The Day Of The Confederacy - Chapters XI-XII



Chapter XI. An Attempted Revolution

Almost from the moment when the South had declared its independence voices
had been raised in favor of arming the negroes. The rejection of a plan to
accomplish this was one of the incidents of Benjamin's tenure of the
portfolio of the War Department; but it was not until the early days of
1864, when the forces of Johnston lay encamped at Dalton, Georgia, that
the arming of the slaves was seriously discussed by a council of officers.
Even then the proposal had its determined champions, though there were
others among Johnston's officers who regarded it as "contrary to all true
principles of chivalric warfare," and their votes prevailed in the council
by a large majority.

From that time forward the question of arming the slaves hung like a heavy
cloud over all Confederate thought of the war. It was discussed in the
army and at home around troubled firesides. Letters written from the
trenches at Petersburg show that it was debated by the soldiers, and the
intense repugnance which the idea inspired in some minds was shown by
threats to leave the ranks if the slaves were given arms.

Amid the pressing, obvious issues of 1864, this project hardly appears
upon the face of the record until it was alluded to in Davis's message to
Congress in November, 1864, and in the annual report of the Secretary of
War. The President did not as yet ask for slave soldiers. He did, however,
ask for the privilege of buying slaves for government use--not merely
hiring them from their owners as had hitherto been done--and for
permission, if the Government so desired, to emancipate them at the end of
their service. The Secretary of War went farther, however, and advocated
negro soldiers, and he too suggested their emancipation at the end of
service.

This feeling of the temper of the country, so to speak, produced an
immediate response. It drew Rhett from his retirement and inspired a
letter in which he took the Government severely to task for designing to
remove from state control this matter of fundamental importance.
Coinciding with the cry for more troops with which to confront Sherman,
the topic of negro soldiers became at once one of the questions of the
hour. It helped to focus that violent anti-Davis movement which is the
conspicuous event of December, 1864, and January, 1865. Those who believed
the President unscrupulous trembled at the thought of putting into his
hands a great army of hardy barbarians trained to absolute obedience. The
prospect of such a weapon held in one firm hand at Richmond seemed to
those opponents of the President a greater menace to their liberties than
even the armies of the invaders. It is quite likely that distrust of Davis
and dread of the use he might make of such a weapon was increased by a
letter from Benjamin to Frederick A. Porcher of Charleston, a supporter
of the Government, who had made rash suggestions as to the extra-
constitutional power that the Administration might be justified by
circumstances in assuming. Benjamin deprecated such suggestions but
concluded with the unfortunate remark: "If the Constitution is not to be
our guide I would prefer to see it suppressed by a revolution which should
declare a dictatorship during the war, after the manner of ancient Rome,
leaving to the future the care of reestablishing firm and regular
government." In the State of Virginia, indeed, the revolutionary
suggestions of the President's message and the Secretary's report were
promptly taken up and made the basis of a political program, which
Governor Smith embodied in his message to the Legislature--a document that
will eventually take its place among the most interesting state papers of
the Confederacy. It should be noted that the suggestions thrown out in
this way by the Administration to test public feeling involved three
distinct questions: Should the slaves be given arms? Should they, if
employed as soldiers, be given their freedom? Should this revolutionary
scheme, if accepted at all, be handled by the general Government or left
to the several States? On the last of the three questions the Governor of
Virginia was silent; by implication he treated the matter as a concern of
the States. Upon the first and second questions, however, he was explicit
and advised arming the slaves. He then added:

"Even if the result were to emancipate our slaves, there is not a man who
would not cheerfully put the negro into the Army rather than become a
slave himself to our hated and vindictive foe. It is, then, simply a
question of time. Has the time arrived when this issue is fairly before
us? ...For my part standing before God and my country, I do not hesitate
to say that I would arm such portion of our able-bodied slave population
as may be necessary, and put them in the field, so as to have them ready
for the spring campaign, even if it resulted in the freedom of those thus
organized. Will I not employ them to fight the negro force of the enemy?
Aye, the Yankees themselves, who already boast that they have 200,000 of
our slaves in arms against us. Can we hesitate, can we doubt, when the
question is, whether the enemy shall use our slaves against us or we use
them against him; when the question may be between liberty and
independence on the one hand, or our subjugation and utter ruin on the
other?"

