CONTENTS:

The Affair of Smyrna Campground.
Peachtree Creek: Preliminaries: Battle.
Battle of the Twenty-Second of July.
Battle of Ezra Chapel, Near Atlanta.
An Interim of Small Combats: Changes of Officers.
Grand Flank Movement Upon Hood's Communications.
Battle of Jonesboro'



THE AFFAIR OF SYMRNA CAMPGROUND

It is difficult to answer the question often asked, "When did the battle 
of Atlanta begin?"

One could commence an account very properly with Sherman's spring campaign 
of 1864, starting with the movements about the first of May; but it is 
better, perhaps, to skip the battles and combats for sixty days--which 
include Dalton, Resaca, Adairsville, Kingston, Cassville, Dallas, New Hope 
Church, Pickett's Mill, Muddy Creek, Pine Top, and Kenesaw Mountain, 
wherein we burrowed and flanked, and flanked and burrowed in front of the 
retreating Johnston till he was ready to cross the Chattahoochee, six 
miles from Atlanta--and come at once to the several actions which more 
immediately resulted in driving Johnston's successor, the famous Hood, 
from the stronghold of Atlanta.

Pursuing the latter course we take the reader to a place called Smyrna 
Campground, some six or seven miles above the Atlanta crossing of the 
Chattahoochee. It was a bright morning, the 4th of July, one year from the 
close of the battle of Gettysburg, and the anniversary of Pemberton's 
surrender of Vicksburg. (Many of the participators in these battles were 
standing there side by side.) Generals Sherman and Thomas had encamped 
with their headquarters in rear of the fourth corps, which I was at the 
time commanding. I had stepped over to the front of General Thomas's tent, 
and met himself, General Sherman, and several other officers. I was not 
yet sure just how we were to celebrate the day. Sherman and Thomas seemed 
to have been having a discussion concerning the situation of affairs. On 
my arrival the former, turning to me, said, "Howard, what are you waiting 
for? Why don't you go ahead?"

I replied, "The enemy is strongly intrenched yonder in the edge of the 
thick wood; we have come upon his skirmish-line."

"Oh, nonsense, Howard; he is laughing at you. You ought to move straight 
ahead. Johnston's main force must be across the river."

To this I answered, "You shall see, general." Immediately I directed 
General Stanley, who commanded a division and was present, to double his 
skirmishers and move briskly forward, with a view to develop the enemy's 
force, and with instructions to assault and carry the skirmish-line of the 
enemy. The enemy's outer line, sometimes denominated skirmish and 
sometimes picket line, was unusually strong, having short, deep trenches, 
with twenty or more men in each, distributed along the front in places not 
more than twenty or thirty yards asunder. There was an open grove of shade-
trees near us, but between this grove and the enemy's position lay quite a 
large open field. Generals Wood and Newton, commanding the other divisions 
of my corps, were ordered to move their skirmishers in conjunction with 
Stanley and on his right and left. All was in readiness by eleven A. M.

General Sherman, with an amused and doubtful expression of countenance, 
repaired with me to the shade-trees. Quickly, at a signal, the men sprang 
up and crossed that open field at a run. Instantly the hitherto silent 
Confederates opened their batteries and musketry along the concealed 
lines, but our men were too quick, and the skirmish trenches were captured 
and many prisoners taken in them; first on Stanley's front, then on 
Newton's, and then on Wood's. Our main forces moved up and held the 
position gained, within short musket-range. This kind of work had been the 
share of the fourth corps in many an encounter during the past two months, 
that is, to seize the enemy's skirmish-lines, extend the rifle-pits, put 
the batteries under cover at night on or near the line, and then to keep 
blazing away, actually for the purpose of holding a strong hostile body of 
men in front of us, thus facilitating Sherman's flanking operations.

The cannonade in this action was perfectly furious for a time; and the 
worst, most exposed place on our front was our grove of shade-trees. The 
general said, as the shot and shell crashed through the trees, that he was 
satisfied; so then we speedily moved to a safer place of observation.

Those hidden trenches in our front were a kind of outpost to Johnston's 
main works, which covered the Atlanta bridge. Referring to the latter, 
General Sherman remarks in his Memoirs: "I confess I had not learned 
beforehand of the existence of this strong place, in the nature of a tête-
du-pont, and had counted on striking him [Johnston] an effectual blow in 
the expected confusion of his crossing the Chattahoochee, a broad and deep 
river then to his rear." While General Thomas with the fourth, fourteenth, 
and twentieth corps was pushing square against these most formidable 
works, which had been previously constructed by a large force of slaves, 
General Schofield, with the army of the Ohio, was on his right, and 
General McPherson, with the army of the Tennessee, was still further 
beyond and below, opposite Turner's Ferry. Our lines were also extended in 
that direction for miles by the cavalry of General Stoneman. Garrard, with 
a division of cavalry, had been sent northward to cross the Chattahoochee 
at Roswell's factory. Our antagonist perceived that both his flanks were 
virtually turned, and though he could still occupy his magnificent bridge-
head and outworks, and make a strong fight against any direct attack, he 
knew this would be useless, for it would endanger his depots and lines of 
communication. At last he would have to leave them. My field notes of the 
5th say concerning the force in my front: "During the night the enemy 
again retreated." We pressed hard upon his rear guard the next morning, 
and followed it as far as Vining Station and Paice's Ferry near that 
point. This was the place where my chief of staff, Colonel Frank T. 
Sherman, to his great chagrin, was captured. While reconnoitring he had 
passed through a gap between my corps and the next on my right, not being 
aware of the exposure till startled by the enemy's call upon him to 
surrender. It was said that for some time the rumor was current in the 
Confederate camp that our commander-in-chief had been captured. Colonel 
Sherman, a prompt, bright, hearty man, had been of great assistance to me, 
and I missed his aid and companionship very much during my remaining 
connection with the fourth corps. One is never quite reconciled to loss by 
a capture that could so easily have been prevented.



PEACHTREE CREEK: PRELIMINARIES: BATTLE

It is a little hard to cross a broad river without bridges and with a 
swift current at any time, but of course very difficult with an 
enterprising enemy on the adverse bank. General Schofield was moved up to 
the neighborhood of Power's Ferry, and I followed in support, sending one 
division, Newton's, with Garrard's cavalry, to secure the crossing at 
Roswell's. The remainder of the army made demonstrations and trials of 
crossing at Paice's Ferry, pressed against Johnston's bridge-head, or were 
put in motion below the Atlanta bridge. The plan, apparently otherwise to 
Johnston, really was to move the left of the army over first. There was 
little or no trouble at Roswell's, and none where we were, at Power's. As 
soon as the upper force was well over the river, it moved southward in 
support of the troops who were next to cross. I sent General T. J. Wood 
with his division, on the 17th of the month, to sweep along the eastern 
bank and uncover Paice's Ferry, so that a bridge might be put across at 
that point. General Wood always delighted in duty, and enjoyed being 
trusted with anything that would try his skill or enterprise. Wood's 
movement was an important and a delicate one. This was owing to the rugged 
nature of the country, the want of roads, and the proximity of the enemy's 
masses to Paice's Ferry. It was satisfactorily executed, and without 
bringing on an engagement. McPherson now, moving from our right to the 
left, crossed his main force at Roswell's; Schofield, at the mouth of Soap 
Creek, above Power's Ferry; and Thomas, at Power's and Paice's ferries. It 
was on the night of the 16th that Johnston withdrew his last troops from 
his bridge-head to Atlanta. Therefore our forward movement began in good 
earnest on the 17th, and continued during the 18th and 19th. Sherman calls 
this march "a general right wheel" toward Atlanta. Of course, belonging to 
Thomas's command, I moved near the centre, that is, along the Buckhead and 
Atlanta road, encountering the usual cavalry opposition, road 
obstructions, and burning of creek bridges. The 18th of July, the day that 
Joe Johnston was relieved from the command of the Confederates, my column 
reached Buckhead. The next day, by getting an early start, we had struck 
the crossing of Peachtree Creek (a stream that has now become of historic 
importance) before seven A. M., and found some sort of works, logs and 
trenches, on the other side, with an enemy behind them. Wood's division 
touched the creek on the Buckhead road, Stanley's on the Decatur, and 
Newton's between the two. General Thomas now ordered me to cross this 
creek. Wood, by my direction, crossed, turned the small bridge-head, put 
the enemy to flight, and held the other bank, supported by Newton. Stanley 
repaired a bridge which he had partially saved from the flames, and 
secured his crossing in the usual way, that is, by temporary barricades 
and embankments constructed a hundred yards in advance of the bridge. All 
these operations required severe skirmishing but they are reckoned the 
preliminaries of a battle.

