Naval History of the American Revolution - Chapters XVI-XVII



CHAPTER XVI
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1781

The frigate Alliance, Captain Barry, was made ready at Boston for another 
voyage to France as soon as the court martial of Captain Landais was over. 
There was the usual delay and difficulty in recruiting a crew for the ship 
and application was made to the state government for authority to impress 
seamen and to enlist soldiers. The former request was denied, but 
permission was obtained to enroll volunteers from the guard at the castle 
and it was again necessary to take a considerable number of British 
prisoners. A turbulent ship's company was the consequence and a sanguinary 
brawl on Long Wharf with the crews of two French frigates was an early 
result. Some distinguished passengers were taken, including Colonel John 
Laurens and Thomas Paine. Several others obtained passage on condition 
that if necessary they should serve against the enemy or in quelling 
mutiny. Laurens was a son of Henry Laurens, still a prisoner in England, 
and was bound on an important mission to France. He was the bearer of a 
letter, dated January 15, 1781, from General Washington, addressed to 
himself (Laurens), discoursing on the objects of his mission; it was 
afterwards submitted to Vergennes. In this letter, first of all, the 
imperative need of money to carry on the approaching campaign was urged. 
Washington then says: "Next to a loan of money, a constant naval 
superiority on these coasts is the object most interesting. This would 
instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult defensive and, by removing all 
prospect of extending their acquisitions, would take away the motives for 
prosecuting the war. Indeed, it is not to be conceived how they could 
subsist a large force in this country, if we had the command of the seas 
to interrupt the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This 
superiority, with an aid in money, would enable us to convert the war into 
a vigorous offensive. I say nothing of the advantages to the trade of both 
nations, nor how infinitely it would facilitate our supplies. With respect 
to us, it seems to be one of two deciding points, and it appears too to be 
the interest of our allies, abstracted from the immediate benefits to this 
country, to transfer the naval war to America. The number of ports 
friendly to them, hostile to the British, the materials for repairing 
their disabled ships, the extensive supplies towards the subsistence of 
their fleet, are circumstances which would give them a palpable advantage 
in the contest of these seas." (Washington, ix, 106.) The Alliance sailed 
from Boston, February 11, 1781. On the voyage a small British privateer 
was taken and her prize, a Venetian ship, was released. The frigate 
arrived at L'Orient March 9 (Barry, ch. xii; Wharton, iv, 249, 250, 252, 
279, 826; Has,. Court Rec., January 29, 1781; Mass. Acts and Resolves, 
February 6, 1781; Boston Gazette, January 1, 1781.)

The two main objects of Washington's desire, indispensable at this 
critical period, were realized. Money was obtained and a French fleet soon 
set sail for America. March 29, the Alliance got under way for her return 
voyage in company with a large French letter of marque called the Marquis 
de Lafayette, loaded with military stores. Soon after sailing, a mutiny 
was discovered on the Alliance. John Kessler, mate of the frigate, who 
wrote a narrative of her voyages, says that "on March 30th an Indian, one 
of the forecastle men, gave Captain Barry information of a combination 
among the crew for the purpose of taking the ship, and pointing out three 
who had strove to prevail on him to be concerned therein. The three men 
were immediately put in irons and all the officers, with such of the crew 
as could be confided in, were armed and required to remain all night on 
deck. On the next morning all hands were called and placed on the 
forecastle, booms, and gangways, excepting the officers and such part of 
the crew in whom Captain Barry confided, who, armed, strongly guarded the 
quarter deck, the steerage, and the main deck, to keep the remainder of 
the crew together on the forecastle and boom. The three designated men 
were brought out of their irons on the quarter and, being stripped and 
hoisted by the thumbs to the mizzen stay, underwent a very severe whipping 
before either would make any confession. The names of 25 of their 
accomplices were obtained from them before the whipping was discontinued. 
As their accomplices were disclosed, they were called to the quarter deck, 
stripped and tied to the ridge-rope of the netting and the whipping 
continued until it was thought all were disclosed that could possibly be 
obtained, which proved to be. That it was intended to take the ship on her 
passage out by killing all the officers in the middle watch of the night, 
except the second Lieutenant, P. Fletcher, who was to navigate her to some 
port in Ireland, or on failure, to be destroyed. A quartermaster, one of 
the mutineers, was to have command. They had all been bound by an oath on 
the Bible administered by the Captain's assistant cabin steward, and had 
also signed their names in a round robin so-called, but that they found no 
good opportunity on the outward passage and intended to accomplish the 
taking of the ship as aforesaid immediately on leaving France. But on 
coming out of L'Orient we lost a man overboard who was one of the chief 
ringleaders and they considering that as a bad omen, threw the round robin 
overboard and relinquished their designs. The three principles were placed 
securely in irons and the remainder, after being admonished by Captain 
Barry and on their solemn declaration to conduct themselves well, were 
permitted to return to ship's duty." (Barry, 133.) The three principals 
were afterwards tried and sentenced to death, but this penalty was not 
exacted.

Kessler further relates that "on April 2nd, 1781, two brigs gave us chase 
and were permitted to come up. One ran close on board of us and without 
any hail fired the whole broadside at us and immediately every one run off 
her deck. We had commenced firing, but on discovering their retreat the 
firing ceased and we boarded them. She proved to be a brig with flush deck 
and 20 twelve pounders, two six pounders and 14 [four-pound coehorns], 
with 112 men, called the Mars and belonging to the Guernsey. The crew were 
taken aboard the Alliance and all put in irons without distinction, 
Captain Barry considering them as not meriting other treatment in 
consequence of their firing on us with no intention of bravely fighting. 
The other brig was a Jersey called the Minerva, of 10 guns and 55 men. She 
was taken possession of and manned by the Marquis de Lafayette, our 
consort. Soon after, in a gale of wind, we parted with our consort and the 
prizes." (Barry, 134.) A month later two other prizes were taken. May 16, 
the Alliance was struck by lightning, which shattered her main topmast and 
burned several men.

An action was fought, May 29, with the British ship Atalanta and brig 
Trepassey in about north latitude 40° and west longitude 63°, which is 
described by Kessler. "Towards evening [of the 28th] discovered two sail 
on the weather bow standing for us and which after coming near enough to 
be kept in sight, hauled to wind and stood on our course. Towards day it 
became quite calm. After it became light it appeared that they were an 
armed ship and brig, about a league distant. At sunrise they hoisted the 
English colors and beat drum . At the same time the American colors were 
displayed by the Alliance. By little puffs of wind we were enabled to get 
within short hailing distance." At eleven o'clock the ships hailed each 
other. "The firing then began, but unfortunately there was not wind enough 
for our steerage way and they being lighter vessels, by using sweeps got 
and kept athwart our stern and on our quarters, so that we could not bring 
one-half our guns, nay, oft time only one gun out astern to bear on them, 
and thus laying like a log the greatest part of the time. About two 
o'clock Captain Barry received a wound by a grape shot in the shoulder. He 
remained, however, on the quarter deck until by the much loss of blood he 
was obliged to be helped to the cock-pit. Some time after, our colors were 
shot away and it so happened that at the same time such guns as would bear 
on them had been fired and were then loading, and which led the enemy to 
think we had struck the colors, and manned their shrouds and gave three 
cheers; by that time the colors were hoisted by a mizen brail and our 
firing again began. A quartermaster went to the wheel in place of one just 
killed there. At the moment a small breeze of wind happening, a broadside 
was brought to bear and fired on the ship and then one on the brig, when 
they struck their colors at three o'clock." (Barry, 135, 136.)

Captain Edwards of the Atalanta, testifying at his court martial, said of 
the Alliance that when "about two cables lengths to leeward she hoisted 
Rebel colours and fir'd a Shot across us. I immediately hoisted our 
colours, when she fired her broadside, wore, and as soon as on the other 
tack and her Guns woud bear, kept a constant Fire on us; our Firing began 
on her, but being at too great a distance, I ceast our Fire and 
endeavour'd to get nearer to her, which having effected she haild us, said 
she was the Alliance continental Frigate and desired we would strike." 
Edwards tried to keep up a conversation until the Trepassey could get up, 
but the Alliance began the action again. The Trepassey was so anxious to 
get up that she passed under the stern of the Alliance "with too much way 
and in hauling under her Quarter, shot abreast of her; in this situation 
she received two broadsides." The Atalanta was then brought under the 
frigate's stern and got between her and the Trepassey. The Atalanta 
continued the action an hour and a half longer, nearly three hours in all; 
she was then so greatly disabled in masts, yards, sails, and rigging as to 
be unmanageable. It was accordingly necessary to strike and the Trepassey, 
unable to get away, struck also. The Atalanta's mainmast soon went over 
the side."(Brit. Adm. Rec., Courts Martial, No. 5319 (October 15,1781) The 
master of the Trepassey, describing the battle, says that the Alliance, at 
a distance of half a mile to leeward, "hoisted rebel colours and gave the 
Atalanta and us a broadside, we being then very nigh to each other; we 
then 'bore up close alongside of her, the Atalanta on the starboard and 
the Trepassey on the larboard quarter, and began to engage. About an hour 
after the action began Capt. Smith of the Trepassey was killed." (Almon, 
xii, 160.)