With their Governor as leader for the Administration, the Virginians found
this issue the absorbing topic of the hour. And now the great figure of
Lee takes its rightful place at the very center of Confederate history,
not only military but civil, for to Lee the Virginia politicians turned
for advice.* In a letter to a State Senator of Virginia who had asked for
a public expression of Lee's views because "a mountain of prejudices,
growing out of our ancient modes of regarding the institution of Southern
slavery will have to be met and overcome" in order to Attain unanimity,
Lee discussed both the institution of slavery  and the situation of the
moment. He plainly intimated that slavery  should be placed under state
control; and, assuming such control, he considered "the relation of master
and slave...the best that can exist between the black and white races
while intermingled as at present in this country." He went on to show,
however, that military necessity now compelled a revolution in sentiment
on this subject, and he came at last to this momentous conclusion:

* Lee now revealed himself in his previously overlooked capacity of
statesman. Whether his abilities in this respect equaled his abilities as
a soldier need not here be considered; it is said that he himself had no
high opinion of them. However, in the advice which he gave at this final
moment of crisis, he expressed a definite conception of the articulation
of civil forces in such a system as that of the Confederacy. He held that
all initiative upon basal matters should remain with the separate States,
that the function of the general Government was to administer, not to
create conditions, and that the proper power to constrain the State
Legislatures was the flexible, extra-legal power of public opinion.

"Should the war continue under existing circumstances, the enemy may in
course of time penetrate our country and get access to a large part of our
negro population. It is his avowed policy to convert the able-bodied men
among them into soldiers, and to emancipate all.... His progress will thus
add to his numbers, and at the same time destroy slavery in a manner most
pernicious to the welfare of our people. Their negroes will be used to
hold them in subjection, leaving the remaining force of the enemy free
to extend his conquest. Whatever may be the effect of our employing negro
troops, it cannot be as mischievous as this. If it end in subverting
slavery it will be accomplished by ourselves, and we can devise the means
of alleviating the evil consequences to both races. I think, therefore, we
must decide whether slavery shall be extinguished by our enemies and the
slaves be used against us, or use them ourselves at the risk of the
effects which may be produced upon our social institutions..."

"The reasons that induce me to recommend the employment of negro troops at
all render the effect of the measures...upon slavery immaterial, and in my
opinion the best means of securing the efficiency and fidelity of this
auxiliary force would be to accompany the measure with a well-digested
plan of gradual and general emancipation. As that will be the result of
the continuance of the war, and will certainly occur if the enemy succeed,
it seems to me most advisable to adopt it at once, and thereby obtain all
the benefits that will accrue to our cause..."

"I can only say in conclusion, that whatever measures are to be adopted
should be adopted at once. Every day's delay increases the difficulty.
Much time will be required to organize and discipline the men, and action
may be deferred until it is too late."

Lee wrote these words on January 11, 1865. At that time a fresh wave of
despondency had gone over the South because of Hood's rout at Nashville;
Congress was debating intermittently the possible arming of the slaves;
and the newspapers were prophesying that the Administration would
presently force the issue. It is to be observed that Lee did not advise
Virginia to wait for Confederate action. He advocated emancipation by the
State. After all, to both Lee and Smith, Virginia was their "country."

During the next sixty days Lee rejected two great opportunities--or, if
you will, put aside two great temptations. If tradition is to be trusted,
it was during January that Lee refused to play the role of Cromwell by
declining to intervene directly in general Confederate politics. But there
remained open the possibility of his intervention in Virginia politics,
and the local crisis was in its own way as momentous as the general
crisis. What if Virginia had accepted the views of Lee and insisted upon
the immediate arming of the slaves? Virginia, however, did not do so; and
Lee, having made public his position, refrained from further
participation. Politically speaking, he maintained a splendid isolation at
the head of the armies.

