by Prince 
de Montbarrey on March 1, 1780, were as follows:

His Majesty, having determined to send a considerable body of troops to 
America to the assistance of his allies, the United States, has appointed 
Count de Rochambeau, one of his lieutenant generals, to the command of the 
twelve battalions of infantry which are to be commanded under his orders 
by four major generals. This corps, with a proper complement of artillery 
for sieges and service in the field, is to be in readiness to start from 
Brest in the first days of April, under the escort of a squadron of six 
ships of the line, commanded by the Chevalier de Ternay.

In sending such considerable succours to cooperate with General 
Washington, Commander in chief of the troops of the Congress of the United 
States of North America, in the military operations which he may determine 
upon, the intentions of His Majesty are: 

Article I. That General Rochambeau should always be under the command of 
General Washington. 

Article II. That all projects and plans for the campaign or for limited 
expeditions should be decided upon by the American general, with a view to 
preserve 

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that harmony which His Majesty hopes to see between the two Commanders in 
chief, the generals, and the soldiers of the two nations. 

Article III. The French troops, being only auxiliaries, will always yield 
precedence and the right of the line to the American troops. 

Article IV. In conformity with the above article, American officers of the 
same rank and date of commission as French officers, shall take command. 

Article V. It is His Majesty's expectation and very positive order to 
Count de Rochambeau, that he will see to the exact and literal execution 
of the above four articles. 

Article VI. The corps of French troops will retain in all cases full 
jurisdiction and right of trial over every individual belonging to it. 

Article VII. His Majesty, having provided for all the wants of the troops 
who may be sent from Europe, Congress and General Washington having been 
previously informed of the intended succours, and the Marquis de Lafayette 
having been especially charged to give them notice of it and of the moment 
of their arrival, expects that the strictest orders will have been issued 
for furnishing the necessary provisions and refreshments of all kinds and 
the horses required for transporting the French artillery; and that these 
supplies will be at hand, wherever circumstances may render it advisable 
for the French troops to land. 

Article VIII. His Majesty confides to the prudence of Count de Rochambeau, 
to his zeal and military talents, and above all to his firmness, the care 
of maintaining among the French troops the most severe and exact 
discipline in all respects. Above all it is enjoined upon him to promote 
by all possible means the greatest harmony and good understanding between 
the French and the American troops, and all the inhabitants who are either 
subjects or allies of the Congress of the United States. 

SECRET INSTRUCTIONS 

Article I. His Majesty desires and orders Count de Rochambeau to retain, 
as far as circumstances will permit, the French troops collected together 
in one corps; and to represent to General Washington that it is the King's 
intention that the French troops shall not be dispersed, except in the 
case of temporary detachments, which are to rejoin the principal corps 
within a few days. 

Article II. His Majesty intends that the corps of French troops shall keep 
its own guards and secure its own camps, cantonments, or quarters. 

The action of the French Government in assigning to Rochambeau's army the 
rôle of auxiliaries was a most gracious bit of diplomacy, conducive to 
flatter the national pride of a sovereign people. Had not this been done 
the army would have entered 

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America as an independent allied force, in which case serious 
complications regarding command could not have been avoided. 

Lafayette was ordered to precede the expedition to America, and on the 5th 
of March instructions of the most confidential nature were given him by 
Vergennes. Immediately upon landing he was to proceed to headquarters of 
the army and impart to Washington the secret information that the King, 
"willing to give the United States a new proof of his affection and of his 
interest in their security," would send six vessels of the line and 6,000 
regular troops of infantry to the United States to take part in the next 
campaign. The convoy would have orders to land at Rhode Island; and 
Washington was requested to send letters by French officers to that place 
and to Block Island, containing information for the expeditionary 
commanders regarding the position of the English Fleet and Army. If no 
intelligence should be received from confidential agents located at these 
points, the convoy would proceed to Boston Harbor. 

In case unfavorable winds forced the squadron to the south, it would sail 
for the capes of Virginia, where another intelligence officer with similar 
information should be in waiting. Washington was to be informed that the 
French troops were simply auxiliaries, to act under his orders in all 
matters except in their internal management. The naval commander was to 
second by every means in his power all the operations for which his aid 
was requested. To Washington and his council of war were left all 
decisions regarding the operations to be undertaken. 

After conferring with the American Commander in Chief, Lafayette was to 
proceed to Congress, "having first ascertained from General Washington how 
far it will be expedient to open to Congress the secret of our measures." 
Upon arriving in Philadelphia he was first to see M. de la Luzerne, who 
had succeeded M. Gerard as minister from France, show him his 
instructions, communicate all that had passed between General Washington 
and himself, and take no further steps except in concert with the 
minister, by whose advice he must be influenced. 

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Supplementing the foregoing instructions, certain suggestions were offered 
for the consideration of Washington in determining what operations were 
most advisable. Two political objectives were proposed: One to drive the 
British as far as possible from the frontiers, so that the United States 
would no longer be hemmed in by detachments of the enemy in the Floridas, 
the Mississippi region, Canada, and Nova Scotia; the other to secure the 
active assistance of Spain by promising a return of the Floridas to the 
dominion of their old masters. 

The Marquis de Lafayette sailed from France on the 19th of March, 1780, 
aboard the Hermione and arrived in Boston Harbor on the 26th of April 
after a passage of 38 days. On the morning of May 10 he reached Army 
headquarters at Morristown, where a joyful welcome awaited him. After 
spending four days with Washington he proceeded to Philadelphia to report 
his return from leave to Congress and to carry out the remainder of his 
instructions. Congress acknowledged its pleasure in receiving this tender 
of further services of "so gallant and meritorious an officer" by an 
appropriate resolution. 

The departure of the convoy from the French coast was much delayed, due to 
changes made in the plans and to other disappointments. Many of the 
transports assembled at Brest for the expedition were taken by Admiral de 
Guichen for service in the West Indies, and others that were gathered at 
Havre and St. Malo to replace them were blockaded in those harbors by an 
English squadron. It became necessary to divide the army into two 
detachments, and finally the King ordered Rochambeau to embark at Brest 
whatever number of troops he could carry. By the 14th of April a force of 
5,000 men, together with field and siege artillery detachments, was ready 
to sail, but was prevented by head winds from going to sea until the 2d of 
May. The coast of Rhode Island was reached on the 10th of July. The ships 
were anchored in the harbor, and a post and batteries were established 
upon Conanicut Island for their protection. 

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A memorandum for concerting a plan of operations with the French Army was 
prepared at Washington's headquarters on the 15th of July, and Lafayette 
was designated to carry it to the French commanders. A letter was 
addressed to Rochambeau in which Washington sent messages of welcome and 
expressions of deep appreciation for "this new mark of friendship from his 
Most Christian Majesty." Complimenting the French commander in chief, 
Washington said: 

Among the obligations we are under to your Prince, I esteem it one of the 
first, that he has made choice, for the command of his troops, of a 
Gentleman whose high reputation and happy union of social qualities and 
military abilities promise me every public advantage and private 
satisfaction. 