The Atalanta, which carried sixteen guns and a hundred and twenty-five 
men, lost six killed and eighteen wounded; the Trepassey, with fourteen 
guns and eighty men, lost six killed, including the captain, and eleven 
wounded. The Alliance mounted twenty-eight twelve-pounders and eight 
nines; her crew was reduced by manning prizes and weakened by disaffection 
and sickness. Her loss was five killed, including the lieutenant of 
marines, and twenty-two wounded, three of them mortally. Captain Edwards 
and a few other officers were sent on board the Alliance; also some of the 
wounded. Captain Barry agreed with the British to send the Trepassey as a 
cartel to Halifax with all his other prisoners, about two hundred and 
fifty in number, to be exchanged for Americans; before entering upon this 
service the Trepassey's guns were thrown overboard. She arrived in due 
time at Halifax. The Atalanta, which had been dismasted in the engagement, 
was fitted with jury masts and put in charge of Hezekiah Welch, second 
lieutenant of the Alliance as prize master. Some weeks later, in the Vice-
Admiralty Court at Halifax, Welch testified that he was ordered by Captain 
Barry "to take possession of the Atalanta and proceed with her to Boston, 
New England; that on their passage thither the 7th June last, being near 
Cape Cod, they fell in with His Majesty's ships of War the Assurance, 
Charlestown, Amphitrite and Vulture, which retook the said sloop Atalanta, 
put a British officer & Seamen on board her & sent her safe into this Port 
of Halifax." (Essex Inst. Coll., January, 1909.) The Marquis de Lafayette, 
letter of marque, which parted from the Alliance in April, was also 
unlucky. She fell in with the enemy's Jamaica fleet under a strong convoy 
and after a hard fight of three hours was captured by a greatly superior 
force. The Alliance arrived at Boston, June 6. During the summer she was 
sheathed with copper on Barry's recommendation (Barry, chs. xiii, xiv; 
Almon, xii, 158-160; Boston Gazette, June 11, July 9, 1781; London 
Chronicle, August 7, 1781; Lee MSS., July 15, 1782, report on loss of the 
Lafayette.)

The presence in Massachusetts Bay of the British squadron which recaptured 
the Atalanta, and which the Alliance had the good fortune not to meet 
with, is explained in a letter of Admiral Arbuthnot to the Admiralty, 
dated off Sandy Hook, July 4, 1781 : "The rumours that had been abroad for 
a considerable time past, that a reinforcement of troops was daily 
expected from France, induced me to send a squadron into Boston Bay of 
superior force, as the enemy's guard was reported to be only two frigates; 
the Assurance, Charles-Town, Amphitrite, Vulture, and Savage are employed 
on this service, and the Royal Oak, on her way to Halifax, was directed to 
take that route. I have since, by the channel of the Rebels, received 
intelligence that a few recruits and some storeships have notwithstanding 
got into Boston, with a French fifty gun ship and two frigates; but 
Captain Duncan of the Medea, which arrived from Halifax on the 30th ult., 
informs me that his Majesty's sloop the Atalanta, which had been taken 
after a very gallant action by the rebel Frigate Alliance, of 40 guns, was 
retaken by that detachment in Boston Bay, and that he took a store-ship of 
near 800 tons, also a prize, on her entrance into the port of Halifax as 
he came out. It is believed that they have been much more successful, but 
I have no authentic advices of their operations . . . The Medea on her 
return captured two privateers from Salem, the ship Rover, of 18 six 
pounders and 140 men, and the sloop Revenge of 10 guns." (Almon, xii, 158,
159.)

The frigate Trumbull, Captain James Nicholson, spent the first half of the 
year 1781 fitting out at Philadelphia for a cruise, under the accustomed 
difficulties imposed by lack of money and scarcity of seamen. The Deane, 
Captain Samuel Nicholson, the Confederacy, Captain Harding, and the 
Saratoga, Captain Young, cruised in the West Indies during the winter and 
early spring. They sailed, March 20, from Cape Francois bound north in 
company with a French frigate and a large convoy of American and French 
merchantmen. The Deane arrived at Boston about the middle of April. The 
Confederacy, on April 15, fell in with the British ships Roebuck, 44, and 
Orpheus, 32. In the face of so superior a force, and with the working of 
his ship hindered by a large cargo of military supplies, Captain Harding 
considered resistance useless and promptly struck his flag. Thus ended the 
brief and unlucky career in the Continental service of this fine frigate. 
She was taken into the British navy under the name of Confederate. Several 
of the convoy were also taken. It would appear that the Saratoga, after 
parting from her consorts, was lost at sea, for she was never heard of 
again (Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 355, 411, 471, 475, 505 (February 7, April 
28, May 5, June 6, 1781); Boston Gazette, January 29, March 19, April 16, 
30, May 14, 1781; Continental Journal, March 22, April 19, 26, 1781; 
Independent Chronicle, May 4, 10, 1781; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, 
i, 62; Navy Rec. Soc., vi, 109; Barney, 86.)

The Trumbull got to sea at last and took her departure from the Delaware 
capes August 8; among her lieutenants were Richard Dale and Alexander 
Murray, a volunteer. She sailed in company with a twenty-four-gun 
privateer, a fourteen-gun letter of marque and a convoy of twenty-eight 
merchantmen. The same day three sail were discovered to the eastward, two 
of which gave chase to the convoy. Night came on rainy and squally and the 
Trumbull carried away her fore-topmast and main-topgallantmast. She was 
obliged to run before the wind and the rest of the fleet left her. Captain 
Nicholson reported: "The wreck of the topmast with the yard and rigging 
laying aback of the foresail and over the bows, the topsail yard arm came 
through the foresail and on the forecastle, so that with our utmost 
exertion we could not clear ourselves of the wreck until one of the ships 
came alongside and the other in sight. Immediately all hands were called 
to quarters; instead of coming, three quarters of them ran below, put out 
the lights, matches, &c. With the remainder and a few brave officers we 
commenced an action with the Iris for one hour and thirty-five minutes, at 
the end of which the other ship came up and fired into us. Seeing no 
prospect of escaping in this unequal contest, I struck, having my first 
and third lieuts. and Capt. Murray, a volunteer, with eight others wounded 
and 5 killed. My crew consisted of 180 men, 45 of whom were taken out of 
the new gaol - prisoners of war; they through treachery and others from 
cowardice betrayed me, or at least prevented my making the resistance I 
would have done. At no time of the engagement had I more than 40 men upon 
deck." (Continental Journal, September 13, 1781.) The British thirty-two-
gun frigate Iris had formerly been the American frigate Hancock, captured 
by the Rainbow in 1777. Her consort was the eighteen-gun ship General 
Monk, also a prize, having been originally an American privateer called 
the General Washington. The Trumbull was almost a wreck and was towed into 
New York by the Iris. She was not taken into the British service. A few 
weeks after this the Iris and another British frigate were captured by the 
French (Port Folio, May, 1814; Clark, i, 124; Almon, xii, 259, 260; 
Independent Ledger, October 8, 1781; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 
57, 58.)

In the summer of 1781 the Board of Admiralty ceased to exist and the 
management of naval affairs passed under the control of Robert Morris as 
Agent of Marine. He issued orders for a cruise together of the Alliance 
and Deane, which were now the only Continental vessels in commission. He 
wrote to Captain Barry, September 21: "When these ships are ready you will 
proceed to sea. The Ships are both under your command, the Captain of the 
Deane being instructed to obey your orders, wherefore you had best to 
furnish him a copy of these instructions, giving such in addition as you 
shall judge necessary for Keeping Company, respecting Signals, Places of 
Rendevous in case of Separation and all other things that tend to promote 
Success and Glory or secure Safety against superior force. It is my 
intention that you should go upon a cruize and therefore you will be ready 
to sail from the Harbour of Boston and use your best Efforts to disturb 
the Enemy. Such prizes as you may take you will send into the Port which 
you will find endorsed, a list of Persons in several Ports to whom to 
apply in Case you go yourselves or send your Prizes thither . . . I do not 
fix your cruizing ground nor limit the length of your cruize, because I 
expect you will know the most likely course and will be anxious to meet 
such events as will do honor to the American flag and promote the general 
interest. When you want provisions, I think it will be best that you 
should enter the Delaware and send up as far as New Castle, to which place 
they can best be sent in shallops. The latitude I have given precludes 
both the necessity and propriety of more particular instructions. Let me 
hear from you by every convenient opportunity and don't fail to transmit 
to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of our Army, as well as to me, 
any intelligence that you may obtain which you think may in any wise 
affect his operations." (Barry, 151.) October 17, the Deane not being 
ready, Morris sent orders to Barry to cruise alone in the Alliance, but 
the fall of Yorktown soon after this caused a change of plans and both 
ships remained in port (lbid., 150-154; Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 273.)