As there appeared to be some conflict in my orders received during the 
night, I visited General Thomas's head-quarters at daylight of the 20th. 
The general then instructed me to push one division forward on the direct 
Atlanta road, and to move the other two off to the left to the support of 
General Schofield's right flank. These instructions, which came from 
Sherman, now moving in person with Schofield, indicated to us his belief 
that Hood would give battle to his (Sherman's) left. In fact, the 
obstinacy of the cavalry in our front and the skirmish and outpost 
resistance in this quarter were of the sort to lead to such a surmise. 
Moreover, it would seem Hood's natural plan to assail the left with vigor 
in order to save his communications toward Augusta and Savannah, which 
were already half in McPherson's possession. I chose Newton's division for 
the direct road and work, and the other two, Stanley's and Wood's, for the 
movement to the left. After giving general instructions to General Newton, 
I was obliged to leave him to coöperate with Hooker's corps on his 
immediate right. If the exigencies of the day should require it, he was to 
go directly to General Thomas for more specific orders. I then accompanied 
the two divisions. Schofield was on a road a mile distant. As we moved in 
conjunction with his command, the gap was made wider. When we had reached 
the enemy in force in our front, there was a break in my line between Wood 
and Newton of at least two miles. McPherson, it will be remembered, was 
still further to the left, moving toward Stone Mountain.

Notice now, in brief recapitulation, the general position of Sherman's 
troops on the morning of the 20th of July, while moving and just before 
the battle. They were mostly on the south bank of Peachtree Creek, that 
is, for troops below the fork of that creek, and on the south bank of the 
south fork for troops above that point. Palmer's fourteenth corps, made up 
of Baird's, Davis's, and Johnson's divisions, were on the right (northwest 
of the town), near the Atlanta and Chattanooga railroad. Hooker's corps 
came next: Williams's, Geary's, and Ward's divisions in order. Then 
Newton's of my corps; then a gap of two miles; then Wood's and Stanley's. 
Schofield was next, and McPherson occupied the left, having already 
reached the Atlanta and Augusta railway. Our cavalry was just then on the 
extreme flanks, Garrard's division near McPherson, and the rest beyond the 
right of the general line.

I did not know till after the war that Joe Johnston, as he was familiarly 
called, had himself planned the attack, the account of which I am about to 
relate. I have said that Hood had been put into Johnston's place. It was 
done after Jeff Davis's well-known visit to Atlanta, and was without doubt 
an expression of his dissatisfaction with the constant retrograde 
movements of Johnston. The change took place on the 18th, two days before. 
Hood was well known to McPherson, Schofield, and myself, as we had been 
cadets with him at West Point. He always had a firm, resolute appearance, 
rather enjoyed a fight even while a cadet, and was not remarkable for 
flexibility of mind. He showed no indications of superior genius, but had 
an honest, manly way with him. Such recollections as these made us 
anticipate what occurred, that is, hard knocks often repeated as long as 
he had breath enough left in him to give them. General Sherman speaks of 
Schofield's estimate of Hood. I remember that he had mine also, but I am 
inclined to think that Sherman anticipated more wariness on Hood's part, 
and more manœuvring before battle, than the other generals did. Sherman 
was hardly ready for a general engagement at Peachtree Creek. Could Hood, 
like Johnston, have seen straight through hills, knolls, woods, and 
trackless wilds thickly set with underbrush, and have ascertained just how 
we were situated, he would have thrown a heavy column into the wide gap 
between Newton and Wood and put our right into a bad box, leaving the rest 
well outside of the box. Of course his success would not have been sure 
(nothing is sure in war), for our heavy left, consisting of two armies and 
part of another, might have swung around, still turning on Sherman's 
"general wheel," and thus cut off Hood from his moiety in the Atlanta 
works; so that while he was fighting Thomas desperately (for Thomas never 
gives up, he always fights desperately, as at the almost hopeless 
Chickamauga), the rest of us would have been manning the captured trenches 
at Atlanta. His success would not have been sure, because Thomas was 
indomitable and Sherman clear-headed and full of expedients, but the issue 
would have been more problematical.

Atlanta being a city of considerable size, no one is likely to have, 
before visiting it, a conception of the rough character of the approaches 
to it. There are no plains about it. The country is rolling and thickly 
wooded. The undergrowth is dense, with a few openings for cultivation. The 
creeks cut deep and run crooked. It is just the country to bring on a 
rough-and-tumble fight between hostile forces, where neither commander can 
anticipate precisely the place or the time of the conflict. General John 
Newton, an engineer officer of mark, had always a vivid knowledge of the 
possible and probable approaches of an enemy near him, and could not well 
be surprised. Notwithstanding his orders to advance toward Atlanta, he did 
not start from the creek till his bridges were well built, nor till Ward 
of Hooker's corps had come in sight with his division, to occupy a ridge 
on the right and close at hand. About one o'clock Newton began his 
movement, skirmishers in front, to the top of a ridge. Enemy's skirmishers 
fall back without much resistance at first, but increase their fire and 
stubbornness as he advances, showing the presence of a large support 
behind them. Newton deploys two brigades to the right and left at right 
angles to the road, moves the third along the road in columns of fours for 
support, and places a battery of four guns between his two front brigades. 
This formation, in the shape of the letter T, proved a most fortunate one, 
as we shall see. Newton's men covered their front rapidly with rough rail 
barricades, loose soil being thrown over them.

Hood's or Johnston's plan of attack was substantially as follows: to 
concentrate his strongest column opposite our right flank; to make a 
lively demonstration in front of Schofield, that is, against our centre 
(where Sherman was in person); also to keep McPherson occupied, at least 
with cavalry; all except the attacking force to retire gracefully and 
seductively till Thomas should be moving into the prepared ground south of 
the Peachtree Creek; then to deliver battle against Thomas with suddenness 
and fury.

Hood's advance extended from and beyond Newton's left far over to the 
right, covering one brigade of Palmer, a distance, probably, of little 
more than a mile. The ground near Newton and Ward was quite open. Geary's 
right and Williams's left, beyond Ward in lower ground, were in thickets 
and woods. I suspect Hood's starting was simultaneous throughout his 
front, though Geary and Newton appear to have been first reached. Newton's 
men had hardly placed their piles of rails, and were still carrying fresh 
supplies while their comrades were covering those in place with earth from 
the inside, and a new line of skirmishers pushing out from them was 
creeping cautiously forward, when, of a sudden, the shrill Confederate cry 
from a host of voices pitched on the highest key rang alone the whole 
front; a fearful yell, not easily described, but once heard never to be 
forgotten! On the enemies come, in masses rather than lines. They are 
close upon our men before they are seen. Our skirmishers fire and fall 
back, coming slowly within the rail piles. Every man gets ready at once. 
Our ranks are thin, theirs are thick, firm, and rapid. The three minutes 
before battle are the most trying to men situated as ours are, but they do 
not move. When all are in line and the battery ready between the brigades, 
Newton's words are given, repeated by his officers: "Commence firing. Fire 
steady and low." Instantly the furious rattle and booming begin. And fire 
draws fire. At first there is little apparent impression. The enemy keeps 
firing and advancing, with waving banners. Blake's and Kimball's brigades 
on the front are now hard at work. Our men are partially covered. Walker's 
Confederates confronting them are not. They fall rapidly; his lines begin 
to waver, his men hesitate and seek cover. At the same moment another 
Confederate division turns the flank in the big gap which I have 
mentioned, and starts for the bridges in Newton's rear. Bradley's brigade 
(Newton's reserve support) faces this new danger and pours in its fire. 
Newton has some eight or ten big guns in reserve, two good batteries, and 
what is more they are just where they are needed. Colonel Goodspeed, the 
artillery chief, sent them across the bridge on the main road, ready for 
action south of the creek. These, using canister, are leveled upon the 
enemy's flanking division, and as the swift Confederates advance toward 
the creek they are cut down like grain before the mowers. This battling is 
carried on under the eye of General Thomas, and probably by his immediate 
orders, for he is sure to be at the most threatened point at the right 
time. The enemy approach within one hundred yards of these guns, but no 
column of men can live to traverse the remaining distance. The hail and 
smoke increase, confusion begins in front, then a staggering, waving 
motion, then there is a general break for the rear, seen as the smoke is 
lifting; then for a time it is like the lull in a storm, firing almost 
ceasing on both sides. Later, one more attempt is made to turn this flank, 
but General Thomas has brought up an additional battery and so placed it 
as to break this advance more quickly than the previous one. Meanwhile 
Newton's right as well as his left, so great is the attacking force, is at 
first completely turned, causing his right brigade to change front toward 
the west; but quite promptly, just in the nick of time, Ward's division of 
the twentieth corps appears on the scene.

You have doubtless often stood on an irregular seashore where there are 
projecting points of land, rocks of different sizes, and inlets with 
abrupt banks. You have watched the incoming waters, wave following wave, 
breaking at the points, thrown into confusion at the rocks, and yet 
sweeping with inherent momentum within the inlet, to be thrown back by the 
inflexible banks. So shaped was General Hooker's front, and so like waves 
came on Hood's men, and so did they break against Newton and Geary in the 
outer front, while masses in ravines and intervals found inlets to surge 
into, till met and thrown back by Ward, Williams, and R. W. Johnson. All 
this chafing and surging that was not concealed by the forest and thickets 
and knolls, General Thomas could see from his post of observation near the 
creek.