This letter contained references to Lafayette of a nature which clearly 
shows Washington's personal affection for him, and the official estimate 
of his abilities: 

As a General officer, I have the greatest confidence in him; as a friend, 
he is perfectly acquainted with my sentiments and opinions. He knows all 
the circumstances of our army and the country at large. All the 
information he gives, and all the propositions he makes, I entreat you 
will consider as coming from me. 

The proposed plan of operations which Lafayette carried to Newport was for 
the capture of New York, to be followed immediately by a campaign up the 
North River. Washington considered this project as the most important 
which it would be possible for a joint land and sea expedition to 
undertake at this time. The plan contained the pronouncement:

In any operation, and under all circumstances, a decisive naval 
superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis 
upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend. 

Unless the allied forces gained control of the navigation of the harbor of 
New York and of the North River, their land transportation would be great, 
their expenses enormous, and their progress slow, if not precarious, for 
want of forage and other means. It was to be clearly understood that if 
any capital operation were undertaken-

the French fleet and land forces will at all events continue their aid 
until the success of the enterprise, or until it is mutually determined to 
abandon it. 

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As there was no prospect of a superiority of the French Fleet until the 
arrival of the second division, which was confidently expected at an early 
date, it was not possible to decide at once on any capital operation. 
Lafayette, Rochambeau, and De Ternay wrote letters to officials in France 
urging them to hasten the departure of this division in case it was still 
held in French ports. Five ships were demanded of M. de Guichen from the 
fleet in the West Indies, as he had full authority to send reenforcements 
to Rhode Island. 

The many conferences held by Layafette [i.e., Lafayette] with the two 
commanders during the week commencing July 25 resulted in the decision 
that as soon as there was information of the arrival either of the second 
division from France, or the ships from the West Indies, the American Army 
was to march to Westchester, and the allies were to make preparations for 
embarking at Newport. If the French Fleet were equal to that of the enemy, 
it would immediately fight for control of the sea. If it were of superior 
strength it would immediately take on board the troops at Newport and 
transport them to the place fixed upon for the landing. 

The reception accorded the French troops and the punctiliousness of their 
conduct were matters of much gratification to Lafayette. He wrote to 
Washington from Newport on the 31st of July: 

You would have been glad the other day to see two hundred and fifty of our 
drafts, who went to Connanicut Island without provisions and tents, and 
who were mixed in such a way with the French troops, that every French 
soldier and officer took an American with him, and divided his bed and his 
supper in the most friendly manner. The patience and sobriety of our 
militia are so much admired by the French officers, that two days ago a 
French colonel called all his officers together to desire them to observe 
the good examples, which were given to the French soldiers by the American 
troops. On the other hand the French discipline is such, that chickens and 
pigs walk between the lines without being disturbed, and that there is in 
the camp a cornfield, of which not one leaf has been touched. 

Admiral Graves arrived in New York Harbor with six ships of the fine and 
joined Admiral Arbuthnot on the 13th of July, three 

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days after the French squadron had reached Newport. This junction made the 
British naval force at New York decidedly superior to that of M. de 
Ternay, as the armament under Arbuthnot consisted of 4 ships of the line, 
3 frigates of 44 guns, and 3 of a smaller size. 

On the 19th of the month 4 British vessels appeared of the harbor of 
Newport, and the next morning as soon as the wind would permit, 3 frigates 
of the French squadron went in pursuit of them. Two days later 9 or 10 
British ships of the line came in sight, with 5 frigates and 4 small 
vessels. The fleet continued near Block Island, and it was evident that 
its commander intended to blockade the French squadron. About this time 
intelligence came from various quarters that Clinton was preparing to 
proceed from New York with a large part of his army to give battle to the 
French. The most vigorous efforts were made by the latter to place their 
camp in a defensible condition. The distance from the Highlands, where 
Washington's army was at this time, to Newport was too great to permit of 
any portion of the army arriving in time to be of assistance; and 
Washington proposed to relieve the pressure upon the French by menacing 
New York "and even to attack it, if the force remaining there does not 
exceed what I have reason to believe." 

On the 27th of July the British commander completed the embarkation of 6,
000 troops at Frogs Neck and that evening sailed for Newport. There had 
been so much delay in waiting for the transports, however, that Clinton 
knew a coup de main was no longer possible, as the French would have 
strengthened their position. Furthermore, the situation of affairs at New 
York would not permit of a protracted delay in the operations against 
Newport, lest Washington take advantage of the depleted numbers at the 
former place and attack before Clinton's return. Under the circumstances 
there was nothing to do but abandon the enterprise, and Clinton, after 
proceeding as far as Huntington Bay, turned his ships westward and on the 
31st of July disembarked the troops at Whitestone. Admiral Arbuthnot 
remained off the harbor of Newport 

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to maintain a blockade of the French Fleet and to intercept the second 
division. Washington learned on the 19t of August that the British fleet 
of transports had put back, whereupon he discontinued the advance on New 
York and halted his army at Peekskill. 

Orders were issued at Army headquarters on the 19th of August for the 
immediate formation of a corps of light infantry to consist of six 
battalions, each composed of eight companies selected from the different 
lines of the Army. The battalions were formed into two brigades, one under 
General Hand and the other under General Poor. Lafayette took command of 
this corps on the 7th of August, on which day he returned from his mission 
to Newport. 

Uncertain as to whether his next move would be against New York or to the 
relief of the blockaded French forces, Washington began crossing the North 
River on the 5th of August for the purpose of establishing the command at 
Dobbs Ferry, about 10 miles from Kings Bridge. He proposed establishing 
lines of communication that would save considerable land transportation in 
case New York became the eventual objective. 

The frigate Alliance arrived in Boston from L'Orient on the 16th of August 
with intelligence that the French squadron and troops, which were to 
constitute the second division of the expeditionary force, were blockaded 
in the harbor of Brest by an English fleet. Upon the receipt of this news 
Washington sent instructions on the 28th of the month for the dismissal of 
the militia which had been assembled on Rhode Island, as their services to 
Count de Rochambeau were no longer necessary. 

The 12th of September, 1780, marks an important point in the growth of 
authority delegated to Washington by Congress. On that day he wrote a 
letter to Count de Guichen in the West Indies, describing conditions in 
the United States and asking for assistance. The authority to conduct 
correspondence direct with the representatives of foreign countries had 
been delegated to the Commander in Chief on the 5th of August. Congress 
was considering affairs in South Carolina and Georgia at the time and 
adopted 

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a resolution looking to the expulsion of the enemy from their several 
posts in these States. The Commander in Chief was given authority to 
correspond with the ministers of France and all army and navy officers of 
the French Government, and with all officers of Spain in the West Indies 
and Louisiana, for the purpose of arranging any enterprise which he might 
favor for the expulsion of the enemy from South Carolina and Georgia. The 
Count de Guichen had sailed for France before Washington's letter arrived, 
and as his successor could not decipher it, no reenforcements were 
forwarded from the fleet. 