The quarrels of Jones and Landais in France in 1780, the failure of the 
Alliance to bring over the clothing and stores so much needed by the army, 
and other circumstances led to much dissatisfaction in and out of 
Congress, and in March, 1781, soon after his return to America in the 
Ariel, Jones was called upon to explain his conduct. The Board of 
Admiralty propounded a list of forty-seven questions covering all his 
movements since taking command of the Ranger in 1777. Jones answered these 
questions promptly and fully, and his replies cleared up all doubts as to 
his various transactions in Europe, naval, political, and financial. 
Influenced by the good impression he made in this matter and by the honors 
paid him in Europe, Congress resolved, April 14, 1781, "That the thanks of 
the United States in Congress assembled be given to Captain John Paul 
Jones, for the zeal, prudence and intrepidity with which he has supported 
the honor of the American flag, for his bold and successful enterprises to 
redeem from captivity the citizens of these States who had fallen under 
the power of the enemy, and in general for the good conduct and eminent 
services by which he has added lustre to his character and to the American 
arms; that the thanks of the United States in Congress assembled be also 
given to the officers and men who have faithfully served under him from 
time to time for their steady affection to the cause of their country and 
the bravery and perseverance they have manifested therein." (Sherburne, 
225.) A few weeks after this a special committee of Congress recommended 
Jones's promotion to the rank of rear-admiral, but, owing to the jealousy 
and opposition of other officers, no action was taken. The Ariel was sent 
back to France in the summer or early fall of 1781 (lbid., 214-226; Sands, 
321-328; Wharton, iv, 288-297; Logs of Serapis, Alliance, Ariel, 125; 
Barry, 149; Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 401, 405; Royal Gazette, July 10, 1782.)

The Massachusetts ship Mars remained in the river Loire about three months 
and then returned to Boston, arriving February 28, 1781, with a prize. The 
frigate Protector, during the early part of the year, cruised in the West 
Indies, part of the time in company with the Continental frigate Deane, 
and with some success. In the Massachusetts House of Representatives, 
March 3, the following action was taken: "Whereas by recent Advices 
received by express from the Eastward it appears that the Enemy with a 
Number of Armed Vessels are daily committing the most horrid Depredations 
and Cruelties on the Inhabitants who reside on or near the Sea Coasts in 
the County of Lincoln," it was resolved to request the French admiral at 
Newport to send one or two frigates, to fit out the ship Mars immediately, 
and to grant bounties to privateers which should capture the enemy's 
vessels (Mass. Court Rec.) On May 19, it was resolved to send an armed 
vessel with provisions for the relief of the garrison at Machias, and to 
reinforce the garrison. Conditions along the Maine coast continued to be a 
source of chronic irritation at the seat of the state government in Boston 
and strongly worded resolves were from time to time adopted in the General 
Court. Notwithstanding the Penobscot disaster of two years before, the 
possibility of driving out the British remained, with the more sanguine, a 
practical question. The Mars, under the command of Captain Nevins, and 
apparently unaccompanied by the French frigates asked for, cruised during 
the spring and took two prizes. The new ship Tartar seems to have met with 
great delay in building and it was proposed to sell her, but this was not 
done at the time; she was not ready for service until the following year. 
The sale of the Mars was also considered. In the summer a sloop called the 
Defence was added to the Massachusetts navy and made one cruise, after the 
return to port of the Mars and under the same captain, James Nevins. 
Another severe blow came to the Massachusetts navy in 1781, in the loss of 
its most powerful vessel, the Protector, which was captured, May 5, by the 
British ship Roebuck and frigate Medea (Boston Gazette, March 5, 19, April 
30, May 14, July 2, 1781; Independent Chronicle, May 4, 1781; 
Massachusetts Mag., July, October, 1910, January, 1911, January, 1912; 
Mass. Court Rec., February 14, March 3, 6, 7, May 19, 1781; Mass. Rev. 
Rolls, xxxix, 45; Mass. Archives, clviii, 212; Fox, 79-88.)

The frigate Indien, which had been built at Amsterdam for the Continental 
navy and then sold to the King of France, later became the property of the 
Chevalier Luxembourg, who leased her in 1779 or 1780 to Commodore 
Alexander Gillon of the South Carolina navy. Gillon had been in Europe 
since 1778, employed in furthering the naval and commercial interests of 
his state. He made enemies and his reputation has suffered from statements 
concerning his financial transactions. He changed the name of the Indien 
to South Carolina, manned her largely with American sailors from English 
prisons, and armed her with twenty-eight thirty-six-pounders (Thirty-nine-
pounders, according to the British account, Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 490, 
January 18, 1783.) and twelve twelves. He moved her from Amsterdam to the 
Texel during the summer and fall of 1780, the passage being much 
obstructed by shoal water. While on the way the South Carolina was joined 
by Lieutenant Matthewman, who had been engaged as master. This officer 
gives an account in his "Narrative" of conditions on board the frigate 
during his stay. "In Rotterdam," he says, "I saw Commodore Gillon, the 
commander of the ship, who gave me his directions. On my arrival on board 
the ship, then laying about half way between Amsterdam and the Texel, 
everything was in confusion, three of the Lieutenants were under arrest, 
and the ship like a mere wreck, her crew then about 250 men mostly 
Americans, who had made their escape and had got on board under pretence 
of giving them a passage to America; where they were near a twelve month
. . . and were never allowed the liberty of slipping over the ship's side. 
I myself was seven months on board, though master of the ship. On some 
disagreement I quit the ship and returned to Amsterdam." (Mag. Amer. 
Hist., March, 1878.) The South Carolina remained at the Texel until 
August, 1781, when she was finally ready for sea. She had a crew of five 
hundred and fifty, including three hundred French marines. She cruised 
first in the North Sea, and on August 25, captured and burned a prize. 
September 1, she was off the Shetland Islands and on the 3d her log 
records: "Hove the Corps of a French Mareen over Aboard at 8 P.M." On the 
7th, she captured a sixteen-gun Liverpool privateer; the same day, "Put 2 
French Mereens in Irons for Insulting Lieut. White." By the middle of the 
month the South Carolina was making a southerly course, and on the 24th, 
"Mored att Carone in Spain." October 17, she sailed from Coruna, and on 
the 21st, in latitude 37° 52', "Brought Tew A Brigg; She Pruved to Be A 
Brigg from Newfound Land Called the Venus." On the 31st, the South 
Carolina was off Teneriffe. She made a short cruise in the West Indies, 
then sailed north, and, December 31, was off Charleston. The next day, 
however, she "Bore Away for the Havannah." (Log of the South Carolina; 
Paullin, 436-438; Wharton, iv, 546, 547; So. Carolina Hist. and Gen. Mag., 
January, April, 1900; Boston Gazette, November 19, 1781; Independent 
Chronicle, November 22, 1781; Royal Gazette, July 10, 1782; Lee MSS., July 
5, 1779, June, 1780; Adams MSS., March 8, September 26, October 26, 1781.)

In a letter, dated September 23, 1781, Captain Stirling reported the 
capture of his ship, a sixteen-gun sloop of war of the British navy, by an 
American privateer. "It is," he says, "with the most poignant grief I 
acquaint your Excellency of the capture of his Majesty's sloop Savage, 
late under my command . . . Early in the morning of the 6th instant, 10 
leagues East of Charles-town, we espied a ship bearing down on us, who 
when about four miles distant, hauled her wind to the Eastward, showing by 
her appearance she was an American cruizer; her force could not be so 
easily distinguished. I therefore gave way to the pleasing idea that she 
was a privateer carrying 20 nine-pounders, whom I had intelligence was 
cruizing off here, and instantly resolved either to bring her to action or 
oblige her to quit the coast, for which purpose we gave chase, but were 
prevented continuing it long by her edging down, seemingly determined to 
engage us. Conscious of her superiority in sailing and force, this 
manoeuvre coinciding with my wishes, I caused the Savage to lay by till we 
perceived on her nearer approach she was far superior to what we imagined 
and that it was necessary to attempt making our escape, without some 
fortunate shot, in the course of a running fight we saw inevitable, 
admitted our taking advantages and bring on a more equal conflict. At half 
past ten she began firing bow chacers and at eleven, being close on our 
quarter, the action commenced with musquetry, which after a good deal of 
execution was followed by a heavy cannonade on both sides. In an hour's 
time I had the mortification to see our braces and bow-lines shot away and 
not a rope left to trim the sail with, notwithstanding every precaution 
had been taken; however, our fire was so constant and well-directed that 
the enemy did not see our situation, but kept alongside of us till 
accident obliged him to drop astern. The Savage was now almost a wreck, 
her sails, rigging and yard so much cut that it was with the utmost 
difficulty we could alter our position time enough to avoid being raked, 
the enemy lying directly athwart our stern for some minutes. This was the 
only intermission of great guns, but musquetry and pistols still aid 
execution and continued till they opened again, which was not till both 
ships were almost on board each other, when the battle became more furious 
than before. Our quarter-deck and forecastle were soon now nearly cleared, 
scarce a man belonging to either not being killed or wounded, with three 
guns on our main-deck rendered useless. In this situation we fought near 
an hour with only five six-pounders, the flre from each ship's guns 
scorching the men who opposed them, shot and other implements of war 
thrown by hand doing execution, when our mizen-mast being shot away by the 
board, our main-mast tottering with only three shrouds standing, the ship 
on fire dangerously, only 40 men on duty to oppose the foe who was 
attempting to board us in three places, no succour in sight or possibility 
of making further resistance, I was, necessitated at a quarter before 
three P.M. to surrender to the Congress, a private ship of war belonging 
to Philadelphia, who carried 215 men and mounted 20 twelve pounders on her 
main-deck and 4 sixes above, fourteen of which were fought on one side. 
She lost during the action eleven men and had near thirty wounded, several 
of them mortally; her masts, her sails and rigging were so much damaged 
that she was obliged to return to port, which partly answered my wishes 
prior to the action, as a great part of the Carolina trade was daily 
expected on the coast and this privateer we saw sailed remarkably fast. 
Three days were employed putting her in a condition to make sail and five 
for the Savage, who was exceedingly shattered. Indeed it is astonishing 
more damage was not done, as the weather was fine, the water remarkably 
smooth, and the ships never 30 yards asunder." (Almon, xiii, 48, 49; Ann. 
Reg. (1781), 251.) Stirling reported a loss of eight killed and twenty-six 
wounded. The Congress was commanded by Captain Geddes and her loss was 
eight killed and thirty wounded. The Savage was recaptured by the British 
frigate Solebay (Clark, i, 125; Penn. Gazette, September 19, November 28, 
1781; Brit. Adm. Rec., Instance and Prize Records, 44, 401. See further on 
privateering in 1781, Clark, i, 120, 127; Tucker, ch. viii; A. Sherburne, 
37-49; Mil. and Nav. Mag. U. S., July, 1833; Papers New London Hist. Soc., 
IV, i, 20; Massachusetts Mag., January, 1908; Boston Gazette. February 19, 
April 9, 16, 30, May 7, June 4, 25, July 2, August 6, September 10, 1781; 
Continental Journal, February 1, May 24, 1781; Conn. Courant, August 7, 
1781; Freeman's Journal, May 16, 1781; London Chronicle, May 10, 1781.)