Endeavoring to secure a closer cooperation, at two P. M. Ward's lines had 
reached the base of the ridge that Newton, as we have seen, was already 
fortifying. His (Ward's) skirmishers were already nearing the crest, when 
the same Confederate battle cry, fearful and shrill, was heard, and the 
enemy's regiments, with their glistening guns and restless flags, rolled 
out of the opposite wood, three or four hundred paces off. This time the 
brave skirmishers, instead of retiring and falling into their places 
behind the solid troops, held their ground by a brisk, rapid fire long 
enough for General Ward to unfold his lines and get well in motion 
forward. The brave Ward, fleshy and heavy as he always seemed at rest, now 
brightened into youthful activity. Following the impulse of a true 
soldier's instinct, he did not suffer his men to wait without cover, pale 
and sick at heart as men are apt to be at such a juncture, but put them at 
once into rapid motion, ascended the hill, absorbed his skirmishers as he 
went, and met the Confederate charge with a vigorous countercharge. An eye 
witness says, "So great was the momentum of this countercharge that 
several regiments became commingled, the rebels in such eases exhibiting 
the greatest disorder and submitting to capture without debate." At some 
points on Ward's front the enemy gave way at once and fled. At other 
points all on both sides went to firing anywhere, as men do when excited, 
delivering irregular volleys of musketry. Ward had no artillery in action 
here, yet the destruction of life was very great, and his own losses, as 
he had no cover, were heavy. Upwards of one hundred and fifty wounded, 
three hundred prisoners, and many battle flags fell into his hands. The 
enemy's dead, as usual, he could only roughly estimate.

General Geary (a Marshal Ney in size, deportment, and vigor), always on 
hand for a battle and sure to be in some exposed position, was this 
memorable afternoon on a hill quite as far advanced as Newton, making 
arrangements to intrench his skirmishers. He probably intended to bring 
hither his main lines. While thus engaged, the cry of battle, already too 
well known to him, was heard. Part of his line had an open field in front, 
but his right was in a densely wooded ravine closely set with underbrush. 
There was still a gap in the woods between him and Williams. Geary's 
division, from right to left, was made up of three brigades, commanded by 
Colonels Jones, Ireland, and Candy; and one battery only was at hand. They 
had left the bridge-head near the creek, and were fortifying a new 
position considerably in advance--I should say, just beginning to fortify--
when the blow came.

Without skirmishers, without previous warning, in masses with a quick, 
springy movement, the Confederates came upon Geary up there with his 
skirmishers. Of these, fifty per cent. of one regiment (all doing skirmish 
or picket duty), the thirty-third New Jersey, were instantly placed hors 
du combat. Geary passed quickly to his main infantry and battery force, 
where his left and centre brigade, by quick, low, and straight firing, 
held in check the fierce onset; but unfortunately his right brigade and 
part of Ireland's were confused by the woods and turned. They changed 
front as soon as they could, but being too late to hold on they were 
forced to fall back to the bridge-head of the morning. The contest in this 
front was not more furious than near Newton and Ward, but it was more 
evenly balanced than elsewhere. The trees and thickets afterward seemed to 
have been bruised and broken by some terrific tornado. This part of the 
fight, obstinate and sanguinary, was kept up till night, when the enemy 
slowly, reluctantly withdrew.

We have seen that Hood's troops passed Geary's flank. It was through a 
ravine between Geary and Williams. They then seem to have struck 
Robinson's brigade of Williams's division, even while he was in motion by 
the flank to connect with Geary. This brigade thus placed in the worst 
condition faced them, and received, to start with, a severe fire, yet 
wonderful to tell did not give way, but stood (those of course who were 
not wounded or slain) and returned the fire with increase. After a time 
Geary's regiment that had retired was brought up to help; recovering under 
Robinson's protection, they were sent, doubtless by General Hooker, to 
this support. Williams, the division commander, wide awake at the outset, 
at the first signal--Hood and his men ought to be thanked for their 
rallying cry, doubtless alarming to recruits, but a grand signal to 
veterans--immediately put into position abundant artillery, arranging it 
on his hill so as to get an oblique fire upon the enemy in the woods, in 
Robinson's and Geary's front. As the assault rolled along, like an oblique 
wave against the beach, it touched Williams's other two brigades, Knipes's 
and Ruger's, and even broke a little upon Anson MeCook's, of General 
Palmer's corps. An officer present, speaking of the battle on this front, 
which could not have equaled the prolonged contest at other points, says: 
"The awful picture of the battle as it raged at this moment, no pencil can 
paint or pen describe…Wounded men were borne to the rear by scores, the 
blood streaming from their lacerated flesh, and presenting a sight which 
at any other time would sicken the heart with horror."

This was Hood's first battle. It was well planned, and as well put into 
execution as it could be; but the steady, fearless resolve of our veteran 
soldiers won the day against a spirited and well-sustained attack, so that 
at dark our troops were masters of the bloody field. Our entire loss was 
not far from two thousand men, and the enemy's loss estimated, from the 
five hundred or six hundred dead and the several hundred prisoners left in 
our hands, to be in the neighborhood of five thousand. Estimates vary from 
five to seven of the wounded to one of the killed, but I confess they are 
not very reliable at such times.

The main success to Sherman was that Hood's attack, the 20th June, 1864, 
had failed, and Peachtree Creek was to be inscribed hereafter on our 
victorious banners.



BATTLE OF THE TWENTY-SECOND OF JULY

There are so many elements to deal with, namely, three small armies and 
two columns of cavalry, making altogether eight army corps or twenty-four 
divisions, each constituting a major-general's command, all operating 
simultaneously, that it becomes difficult to give a clear account and yet 
condense within reasonable limits.

On the 20th, Garrard's cavalry had been relieved from its watch on our 
left flank, and had gone, by General Sherman's orders, to burn some 
bridges and destroy the track and material along the Augusta railroad as 
far away as Covington. Stoneman, with the remaining cavalry, had not yet 
replaced Garrard. He was really needed where he was, to protect our line 
of communications against the enemy's enterprising raiders. For it may be 
remembered that what we call "raiding" had become about this period of the 
war a very popular method of petty annoyance to opponents, certainly 
bothersome and irritating to generals who had nerves. Railroad tracks 
broken; cars thrown off in transit; small bridges burned; trees, logs, and 
stones cast into the way; beef-cattle caught and driven off; everything at 
unexpected times and places, --all these things were chargeable to raiding.

Hood had abandoned the Peachtree Creek defenses after his unsuccessful 
battle on the night of the 20th, and had apparently drawn everything into 
the works close around Atlanta. (These works were mainly the ordinary 
redoubts nicely arranged for heavy guns, and connected by shallow dry 
ditches sometimes called "curtains of intrenchment," with an abundance of 
obstacles in front, such as abattis, chevaux-de-frise, felled trees and 
brushwood.) We pressed up during the day on all the roads, marching in the 
same general order, and coming together so as to close the gap in my corps 
and to crowd out that portion of the sixteenth corps (Dodge's) which was 
with the field-army. Schofield and McPherson, having turned gradually 
toward Atlanta from the east, had passed Decatur. General J. W. Sprague, 
with his brigade, was left at Decatur by McPherson, to replace Garrard at 
that point and protect the trains.

McPherson, following, substantially the line of the Augusta railroad, 
moving in a westerly direction, encountered the enemy's observing force 
soon after leaving Decatur, and drove it steadily toward Atlanta. Coming 
upon the enemy's abandoned rifle-pits, now in plain sight of the city, he 
placed the fifteenth corps (Logan's) in position and brought up the 
seventeenth on its left. General F. P. Blair, then commanding the 
seventeenth, gives a detailed account of this movement: "After marching 
three or four miles [from Decatur] I struck the road running nearly north 
nnd south in front of Cloy's house. At this point the fourth division, 
Brigadier-General Gresham's, discovered the enemy posted half or three 
quarters of a mile west of Cloy's road [nearer Atlanta] in a strip of 
timber, who immediately opened with artillery upon my advance." …Blair 
deployed his lines, replied with artillery, and "drove the enemy full a 
mile and a quarter to a ridge of hills. At this point my right connected 
with Major-General Logan [fifteenth corps]."

A bald bill was on the left of this position, from which a sharp-shooter 
wounded Brigadier-General Gresham, who was not only an able and gallant 
officer in action, but excellent in council. His loss from the front at 
this time was much felt. Blair sent another division commander, General 
Leggett, an order to assault this hill. This order, for some unexplained 
reason, he did not get on the evening of the 20th, but "with great 
gallantry carried into effect" the morning, of the 21st. The division 
moved upon the enemy's works at a double-quick, capturing forty or fifty 
prisoners. The position being important, the enemy attempted to regain 
this bald hill, but was handsomely repulsed, Gresham's division having 
been brought up to assist.

General Giles A. Smith, a clear-headed, self-possessed soldier, who, it 
will be remembered, became Assistant Postmaster-General after the war, was 
assigned to the division of Gresham on the latter being disabled by his 
wound. The ridge terminating in what, since Leggett's combat for it, has 
been called Leggett' s Hill, formed the left of the general line. We now 
had every part of Sherman's force, except the cavalry, in position facing 
Atlanta and connected from left to right: McPherson's command including 
Blair, Logan, and Dodge (the latter's force mainly in reserve); 
Schofield's, the twenty-third corps (Cox's), and a few other troops; 
Thomas's, the fourth (Howard), twentieth (Hooker), and fourteenth 
(Palmer); the whole extending around almost a semicircle from Leggett's 
Hill, just south of the Atlanta and Augusta railroad, to the south of the 
Chattanooga and Atlanta railroad.