General Washington set out from the headquarters of the Army for Hartford 
on the 18th of September, to have an interview with Count de Rochambeau 
and the Chevalier de Ternay. That evening he crossed the Hudson at Kings 
Ferry, where he was met by General Arnold, who had come down from West 
Point to greet the Commander in Chief. Washington pursued his journey to 
Hartford and there met the French general and admiral.

On the return journey he reached Arnold's headquarters at the Robinson 
house the morning of the 25th. There he learned that an hour or two before 
his arrival Arnold had departed, leaving word that he would visit the post 
at West Point. Washington proceeded across the river to inspect the 
fortifications and found that Arnold had not been to West Point. Upon his 
return to the Robinson house that afternoon Arnold was still absent. In 
the meantime a packet had arrived announcing the capture of a John 
Anderson (Major Andre), with several interesting and important papers, all 
in the handwriting of Arnold. Later it was learned that this officer had 
proceeded down the river, deserting to the enemy. Benjamin Franklin's 
arraignment of this treacherous act is an awful condemnation of its 
perpetrator: 

Judas sold only one man, Arnold three million. Judas got for his one man 
thirty pieces of silver, Arnold not a halfpenny a head. 

The inactive campaign of 1780 in the North was now drawing to a close.

I hoped, but I hoped in vain -- 

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Washington wrote to a personal friend on the 5th of October- 

that a prospect was displaying, which would enable me to fix a period to 
my military pursuits, and restore me to domestic life. The favorable 
disposition of Spain, the promised succor from France, the combined force 
in the West Indies, the declaration of Russia (acceded to by other powers 
of Europe, and humiliating to the naval pride and power of Great Britain), 
the superiority of France and Spain by sea in Europe, the Irish claims and 
English disturbances, formed in the aggregate an opinion in my breast, 
(which is not very susceptible of peaceful dreams,) that the hour of 
deliverance was not far distant.

In the latter part of September the superiority of the British Fleet, 
which blockaded the French in the harbor of Newport, was increased by the 
arrival of Admiral Rodney with 10 ships from the West Indies. It was known 
that Count de Guichen had returned to European waters without having 
touched anywhere on the American coast, and the futility of planning any 
capital operation was apparent. In the latter part of November Washington 
ordered the Army into winter quarters and repaired to New Windsor, where 
he established headquarters. 



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PART IX
VIRGINIA

The greatest obstacle to the successful movement of an army during the 
Revolutionary War, either in campaign or on the field of battle, was the 
time required for the transmission of dispatches, intelligence, and 
orders. The best of roads were none too good; the worst were often 
impassable. Dispatch riders were subject to capture by hostile partisan 
groups; false intelligence reports were prepared to deceive the enemy; and 
in the theater of action poor roads and unexplored trails often caused 
confusion and delay fatal to the enterprise.

When several armies were directed from a general headquarters, the 
uncertainties of war increased tenfold. Cooperation of the fleet became 
necessary, and an unfavorable action at sea was immediately reflected in 
unsuccessful efforts on land. Dispatch boats carrying letters of 
instruction and reports of progress between general headquarters and the 
armies in the field were frequently captured or were delayed by 
unfavorable winds. The great length of time consumed in transmitting 
instructions and in receiving replies resulted in the situation changing 
so completely that orders could not be executed. Confusion and 
misunderstanding did not cease until the campaign ended, only to be 
followed by recriminations where failure had been the outcome.

There was no experience in the conduct of war over such vast areas to 
guide those in command, except as had been acquired in America. From 
Penobscot Bay, in Maine, down the Atlantic coast and around the Gulf of 
Mexico, to New Orleans, was a magnificent theater of operations; but its 
size was its greatest cause of weakness.

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De Kalb, while leading his army through the southern provinces, wrote to a 
friend regarding the difference between warfare in Europe and warfare in 
the United States. He said that Europeans did not know what war was; that 
they "know not what it is to contend against obstacles." The obstacles 
which confronted a commander in chief located in New York, who attempted 
to conduct operations throughout the entire thirteen colonies, were indeed 
insurmountable.

It is problematic whether or not another general of the army would have 
met with success where Clinton failed. He became so involved in the winter 
of 1780-81 that a military genius could not have extricated him. Greater 
possibility for success would have been his had he possessed a straight-
thinking military mind. He was too prosy in his diction; too prolix in his 
orders; and too vacillating in his decisions. These faults can be charged 
in a large measure to the individual, and in a less degree to the 
confusion occasioned by long delays in the transmission of intelligence 
and instructions.

It was through no prearranged plan that Virginia became the battle ground 
of 1781. The shifting of troops into that theater of action appears slow 
and deliberate until examined in conjunction with methods of 
communication; then it is seen that action follows action with lightning 
rapidity--the measure of this speed being in terms of express riders and 
dispatch boats. It was no mere matter of chance that every British general 
who campaigned in Virginia had the sea end of his communications firmly 
planted on the Elizabeth River. Leslie, Arnold, Phillips, and Cornwallis; 
all were ordered to establish a base at Portsmouth for the protection of 
the fleet, and it was only when the campaign drew to an end that some 
discretion in the matter was given to the man on the ground.

Leslie was sent into Virginia in October of 1780 for the purpose of 
cooperating with Cornwallis, who at the time was supposed to be leading a 
victorious army northward through North Carolina. Clinton did not know how 
completely Cornwallis's plans had been

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upset at Kings Mountain on October 7. When he received information of this 
disaster, together with the later news that Leslie had joined Cornwallis 
in South Carolina, he sent Arnold into Virginia on much the same mission.

A French squadron followed Arnold's detachment for the purpose of 
blockading the British vessels at Portsmouth, and Washington hurriedly 
dispatched Lafayette to operate on land in conjunction with Von Steuben. 
In order to augment the Virginia army Clinton then sent Phillips at the 
head of a large detachment, with instructions to take command also of 
Arnold's corps. This junction of the two corps made the British Army so 
strong that, like a magnet, it drew to itself the army of Cornwallis.

Heretofore the several British armies in Virginia had had a limited 
objective, but with the accretion of the army from the Carolinas it became 
possible to attempt the occupation of all the tidewater and piedmont 
sections. The subjugation of the province of Virginia was a tempting 
enterprise. The State had a population of 700,000, which greatly exceeded 
that of any other colony. It furnished many military and political leaders 
in the revolution; its fields produced the sustenance needed to maintain 
an army; its magazines held a wealth of stores; its warehouses were filled 
with tobacco for trade with France; and its fair face had not been 
devastated by war.