In addition to privateering upon the sea, active maritime warfare was 
carried on during the Revolution by means of boats alongshore and in 
harbors, inlets, and bays. Whaleboats, barges, and other small open craft 
were employed, with eight or more oars, sometimes as many as twenty-four, 
and also carrying sail, and with a swivel or heavier gun mounted in the 
bow. Their crews numbered from less than a dozen to thirty or more. A 
flotilla of four or five such boats made a formidable armament. Sometimes 
by surprise at night and sometimes by direct attack, they captured 
merchantmen, transports, and supply ships, and occasionally armed vessels 
of considerable force. Nantucket and Vineyard Sounds, Long Island Sound, 
Chesapeake Bay, and, most of all, the New Jersey shore and lower New York 
Bay were the waters chiefly frequented by these whaleboat privateersmen. 
The British and loyalists employed the same sort of boats in their 
predatory warfare along the shores of Chesapeake Bay and Long Island 
Sound; and boat expeditions were sent out from British men-of-war for the 
same kind of work. The most famous of the American flotillamen was Adam 
Hyler of New Jersey, who bore a commission from his state. He and others 
began their operations after the occupation of New York by the British in 
1776. They cruised between Egg Harbor and Staten Island. Sometimes their 
boats were destroyed by parties sent from the British fleet, but new ones 
were soon built to replace them. Hyler was most active in 1781 and 1782 
(Naval Mag., November, 1836; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, March, 1882; 
N. Y. Gen. and Biogr. Rec., April, 1891; Clark, i, 113, 120; Boston Post, 
October 17, 1778, January 23, February 6, 1779, May 11, 1782; Penn. 
Packet, May 2, 1780, May 29, 1781; Independent Chronicle, May 17, 1781, 
January 9, 1783; Freeman's Journal, April 25, December 26, 1781, June 26, 
1882; Salem Gazette, August 15, 1782; Boston Gazette, March 31, 1783; 
Pickering MSS., xliv, 162; Almon, xiv, 35; N. Y. Eve. Post, July 18, 1883, 
quoted in Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc., January, 1884.)

Several marauding expeditions in Chesapeake Bay were conducted by the 
British during the Revolution. That of Collier and Mathew in 1779 has been 
noticed. In the fall of 1780, General Leslie, with about three thousand 
men and a naval force consisting of the Romulus of forty-four guns, the 
frigate Blonde, and some smaller vessels, including one of John 
Goodrich's, seized Portsmouth, Virginia. December 30, the expedition of 
Benedict Arnold with sixteen hundred men, which had sailed from New York 
on the 12th with several frigates, arrived in Chesapeake Bay. During the 
early part of January, 1781, Arnold raided up the James River as far as 
Richmond and destroyed much property. Governor Jefferson of Virginia made 
strenuous efforts in the defense of his State. Arnold soon retired to 
Portsmouth where he remained until spring. Meanwhile, in February, a 
French sixty-four-gun ship and two frigates captured the Romulus and 
several small vessels of Arnold's fleet. Another raid was made in April 
and May by twenty-five hundred men under Generals Phillips and Arnold. The 
expedition left Portsmouth April 18, fell down to Hampton Roads, and 
thence proceeded up the James and Chickahominy Rivers. April 27, the 
British met with firm resistance on the part of the Virginia navy on the 
James River; the most important of these vessels were the ships Tempest 
and Renown of sixteen guns each and the fourteen-gun brigantine Jefferson. 
This force, however, the invaders finally overcame, capturing a number of 
vessels that the Americans had not time to destroy. This nearly put an end 
to the Virginia navy. Phillips died May 13, leaving Arnold in command. 
Soon after this, upon the arrival of Cornwallis in Virginia, Arnold 
returned to New York (Almon, xi, 157, 322, xii, 60; Jefferson, ii, 391-
410; Boston Gazette, March 5, 1781; Navy Rec. Soc., vi, 93-102; Dawson, 
ch. lxxx; Narr. and Crit. Hist., vi, 546; Virginia Hist. Reg., July, 1848, 
July, 1849, October, 1851; So. Lit. Messenger, June, 1839, March, 1857.)

When the American and French armies marched south in August, 1781, General 
Clinton sought to divert them from their purpose by sending Arnold on 
another marauding expedition, this time to Connecticut. Having collected a 
force on the Long Island shore at a point about thirty miles from New 
London, Arnold weighed anchor early in the evening of September 5. He had 
about seventeen hundred men on board twenty-four vessels. Captain Bazeley 
was in command of the fleet. They appeared off New London early the next 
morning. The force was landed in two divisions, nine hundred men on the 
west side of the Thames River and eight hundred on the east. Arnold led 
the western division and had little difficulty in taking New London; the 
town was burned. Fort Griswold, at Groton, on the east side of the river, 
made a strong resistance, but it was finally captured by the British and 
loyalists and a massacre of the garrison followed. A very large amount of 
property on shore was destroyed; also all the shipping, except a few 
vessels that escaped up the river. The expedition then returned to New 
York (Almon, xiii, 53,58; Dawson, ch. xcviii; Narr. and Crit. Hist, vi, 
562.)

The most important naval event of 1781 was the culmination of the struggle 
for naval supremacy in American waters on the part of the French and 
British, which decided the outcome of the war. In December, 1780, war 
between Holland and England was declared, and in February, 1781, Admiral 
Rodney, the British naval commander-in-chief in the West Indies, seized 
the Dutch island of St. Eustatius, with a vast amount of property both 
public and private, thereby breaking up a depot for the supply and 
transshipment of goods and military stores, which had been during the war 
of great importance to the Americans and an invaluable aid to their cause. 
After the capture, through the very questionable expedient of leaving 
Dutch colors flying, Rodney was able greatly to increase the amount of 
booty by decoying into the roadstead many unsuspecting vessels. He wrote 
to Germain, March 26: "I may speak within bounds when I say that since 
taking this island upwards of two hundred thousand pounds in value of 
tobacco has fell into our hands." The spoils were sent home to England in 
thirty-four ships, most of which were fortunately captured by the French 
in the English Channel. Before the end of the year, St. Eustatius also was 
captured by the French (Mahan, 382; Channing, iii, 323-327; Almon, xi, 
260, xiii, 119; Amer. Hist. Rev., viii (July, 1903), 699-708; London 
Chronicle, March 15, 1781; Boston Gazette, April 2, 1781; Navy Rec. Soc., 
xxxviii, 123-126; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 202, 207 (Rodney to Germain, 
March 4, 26, 1781); Letters of Lord Rodney. Rodney's letters disclose the 
vindictiveness which marked his conduct at St. Eustatius.)

The French fleet in Newport, now commanded by Commodore Destouches, sailed 
for Chesapeake Bay early in March, closely followed by Arbuthnot from 
Gardiner's Bay, who by superior sailing arrived off the capes in time to 
head off the French. A battle followed in which Destouches had the 
advantage and yet he ran out to sea, allowing Arbuthnot to enter the bay 
undisturbed and form a junction with Arnold. Reinforcements under Phillips 
were then sent from New York to the army in Virginia. The operations of 
these officers on the James River, already mentioned, then took place. 
Late in March the Comte de Grasse with a powerful fleet sailed from Brest 
for the West Indies. Rodney being still occupied at St. Eustatius, the 
French on their arrival late in April had to deal only with Rear-Admiral 
Hood, whose force was inferior. If Rodney had been less intent on prize 
money he could, perhaps, have given De Grasse a reception that might 
possibly have upset French and American plans. He would neither go out 
himself to meet the French nor allow Hood to do so. De Grasse did not make 
full use of his advantage, however, and beyond releasing four blockaded 
French ships at Martinique he accomplished little. He anchored at Cape 
Francois late in July (Mahan, 382-387; Almon, xi, 310-315; Stopford-
Sackville MSS., 207 (March 28, 1781); Navy Rec. Soc, iii (Hood's Letters), 
15-18; Rodney's Letters, 58-62.)