Now, when Garrard's cavalry was away from the left, was the opportune time 
for Hood. During the night of the 21st, leaving a smaller force in the 
works close around the city, to keep our attention and resist any attempt 
at assault, he moved Hardee's and his own corps, now under Stephen D. Lee, 
by quite a detour, probably of eight or ten miles, to the McDonough and 
Decatur road, and having by this means gained our unprotected left and 
rear, he formed lines of assault under cover of the night and the favoring 
forests.

Through the thick woods, and much impeded by underbrush, the Southern men 
worked their way forward in lines, skirmishers in front, and sprang upon 
General Giles A. Smith's division without warning, precisely as Stonewall 
Jackson had led his troops, twenty-five thousand strong, to the attack of 
the right of the eleventh corps at Chancellorsville. A regular battery, 
some field-hospital material, and some pioneers and soldiers detailed to 
assist them, were immediately captured, but General Smith's veterans 
sprang over and into the Confederate works, and quickly repelled the first 
assault. By this time the enemy, from the continuous line of attack, had 
swept around to Smith's front so as to come up on the reverse side of the 
old parapet. Smith's men sprang back to their first position, and, facing 
them again, fought hard and drove the enemy back from this quarter. Few 
troops, with their flank turned in this way by an enveloping force, can 
ever be kept in position. General Smith and his corps commander, General 
Blair, were justly proud of this feat of arms, namely, repelling the enemy 
in two opposite directions with a line in air, gradually withdrawing with 
a comparatively small loss, and finally making a strong flank for Leggett 
at the highest point of the hill. While this struggle was going on, 
Dodge's command was in motion by a country road ruuning south of west, and 
was thus, fortunately, well situated as an effective reserve for this 
sudden emergency. They were marching by the flank, so that on the enemy's 
approach through the wood they simply halted and faced to the left, and 
doubtless surprised Hardee himself by an unexpected vigorous fire well 
directed into his swinging flank. At the first onset McPherson was with 
General Sherman, not far from the famous Howard house. Hearing the sharp 
clangor of musketry not far off, in the direction of his rear and left 
flank, he mounted immediately, and followed by his aids and orderlies rode 
rapidly toward the sound of battle. As he neared the seventeenth corps, 
the noise of artillery and musketry increased so much that he sent off 
messengers for reënforcements to the fifteenth corps, and elsewhere with 
information and warning. He in person gave orders to Dodge's command, and 
then passed on up the road southward, the route Dodge was following. There 
was an interval not yet closed in his line of battle, but the woods were 
thick, and it was doubtless inconceivable to McPherson that his 
seventeenth corps flank could be so far passed by the enemy as to endanger 
his passage to his own troops on the front; but so it was; and he there 
received the fatal shot. It was probably a volley that was fired, as his 
horse was badly wounded at the same time, and ran back bleeding without 
him.

General Logan, being next in rank in the army of the Tennessee, was at 
once assigned by General Sherman to McPherson's command, for the battle. 
Besides putting his left into good practical shape, he sent Martin's 
brigade of the fifteenth corps to further strengthen the exposed flank. 
The first check by Blair, together with Dodge's successful counter-charge 
from his fortunate position, and then the bloody repulse along Blair's 
front, only opened the battle. Hardee, followed by Lee, had marched many 
long miles, and pressed with extreme difficulty through the thick and 
tangled wilderness. Hood would never give up with merely one effort. 
Stephen D. Lee was noted for his energy and enterprise, and Hardee was 
also a thorough soldier. It is not surprising to find this battle renewed 
again and again at different points after the enemy had successfully 
gained the rear of the exposed flank. There was sudden charging, rapid 
firing, and then a counter-charge. Ground was gained and then lost. The 
woods kept up a continuous roar from eleven A. M. till four P. M. The 
Confederate Wheeler with his cavalry had made one desperate trial for the 
wagons at Decatur. Our General Sprague with his infantry brigade assailed, 
dispersed, and drove off this cavalry, and sent the train into safety 
behind my position in the line.

During the afternoon, as I found that the battle continued, and as I was 
under orders not only to keep the force already in my front along the 
strong line of intrenchments busily employed, but also to hold myself in 
readiness to go to Logan's aid if needed, I rode over to General Sherman's 
position at the Howard house. He and General Schofield were there, both 
mounted and watching the movements of troops which were in plain sight. 
They were near the right of the fifteenth corps. Just before this time 
Hood's men had broken the line of the fifteenth corps at the place which 
had been weakened by the withdrawal of Martin's brigade. Lightburn's 
brigade, near the break, doubtless too much stretched out, had dropped 
back considerably, aud DeGress's four-gun battery of choice thirty-two 
pounders had fallen into the enemy's possession. The proudest of battery 
commanders, Captain DeGress, exhibiting much feeling and complaining of 
his loss, was standing near Sherman. Schofield had caused several cannon 
to be so located as to give a sweeping fire along the line of works at the 
interval held by the enemy, and also to bear on the approaches from 
Atlanta in order to keep back any more Confederates. These cannon were 
blazing away with a terrific roar, making volumes of smoke. Just then 
General Charles R. Woods (known in the army as " Susan" Woods; called 
Susan, in cadet fashion, probably because of his ungirl-like qualities, 
except perhaps his modesty of deportment, for he was the largest, tallest, 
stoutest officer on the ground, showing at all times a nerve unconscious 
of danger), was drawing out his brave division by the flank, in column of 
fours at right angles to the occupied line of works. He formed this line 
under cover of the batteries, while they were pouring solid shot and 
canister into the gap which he wished to regain. As soon as ready, his 
division moved steadily on till it had swept the lost interval clean of 
Confederates, rcgained DeGress's much coveted battery, and entrapped many 
prisoners.

General Schofield now suggested to General Sherman that it would be well 
to follow up the retreating enemy with his command, and thus interpose a 
corps between Hood's flanking force and Atlanta, but Sherman thought he 
would not risk it, and said, "Let the army of the Tennessee fight it out, 
this time." The esprit de corps was much increased by these independent 
successes, but my judgment would have leaned to Schofield's suggestion at 
this crisis, for it seemed the opportune moment to strike a decisive blow. 
Still, if it had failed of absolute success, it were better not to have 
undertaken it. Hood finally gave up his attempts and retired into his 
Atlanta works, carrying with him several guns and many prisoners. He 
issued confident bulletins, as if he had won a victory; but he really had 
not, though he had inflicted great injury. We had now fought ourselves 
into a good position to resist a sally, and were becoming familiar with 
this rough wilderness around the city. There was great mourning for 
McPherson, who had been fully trusted by his command, and much beloved by 
all who had come into personal contact with him.

We now spent four days in renewing supplies, putting batteries into 
position, and covering the troops with strong earth-works. Atlanta could 
be seen plainly from several points, and shells were easily landed by our 
rifled cannon within the city limits. It was a partial siege, but like 
that of Yorktown under McClellan, where a complete investment was 
impossible, it would be a long one to terminate while the enemy's 
communication remained intact. On the 24th or 26th, I was reconnoitring 
with General Sherman along my own front (that of the fourth corps), when 
he asked me, "How would you like McPherson's army to command?" I remember 
to have said, "I have a good corps and am satisfied, and as General Hooker 
is senior to me in rank he might be deeply offended." General Sherman said 
in substance, "General Thomas and I have considered the subject, and we 
think you had better be assigned." I replied again, "General, Hooker is a 
good commander, and I believe will be really truer to you than you think." 
General Sherman, with a little of his quick impatience when unexpectedly 
hindered by opposition, said, "Hooker has not the moral qualities that I 
want--not those adequate to the command; but if you don't want promotion, 
there are plenty who do." I answered, "General Sherman, you misunderstand 
me; I am grateful for your confidence and that of General Thomas, and will 
undertake anything." No more passed between us till the evening of the 
26th, which brought to my tent a dispatch from the president, assigning me 
to the command of the army and department of the Tennessee, that is, to 
the place made vacant by the death of McPherson. He was in the class 
before me at West Point. I followed him in the office of quartermaster-
sergeant of cadets the third year, also of quartermaster of cadets the 
fourth year, and was elected to succeed him as president of the Cadets' 
Literary Society. Now here again, in the field, Providence made me his 
successor in the more responsible office. It was at that time a hard place 
to fill. Some of the warm friends of McPherson thought that I could not 
satisfactorily hold his place and keep up the confidence of the army. Some 
of Logan's friends were ambitious for him to succeed to the position, as 
they thought he had already shown the adequate ability and was not a "West 
Point man." Prejudice against officers from the Potomac existed to some 
extent. The personal gossip of mischief-makers came in here to make me a 
great deal of trouble at first, but the steady confidence of the parallel 
commanders, Thomas and Schofield, and the frank, genuine support of 
General Sherman, who always told objectors and fault-finders to wait and 
see, added to the true patriotism and observing loyalty of the command, 
soon gave me the footing I needed.