Through January and February the Virginia crisis continued undetermined.
In this period of fateful hesitation, the "mountains of prejudice" proved
too great to be undermined even by the influence of Lee. When at last
Virginia enacted a law permitting the arming of her slaves, no provision
was made for their manumission.

Long before the passage of this act in Virginia, Congress had become the
center of the controversy. Davis had come to the point where no tradition
however cherished would stand, in his mind, against the needs of the
moment. To reinforce the army in great strength was now his supreme
concern, and he saw but one way to do it. As a last resort he was prepared
to embrace the bold plan which so many people still regarded with horror
and which as late as the previous November he himself had opposed. He
would arm the slaves. On February 10, 1865, bills providing for the arming
of the slaves were introduced both in the House and in the Senate.

On this issue all the forces both of the Government and the opposition
fought their concluding duel in which were involved all the other basal
issues that had distracted the country since 1862. Naturally there was a
bewildering criss-cross of political motives. There were men who, like
Smith and Lee, would go along with the Government on emancipation,
provided it was to be carried out by the free will of the States. There
were others who preferred subjugation to the arming of the slaves; and
among these there were clashings of motive. Then, too, there were those
who were willing to arm the slaves but were resolved not to give them
their freedom.

The debate brings to the front of the political stage the figure of R. M.
T. Hunter. Hitherto his part has not been conspicuous either as Secretary
of State or as Senator from Virginia. He now becomes, in the words of
Davis, "a chief obstacle" to the passage of the Senate bill which would
have authorized a levy of negro troops and provided for their manumission
by the War Department with the consent of the State in which they should
be at the time of the proposed manumission. After long discussion, this
bill was indefinitely postponed. Meanwhile a very different bill had
dragged through the House. While it was under debate, another appeal was
made to Lee. Barksdale, who came as near as any one to being the leader of
the Administration, sought Lee's aid. Again the General urged the
enrollment of negro soldiers and their eventual manumission, but added
this immensely significant proviso:

"I have no doubt that if Congress would authorize their [the negroes']
reception into service, and empower the President to call upon individuals
or States for such as they are willing to contribute, with the condition
of emancipation to all enrolled, a sufficient number would be forthcoming
to enable us to try the experiment [of determining whether the slaves
would make good soldiers]. If it proved successful, most of the objections
to the measure would disappear, and if individuals still remained
unwilling to send their negroes to the army, the force of public opinion
in the States would soon bring about such legislation as would remove all
obstacles. I think the matter should be left, as far as possible, to the
people and to the States, which alone can legislate as the necessities of
this particular service may require."

The fact that Congress had before it this advice from Lee explains why all
factions accepted a compromise bill, passed on the 9th of March, approved
by the President on the 13th of March, and issued to the country in a
general order on the 23d of March. It empowered the President to "ask for
and accept from the owners of slaves" the service of such number of
negroes as he saw fit, and if sufficient number were not offered to "call
on each State ...for her quota of 300,000 troops...to be raised from
such classes of the population, irrespective of color, in each State as
the proper authorities thereof may determine." However, "nothing in this
act shall be construed to authorize a change in the relation which the
said slaves shall bear toward their owners, except by consent of the
owners and of the States in which they may reside and in pursuance of the
laws thereof."

The results of this act were negligible. Its failure to offer the slave-
soldier his freedom was at once seized upon by critics as evidence of the
futility of the course of the Administration. The sneer went round that
the negro was to be made to fight for his own captivity. Pollard--whose
words, however, must be taken with a grain of salt--has left this account
of recruiting under the new act: "Two companies of blacks, organized from
some negro vagabonds in Richmond, were allowed to give balls at the Libby
Prison and were exhibited in fine fresh uniforms on Capitol Square as
decoys to obtain recruits. But the mass of their colored brethren looked
on the parade with unenvious eyes, and little boys exhibited the early
prejudices of race by pelting the fine uniforms with mud."