Meanwhile Washington and Rochambeau, having united their forces near New 
York, were prepared to move on that place or against Cornwallis in 
Virginia, according to whether the one or the other movement could most 
advantageously be supported by the French fleet. Having been apprised of 
this situation upon his arrival at Cape Francois, De Grasse decided on the 
Chesapeake and promptly dispatched a frigate to notify the generals. They 
at once moved the allied army to the head of Chesapeake Bay and thence by 
transports to the York Peninsula, where Cornwallis in his camp at Yorktown 
was soon invested. De Grasse sailed north, August 5, and anchored in 
Lynnhaven Bay, just inside the capes of the Chesapeake, on the 30th. There 
was no English naval force in the bay at this time. Arbuthnot had departed 
long before, returning to England on leave, and a few days before, Hood, 
sent north from the West Indies by Rodney, had passed the capes, and 
seeing no French had kept on to New York, where he joined Admiral Graves, 
now in command of the North American station. August 31, Graves sailed 
with the whole force for the Chesapeake, and upon arriving off the capes, 
September 5, saw De Grasse inside. The English had nineteen ships of the 
line, the French twenty-four. De Grasse got under way and ran out to sea 
to meet his adversary, and five days were spent in manoeuvring and 
desultory flghting. This gave an opportunity for another French fleet to 
get into the bay. This was the Newport fleet, now commanded by Commodore 
De Barras with a convoy of transports carrying siege artillery for the use 
of the array before Yorktown, which it was most important to conduct in 
safety. Graves, overmatched, was obliged to return to New York. De Grasse 
again entered the bay, where he found De Barras safely anchored. The 
action of September 5 was a subject of controversy among British officers. 
Graves fought the battle under a new system of instructions, and believed 
that his want of success was due to the failure of his captains, bound by 
tradition to the old system, to interpret his signals intelligently. Hood 
sharply criticized the management of the fleet and has been charged with 
purposely failing to get into action and with a willingness to see Graves 
blunder (Mahan, 387-400; Almon, xii, 283, xiii, 33-48, xiv, 36; Boston 
Gazette, October 1, 1781; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 212-215; Navy Rec. 
Soc., iii, 24, 28-36, 40, 44, vi, 111-127, xxix, 213, xxxii, 120, 121, 
124, 125, 129, xxxv, 53-55, 260, 261; Clowes, iii, 488-502; Channing, iii, 
334-339, 345; Doniol, iv, chs. xiii, xiv; Chevalier, ch. viii. See article 
on Rochambeau, by J. J. Jusserand in Harvard Graduates' Mag., December, 
1912.)

The naval supremacy of France at the seat of war was now complete, the sea 
power so much desired by Washington had been won for the allies. The 
situation of Cornwallis seemed hopeless, although if he had held out a few 
weeks longer, it is possible that Clinton's efforts to relieve him might 
have been successful. He considered his position untenable, however, and 
surrendered to the allies, October 19.

Before the end of 1781, the Continental navy was reduced to the lowest 
point it reached during the war. Three vessels had been lost within the 
year: the frigates Confederacy and Trumbull and the sloop of war Saratoga. 
The Trumbull was the last of the original thirteen frigates of 1775. The 
frigates Alliance and Deane now constituted the whole strength of the navy 
in commission. The America of seventy-four guns and the frigate Bourbon 
were still on the stocks, with no likelihood of their being finished for a 
long time to come. On the list of officers were twenty-two captains and 
thirty-nine lieutenants, and of marine officers twelve captains and twelve 
lieutenants (Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 473. This list is dated September, 
1781, and is doubtless inaccurate.) The great majority of these officers 
were either unemployed or serving on board privateers; several were 
prisoners of war. The administration of naval affairs continued to be in 
charge of Robert Morris as Agent of Marine until after the end of the war.

Five hundred and fifty letters of marque were issued to private armed 
vessels by the Continental Congress in 1781, a much larger number than in 
any other year and an increase over the figures for 1780 of two hundred 
and forty-nine (Naval Records (calendar), 217-495.) This indicates a 
decided activity and enterprise on the part of American privateers. A 
correspondent of John Adams wrote to him early in the following year: " It 
is true that a large number of our private armed ships to the Eastward 
have been taken in the course of the last season, but in every other 
respect we have been successful. And indeed we have captured a number of 
valuable ships belonging to the enemy." (Adams MSS., January 18, 1782.)

During the year 1781 the number of vessels of all classes in the British 
navy increased from five hundred and thirty-eight to five hundred and 
fiftyone, a much smaller growth than in the previous years of the war. The 
number in commission reached three hundred and ninety-eight at the end of 
the year, an increase of only two over the figures for the first of 
January. The number on the North American station seems to have varied 
considerably and to have been largest in October, when Graves had forty-
five in his fleet; there were about forty in the West Indies. The total 
number of seamen and marines in the navy was ninety thousand (Hannay, ii, 
211; Schomberg, ii, 36, iv, 376-384.)

According to the table of losses and captures before referred to, the 
British lost six hundred and twenty-five vessels, of which thirty-eight 
were privateers and the others merchantmen; of these, two hundred and 
seventeen were recaptured or ransomed. England took from her enemies three 
hundred and seventeen, including forty privateers, and ten of them were 
recaptured (Clowes, iii, 396.) Another correspondent of John Adams, 
writing from Boston, says: 11 The British frigates have done more damage 
to Our trade the last Season than any time since the Warr; that confounded 
Penobscot is a handy resort." (Adams MSS., January 23, 1782.)

John Paul Jones wrote to Washington, May 7, 1781: "Our Navy has been badly 
conducted; it has ever been without a head and is now almost entirely lost 
. . . I have pointed out many desirable operations that promised success 
and would have taught the barbarous Britains humanity, but my voice has 
been as a cry in the desert. The importance and necessity of a marine 
establishment does not appear sufficiently impressed on the minds of our 
Legislature." (Sparks MSS., xii, 247)



CHAPTER XVII
THE END OF THE WAR, 1782 AND 1783

Although the surrender of Cornwallis virtually put a stop to military 
operations on land, hostilities on the sea continued until the conclusion 
of peace. Notwithstanding the fact that the naval resources of the country 
were nearly exhausted, cruising was actively carried on by the few 
Continental and State ships still remaining, while privateersmen, lured by 
the hope of prize money, did not cease fitting out their craft and sending 
them to sea as long as there were enemies to pursue.

After the victory at Yorktown it was deemed necessary to send the Alliance 
again to France with Lafayette, and the cruise which had been planned for 
her by the Agent of Marine was accordingly abandoned. Washington wrote to 
Lafayette, November 15, 1781, once more strongly urging the importance of 
sea power. If De Grasse had remained a few weeks longer on the American 
coast, the English forces in the Southern States, in Washington's opinion, 
would have suffered "total extirpation." He says: "As you expressed a 
desire to know my Sentiments respecting the operations of the next 
Campaign, before your departure for France, I will without a tedious 
display of reasoning declare in one word, that the advantages of it to 
America and the honor and glory of it to the allied arms in these States 
must depend absolutely upon the naval force which is employed in these 
Seas and the time of its appearance next year. No land force can act 
decisively unless it is accompanied by a maritime superiority; nor can 
more than negative advantages be expected without it . . . It follows 
then, as certain as that night succeeds day, that without a decisive naval 
force we can do nothing definitive, and with it everything honorable and 
glorious. A constant naval superiority would terminate the war speedily; 
without it I do not know that it will ever be terminated honorably." 
(Washington, ix, 406, 407.) The magnitude of the advantage gained at 
Yorktown and the temper of the enemy were evidently not appreciated in 
America at this time. As it turned out, the British were in no need of a 
further exhibition of force to dispose them to thoughts of peace. In fact 
they were so in fear of another great disaster that orders, dated April 4, 
1782, were issued to General Carleton, who was sent to relieve General 
Clinton, to evacuate New York at once, or even to capitulate, if beset by 
a force so formidable as to render evacuation without heavy loss 
impracticable. For lack of transports, however, evacuation was impossible, 
and the tide soon turned somewhat in England's favor. The defeat of De 
Grasse by Rodney in the West Indies, in April, 1782, revived the spirits 
and restored the confidence of the British. Nevertheless, efforts to 
procure transports for removing the troops from New York continued, but as 
a sufficient number could not be collected to embark the whole army at 
once, the matter rested until at length the cessation of hostilities 
removed the supposed hazard of the situation. The British state of mind 
after Yorktown was of course unknown in America (Sparks MSS., Iviii, 145-
149; Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 73, 77-80.)

Lafayette proceeded to Boston and on board the Alliance. Several other 
passengers accompanied him. Morris issued minute instructions, dated 
November 27, 1781, in which Captain Barry was directed to give special 
attention to the comfort of his passengers. "Let it be done with 
discretion; remember that we are not rich enough to be extravagant, nor so 
poor as to act meanly." The importance of landing these distinguished 
persons safely was such that it would be necessary to avoid all vessels, 
it being the sole object "to make a quiet and safe passage to some port in 
France." The Alliance was to remain in Europe until about the 1st of 
March, cruising "where you can promise yourself of the best chance of 
Success"; she was then to set sail from L'Orient on her return voyage, 
taking as many prizes on the way as possible and finally putting into the 
most convenient American port, preferably Philadelphia, there to await 
further instructions. The frigate's crew was finally made up. A number of 
French sailors were obtained through the efforts of the French minister 
and some of the Deane's crew were transferred to the Alliance. She sailed 
December 23, 1781, and in spite of her orders to avoid all vessels, she 
made a prize of a large ship from Jamaica which was sent into Boston. The 
frigate arrived at L'Orient, January 18, 1782 (Barry, 153-161; Independent 
Chronicle, January 24, 1782.)