BATTLE OF EZRA CHAPEL, NEAR ATLANTA

The army of the Tennessee was already in motion, from our left toward the 
right of the general line, when at daylight on the 27th of July I joined 
its head of column, as it was crossing the Buckhead and Atlanta wagon-
road. General Sherman, who rode with me as far as the right of Palmer's 
line, there indicated the wooded ridge on which he wished me to form. He 
hoped that I could get hold of Hood's railroad before he could so extend 
his intrenchments as to cover and protect it. He thought I had better run 
my line along the ridge, which was mostly covered thickly with trees, by 
continuing the usual flank march in column of fours. But as the general 
did not order me to preserve this formation I asked to vary from it, 
giving my reasons. I said to him that I anticipated another blow from Hood 
as I pushed my right flank into the air, and that I would like to unfold 
by division, that is, by army division, with a view of having each 
division succeeding the first protect the flank of the one ahead. Sherman 
said pleasantly, "I don't think Hood will trouble you now, but would 
rather you would deploy in your own way." General Dodge's corps took the 
lead. General Corse, one of his division commanders, who subsequently 
became distinguished for his indomitable defense of our provision depot at 
Allatoona Pass, was then in advance, and deployed his line on the ridge 
not far from Palmer's right. He got as near as possible to the enemy's 
line concealed in the thicket, curving his own and facing it toward 
Atlanta. General Fuller's division deployed, passed beyond Corse, and 
wheeled into line. Succeeding divisions did the same. The long march, the 
preliminary reconnoissance in a new place, and the difficulties of the 
ground in the immediate presence of the enemy consumed the day, so that 
General Blair's corps, following Dodge's, was barely in position at 
nightfall. I had the fifteenth corps (General Logan's) in reserve.

This movement was resumed at dawn of the 28th. Logan marched slowly and 
carefully into position, while Blair and Dodge covered their front as well 
as possible by rails, and by digging and scooping up of soil with the tin 
of broken canteens, and bayonets, and with the hands. (It will be 
remembered that the enemy captured pioneers and tools belonging to these 
troops, when Hood turned their position at the beginning of the last 
battle on the 22d of July.) The skirmishers in front of the fifteenth 
corps were resisted more and more as they advanced eastward; when the last 
division, General Morgan L. Smith's, was crowning a ridge in his front, 
General Sherman and I were together in rear of it, in the neighborhood of 
the line of battle. The enemy had opened a battery not far off, and what 
was apparently grape-shot or canister was striking and crashing through 
the tree-tops over our heads; occasionally there was the explosion of a 
shell uncomfortably near; and the report reached me that our skirmishers 
could get ahead no farther. I directed that the front be covered as 
rapidly as possible with rails and logs. There was an open space but 
partially cleared of old trees and stumps, and rather a steep slope, just 
in rear of Logan's hill. The officers and men worked rapidly in piling up 
rails and logs. Batteries were brought up so as to be near at hand; 
reserves were carefully located, and so instructed as to be ready for any 
emergency. General Sherman, hardly thinking yet that a battle was near at 
hand, after telling me that Morgan's division of Palmer's corps had been 
sent by him to make a reconnoissance to Turner's Ferry, beyond my 
position, and would soon return as a protection to my right flank, went 
back to his headquarters near General Thomas's position, leaving the right 
to my care. Morgan L. Smith had just located a battery to encage the 
troublesome one to which I had referred, placed somewhere in the blind 
woods in his front, when the well-known piercing yell came to our ears 
with its continuous, tumultuous, increasing sound.

"Be ready, boys!" passed quickly along the lines as every man dropped into 
his place, kneeling behind his fragile protection, or lying on his stomach 
with his head raised and musket in hand, watching through the trees. "Take 
steady aim, and fire low at the word," are the orders. In three minutes 
after the charging cry, glimpses of the on-coming line are seen in the 
thickets; gleams of bright bayonets, or gun-barrels, or swords flash 
through to the watching eyes. Then the fire (nobody knows who began it), 
roar of cannon, rattle of musketry, breaking of trees, running back of a 
few scared men and officers – very, very few – from the right flank, which 
is enveloped at the first charge. Logan brightens always after the battle 
is really joined; be gives all orders clearly, goes back a little for 
stragglers and drives them with voice, horse, and drawn sabre to duty. The 
attack burst on the front of Generals Harrow's, Wood's, and Morgan L. 
Smith's divisions; and, fearing the necessity of support, I sent at once 
to General Blair to give us all the troops he could spare. In response, 
four regiments were sent. In less than twenty minutes from the first 
assault, Captain Gilbreth, of my staff, placed two of these regiments on 
the right. Lieutenant-Colonel Strong, my inspector-general, led two 
others, fortunately provided with breech-loading guns, to clear the same 
flank. Quickly they came into line, and they were quick to commence that 
fire that never stops till the ammunition is exhausted. Enemies were close 
up to the right, some on the rails already, some past them, when these 
fearful weapons swept this part of the field. Hood's men fell where they 
were; few got back thence. I had batteries put into position by my chief 
of artillery, a little to the rear of the right flank, that could sweep 
every approach and cover easily a quarter of a circle. A slight épaulement 
was raised in a few minutes, while the guns were already at work. A few 
words of my report, written while everything was fresh in recollection, 
bring out the method of this defense: " The position occupied was a very 
strong one, naturally, to resist a front attack; but I supposed that the 
enemy had now discovered the right, and would push in a body to hold that 
point before making his second assault. Therefore, in order to secure my 
right more substantially, twenty-six pieces of artillery were placed in 
position in such a way as to sweep the approaches in that direction."

The attack of Hood, or of his representative, Stephen D. Lee (a classmate 
of mine at West Point, – he appeared and was recognized by our men, urging 
on his troops), was renewed again and again during the day. It was as 
severe a musketry engagement as it was my fortune to see during the war. 
Our men, being in position, had the advantage. The slight cover of rails 
and logs was a great protection. They fired low, and ceased firing when 
the enemy was driven back, thus keeping cool and self-possessed. As I 
moved along the line to make a better acquaintance with my forces, the men 
cheered, and their officers said all preferred to fight the battle through 
without being replaced by others, who were waiting at hand to give them a 
rest. Logan's report says Colonel W. W. Belknap brought him reënforcements 
of two regiments from General Blair, and Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips four 
regiments from General Dodge. "These troops were received at a time when I 
much needed them, and, under the skillful management of the officers who 
commanded them, acted gallantly until the battle was ended."

It was necessary to meet Hood's assaults all along my line with active 
firing, and having used up all the reserves that I cared to spare from 
Blair and Dodge for the fifteenth corps front, and finding that the 
enemy's assaults exhibited singular pertinacity, I feared that by 
continually throwing in fresh troops he might at last succeed in breaking 
our line, as he had done on the 22d, at one point. For these reasons I 
asked General Sherman to send me at least a brigade.

At first Sherman replied, "Morgan's division will be back in time, and 
will come in on your right flank." But Morgan, delayed by the enemy's 
cavalry, did not appear. Toward night I sent my brother, Lieutenant-
Colonel Charles H. Howard, then on my staff, to represent the facts to the 
general. He sent me a brigade immediately. I learned, I think it was 
through Colonel Howard on his return from Sherman, that those men who had 
given way at the first onset had fled as far as Sherman's headquarters, 
and that an officer had headed them in the retreat, and had said to the 
general, "Everything is lost; the troops are missing, McPherson; if you 
don't at once take care of that flank you will be defeated!" Sherman 
simply asked, "Is General Howard there?" "Yes." "Then I shall wait for his 
report."

It is difficult to fight any battle without suffering from at least a few 
stragglers and croakers. Approaching the battle line during the progress 
of an engagement, the nearer you come to the actual front, the cooler and 
steadier you find the men. This was my first trial with these troops, and 
I was delighted with their conduct. Our losses were in the neighborhood of 
six hundred. In a letter to General Sherman, dated July 29th (the next day 
after the battle), I reported the enemy's dead at six hundred and forty-
two. Between one and two hundred more bodies were subsequently found, and 
two hundred prisoners taken. As it was presumed that many others were 
removed, as well as the wounded, our officers estimated Hood's loss in 
this battle at upwards of five thousand all told.

I meditated sweeping the field after the last repulse, and making a bold 
push for Atlanta, but the troops were tired, Morgan's division was still 
held back, and it was near night, so that I contented myself with the old 
game, namely, "strengthening the skirmishers and pushing them out." This 
was done as Lee drew his defeated men within the Atlanta works, and opened 
on our advance with his musketry and artillery reserves. Thus ended Hood's 
third attempt to defeat Sherman and drive him from Atlanta.



AN INTERIM OF SMALL COMBATS: CHANGES OF OFFICERS

From this battle to the 26th of August the enemy stood on the defensive, 
and "our command," in the words of Blair, "was occupied in making 
approaches, digging rifle pits, and erecting batteries, being subjected 
day and night to a galling fire of artillery and musketry." During these 
operations of pressing up closer and closer to the enemy's lines, putting 
our batteries in place within forty or fifty yards of his, a man could not 
put up a hand without drawing fire. The heads of the men were protected by 
a large piece of timber laid upon the embankment, which the soldiers named 
"the top log." General Dodge was one day reconnoitring under this cover, 
when a ball struck his head and gave him a serious and painful wound, and 
he retired from the field. General S. E. G. Ransom succeeded him, a young 
man, very able and very handsome, like his father, who fell in the Mexican 
war. Before the close of the campaign he, too, gave up his life.