Clinton had campaigned in the southeastern extremity of the State in 1776 
and had ordered the construction of a fort on the Elizabeth River at Mill 
Point. This brief campaign had resulted in centering his mind on 
Portsmouth as the place best adapted for the protection of the fleet. He 
expected that a great part of the Virginia army would be free to engage in 
extensive operations, for he had no intention of "burying the elite of my 
army in Nansemond and Princess Anne." A campaign might be undertaken that 
would bring the rebels to their knees. The leadership of the best English, 
French, and American officers would be put to a test, and the valor of 
their armies and fleets determined.

Virginia became the Cockpit of the Revolution.

* * * * * * *

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When General Leslie sailed from Chesapeake Bay on the 24th of November, 
1780, to join Cornwallis in South Carolina, Virginia was left without any 
British troops within her borders. The reasons which had prompted Clinton 
to send a detachment into the province still prevailed, and plans were 
being made, even before it was known that Leslie would abandon the State, 
to send Arnold with reenforcements. This disposition of the recent 
accession to the list of British general officers seemed the best way to 
handle a difficult situation. Lieutenant Colonels Dundas and Simcoe, 
officers of experience and much in the confidence of Clinton, were sent 
with Arnold, to insure that a possible repetition of treasonable acts by 
him would not jeopardize his command. Arnold's instructions were quite 
like those given to Leslie, with special emphasis upon the necessity of 
maintaining a well-defended base at Portsmouth.

This expeditionary force, consisting of 1,609 effectives, passed out of 
Sandy Hook on the 21st of December. A severe gale which was encountered on 
the 26th and 27th of the month caused the ships of the convoy to be widely 
dispersed, but on the 30th anchorage was made at Hampton Roads by all the 
vessels except three transports and one armed ship, which arrived some 
days later.

When the troops landed, Arnold, "'with incomparable activity and despatch" 
according to Simcoe, pushed up the James River, "the whole detachment 
showing an energy and alacrity that could not be surpassed." It was 
necessary to reach Richmond before Von Steuben could raise sufficient 
troops to render the James River impassable, as that town would be the 
center from which to operate against magazines of supplies. A weak battery 
which had been established at Hood's Point was taken and dismantled, and 
the expedition continued its ascent of the river until Westover was 
reached. Here the troops disembarked, as Colonel Byrd's plantation was the 
best situated camp site along the James, and frigates belonging to the 
State held the river beyond City Point.

Intelligence received at Westover as to the small number of militia at 
Richmond, and the weakness of their advance parties,

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caused Arnold to march promptly to the capital, and on the 5th of January, 
1781, he occupied the town after a sharp skirmish with the militia. Arnold 
remained in Richmond until the evening of the 6th, detaching troops to 
destroy the foundry and other public buildings at Westham, and the stores 
assembled in near-by magazines, by which time the Continentals and militia 
were in such strength on the south side of the James that he considered it 
prudent to withdraw to his shipping. The command returned to Westover on 
the 8th, and two days later Arnold dropped down the James River, finally 
landing at Hardings Ferry on the 14th for the purpose of marching to 
Portsmouth by way of Smithfield, and clearing the country of small parties 
of militia. Portsmouth was reached on the 20th, and for the next several 
weeks the British were busy preparing defenses for the army and fleet, and 
conducting raids into the adjacent country. On the 13th of February it 
became known that a small squadron of French ships had entered the 
Chesapeake Bay.

The British squadron employed in blockading the French Fleet at Newport 
was stationed in Gardiners Bay near the east end of Long Island. It 
consisted of nine ships of the line and several frigates anchored in line 
between Gardiners Island and Plum Island. On the night of the 22d of 
January a storm of great violence arose. When the morning dawned a sixty-
four was discovered standing to the south of Montauk Point under jury 
masts. The Culloden, a seventy-four, was on a reef near Gardiners Island. 
The Bedford, a seventy-four, was off New London with all her masts carried 
away, and her upper tier of guns thrown overboard. The Culloden was 
finally lost, but her masts and guns were used to refit the other two 
ships. When information of the disaster to the British ships reached M. 
Destouches, who had assumed command of the French Fleet upon the death of 
M. de Ternay, he resolved to undertake an enterprise now possible because 
of the present naval inferiority of the British.

Some time before the Chevalier de la Luzerne had requested that a ship of 
the line and some frigates be sent into the Chesapeake

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to blockade Arnold and cut of his communications by sea. The governor of 
Virginia had made an urgent demand upon the French minister for aid of 
this kind and Congress had supported the request. In view of the 
unexpected weakening of the blockading fleet, Destouches felt safe in 
sparing a corresponding detachment from his own fleet. A small squadron, 
consisting of a sixty-four and two frigates, under the command of M. de 
Tilly, sailed from Newport on the 9th of February. Count de Rochambeau 
considered sending a division of land troops, but finally concluded that 
such reenforcements were unnecessary and inexpedient, as the mission of 
the squadron was merely to cut off Arnold's communications by water. It 
was presumed at French headquarters that there were sufficient Continental 
troops and militia in Virginia to ad as a check upon extensive land 
operations by the British Army.

As soon as the plan to operate in Virginia had been partially developed, 
Rochambeau wrote to Washington on the 3d of February regarding it. The 
project was viewed with so much favor by the latter that he determined to 
effect a quick reassembling of the fight companies which Lafayette had 
previously commanded and send them to Virginia to aid in the operations. 
Unfortunately Rochambeau's letter was not received by Washington until the 
14th of the month. Furthermore, it did not state definitely the size and 
the purpose of the naval expedition, other than that Destouches might go 
with all of his ships. Washington considered it likely that the admiral 
would want to employ the entire fleet in the enterprise, and that the 
general would gladly cooperate with a part of the French army, and replied 
to Rochambeau's letter accordingly.

The details of this proposed capital operation were quickly arranged at 
the American headquarters, and in a letter dated the 15th Rochambeau was 
informed of them. Lafayette's detachment of 1,200 men was under marching 
orders at the time, and in a few days it would advance toward the Head of 
Elk, whence the remainder of the journey would be made by boat. In order 
to give

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a certainty to the enterprise Rochambeau was requested to embark about 1,
000 men, together with a proper amount of siege artillery, to accompany 
the expedition. Washington said he would not delay the march of 
Lafayette's detachment until a reply could be received to his letter, as 
not a moment was to be lost in forwarding the light infantry.