Nevertheless both Davis and Lee busied themselves in the endeavor to raise
black troops. Governor Smith cooperated with them. And in the mind of the
President there was no abandonment of the program of emancipation, which
was now his cardinal policy. Soon after the passage of the act, he wrote
to Smith: "I am happy to receive your assurance of success [in raising
black troops], as well as your promise to seek legislation to secure
unmistakable freedom to the slave who shall enter the Army, with a right
to return to his old home, when he shall have been honorably discharged
from military service."

While this final controversy was being fought out in Congress, the
enthusiasm for the Administration had again ebbed. Its recovery of
prestige had run a brief course and was gone, and now in the midst of the
discussion over the negro soldiers' bills, the opposition once more
attacked the Cabinet, with its old enemy, Benjamin, as the target.
Resolutions were introduced into the Senate declaring that "the retirement
of the Honorable Judah P. Benjamin from the State Department will be
subservient of the public interests"; in the House resolutions were
offered describing his public utterances as "derogatory to his position
as a high public functionary of the Confederate Government, a reflection
on the motives of Congress as a deliberative body, and an insult to public
opinion."

So Congress wrangled and delayed while the wave of fire that was Sherman's
advance moved northward through the Carolinas. Columbia had gone up in
smoke while the Senate debated day after day--fifteen in all--what to do
with the compromise bill sent up to it from the House. It was during this
period that a new complication appears to have been added to a situation
which was already so hopelessly entangled, for this was the time when
Governor Magrath made a proposal to Governor Vance for a league within the
Confederacy, giving as his chief reason that Virginia's interests were
parting company with those of the lower South. The same doubt of the upper
South appears at various times in the Mercury. And through all the tactics
of the opposition runs the constant effort to discredit Davis. The Mercury
scoffed at the agitation for negro soldiers as a mad attempt on the part
of the Administration to remedy its "myriad previous blunders."

In these terrible days, the mind of Davis hardened. He became possessed by
a lofty and intolerant confidence, an absolute conviction that, in spite
of all appearances, he was on the threshold of success. We may safely
ascribe to him in these days that illusory state of mind which has
characterized some of the greatest of men in their over-strained,
concluding periods. His extraordinary promises in his later messages, a
series of vain prophecies beginning with his speech at the African Church,
remind one of Napoleon after Leipzig refusing the Rhine as a boundary. His
nerves, too, were all but at the breaking point. He sent the Senate a
scolding message because of its delay in passing the Negro Soldiers' Bill.
The Senate answered in a report that was sharply critical of his own
course. Shortly afterward Congress adjourned refusing his request for
another suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Davis had hinted at important matters he hoped soon to be able to submit
to Congress. What he had in mind was the last, the boldest, stroke of this
period of desperation. The policy of emancipation he and Benjamin had
accepted without reserve. They had at last perceived, too late, the power
of the anti-slavery movement in Europe. Though they had already failed to
coerce England through cotton and had been played with and abandoned by
Napoleon, they persisted in thinking that there was still a chance for a
third chapter in their foreign affairs.

The agitation to arm the slaves, with the promise of freedom, had another
motive besides the reinforcement of Lee's army: it was intended to serve
as a basis for negotiations with England and France. To that end D. J.
Kenner was dispatched to Europe early in 1865. Passing through New York in
disguise, he carried word of this revolutionary program to the Confederate
commissioners abroad. A conference at Paris was held by Kenner, Mason, and
Slidell. Mason, who had gone over to England to sound Palmerston with
regard to this last Confederate hope, was received on the 14th of March.
On the previous day, Davis had accepted temporary defeat, by signing the
compromise bill which omitted emancipation. But as there was no cable
operating at the time, Mason was not aware of this rebuff. In his own
words, he "urged upon Lord P. that if the President was right in his
impression that there was some latent, undisclosed obstacle on the part of
Great Britain to recognition, it should be frankly stated, and we might,
if in our power to do so, consent to remove it." Palmerston, though his
manner was "conciliatory and kind," insisted that there was nothing
"underlying" his previous statements, and that he could not, in view of
the facts then existing, regard the Confederacy in the light of an
independent power. Mason parted from him convinced that "the most ample
concessions on our part in the matter referred to would have produced no
change in the course determined on by the British Government with regard
to recognition." In a subsequent interview with Lord Donoughmore, he was
frankly told that the offer of emancipation had come too late.