General Lightburn was also disabled by a wound, and General Hazen, at my 
request, succeeded to his division. General Osterhaus, returning from a 
leave of absence, took General Charles R. Wood's division of the fifteenth 
corps, and General Wood passed to the third division, seventeenth corps. 
By lengthening the fourth and twentieth corps fronts, the fourteenth was 
drawn out and passed beyond me. Schofield with his command moved from the 
left to the right. A little trouble arose concerning seniority, during 
this movement. General Hooker took offense at my assignment, apparently 
because he was senior to me, and thought that he should have been chosen. 
He probably forgot that he had previously done substantially the same 
thing as Sherman, that is, he let a junior general command a corps while 
his senior was commanding a division. General Palmer now took offense 
because General Schofield (really a junior, but acting senior because 
commanding an army under the president's assignment) was placed by General 
Sherman in charge of a combined movement to strike the enemy's 
communications. Palmer was thus put under Schofield's command. He gave up 
his own command and went home. General Jeff. C. Davis (now so well known 
to the country) succeeded to Palmer's corps.



GRAND FLANK MOVEMENT UPON HOOD'S COMMUNICATIONS

We now come to the final movement before the fall of Atlanta. It will be 
noticed that Sherman kept withdrawing his forces from the general left and 
gaining ground to the right, both by the transfer and by thinning and 
extending the lines of two corps, the fourth (Stanley's) and the twentieth 
(Williams's). We hugged the works of the enemy closely, and by sudden 
movements endeavored to circumvent Hood's left flank and strike the 
railroads to his rear, but he was too wary and active to allow us to do 
this. He extended as rapidly as we did, dug the same sort of ditches, 
completed batteries, made épaulements revetted with logs, had good flank 
covers, and the "Johnnies" rivaled the "Yanks" even in the size and 
arrangement of the top logs for protection. We were having all the 
exhausting labor and worry of a regular siege without being able to first 
invest this forest city. Failing in these safer attempts, Sherman, more 
fertile than any other man in expedients and being now aware that 
Stoneman's cavalry had failed to make any decided impression in its raid 
upon Hood's communications (which raid, it will be remembered, resulted in 
the discomfiture and capture of General Stoneman himself), determined to 
move his army in a body across Hood's lines of supply, leaving behind only 
a detachment of Thomas's army – Williams's corps – safely intrenched 
beyond the Chattahoochee.

The manner in which this movement was effected was somewhat like that of a 
battalion of three divisions changing front, faced to the rear on the 
right division. General Schofield, being near Atlanta at the West Point 
railroad, turned his command like the pivot division and faced east. My 
army was drawn out and marched on the outer circuit to Renfrew's place. 
General Thomas swung the fourteenth and the fourth corps into position 
midway between Atlanta and Renfrew. Kilpatrick with his division of 
cavalry reported to me during this march, and watched my front and right 
flank while moving.

August 16th, General Sherman issued his Special Field Order, No. 57, the 
substance of which appears in the following extracts:--

"I.…First move: General Kilpatrick's cavalry will move to Camp Creek; 
General Schofield will cover the Campbellton road, and General Thomas will 
move one corps (General Williams's) to the Chattahoochee bridge, with 
orders to hold it; Paice's Ferry bridge, and a pontoon bridge (Captain 
Kossack's) at Turner's Ferry, ready to be laid down if necessary. The 
other corps, General Stanley's, will move south of Proctor's Creek to near 
the Utoy, behind the right centre of the army of the Tennessee, prepared 
to cover the Bell's Ferry road. General Garrard's cavalry will fall behind 
Peachtree Creek, and act against the enemy should he sally against General 
Williams's or General Stanley's corps during the movement.

"Second move: the army of the Tennessee will withdraw, cross Utoy Creek, 
and move by the most direct road toward Fairburn, going as far as Camp 
Creek. General Thomas will mass his two corps, Generals Stanley's and 
Johnson's, below Utoy Creek, and General Garrard's cavalry will join 
General Thomas by the most direct road, or by way of Sandtown bridge, and 
act with him during the rest of the move. General Schofield will advance 
abreast of, and in communication with, the army of the Tennessee, as far 
as Camp Creek.

"Third move: the armies of the Ohio and Tennessee will move direct for the 
West Point road, aiming to strike it between Red Oak and Fairburn; General 
Thomas will follow, well closed up in two columns, the trains between. 
General Kilpatrick will act as the advance, and General Garrard will cover 
the rear under direction of General Thomas. The bridge at Sandtown will be 
kept and protected by a detachment of cavalry detailed by General Elliott, 
with a section of guns or four-gun battery.

"II.…During the movement, and until the army returns to the river, the 
utmost care will be taken to expose as little as possible the trains of 
cars and wagons. The depots at the bridge, at Allatoona and Marietta, will 
be held against any attack, and communication kept up with the army as far 
as possible by way of Sandtown. On reaching any railroad the troops will 
at once be disposed for defense, and at least one third put to work to 
tear up track and destroy iron, ties, and all railroad materials."

General Sherman suspended this order when he learned that Hood had sent 
off his cavalry upon a raid, but it was subsequently put into execution, 
with such modification from time to time as the actual march necessitated.

General Thomas began on the night of the 25th, as directed. By his 
marchings toward the rear and toward our right, the rear movement being 
much the more exposed, Hood was completely deceived. Having myself already 
prepared a new left flank to guard against a sally from Atlanta after 
Thomas's withdrawal, I had my command in readiness to begin the withdrawal 
in two columns as soon as it was dark on the night of the 26th. In perfect 
silence, twenty-five thousand men were wakened. Each column started 
quietly, following its guide, who had familiarized himself with the road 
that he was to take. Regiment followed regiment, brigade followed brigade, 
till the whole ground was cleared. Even the ordinary rattle of the wheels 
of batteries and wagons had been obviated by various contrivances. Of a 
sudden, as the rear of our column was just clearing the old camping-
ground, the enemy appeared to suspect what we were attempting to do, and 
opened fire with artillery. The cannon sounded louder than ever in the 
stillness of the night, and we feared that the suddenness and terrific 
nature of this firing, the round shot breaking branches and lopping trees 
in close proximity to the dim pathway, might throw some of our troops into 
confusion and create an extensive panic in the command. Nothing in the way 
of confusion and horror can exceed a panic in the woods and at night, for 
an army with loaded muskets in hand. I recall one, near the Chain Bridge 
in Virginia, when every man was alarmed by a sudden firing, supposed to 
come from an enemy. Men sprang to their feet, brigades were broken, 
regiments dispersed, some ran and some lay down, but all fired in wild 
panic. There was talking in a high key, cursing, pleading, moaning. Many 
were killed and hundreds wounded during that fearful night while 
Sedgwick's division was marching from Vienna to the Chain Bridge, after 
the second Bull Run disaster. But, providentially, at Atlanta the enemy's 
random fire effected comparatively little damage. One man was killed, and 
only one man was reported wounded. He had a leg broken by a round shot. By 
the break of day we were far on our way. Kilpatrick, who was in the van, 
kept the road pretty well cleared of the enemy. Wheeler, his enterprising 
antagonist, had some of his cavalry in our front. At every favorable 
ground, for example at the crossing of creeks large enough to bridge, 
Wheeler would cross over, burn or otherwise destroy the bridge, make a 
rail obstruction across the road and on the sides in the timber, and fire 
upon Kilpatrick's advance. This was done with carbines and rifles, and 
sometimes with two pieces of artillery. When the opposition was too 
strong, the cavalry would be massed, off to the right and left of the 
road, and a battery be brought forward at a trot, supported by infantry. 
This expedient generally put the enemy quickly to flight. In some cases 
these positions had to be turned by infantry soldiers working around their 
flank, before the enemy would abandon the shelter and leave. I never could 
quite get accustomed to the use of cavalry. Small numbers of horse-men 
always took up much space. It was difficult to manœuvre them in a country 
as broken and rough as that in Central Georgia, and when in camp it always 
appeared as if it would take too long for them to get ready for action. in 
case of surprise, it seemed perilous to sleep in a cavalry camp, owing to 
so very many articles of equipment, as saddles, bridles, blankets, 
halters, holsters, sabres, carbines, and so on, being scattered around, 
and not easily to be put into orderly condition except upon the cavalrymen 
themselves when mounted, and upon their horses. My instinctive 
apprehension in the presence of cavalry camps and cavalry movements, I 
think, made me admire the successful cavalry officer the more. About 
Kilpatrick, in camp, I often found all the ease and apparent or necessary 
irregularity to which I have referred; but he was quick to saddle, quick 
to mount, and, as I discovered during this march, very systematic in 
massing, deploying, and otherwise using his cavalry. In Kilpatrick's case 
the apparent recklessness was only in the seeming, for his watches were 
well out, and his own ears always open. I spoke of two columns. Logan 
headed one, which marched via Utoy to Camp Creek; Blair, followed by 
Ransom, took the other, by Lickskillet, to the same point. These men, 
wagons, and horses filling the roads, well closed up, made their silent 
night-march and went into camp at daylight at the place indicated in 
General Sherman's orders. Kilpatrick had encamped for the night not far 
away, on a road to the right of us. Quite early, near dawn of the 27th, 
lie drew out and cleared our road of the enemy's cavalry and scouts as far 
as the West Point railroad. Here he had quite a successful little cavalry 
combat, which suited his spirit. The enemy vainly attempted to drive him 
from the railway.