For some reason this letter was not dispatched at once. It contains a 
postscript dated the 19th to the effect that the destruction of the corps 
under the command of Arnold was of such immense importance to the welfare 
of the Southern States that Washington had resolved to attempt it with the 
American detachment now being sent, in conjunction with the militia, even 
though none of the French Army should join the expedition. There was one 
proviso added, however, which indicates that Washington was not to be 
again disappointed in the conduct of joint land and naval warfare: M. 
Destouches was to protect the operations by such a disposition of his 
fleet as would give the allied land and sea forces command of Chesapeake 
Bay and at the same time prevent reenforcements reaching Arnold from New 
York.

No sooner had this letter to Rochambeau been dispatched than a 
communication was received from Destouches conveying information that a 
squadron of three ships, unaccompanied by any part of the army, had sailed 
on the 9th of February for the Chesapeake. The intelligence caused 
temporary uneasiness and disappointment at Army headquarters, but soon a 
spirit of optimism became prevalent, and Washington decided to go through 
with his plans. Explicit instructions were given to Lafayette for the 
conduct of his detachment, and he was earnestly enjoined to do no act, in 
dealing with Arnold, that might screen him from the punishment which he 
merited for his treason and desertion. Should Arnold become his prisoner, 
he was to execute punishment upon him "in the most summary way." If 
Lafayette should receive intelligence of the enemy having left Virginia, 
or that the ships under De Tilly were unable to give any effective 
cooperation, he was to return at once with the detachment , as the enemy 
cannot be affected by it while

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they have the command of the waters; but the detachment may be capitally 
injured by committing itself on the water."

M. de Tilly returned to Newport on the 24th of February, having been 
absent only 15 days. Near the entrance of Chesapeake Bay he captured a 
frigate, took two privateers, sent four prizes to Yorktown, burnt four 
other prizes, and captured about 500 prisoners. Arnold had been advised of 
the approach of the French squadron and had withdrawn his frigates to a 
position of safety in the Elizabeth River. The shallowness of the water 
made it unsafe for the French ships to ascend the river nearer than within 
about four leagues of the British frigates; and as De Tilly could not 
bring about their destruction, and his own squadron ran the risk of being 
blockaded, he abandoned the enterprise and put to sea.

As soon as De Tilly returned to Newport and reported the partial success 
of his enterprise, the decision was made at the French headquarters to 
engage at once in the capital operation which Washington had suggested. 
"The great consequence, that your Excellency seemed to attach to the 
establishment of Arnold at Portsmouth," Rochambeau, wrote on the 25th of 
February, "has determined M. Destouches to sacrifice every other object to 
this one." The captured British frigate, together with the French 
frigates, would be utilized near the mouth of the Elizabeth River to 
blockade the port. A detachment of 1,120 men under the command of Baron de 
Viomesnil would be sent with the expedition. This letter reached 
Washington at New Windsor in the evening of the 27th, and an express was 
immediately dispatched to Lafayette directing him not to leave the Elk 
River until he had information that the French squadron was again in the 
Chesapeake. Preparations for the enterprise were expedited. The detachment 
was ready to embark by the end of February, but 8 or 10 days more were 
necessary before the fleet would be ready to sail.

Meanwhile two of the British ships damaged in the storm of January 22 were 
made seaworthy, and another which had been driven out to sea returned to 
Gardiners Bay. Once again did the British

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ships of the line outnumber those of the French. In order "to level all 
difficulties and be in the way to improve circumstances," Washington made 
a hurried trip to Newport, arriving there on the 6th of March. No thought 
was given to the abandonment of the enterprise because of the British 
having recovered their naval superiority; instead it was the purpose of 
the French admiral to gain the shelter of the Chesapeake and fight for 
control of those waters. The fleet went out with a fair wind the evening 
of the 8th of March, every soldier and sailor exhilarated now that the 
long period of inaction was at an end.

Two days after the French Fleet sailed the British put out to sea, and on 
the 16th the two met of the capes of Virginia. Each fleet had a strength 
of eight line-of-battle ships and three or four frigates, and in the 
engagement which ensued they suffered equally. The honors of the affair 
went to the English, however, as Arbuthnot got possession of Chesapeake 
Bay, and Destouches returned to the harbor of Newport, where he arrived on 
the 26th of March after an absence of 18 days.

Once again the clouds of frustrated effort hung like a pall over the 
American headquarters. Washington's thoughts turned to the elite corps 
under Lafayette, now halfway to Virginia, and on the 5th of April orders 
were dispatched for its immediate recall. Washington wrote:

As matters have turned out it is to be wished that you had not gone out of 
the Elk.

To this expression of regret he added a comment which, more than any other 
of his military maxims, typifies those qualities of mind that made him a 
great soldier:

But I never judge of the propriety of measures by after events.

The next day the clouds had lifted and the sunshine of reason showed the 
way. Washington dispatched another letter to Lafayette ordering him to 
continue south. Had this decision been inspired it would not have been 
fraught with more vital consequences. For the Americans, it was the 
beginning of the end of

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the revolution. Its complement was the decision made 17 days later by 
Cornwallis to march from North Carolina into Virginia.

Since my letter to you of yesterday--

Washington wrote on the 6th of April--

I have attentively considered of what vast importance it will be to 
reenforce General Greene as speedily as possible; more especially as there 
can be little doubt, but the detachment under General Phillips, if not 
part of that now under the command of General Arnold, will ultimately join 
or in some degree cooperate with Lord Cornwallis.

Lafayette was directed to turn his corps to the southward and inform 
Greene that he was marching to join him. The junction with Greene was 
never made, but the presence of Lafayette's small army in Virginia drew 
into the same theater of operations the armies of Washington and 
Rochambeau, and the ships of De Grasse and De Barras.

* * * * * * *

In the early part of March the British commander in chief instructed 
General Phillips as to his mission in Virginia. As soon as possible after 
his arrival he was to unite his corps with that of Arnold and take command 
of the whole. The principal object of the expedition was the security of 
Arnold's command and the posts which he had established on the Elizabeth 
River. After strengthening these posts and putting them in a better 
condition of defense, so that they could be held by a small garrison, 
Phillips was to render indirect service to Cornwallis in North Carolina by 
destroying all magazines in the region of Richmond and the James and at 
Petersburg. Posts were to be established along the James to insure the 
safe passage of that river by British vessels, following which rapid 
incursions were to be made into the region of the upper James River for 
the purpose of interrupting the course of supplies to Greene's army in the 
Carolinas.

Some discretion was allowed Phillips as to how much reliance should be 
placed in the posts around Portsmouth. Reports had already come from 
Arnold to the effect that Portsmouth was poorly

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fitted to serve as the base of the expedition, and Phillips was told that 
if the admiral did not favor Portsmouth as a fortified station for large 
ships, he was to inspect Yorktown and Old Point Comfort. Under any 
circumstances, however, a post at Portsmouth was to be held, and Mill 
Point, where Clinton had ordered a fort to be built in 1776, was pointedly 
referred to as a suitable place.