The Alliance made a short and unsuccessful cruise in February, and on 
March 16 set sail on her homeward voyage. She was again unfortunate in the 
matter of taking prizes and fell in with no vessel of the enemy until off 
the Delaware capes, May 10, when a British sixty-four-gun ship appeared 
and gave chase. The Alliance succeeded in eluding her and ran for New 
London, where she arrived, May 13, and remained until August (Barry, ch. 
xv; Boston Post, May 11, 1782; Independent Chronicle, May 23, 1782; 
Independent Ledger, June 10, 1782.)

The General Court of Massachusetts, on February 25, 1782, resolved to 
allow Captain Nicholson, who had unwillingly given up some of his crew to 
the Alliance, to enlist not more than twelve men from the garrison of the 
Castle in Boston Harbor, for the frigate Deane. This ship sailed from 
Boston in March on a two months' cruise in the West Indies. She captured 
two ships, a brig, and a schooner, three of them armed vessels. She 
returned to Boston in May with many prisoners on board, also several cases 
of fever. She remained in Boston Harbor four or five months (Mass. Court 
Rec., February 25, 1782; Boston Gazette, May 13, July 29, 1782, 
Independent Chronicle, May 23, 1782.)

The frigate South Carolina, Commodore Gillon, arrived at Havana, January 
12, 1782. Here it was learned that the Spaniards were making plans for an 
expedition against New Providence, under General Cagigal, the governor of 
Cuba. Gillon joined forces with them, taking command of the fleet 
consisting of fifty-nine vessels, presumably mostly Spanish. The next 
three months were spent in fitting out this armada. April 22, the 
expedition sailed, and May 5 the whole fleet lay before New Providence. 
Several outlets at the north side of the island were blocked by some of 
the American vessels, while others were stationed in the offing. The South 
Carolina stood off and on until five o'clock, then took a position as near 
the bar of the harbor as possible, within gunshot of Fort Nassau, in order 
to draw attention that way while the transports prepared to land the 
troops. General Cagigal sent a flag to the governor asking on what terms 
he would surrender the Bahama Islands to Spain. Meanwhile Gillon directed 
the transports to follow a leading vessel, which repeated his signals for 
anchoring before the town, that the general might debark when he saw fit. 
The next day at nine o'clock the British governor sent proposals on board 
the South Carolina which were not accepted. All the American vessels 
continued as near their stations as wind, shoals, and circumstances 
allowed. The Spanish transports, with armed vessels and galleys, kept 
anchoring as ordered, and at three o'clock Cagigal with the Spanish 
officers on the South Carolina departed in order to make preparations for 
debarking the troops. At five o'clock another flag was sent to the 
governor and returned the next day, having agreed on a capitulation. On 
the following day, May 8, Cagigal landed the army and took possession of 
the forts and town. This made the third capture of New Providence during 
the Revolution. Gillon thought that the success of the expedition was due 
to the captains of the American armed vessels, who led the fleet against 
head winds through difficult passages among the islands and reefs, a route 
so unfrequented and unexpected by the enemy that they had made no 
preparations to obstruct or defend it (Royal Gazette, June 19, 1782, 
Gillon's report to the governor of South Carolina (May 15, 1782); Penn. 
Packet, March 5, June 4, October 19, 1782; Log of the South Carolina; 
Almon, xiv, 148-151.)

The South Carolina then sailed north and arrived at Philadelphia May 28. 
Here she remained nearly six months. Gillon was displaced from the command 
of the ship by an agent of the owner, Chevalier Luxembourg, the exact 
reason for which does not appear. The command was given to Captain John 
Joyner of the South Carolina navy. In November the frigate sailed from 
Philadelphia having three vessels under convoy, bound to Europe. 
Apparently she did not clear the capes for about a month, as she had not 
gone far when, on the night of December 19, she fell in with three British 
men-of-war, the forty-four-gun ship Diomede and the frigates Quebec and 
Astrea of thirty-two guns each. A chase of eighteen hours ensued, during 
which two of the convoy were captured by the British and found to be a 
ship and brig from Philadelphia; the third, a schooner, got away. 
"Prisoners inform'd us," says the Astrea's log "the large Ship was the 
South Carolina Frigate, 40 Guns ... At 3 [P.M., December 21] the Carolina 
fir'd several stern chace Guns at the Diomede & Quebec ... At 1/2 past 3, 
the Quebec hauld up for the South Carolina's Weather Quarter. The Diomede 
continued standing on & Fir'd her Bow Chace Guns at the South Carolina; 
she ret'd her stern Chace Guns. At 45 Min. past, the Diomede bore up and 
fir'd her Starbd Guns at the Chace. At 50 Min. past 4 the Chace struck her 
Colours & hove too." The prize was sent into New York. Soon afterwards a 
survey of the South Carolina was made which furnishes a description of 
this interesting ship, which might have done so much and really did so 
little for the American cause. Her length on the upper deck was one 
hundred and seventy feet, on the keel one hundred and forty-four feet and 
one inch; extreme breadth, forty-three feet and three inches. She measured 
fourteen hundred and thirty tons burden. "She appears to be about Five 
Years Old, Built in Holland; had on board when taken, 28 No. (about) 
Thirty-Nine Pounders on the Upper Deck, 10 No. Twelve Pounders on the 
Quarter Deck, and 2 No. Nine Pounders on the Fore Castle." (Brit. Adm. 
Rec., A. D. 490, January 18, 1783; Captains' Logs, Nos. 23 and 749 (logs 
of the Astrea and Quebec); Boston Gazette, September 16, 1782; Independent 
Chronicle, November 29, 1782, January 9, 1783; Penn. Packet, December 31, 
1782; Almon, xv, 227; Clowes, iv, 91.)

Two new vessels were added to the Massachusetts navy early in 1782, the 
Tartar and the sloop Winthrop. The Tartar had been under construction 
nearly two years and was only just ready for service; she was a ship of 
four hundred tons and carried eighteen nine-pounders and two sixes. These 
vessels seem to have cruised together in June for a short time. In a 
letter, dated July 1, William Vernon says: "The State Ship Tartar and 
Sloop of 12 Guns went out the last Week, in quest of the Bermuda Brigt., 
but they were soon drove in by the appearance of a Ship wch they supposed 
to be of 50 Guns and proved to be only a Sloop of War of 18, much to the 
discredit of Capt. Cathcart, I think." (Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 274.) 
Cathcart, however, apparently retrieved his good name and later in the 
season the Tartar took several prizes. She was sold before the end of the 
year 1782 and was fitted out as a privateer, still under Cathcart's 
command. After cruising a short time in 1783, she was captured by the 
British frigate Bellisarius and taken into New York. The Winthrop, Captain 
George Little with Edward Preble as lieutenant, was employed on the Maine 
coast. She came into Boston, September 16, 1782, after a short cruise in 
which she took five prizes, including two privateers and a brig which was 
cut out of her anchorage under the fort in Penobscot Bay. "Much Praise is 
due to the Bravery and good Conduct of Capt. Little and his Crew for this 
spirited Enterprise and for the great Service they have rendered this 
Commonwealth in captivating the above Privateers, that have for a long 
Time infested this Coast and taken many valuable Vessels from us." (Boston 
Gazette, September 23, 1782.) In February, 1783, the governor, in a 
message relating to the employment of Little and the Winthrop, said: "I 
considered that he had most essentially prevented the Depredations on that 
coast by Capturing & sending into this Port near the whole of the Arm'd 
force they possess'd at Penobscot." (Mass. Archives, clviii, 274.) The 
Winthrop made two cruises in 1783, the last one ending in June. She was 
the last ship of the Massachusetts navy in commission and was sold soon 
after her return to port (Mass. Acts and Resolves, May 2, November 12, 
1782, March 26, June 4, 1783; Mass. Archives, clviii, 238, 274; Boston 
Post, August 10, October 12, November 23, 1782; Boston Gazette, September 
23, October 14, November 11, 1782, March 17, 1783; Continental Journal, 
October 3, 1782; Independent Chronicle, November 7, 1782; Massachusetts 
Mag., January, April, 1911.)

In the winter and early spring of 1782, Delaware Bay was infested with 
privateer barges and other small craft, fitted out by loyalists, which 
preyed upon the commerce of Philadelphia and ravaged the shores of the 
bay. The merchants of the city applied to the state government for 
protection and as a result, provision was made for fitting out a number of 
armed vessels for the defense of the bay. This action was taken April 9. 
On the 29th, the Philadelphia merchants appealed to the Continental 
Congress, more especially, however, in behalf of American shipping in 
general. Robert Morris reported on this memorial that the Continental navy 
was unable to give sufficient protection to commerce and recommended 
calling upon the navies of France and Spain for assistance. Meanwhile 
conditions in Delaware Bay were too acute to admit of waiting for the slow 
progress of legislation and in March the merchants of Philadelphia had 
purchased on their own responsibility and fitted out as a privateer under 
a Continental commission a ship called the Hyder Ally. She was armed with 
four nine-pounders and twelve sixes and manned by a crew of a hundred and 
twenty. The command was given to Joshua Barney, a lieutenant in the 
Continental navy, who had recently returned from a long imprisonment in 
England (Barney, 303; Pap. Cont. Congr., 41, 6, 283 (April 29, 1782), 28, 
241, 243a (May 2, 4, 1782), 137, 1, 435 (May 4, 1782).)