After a couple of hours' rest I moved on; Blair and Logan marching in 
parallel columns. Logan cut a new road for most of the way. This was done 
to enable a quick concentration of force, if needed, at the front. By noon 
my three corps were securely intrenching at the railroad, not far from 
Fairburn. Logan took the right, Blair the left, and Ransom was held in 
reserve, while Kilpatrick pushed his cavalry well out on the different 
roads approaching the position. With wonderful quickness the different 
regiments in position along the front and toward any possible approaches 
threw up embankments or took advantage of any favorable railroad cuts at 
hand. Then the work of railway destruction begins. For this purpose, the 
men arrange themselves, often five hundred at a time, by the side of a 
road-bed, seize together a set of rails, and lift till the rails and ties 
are separated. Some pile the ties together in heaps and lay the rails 
across them, while others throw into the heaps dry stuff enough to quicken 
the ignition, quickly setting them on fire. As the fire burns, the rails 
are heated and the ends begin to droop; four or more men, two or three at 
each end, will catch an iron rail and run quickly in opposite directions 
around a tree or telegraph post, thus locking the rail and making it 
troublesome to straighten it. A sort of handspike with a short hook at the 
fulcrum is sometimes used. The men bitch one on at each end of a rail and 
turn twice in opposite ways, and then bend the rail like the twist in a 
cruller, thus leaving it beyond the hope of rectification.

Schofield had made the partial wheel at the pivot. Thomas had come in 
between Schofield and me at Red Oak station. Our picket lines were 
reunited. The remainder of the 27th and all of the 28th of August were 
spent in this destruction of railroad property. My notes say, "The work 
was remarkably well done throughout, the rails bent double or broken, the 
ties burned, and in front of the fifteenth and seventeenth corps cuts 
filled up with rocks, earth, trunks of trees, and other rubbish."

Bright and early on the 30th we were on the march. Logan, followed by the 
trains, took the inner road; Ransom, followed by Blair, the outer or 
southern road leading toward Jonesboro'. (Jonesboro' is a railway station 
and hamlet on a ridge of land near the Macon and Atlanta railroad.) 
Kilpatrick pushed on under my orders to clear the way. Nothing but some 
skirmishing on the front and flanks, which did not disturb the use of the 
soldier's short clay-pipe and the usual happy chats en route, – nothing of 
moment occurred till Logan and Ransom's roads came together before 
crossing Shoal Creek. Here the enemy with artillery and sharp musketry 
firing brought everything to a standstill. Kilpatrick was supported by two 
regiments from Ransom, while Logan sent Hazen's column to pass his flank. 
This had the desired effect. The temporary barricades were quickly 
deserted, and the enemy's artillery went off with speed. The hindrances 
were now more frequent; quite a delay intervened at the creek, of 
precisely the same nature as that just described. Worried with this 
irritating backing-and-filling sort of work, lasting all day, which the 
enemy's enterprising cavalry had caused us, we were glad to reach at night 
the destination appointed, the right of our "general line," named in 
General Sherman's special instructions for the day's march. But here 
several things pressed themselves upon my attention. Sherman had said in 
conversation, "Get hold of the railroad as soon as you can, Howard." I 
knew this to be the principal object of the large circuit we had taken. We 
had been hearing all day the noise of the engines and cars coining and 
going between Atlanta and Jonesboro', and knew that this meant Hood's or 
Hardee's infantry and artillery in front of us. The Flint River was five 
or six miles ahead, and between us and Jonesboro'. Now, though weary and 
isolated and without written permission to go on, as soon as I learned, 
furthermore, that there was no water to refresh the men and animals, I 
made up my mind to attempt getting beyond the Flint that night. I sent for 
Kilpatrick and said, "Have you an officer, general, who with a small body 
of cavalry can keep the rebels in motion, and not allow them to create 
delay between this Renfrew place and the river? "

"Just the man, sir," he replied; and be called to him Captain Estes of his 
staff.

He placed a squadron of horse under Estes, who quickly led the way. 
Wheeler, if our enemy was he, had supposed us through with moving for the 
day, and had made no more rail-piles and hindrances. He had just time to 
spring into the saddle and be off, as Estes came upon him. Then there was 
a race for the river. Infantry followed closely. I went ahead with the 
cavalry, to get all the observation I could before it should grow entirely 
dark. The enemy made a stand at the bridge on the opposite bank, up and 
down, and commenced firing. Those of the enemy's cavalry who could not get 
over, fled down the river. The bridge was on fire. Estes deployed his men, 
some of whom dismounted, and with Spencer rifles (seven-shooters) in hand, 
rushed for the river's bank and commenced their perpetual din of firing, 
while others made for the burning bridge, stamped out the kindled flame, 
crossed, and drove their foe from the other bank. Our infantry skirmishers 
were soon on hand. Just as they crossed the Flint, I went over with some 
of my staff (one of them was Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Stimson, who was 
severely wounded at Pickett's Mill, near Dallas, by a bullet passing quite 
through his body. He was partially recovered, and back again by my side). 
The Confederates fired from the woods which seemed at the foot of a steep 
slope in our front – fired a volley. Nobody was hit, for in their hurry 
they had overshot us. My eye was resting on Stimson in the dim twilight, 
when at the crash I saw him spring in his saddle, and I feared he was 
wounded again. I said, "Harry, are you hurt?" He said, "No, sir; the 
suddenness made me jump." The shock, however, was too much for him. That 
night the old wound in his lung reopened and bled considerably, and he was 
again obliged to leave us. He never fully recovered, but died in Florida 
after the war, in consequence of this wound. The skirmish-lines, as soon 
as deployed, made a dash for the woods and farther slope. The enemy's 
outer line fell back. By my orders General Logan secured the crest of this 
ridge beyond the Flint, worked a part of his men all night, even tired as 
they already were, to intrench, and was ready in the morning for Hardee 
(for it was his corps and part of S. D. Lee's that had been brought from 
Atlanta to head us off).

Kilpatrick pushed out to the right until he came upon the enemy's infantry 
in a cornfield, where with much skirmishing he held the foe back till the 
infantry was well in position. Ransom prolonged Logan's right. Blair, near 
at hand, crossed Wood's division and got it into position in the morning, 
and extended Logan's left. Then the cavalry was withdrawn and sent down 
the Flint to Anthony's bridge, to effect another crossing below and 
prevent the possibility of surprise from that quarter. This completed my 
work of preparation for the last struggle for Atlanta. Schofield and 
Thomas had carried forward their part and were already upon their ground, 
the Renfrew place and Atlanta line, on the evening of the 30th.



BATTLE OF JONESBORO'

The army of the Tennessee, by its energy, patience, and rapid work, had 
secured a position on the railroad ridge. The railroad could be reached 
with artillery and even with musketry, so that the trains of cars could 
not pass up and down. Logan was well intrenched, holding the ridge; Hazen 
to the left of the road, Harrow on the right, and Osterhaus mostly in 
reserve. The latter, a division-commander, had taken great pains to locate 
a battery, well supported by infantry, somewhat in advance of the general 
line, facing the railroad and not more than seven or eight hundred yards 
from it in a direct line. Other batteries were equally well placed under 
the cover of the woods, for there were woods everywhere. Ransom's corps, 
to the right of Logan (Corse's division on the front line), had built a 
practicable bridge behind him across the Flint. Reserve wagons of all 
kinds, not forgetting ambulances, were well parked on the west side. 
Kilpatrick's bridge (Anthony's) was a mile and a half down-stream. At 
first Kilpatrick pushed a small force across the bridge, went to the 
railroad by the shortest route, and took up a threatening position. The 
enemy, fearing that his flank might be turned by a larger force, attacked 
Kilpatrick with infantry, and forced him, with some loss, to haul off and 
recross the Flint, following up our cavalry. General Blair sent Giles A. 
Smith's division, still in reserve, to check this move. Combating with the 
cavalry on the right, skirmishing and battery-firing along the line, were 
going on all the time while we and the enemy were getting ready for our 
next trial of strength. Hardee seemed slow to strike. We expected a blow 
at daybreak and all the forenoon; but as he delayed, 1 prepared to make a 
break after the manner of our Chattanooga battle, on a smaller scale. I 
ordered a reconnoissance; but just before the hour set for it, the enemy, 
as early as three in the afternoon, came on with the same old ringing, 
tumultuous cry, but opened fire before getting very close. Our men had 
been for some time all ready, and the fire was returned with the utmost 
spirit. Two or three times Hardee's men renewed the charge, but each time 
the cry was less vigorous and the charge amounted to little in results. 
General Logan says: "The most determined part of the assault was sustained 
by General Jiazen. It raged fiercely in front of Harrow and Osterhaus, the 
enemy approaching to an average distance of fifty to one hundred paces." 
Wood's division, at the left, had ground more open. The enemy' s heavy 
loss in front of Colonel Bryant's brigade indicated a sharp contest there. 
The charge on Ransom's front was of much the same description. But 
everywhere the Confederates were met and resolutely driven back 
disheartened. My estimate of Hardee's loss was recorded at the time "in 
killed, wounded, and prisoners as not far from six thousand." 