The dispatch in which Mason reported the attitude of the British
Government never reached the Confederate authorities. It was dated the
31st of March. Two days later Richmond was evacuated by the Confederate
Government.



Chapter XII. The Last Word

The evacuation of Richmond broke the back of the Confederate defense.
Congress had adjourned. The legislative history of the Confederacy was at
an end. The executive history still had a few days to run. After
destroying great quantities of records, the government officials had
packed the remainder on a long train that conveyed the President and what
was left of the civil service to Danville. During a few days, Danville was
the Confederate capital. There, Davis, still unable to conceive defeat,
issued his pathetic last Address to the People of the Confederate States.
His mind was crystallized. He was no longer capable of judging facts. In
as confident tones as ever he promised his people that they should yet
prevail; he assured Virginians that even if the Confederate army should
withdraw further south the withdrawal would be but temporary, and that
"again and again will we return until the baffled and exhausted enemy
shall abandon in despair his endless and impossible task of making slaves
of a people resolved to be free."

The surrender at Appomattox on April 9, 1865, compelled another migration
of the dwindling executive company. General Johnston had not yet
surrendered. A conference which he had with the President and the Cabinet
at Greensboro ended in giving him permission to negotiate with Sherman.
Even then Davis was still bent on keeping up the fight; yet, though he
believed that Sherman would reject Johnston's overtures, he was overtaken
at Charlotte on his way South by the crushing news of Johnston's
surrender. There the executive history of the Confederacy came to an end
in a final Cabinet meeting. Davis, still blindly resolute to continue the
struggle, was deeply distressed by the determination of his advisers to
abandon it. In imminent danger of capture, the President's party made its
way to Abbeville, where it broke up, and each member sought safety as best
he could. Davis with a few faithful men rode to Irwinsville, Georgia,
where, in the early morning of the l0th of May, he was surprised and
captured. But the history of the Confederacy was not quite at an end. The
last gunshots were still to be fired far away in Texas on the 13th of May.
The surrender of the forces of the Trans-Mississippi on May 26, 1865,
brought the war to a definite conclusion.

There remains one incident of these closing days, the significance of
which was not perceived until long afterward, when it immediately took its
rightful place among the determining events of American history. The
unconquerable spirit of the Army of Northern Virginia found its last
expression in a proposal which was made to Lee by his officers. If he
would give the word, they would make the war a duel to the death; it
should drag out in relentless guerrilla struggles; and there should be no
pacification of the South until the fighting classes had been
exterminated. Considering what those classes were, considering the
qualities that could be handed on to their posterity, one realizes that
this suicide of a whole people, of a noble fighting people, would have
maimed incalculably the America of the future. But though the heroism of
this proposal of his men to die on their shields had its stern charm for
so brave a man as Lee, he refused to consider it. He would not admit that
he and his people had a right thus to extinguish their power to help mold
the future, no matter whether it be the future they desired or not. The
result of battle must be accepted. The Southern spirit must not perish,
luxuriating blindly in despair, but must find a new form of expression,
must become part of the new world that was to be, must look to a new birth
under new conditions. In this spirit he issued to his army his last
address:

"After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and
fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to
overwhelming numbers and resources. I need not tell the survivors of so
many hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that I
have consented to the result from no distrust of them; but feeling that
valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the
loss that would have attended the continuation of the contest, I
determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past services
have endeared them to their countrymen.... I bid you an affectionate
farewell."

How inevitably one calls to mind, in view of the indomitable valor of
Lee's final decision, those great lines from Tennyson:

"Tho' much is taken, much abides; and tho'

We are not now that strength which in old days

Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are;

One equal temper of heroic hearts,

Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will."