On April 7, the Hyder Ally with a convoy of merchantmen dropped down the 
bay to Cape May Road. Here they were seen towards evening by the British 
frigate Quebec and the sloop of war General Monk, formerly the American 
privateer General Washington, which anchored outside the capes. At 
daylight the next morning the General Monk entered the Cape May Channel in 
pursuit of the Americans, while the Quebec stood up the Henlopen Channel 
to cut off their retreat to Philadelphia. The General Monk was joined by a 
New York sixteen-gun privateer called the Fair American. At noon these two 
vessels came into Cape May Road. The American fleet got under way, stood 
up the bay, and dispersed. One of them ran ashore and another struck to 
the General Monk. The Fair American then got aground, and the Monk 
continued the chase alone. An English account says: "We soon came up with 
the Hyder Ally, notwithstanding she cut her boat adrift and did everything 
else to get away. We meant to have run upon her quarter and board her at 
once, but after firing two of our bow chaces when at 100 yards distance, 
she put her helm a-port and stood right athwart us, therefore we did the 
same, to prevent being raked, when the action began and we edged towards 
her till within close pistol-shot. We with great concern soon found our 
short guns (carronades) to become totally unmanageable and that two-thirds 
of the shot we fired did not strike the hull of our antagonist. After 
having sustained the action for ten minutes with musketry only, the decks 
full of killed and wounded (among the former the Lieutenant and Master, 
two brave Officers), our rigging so much shot as to render it impossible 
to haul off, and lastly, seeing no prospect of assistance from the Fair 
American, Captain Rogers was under the mortifying necessity of striking 
his Majesty's colours to the Hyder Ally, of 18 long nine and six pounders 
and between 130 and 140 men, belonging to the state of Philadelphia." 
(London Chronicle, September 10, 1782.) The General Monk, according to the 
same authority, was armed with eighteen nine-pounder carronades and two 
sixes; her crew numbered a hundred and ten. Her loss was eight killed and 
thirty-two wounded, four of them mortally; the Hyder Ally lost four killed 
and eleven wounded. The time of the action was about half an hour. It is 
very doubtful if, as the English asserted, Barney tried to escape at the 
outset of the engagement. This impression may have arisen from the fact 
that he shouted his orders in a manner intended to deceive the enemy. The 
capture of the Monk produced great satisfaction in Philadelphia. A 
dispatch from that place says: "Capt. Barney with the officers and men of 
the State ship Hyder Ally have received the thanks of the honorable House 
of Assembly of Pennsylvania as a mark of the high sense which they 
entertain of their bravery and intrepid conduct in the above action; and 
have also ordered that an elegant sword be presented to Capt. Barney." 
(Boston Gazette, May 6, 1782.) Some time after her capture, the General 
Monk was purchased by the national government and taken into the 
Continental navy under her original name of General Washington. Barney was 
given command of her and she was used as a packet (Barney, 112-117, 304-
308; Freeman's Journal, April 10, 1782; Penn. Gazette, April 17, 1782; 
Boston Gazette, April 22, May 6, 1782; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, 
Matthewman's narrative; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 490, May 10, 1782.)

The brig Holker of Philadelphia was one of the most famous privateers of 
the Revolution. She began her career in 1779, and cruised three years or 
more under different commanders. In the winter of 1782, a squadron of 
American privateers made their rendezvous at Martinique and planned an 
attack on Tortola, one of the Virgin Islands. Besides the Holker there 
were four ships and a sloop, with about five hundred men; only four 
vessels, however, finally took part in the expedition. They left 
Martinique about March 1, and were seen off Tortola on the 4th. They 
intended to anchor off the forts and cover a landing party at night, but 
were delayed and the movement was deferred. They were seen standing into 
the harbor by moonlight and the alarm was given, so the attack was 
postponed until morning. Three brigantines attempting to escape from the 
harbor were chased and one of them was captured by the Holker. Several 
letters of marque at St. John came out to meet the American squadron and 
an action of half an hour's duration followed. A few days later the 
British sloop of war Experiment, coming in from a cruise, had an 
engagement with the Holker and the Junius Brutus, one of the other 
American vessels. The Experiment succeeded in beating them off and went 
into Antigua. The American squadron then cruised a few days and captured a 
rich prize. The attempt on Tortola was abandoned. The Holker returned to 
Philadelphia, May 11, having taken fourteen prizes (Boston Post, September 
11, October 2, 1779, May 25, 1782; Penn. Packet, August 21, 1779; Boston 
Gazette, January 14, 1782, March 10, 1783; Independent Chronicle, May 30, 
1782; Royal Gazette, June 5, 1782; Clark, i, 112, 119, 120, 129.)

Captain Mowatt, the British commander at Penobscot, in March, 1782, sent a 
fourteen-gun brig to cruise off Cape Ann. She captured a fishing-boat, put 
twenty-five men on her and sent her into Gloucester. There it was found 
that a ship with a valuable cargo was about to go to sea. At half-past 
four the next morning, April 1, the boat ran in, boarded the ship and 
brought her out. The ship Polly, pierced for twenty guns, was on the ways 
at Gloucester, with her topmasts struck and otherwise unprepared. Work was 
began on her at seven o'clock and at eleven she got to sea with a hundred 
volunteers on board. She chased the brig, fishing-boat, and prize ship on 
their way to Penobscot and at twelve o'clock recaptured the prize. She 
then chased Mowatt's brig, but night came on and she escaped (Salem 
Gazette, April 11, 1782.)

One hundred and fifty-eight private armed vessels, with about two thousand 
guns and six thousand men, were sent out of Salem during the Revolution. 
They captured nearly four hundred and fifty vessels, nine tenths of which 
safely reached port. One of the most noted of these Salem privateers was 
the ship Grand Turk, of three hundred tons, built in 1781. She was armed 
with twenty-two guns and carried a crew of a hundred and ten men. She was 
actively and successfully employed as long as the war continued. She 
cruised off the coast of Europe and in the West Indies (Hunt's Mag., 
February, 1857; Coll. Essex Inst., xliv (1908), 214-218; Boston Gazette, 
October 22, 1781, May 6, 1782; Independent Chronicle, January 24, 1782; 
Boston Post, April 5, 1783. A list of 196 Salem privateers is given in 
Paine's Ships and Sailors of Old Salem.)

The privateer Jack of Salem, a sloop of twelve guns and sixty men, fought 
a long and severe engagement off Halifax with the British sloop of war 
Observer, carrying twelve guns and a hundred and seventy-three men. At 
nine in the evening, May 28, 1782, the Observer came alongside the Jack. 
William Gray, the first lieutenant of the privateer, says: "It was our 
misfortune to have our worthy commander, Capt. Ropes, mortally wounded by 
the first broadside. I was slightly wounded at the same time in my right 
hand and head, but not so as to disable me from duty. The action was 
maintained on both sides, close, severe and without intermission, for 
upwards of two hours, in which time we had 7 killed, several wounded, and 
many abandoned their quarters. Our rigging was so destroyed that not 
having command of our yards, the Jack fell with her larboard bow foul of 
the brig's starboard quarter, when the enemy made an attempt to board us, 
but they were repulsed by a very small number compared with them. We were 
engaged in this position about a quarter of an hour, in which time I 
received a wound by a bayonet fixed on a musket and which was hove with 
such force as, entering the fore part of my right thigh and passing 
through close to the bone, entered the carriage of a bow gun, where I was 
fastened, and it was out of my power to get clear till assisted by one of 
the prize masters. We then fell round and came with our broadsides to each 
other, when we renewed the action with powder and balls, but our match 
rope, excepting some which was unfit for use, being all expended and being 
to leeward, we bore away, making a running fight. The brig being far 
superior in her number of men, was able to get soon repaired and 
completely ready to renew the action, indeed had constantly kept up a 
chasing fire, for we had not been out of reach of her musketry. She was 
now close alongside of us again with 50 men picked out for boarding. I 
therefore called Mr. Glover and the rest together and found we had but 10 
upon deck and two of them besides myself wounded. I had been repeatedly 
desired to strike, but I mentioned the sufferings of a prison ship and 
made use of every other argument in my power for continuing the 
engagement. All the foreigners however deserted their quarters every 
opportunity. At 2 o'clock P.M. on the 29th I had the inexpressible 
mortification to deliver up the vessel." (Salem Gazette, July 11, 18, 
1782; Boston Post, June 15, 1782; Hunt's Mag., February, 1857.)