All of the many instructions given to both Arnold and Phillips were based 
on the assumption that not more than 600 men would be needed to defend the 
forts established for the protection of the fleet, leaving the remainder 
of the troops free to engage in extended operations. Clinton had no 
intention, as was mentioned before, of "burying the elite" of his army in 
"Nansemond and Princess Anne." Unfortunately for the execution of this 
plan, the successive commanders were never able to furnish protection for 
a safe anchorage with so small a force. It was this fact, more than any 
other, which later caused Cornwallis to become involved in a web of 
circumstances from which he could not escape.

General Phillips arrived at Portsmouth on the 27th of March, 1781, and 
spent the next three weeks improving the defenses of the harbor. When this 
work was completed to his satisfaction he embarked his command, which now 
included Arnold's corps, and on the 18th of April proceeded up the James 
River, reaching Burrells Ferry the following day. Here the troops were 
landed and on the 20th detachments were sent to the Chickahominy River and 
to Yorktown, while part of the army marched to Williams, burg. Phillips 
encountered small bodies of militia which offered but little resistance, 
and after dispersing them he proceeded to Barrets Ferry at the mouth of 
the Chickahominy and on the 22d reembarked. A detachment of light 
infantry, which went about 12 miles up the Chickahominy, destroyed 
shipyards and several armed vessels belonging to the State. At 10 o'clock 
that night the fleet weighed anchor and continued up the James River to 
within 4 miles of Westover. On the morning of the 24th the tide carried 
the boats to City Point, where the army went ashore, as it was proposed to 
make the movement from City Point to Petersburg by

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land. The boats were to follow as soon as the shores were cleared of 
hostile troops. Setting out from City Point at 10 o'clock on the morning 
of the 25th, Phillips encountered no opposition until within a mile of 
Petersburg, where a body of militia under General Muhlenberg was posted. 
After a sharp conflict the Americans retired to the north side of the 
Appomattox River and partly demolished the bridge.

The British destroyed 4,000 hogsheads of tobacco, a ship, and a number of 
small vessels before marching from Petersburg on the 27th of April. Part 
of the army under Phillips proceeded to Chesterfield Court House where 
they burned a range of barracks for 2,000 men, and 300 barrels of flour. 
Arnold conducted the remainder of the command to Osborne's, at which place 
he learned that a considerable number of vessels were in the James River 
about 4 miles farther up stream. The commodore of the fleet was called on 
to surrender, and upon his refusal to do so Arnold disposed his troops for 
attack. The fleet was soon obliged to strike its colors, and 2 ships, 3 
brigantines, 5 sloops, and 2 schooners, loaded with tobacco, cordage, and 
flour were taken. Four ships, 5 brigantines, and a number of small vessels 
were sunk or burned. The stores taken included about 2,000 hogsheads of 
tobacco, all of which was destroyed.

Phillips joined Arnold at Osborne's and the army lay there on the 28th in 
order to give the British boats time to come up the James River to that 
point. On the 29th the commanding general put the troops in motion, and on 
the following day the army marched into Manchester, where, greatly to the 
surprise of every, one, it was seen that the opposite side of the river 
was held by a considerable body of men. Lafayette had arrived the day 
before, and had now assembled on the heights of Richmond not only his own 
army but the groups of militia which the British had dispersed at 
Williamsburg and Petersburg.

The impatience of Lafayette to reach some destination where his command 
might become engaged had caused him to march with the utmost haste. 
Reaching Baltimore on the 18th of April, he

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obtained a loan of $10,000 on his own credit from the merchants of that 
city to be used in the purchase of clothing for his men. On this day he 
wrote to Washington that--

The importance of celerity, the desire of lengthening the way home, and 
immense delays that would stop me for an age, have determined me to leave 
our tents, artillery, etc. under a guard, and with orders to follow as 
fast as possible, while the rest of the detachment, by forced marches, and 
with impressed wagons and horses, will hasten to Fredericksburg or 
Richmond.

He did not expect to reach Greene in North Carolina without first 
encountering the British Army at some point in Virginia.

The marquis's corps left Baltimore on the 19th of April; it was in 
Alexandria on the 23d and arrived at Richmond on the 29th. His presence in 
the Virginia capital was not expected by the British and Phillips decided 
that it would be unwise to attack. Lafayette's letter to Washington 
written on May 4 is an enthusiastic report on this initial advantage 
gained at the very beginning of his campaign.

The leaving of my artillery appears a strange whim, but had I waited for 
it, Richmond had been lost. It is not without trouble I made this rapid 
march. General Phillips has expressed to a flag officer the astonishment 
he felt at our celerity; and when on the 30th he was going to give the 
signal to attack, he reconnoitered our position, Mr. Osborn, who was with 
him, says, that he flew into a violent passion, and swore vengeance 
against me and the corps I had brought with me.

The British, seeing themselves forestalled at Richmond, retired down the 
river from Manchester after destroying 1,200 hogsheads of tobacco. That 
evening they stopped at Warwick and burned a magazine of 500 barrels of 
flour, several mills, some warehouses, 5 vessels, and other property. 
Continuing down the James, the army reached Bermuda Hundred, where it 
embarked on the 2d of May with the intention of returning to Portsmouth. 
On the 7th of the month, when part of the fleet was at Hog Island, General 
Phillips received a letter from Lord Cornwallis upon the perusal of which 
he issued orders for the fleet to return up the river. Writing from 
Wilmington on the 24th of April, Cornwallis informed

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Phillips that he had resolved to march into Virginia and suggested a 
rendezvous for the armies at Petersburg, which lay on the main highway 
from Wilmington through Virginia.

Orders were immediately issued for Simcoe's command, consisting of the 
light infantry and the Queen's Rangers, to proceed up the river to City 
Point. The rest of the army marched to Petersburg early on the morning of 
May 9, and arrived outside the town late that night after a march of 
nearly 30 miles.

When the British Army embarked at Bermuda Hundred Lafayette moved rapidly 
in the direction of Williamsburg and crossed the Chickahominy at Long 
Bridge. Upon learning that the fleet had turned about and was again 
ascending the river, Lafayette retraced his steps and by forced marches 
hastened to Osborne's, where he arrived on the 8th and then continued in 
the direction of Petersburg. An advance party was sent ahead to that town 
to seize the bridge and take possession of the boats on the river. This 
small force was encountered by the British when they approached Petersburg 
on the evening of the 9th, and many of its numbers were captured.

On the 10th the marquis made his appearance on the opposite side of the 
river with a strong escort, but after observing the strength of the army 
which occupied Petersburg he returned to Osborne's. Owing to the serious 
illness of General Phillips, which terminated in his death on the 13th of 
May, the command of the army devolved upon Arnold. Intelligence was 
received by him that the advance of Cornwallis's army had reached Halifax 
on the 7th of the month, and several expresses were dispatched to his 
lordship informing him that the Virginia army would retain its position at 
Petersburg until his arrival.