A bold commander will throw in his reserves after such a repulse of his 
adversary, but from experience I had learned caution. Hardee might have a 
trap for us like that of Kenesaw Mountain, or of Hooker's discomfiture 
after Chattanooga, at Taylor's Ridge. It was near night, and Thomas was 
not far off, for Carlin's division, fourteenth corps, that had been sent 
ahead, was already supporting Giles A. Smith's movement at Anthony's 
bridge.

A messenger from General Sherman brought word that Schofield and Thomas 
had already struck the railroad at several points between myself and 
Atlanta. This seemed to put a complete barrier between Hood there and 
Hardee in my front. I could then wait for Thomas to push Jeff. C. Davis's 
and Stanley's corps upon Hardee's exposed right flank. Hence I decided to 
run no risk by a hasty advance. General Sherman, who in his Memoirs gives 
an interesting and graphic account of these movements, remained for a time 
with General Thomas. He was at Renfrew's place when my battle closed, and 
came up the next morning. General Thomas soon appeared, with his men in 
the best of spirits. Jeff. C. Davis's corps, Carlin's division being 
recalled from the right, was placed on my immediate left, and Stanley 
ordered to hasten his march. General Sherman says, "I also dispatched 
orders after orders to hurry forward Stanley so as to lap around 
Jonesboro' on the east, hoping thus to capture the whole of Hardee's 
corps." Without waiting for Stanley, Davis sent a brigade to reconnoitre. 
Pressing back the enemy's skirmishers to a point beyond a small creek in 
his front, occupied by the enemy in force, he seemed to expose the enemy's 
flank. General Davis formed his troops for the assault in his usual 
complete manner. I was with Generals Thomas and Sherman and saw the 
movement commence, before passing to my right to execute my part of the 
programme, namely, to keep the enemy in my front employed and send a force 
to endeavor to turn his left. Van Home, in his recent history, gives an 
excellent detailed account of this assault, in which he lets Generals 
Carlin, Morgan, and Baird, commanding divisions, each successfully perform 
his part, and mentions the distinguished conduct of their subordinates, 
Colonels Edie, Este, Mitchell, Dilworth, Moore, and Grower, as well as the 
work of Prescott's and Gardiner's batteries preceding the assault.

I heard the sound of battle, but could see nothing till I followed up 
Davis's lead, for Blair's command had not time to make the long circuit 
ordered around the left flank, before this forward movement was completed.

General Sherman summarized it in a few words as follows: "General Davis 
formed his division in line about four P. M., swept forward over some old 
cotton-fields in full view, and went over the rebel parapet handsomely, 
capturing the whole of Govan's brigade, with two field batteries of ten 
guns." This was the time, just before sun-down, when General Thomas was 
said for the first time to have set his horse into a gallop, so anxious 
was he to push forward the fourth corps to the east of Jonesboro'. (Thomas 
was fleshy and very heavy, and it took a pretty good-sized horse to carry 
him, even at a walk or trot.) He went, as I said, to press Stanley's 
command (it had previously been set to destroy the railroad, working 
toward us), and .for some reason, probably because not up with us, did not 
seem to catch the spirit of the occasion. Van Home says, comparing the 
movements of the fourteenth and fourth corps, "Equal success on the part 
of the fourth corps might have resulted in the capture of Hardee's
command," but adds, in extenuation of Stanley, that "Kimball's and 
Newton's divisions were so delayed by the thick undergrowth and the 
enemy's skirmishers that they did not get before his main lines before 
five P. M." Newton did at last arrive at the point which General Sherman's 
orders directed, but it was too late, too dark, to gain much except to aid 
in the capture of prisoners, who from the situation could hardly escape 
falling into our hands during Hardee's night march in withdrawing. Blair 
promptly withdrew as Davis relieved his troops by his forward movement, 
and marched back across the Flint and down the river bank to Anthony's 
bridge, as far as Kilpatrick's former battle-ground. The officer sent to 
guide General Blair had been there before, but took him by a circuitous 
route which consumed much time, so that Blair succeeded only in crossing 
the river and pressing back the enemy sufficiently to gain a good foothold 
for further work at daylight. Of course Hardee did not neglect this 
approach to his rear, so that Blair was stoutly resisted.

The next morning (September 2d), the enemy was already at Lovejoy's 
Station, having retired from our front during the night. Hood's dispatches 
of the 3d intimate that the failure of Hardee 1on the 31st to dislodge my 
force caused him to evacuate Atlanta. A Confederate paper said: "Yankee 
Howard stole a march on Hardee at Jonesboro'."

Hood with Stewart's corps and the rest of his command left Atlanta, went 
around by the way of McDonough, and joined Hardee and S. D. Lee at 
Lovejoy. Had we known his intention in season, this reunion of forces 
would doubtless have been prevented by battle. General Slocum, at the 
Chattahoochee bridge (Slocum had joined the twentieth corps and taken 
command after the flank movements began), had heard the sounds of 
explosions at Atlanta during the night. They had been heard by all of us 
who were awake, even at Jonesboro'. We surmised, but could not be certain 
what had happened. General Sherman says he called up a farmer near his 
bivouac, and questioned him concerning the reverberations. He said they 
were in the direction of Atlanta and sounded like a battle. (He had 
probably heard such sounds often within the past two months.)

Slocum's note dated at Atlanta reached us after our arrival at Lovejoy's 
Station, for, of course, we promptly followed Hardee thither during the 
morning of the 2d of September. Slocum had moved his corps up to occupy 
the city. The rousing cheers that greeted the news told how our men felt. 
General Mower used to say at every new success, "Fait accompli!" Sherman 
pithily puts it, "Atlanta is ours, and fairly won."

The great joy and thanksgiving at Washington and at City Point, Virginia, 
are shown in the well-known letters of September 3d and 4th, of President 
Lincoln and General Grant.

Besides the battles which were simply named in the article preceding this, 
there were several cavalry raids and engagements of more or less magnitude 
under Stoneman, Garrard, Kilpatrick, and Rousseau. These have passed into 
history, and I cannot give any new facts concerning them. I knew all these 
leaders. General Stoneman was a brave and loyal cavalry officer, but 
judging from his misfortunes which resulted in capture and confinement in 
the South (a judgment I own that may be a very unfair one), I should now 
say that it would have been better that he should have had an infantry 
command. It requires, to manage a cavalry corps, unusual enterprise, good, 
sound health, sleepless activity, and the ability to organize and direct 
operations on a very large scale. Stoneman had sufficient natural talent, 
but he suffered excruciatingly from a sad physical disability, aggravated 
by the extraordinary exertions devolved upon him in the cavalry service.

Garrard was well fitted for the steadiness and regularity of infantry or 
artillery movements. He was a man of high tone, pure truth, and great 
fidelity, but had not the dash of Sheridan and J. H. Wilson.

Kilpatrick was found to have the temper that suited General Sherman: he 
never could believe himself defeated. He was of sanguine temperament, had 
good powers of endurance, would undertake any enterprise, however 
difficult, and his reports were always spirited. If the enemy surprised 
him in camp, he rather liked it, provided he could recover himself and 
snatch victory from apparent defeat. There was a pleasant humor not only 
in Kilpatrick's talk, but in his deeds of hardihood as he ran tilts 
against his "friend Wheeler," who became celebrated for his ubiquitous 
appearance upon our front and flanks.

Again, besides the cavalry work, our very possession of Atlanta was 
disputed by a raid of Hood in force around our right flank, endeavoring to 
"tow" us back to the place of beginning, even to Chattanooga. This caused 
the most vigorous and trying campaign we had. It was in this campaign that 
General Corse and Colonel Tourtelotte distinguished themselves at 
Allatoona. This is where General Sherman sent his message from Kenesaw, at 
least sixteen miles in a straight line, by the signal flags, and received 
Corse's well-known reply, declaring that wounds, loss of blood, and his 
inferior force could not make him surrender. That beautiful hymn, "Hold 
the fort for I am coming," sprang from this incident.

The youthful Ransom's death was caused by this campaign. He rode his horse 
night and day till very weak, then rode in an ambulance till his strength 
was gone beyond recovery. And then – bless his patriotic soul--!he had 
himself carried on an army-stretcher, by four strong men, at the head of 
his command. He succumbed after Hood had been finally driven beyond the 
Blue Ridge, and died while en route from Gaylesville, Alabama, to Rome, 
Georgia. While this eventful supplementary campaign was in progress, my 
corps was held steadily at Atlanta, and Atlanta, which was fairly won, was 
also fairly kept.