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

There is no adequate history of the Confederacy. It is rumored that a
distinguished scholar has a great work approaching completion. It is also
rumored that another scholar, well equipped to do so, will soon bring out
a monumental life of Davis. But the fact remains that as yet we lack a
comprehensive review of the Confederate episode set in proper perspective.
Standard works such as the "History of the United States from the
Compromise of 1850", by J. F. Rhodes (7 vols., 1893-1908), even when
otherwise as near a classic as is the work of Mr. Rhodes, treat the
Confederacy so externally as to have in this respect little value. The one
searching study of the subject, "The Confederate States of America," by J.
C. Schwab (1901), though admirable in its way, is wholly overshadowed by
the point of view of the economist. The same is to be said of the article
by Professor Schwab in the 11th edition of "The Encyclopaedia Britannica."

Two famous discussions of the episode by participants are: "The Rise and
Fall of the Confederate Government," by the President of the Confederacy
(2 vols., 1881), and "A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the
States," by Alexander H. Stephens (2 vols., 1870). Both works, though
invaluable to the student, are tinged with controversy, each of the
eminent authors aiming to refute the arguments of political antagonists.

The military history of the time has so overshadowed the civil, in the
minds of most students, that we are still sadly in need of careful,
disinterested studies of the great figures of Confederate civil affairs.
"Jefferson Davis," by William E. Dodd ("American Crisis Biographies,"
1907), is the standard life of the President, superseding older ones. Not
so satisfactory in the same series is "Judah P. Benjamin," by Pierce
Butler (1907), and "Alexander H. Stephens," by Louis Pendleton (1907).
Older works which are valuable for the material they contain are: "Memoir
of Jefferson Davis," by his Wife (1890); "The Life and Times of Alexander
H. Stephens," by R. M. Johnston and W. M. Browne (1878); "The Life and
Times of William Lowndes Yancey," by J. W. Du Bose (1891); "The Life,
Times, and Speeches of Joseph E. Brown," by Herbert Fielder (1883);
"Public Life and Diplomatic Correspondence of James M. Mason," by his
Daughter (1903); "The Life and Time of C. G. Memminger," by H. D. Capers
(1893). The writings of E. A. Pollard cannot be disregarded, but must be
taken as the violent expression of an extreme partisan. They include a
"Life of Jefferson Davis" (1869) and "The Lost Cause" (1867). A charming
series of essays is "Confederate Portraits," by Gamaliel Bradford (1914).
Among books on special topics that are to be recommended are: "The
Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy" by J. M. Callahan (1901);
"France and the Confederate Navy," by John Bigelow (1888); and "The Secret
Service of the Confederate States in Europe," by J. D. Bulloch (2 vols.,
1884). There is a large number of contemporary accounts of life in the
Confederacy. Historians have generally given excessive attention to "A
Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital," by J. B. Jones
(2 vols., 1866) which has really neither more nor less value than a
Richmond newspaper. Conspicuous among writings of this type is the
delightful "Diary from Dixie," by Mrs. Mary B. Chestnut (1905) and "My
Diary, North and South," by W. H. Russell (1861).

The documents of the civil history, so far as they are accessible to the
general reader, are to be found in the three volumes forming the fourth
series of the "Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies" (128
vols., 1880-1901); the "Journals of the Congress of the Confederate
States" (8 vols., 1904) and "Messages and Papers of the Confederacy,"
edited by J. D. Richardson (2 vols., 1905). Four newspapers are of first
importance: the famous opposition organs, the Richmond Examiner and the
Charleston Mercury, which should be offset by the two leading organs of
the Government, the Courier of Charleston and the Enquirer of Richmond.
The Statutes of the Confederacy have been collected and published; most of
them are also to be found in the fourth series of the Official Records.

Additional bibliographical references will be found appended to the
articles on the "Confederate States of America," "Secession," and
"Jefferson Davis," in "The Encyclopaedia Britannica," 11th edition.