Lafayette fell back to Wilton and later returned to the vicinity of 
Petersburg. News of the march of the Pennsylvania line was eagerly 
awaited, for until these reenforcements arrived his small army could not 
afford to jeopardize its safety by engaging the British at Petersburg.



Page 95

PART X
CORNWALLIS

As a result of the disaster which had befallen the American Army at Camden 
on the 16th of August, 1780, Congress adopted a resolution on October 5 
directing General Washington to hold a court of inquiry on the conduct of 
General Gates and to appoint his successor. Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, an 
officer in whom the Commander in Chief had the greatest confidence because 
of his loyalty, ability, and military capacity, was selected for the 
command of the southern army. Greene reached the headquarters of General 
Gates at Charlotte Town on the 2d of December and took command the 
following day. After two weeks of arduous attention to a multitude of 
details, report having been received in the meantime of a favorable site 
for the army on the Peedee, the troops were put under marching orders for 
that place. The position selected was on the east bank of the river 
opposite Cheraw Hill, and it was later referred to by Greene as a "camp of 
repose."

Before leaving Charlotte Town Greene arranged to send Brig. Gen. Daniel 
Morgan with an independent command to operate along the tributaries of the 
Broad and Pacolet, threatening the post at Ninety Six and the left of the 
British Army. When Cornwallis received information at Wynnesborough that 
Morgan was in the field he sent Colonel Tarleton into the district north 
of Ninety Six to oppose him. Somewhat later Cornwallis completed 
preparations to renew operations in North Carolina and put his army in 
motion for that province. Morgan and Tarleton met at the Cowpens on the 
17th of January, 1781, and fought one of the most spectacular of the 
smaller actions of the revolution. Morgan formed the Americans in the 
usual three lines, the first and second being composed of militia, and the 
third of the Continental infantry

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[image caption: CORNWALLIS]

Page 97

and dragoons, together with several very excellent militia companies from 
Virginia.

After the first and second lines had been brushed aside by the British 
regulars it was observed that the right of the Continentals was 
outflanked, due to the greater length of Tarleton's line of battle. The 
flanking company of the Continentals was ordered to change front to the 
right, in doing which some confusion arose and the company began marching 
to the rear. Others observing this, and supposing that orders had been 
given for a retreat, faced their men about and moved to the rear in a 
steady line. Fortunately the discipline of the command was not broken, and 
when the order was given to halt, face about, and fire, it was executed 
with devastating promptness--right into the astonished faces of the 
closely pursuing British, who fully expected to terminate the battle in 
another moment by charging with the bayonet. Tarleton's infantry stopped 
in their tracks; then turned in the greatest confusion and fled from the 
scene, followed by his cavalry. In the melee which followed the British 
suffered heavy losses, and those who were not killed, captured, or wounded 
were driven in wild disorder from the field. The outcome of the action was 
one of the most unexpected victories of the war.

Morgan quitted the field of battle and hurried northward with his 
prisoners, intending to pass the Broad and place as much distance as 
possible between his detachment and the British Army. As soon as news of 
the battle reached Greene on the Peedee River, he appointed the eastern 
bank of the Catawba as a place of rendezvous for the army and Morgan's 
corps and then hastened in advance of his troops to join the latter. 
Cornwallis put his army in motion to intercept Morgan before he crossed 
the Catawba and made a junction with Greene and, in order to expedite his 
march, destroyed much of his baggage and transportation. Morgan succeeded 
in passing the Catawba and holding all the fords along the enemy's line of 
approach. When Cornwallis finally effected a passage of the river on the 
19th of February, he found that Morgan's corps was retiring toward the 
Yadkin.

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Greene's army and Morgan's corps came together beyond the Yadkin and 
retreated into Virginia. Cornwallis closely pursued the retiring foe and 
was at the heels of the Americans as they approached the Dan River. Greene 
made his escape across the Dan about 12 miles west of its junction with 
the Staunton River. Cornwallis reached the south bank of the river the 
following day; but being unwilling to abandon North Carolina, owing to the 
confused sate of its affairs, he gave up the pursuit. Resting his troops 
for a few days, he reversed his march and proceeded in the direction of 
Hillsboro, the capital of the province. On the 20th of February he issued 
a proclamation calling on all loyal subjects to repair to the King's 
standard and aid in restoring the royal government.

Previous to the movement of the British Army from Wynnesborough, 
Cornwallis directed the commanding officer at Charleston to send a convoy 
into the Cape Fear for the purpose of establishing a base at Wilmington. 
The execution of this mission had been intrusted to Major Craig, and it 
was now Cornwallis's intention to have that officer examine the 
practicability of establishing a water communication between his garrison 
at Wilmington and Cross Creek, a settlement about 90 miles further up the 
Cape Fear River.

When Greene learned of the efforts being made to draw recruits to the 
British standard, without waiting further for the reenforcements of 
militia which were necessary to strengthen his army, he recrossed the Dan 
on the 23d of February and marched toward North Carolina. A position was 
finally taken near Guilford Court House, on the great highway that passed 
through Hillsboro and Salisbury. About the 10th of the month a junction 
was effected with a Continental regiment and two considerable bodies of 
militia from North Carolina and Virginia, whereupon Greene resolved to 
attack the enemy without further loss of time.

The quick resumption of an offensive rôle by the American Army came as a 
surprise to Cornwallis. It would be impossible to subjugate any 
considerable portion of the province as long as this

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army was undefeated, so the implied challenge of Greene's return was 
accepted and the British proceeded to a point in the forks of Deep River, 
about a day's march from the Americans. On the 15th of March Greene took a 
defensive position just west of Guilford Court House, and Cornwallis 
marched to attack. The British had no difficulty in disposing of the first 
and second lines of the American Army, but the Continentals, who held the 
third line, gave the usual amount of trouble. Here the battle was fought 
with great skill and bravery by both sides, and when it terminated neither 
party appeared to have been the victor. The British loss in officers and 
men was so heavy however, that the army was crippled beyond measure, and 
Cornwallis did not dare to assume an offensive attitude the following day.

Greene made no attempt to renew the action and was content to fall back 
beyond the Haw River to a position about 12 miles from Guilford Court 
House. Information was received by Cornwallis about this time that the 
water route to Cross Creek could not be used for transporting supplies 
because of the hostility of the inhabitants along its banks; and he 
decided that the only course left for him to pursue was to march to 
Wilmington, where he could dispose of the sick and wounded and obtain 
needed supplies for the army.

The British Army reached Wilmington on the 7th of April, and the exhausted 
and impoverished troops considered themselves fortunate in being once more 
on a line of supply. Word was received on the 22d of the month that 
dispatches from Clinton had arrived at Charleston, bearing information 
that Phillips had been sent into Virginia to cooperate with Cornwallis and 
to be under his command. The restored army could no longer enjoy the 
luxury of repose; but where to lead it was difficult for its commander to 
decide. Intelligence of the American Army was to the effect that Greene 
was pointing his course toward South Carolina, with the intention of 
attacking Rawdon's command at Camden. Should Cornwallis march to Rawdon's 
relief; should he embark for Charleston; or should he join Phillips in 
Virginia? Cornwallis knew that

Page 100

neither the first nor second plan could result in anything decisive. He 
hoped that the third plan might lead to the termination of the war by a 
victorious army marching northward from Virginia and effecting a junction 
with Clinton's army in the vicinity of Philadelphia.

Cornwallis had conducted a winter campaign in order to make good his 
promise to the loyalists, that he would come to their aid in North 
Carolina. He was greatly disappointed that so few took service under the 
King's standard. He was enmeshed in a territory in which it was difficult 
to conduct operations. The immense extent of the province, its numberless 
rivers and creeks, the total want of internal water channels; all these 
things made it impossible to remain long in the heart of the country. 
Lines of communication back to Camden could not be maintained because of 
their great length and the poor condition of the roads. The Cape Fear 
River seemed to offer a water route as far as Cross Creek, but to hold it 
against partisan troops would but increase his difficulties. To return to 
Charleston after a year's campaign with nothing but lost territory to show 
for his efforts would be a disgrace. The decision to march into Virginia, 
as the most effectual means of employing his troops, was made on the 23d 
day of April. Cornwallis hoped by joining Phillips that the opulent 
province of Virginia could be subjugated, and on the 24th of April he sent 
a dispatch to that officer designating Petersburg as the place of 
rendezvous for the two armies.

The British Army marched from Wilmington about the 29th of April. Soon 
conflicting reports were received as to what was occurring in Virginia. By 
some it was stated that Phillips had proceeded up the James as high as 
Richmond; by others that he had embarked his troops and sailed from the 
province. Tarleton was ordered to precede the army in the direction of 
Halifax with the utmost speed and secure definite intelligence while the 
main body followed at a more discreet pace. Finally, word came from 
Tarleton that the British troops had not quitted the James, and Cornwallis 
hastened to Halifax, where he joined his advance party

Page 101

on the 13th of May. Tarleton was again pushed ahead to uncover the 
crossings of the Meherrin and Nottaway, and to effect a junction with any 
reconnoitering forces which Phillips might send to ad as an escort. 
Cornwallis's army marched into Petersburg on the morning of the 20th of 
May, 1781.

With the arrival of Lord Cornwallis at Petersburg a new sphere of activity 
and military problems entirely different from those encountered in the 
Carolinas claimed his attention. At first he attempted to keep fully 
informed as to how Rawdon and Balfour were faring, but as time went on, 
affairs in the far South faded into indistinct memories of frustrated 
ambition--quick changes which occurred in Virginia relegated all prior 
enterprises into the haze of forgetfulness.

The death of General Phillips filled the heart of Cornwallis with great 
sorrow, and he mourned the loss of a friend who had been dear to him. 
Numerous letters to Phillips were at hand when Cornwallis reached 
Petersburg, and they were given immediate and careful consideration. With 
the assistance of Arnold, he delved into the intricate and varied 
instructions that Clinton had sent to the several commanders in Virginia, 
hoping to determine upon the best measures for loyal compliance with the 
wishes of the commander in chief.

The instructions given to Phillips in New York on the 10th of March were 
considered first. Next came a letter written on the 14th of March, at 
which time Arbuthnot was at sea in pursuit of the French Fleet. "God send 
our old Admiral success!" Clinton wrote. He sent this letter by a 
schooner, with the admonition that whenever possible he wanted important 
dispatches sent by vessels of this type, as "they make their passage 
better than the frigates." In another letter to Phillips dated the 24th of 
the same month, in which Clinton referred to the success of British arms 
at Guilford Court House on the 15th, he directed that if Cornwallis did 
not desire cooperation from the army in Virginia, "and you see no prospect 
of striking an important stroke elsewhere, I shall

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probably request you and General Arnold to return to me, with such troops 
as I have already named in my instructions."

Other dispatches from the commander in chief addressed to Phillips were 
delivered to Cornwallis at Petersburg on the 24th of May. One written on 
the 14th of April gave many details of a very restrictive nature as to the 
mission of the Virginia army. Clinton wrote that "operations in favour of 
Lord Cornwallis" had invariably been the chief mission for the Virginia 
army. The greater part of its strength was not to be employed in 
establishing and defending a base. Leslie had made choice of Portsmouth 
during the year before, Clinton said; and Arnold, after first reporting 
upon it unfavorably, had later declared the works to be so well advanced 
that he could leave them in safety with a small garrison and conduct the 
main part of the army up the James River. However, if both Phillips and 
Arnold now condemned Portsmouth--

it may be right to return to our original object, a station to protect the 
King's ships, which is capable of being maintained by a garrison of about 
five or six hundred men; and if Mill Point will answer these purposes 
without Norfolk, and the corresponding station on the opposite side of the 
river, I can have no objection.

In another dispatch to Phillips, dated April 26, Clinton commented on a 
letter written at Wilmington on the 10th of the month, wherein Cornwallis 
stated a need for reenforcements. Clinton then referred to a suggestion 
previously made by both Phillips and Arnold that with 2,000 more men their 
army could strike at Lafayette's corps, take Baltimore, and continue 
thence in the direction of Philadelphia. He viewed this project with 
considerable favor, especially as--

the inhabitants of Pennsylvania on both sides of the Susquehannah, York, 
Lancaster, Chester, and the Peninsula between Chesapeak and Delaware, are 
represented to me to be friendly.

This ambitious plan continued to engross Clinton's mind, and four days 
later he decided to undertake a capital operation in the direction of 
Philadelphia, using his own army and the one in Vir-

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ginia. He wrote to Phillips that "if his Lordship proposes no operation to 
you soon, and you see none that will operate for him directly" before the 
1st of June, Phillips was to make the attempt on Philadelphia. In case of 
failure the army could either retire to Portsmouth or pass the Delaware 
into the jerseys, in which case Clinton would effect a junction near Mount 
Holly.

The British commander in chief was in an unenviable position. He did not 
possess the qualities of leadership necessary to attain success. There was 
not that unselfish cooperation between the land and sea forces so 
essential in warfare. "Our Admiral is grown, if possible, more 
impracticable than ever," he wrote to Phillips. Rumors of his recall were 
being circulated, and Clinton said that "if the next packet does not 
satisfy me in this particular, I shall probably retire and leave him to 
Lord Cornwallis' management."

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