Four Massachusetts privateers engaged in an enterprise on the Nova Scotia 
coast which is described in the newspapers of the time. "Captains Babcock 
of the Hero, Stoddard of the Scammel, Woodbury of the Hope, and Tibbets of 
the Swallow, having determined to surprize and possess themselves of 
Lunenburgh, an elegantly situated Town, ten Leagues West of Halifax, 
landed Ninety Men two Miles below it, under the Command of Lieut. 
Barteman, on Monday the first Day of July Instant at half after Seven 
o'Clock A.M. This gallant Corps with amazing Rapidity reached the Town, 
and amidst many heavy Discharges of Musquetry from the Enemy, burnt the 
commanding Officer's House, a Blockhouse in the North West Part of the 
Town, spik'd up two 24 pounders, and forc'd the Enemy into the South 
Blockhouse, from whence they kept up a brisk and animating Fire and 
declared their Intention to hold out to the last Extremity. But their 
Animation subsided upon the Receipt of a few 4-pound Shot from the Hero 
and they reluctantly surrendered themselves Prisoners of War. The 
victorious Party with a natural and pleasing Vivacity fell to plundering, 
and quickly emptied the Stores of a Variety and considerable Quantity of 
Dry Goods, twenty Puncheons of good West-India Rum and the King's Beef, 
Pork and Flour. Upon the near Approach of the Combined Fleet, two 18 
pounders were spiked up and dismounted and the Royal Magazine was safely 
deposited in the Hold of the Scammel. The strictest Decorum was observed 
towards the Inhabitants and their Wearing Apparel and Household Furniture 
inviolably preserv'd for their Use. The Town was ransomed for a Thousand 
Pounds Sterling and Colonel Creighton with some of the principal 
Inhabitants were shipped on board the Scammel. On the Side of the brave 
Sons of Liberty, three were wounded slightly, one dangerously; on the Part 
of the Abettors of Oppression and Despotism, the Number of slain and 
wounded unknown, only one of their slain being found." (Boston Gazette, 
July 15, August 5, 1782; Massachusetts Spy, August 8, 1782.)

Thomas Truxtun, who afterwards became a famous commodore of the 
reestablished navy, was one of the successful privateersmen of the 
Revolution. He cruised throughout the whole war, most of the time in West 
Indian and European waters. In 1780, at L'Orient, he incurred the 
displeasure of Paul Jones by hoisting in his presence a broad pennant, 
contrary to a rule established by Congress Sands, 298; Hist. Mag., April, 
1857; Jones MSS., Jones to Truxtun (October 24, 1780).

In 1782, he was in command of the ship Commerce of Philadelphia, in the 
West Indies; she carried fourteen guns and fifty men. November 15, she 
fell in with a brig of sixteen six-pounders and seventy-five men and a 
schooner, fourteen sixes and eighty men. The Commerce engaged these 
vessels at a distance of thirty yards for twenty minutes. Her loss was one 
killed and two wounded; the brig lost five killed and thirteen wounded and 
the schooner ten killed and eleven wounded. The Commerce was then driven 
off by a British ship and brig which appeared in time to rescue the 
thoroughly beaten vessels (Boston Gazette, January 6, 1783; Port Folio, 
January, 1809.)

At the end of November, 1782, a desperate battle of barges took place in 
Chesapeake Bay off Tangier Islands, near the boundary between Maryland and 
Virginia on the eastern shore of the bay. Four Maryland barges and one 
from Virginia set out to attack six barges drawn up off the islands, 
manned by tories, refugees, and sailors from the British fleet. The 
Virginia barge got aground and the leading Maryland barge, the Protector, 
flagship of Commodore Whaley, being far in advance, engaged the British 
flotilla unsupported. An explosion took place on the Protector and in the 
confusion which ensued the other barges retreated. Whaley was killed, but 
the fight was kept up by the Protector alone under Colonel Cropper of 
Virginia, a volunteer, until he was forced to surrender. Out of a crew of 
sixty-five the Protector lost twenty-five killed or drowned and twenty-
nine wounded, some of them mortally (So. Lit. Messenger, March, 1857.)

The letter of marque brig Iris, eight six-pounders and forty-two men, 
sailed from Havana for Virginia, January 23, 1783, and off the capes of 
the Chesapeake, February 7, was chased by a British frigate and a New York 
privateer called the Admiral Digby, with fifty-four men, fourteen four-
pounders and four nines. The Iris struck on a sand-spit at Cape Charles, 
and shortly afterwards the Admiral Digby also grounded within pistol-shot. 
The two vessels lay parallel to each other and fought two hours and a 
half, the American loss being four wounded and the British four killed and 
twelve wounded. A high wind and heavy surf came up in the night and both 
vessels were lost. The crews got safely ashore (Salem Gazette, April 17,
1783.)

Privateers from the United States continued to cruise in European waters 
at a late period of the war, sending their prizes into France (London 
Chronicle, May 9, 1782; Boston Gazette, January 6, 1783.) Furthermore, the 
services of American privateers commissioned and fitted out in France were 
important and some of them have already been mentioned. Most of them 
sailed under the French flag. Dunkirk seems to have been the home port of 
many if not of the greater part of these vessels. During the war seventy-
eight Dunkirk privateers were commanded by Americans, six of them under 
American commissions; of these six, it would appear that two only, the 
Black Prince and Black Princess, were owned by Frenchmen. These French-
American privateers fought many hard engagements; they greatly annoyed the 
enemy's shipping in the English Channel and visited the shores of the 
British Isles. One of them, a twenty-gun ketch called the Franklin, in 
1781 captured two of the vessels sent to England by Admiral Rodney, loaded 
with plunder from St. Eustatius. Captain William Fall, in the Sans Peur of 
nineteen guns, bombarded the town of Arbroath, which had refused to pay 
ransom, and a few days later captured two British privateers of sixteen 
and eight guns after a sharp action within close range of batteries on the 
Scotch coast (U. S. Nav. Inst. Proc., xxxvii (September, 1911), 935, 964-
972.)

The conduct of these privateers fitted out in France seems sometimes to 
have been much less orderly than that of American ships in general. The 
crews were recruited from the heterogeneous seafaring population of the 
French ports and their commanders were not always able to control them. 
Respect for private property and for neutral flags was occasionally 
lacking. The cutter Eclipse was commanded during the latter part of her 
career by Nathaniel Fanning, who had served as a midshipman on board the 
Bonhomme Richard. The Eclipse was manned by a crew of a hundred and ten, 
just half of whom were Americans; the other half was made up of French, 
English, Irish, Dutch, Flemish, Germans, Italians, Genoese, Maltese, 
Turks, Tunisians, and Algerines. She sailed from Dunkirk under the French 
flag and cruised in the English Channel and in British waters. She took 
many prizes, including several of decidedly superior force, which were 
sent into French ports. In the summer of 1782, the Eclipse boarded a 
Danish vessel in the English Channel and the personal property of some 
French passengers was plundered. Fanning had given special orders to the 
boarding officer to respect private property, and that the robbery 
occurred seems to show loss of control over his men,, to say the least. As 
the result of an investigation and trial at the order of the French 
Minister of Marine, the judges of the admiralty sentenced Thomas Potter, 
the officer of the Eclipse who had boarded the Danish vessel, "to be 
hanged to a gallows erected for the purpose on the quay of this port and 
strangled by the executioner of high justice until he is dead," and two 
other men "to be whipped and flogged naked by said executioner of high 
justice and then branded on the right shoulder by a red-hot brand bearing 
the letters G A L and then conducted to the gallies of his Majesty, where 
they shall be made to serve during three years, their effects to be seized 
and confiscated "; they also declared "the aforesaid Nathaniel Fanning 
duly guilty and convicted of having failed to maintain subordination among 
his crew and of not having supervised that which was done during the 
search of neutral vessels, which gave rise to the aforesaid thefts, in 
punishment for which we declare him incapable during three years of any 
command as captain of vessels within the realm, and we enjoin him to be 
more circumspect for the future under penalty of the law." The three chief 
culprits being absent, "our present judgment will be executed in effigy by 
the attachment of figures to the aforesaid gallows and scaffold." (U. S. 
Nav. Inst. Proc., xxxvii, 982.) These three men had absconded before the 
trial, which was conducted without any defense on their part. In the fall 
of 1782, before the legal proceedings just narrated, Fanning cruised in a 
small cutter called the Ranger, in which he took one prize and was then 
himself captured by the British. He very soon escaped, however, and in a 
few days was again in Dunkirk (Ibid., 972-983; Fanning, 132-137, 141-144, 
174-181, 197-229, 240-242. Privateering continued until the spring of 1783 
was well advanced and prizes were still being tried as late as December. 
See Clark, i, ch. x; A. Sherburne, ch. v; Boston Gazette, January 28, 
February 11, 18, 25, March 11, April 8, 22, June 3, July 1, 8, August 5, 
September 2, 30, December 2, 16, 1782, May 5, Angust 4, December 22, 1783; 
Independent Chronicle, April 4, June 6, 1782, January 9, 1783; Boston 
Post, June 8, 29, July 6, 20, October 26, 1782, March 1, April 5, 1783; 
Freeman's Journal, January 23, February 6, 1782; Penn. Packet, May 11, 14, 
July 30, August 6, 1782. For privateering throughout the war, see Maclay's 
American Privateers; Weeden's New England, ch. xx; Coll. Essex Inst., xlii-
xlv, letters of George Williams to Timothy Pickering.)

The prize ship General Washington, formerly the General Monk, was not 
purchased by the Continental government until September, 1782, but in May 
she was loaned by the owners to Robert Morris, who sent her to the West 
Indies in June under the command of Joshua Barney. She sailed down the bay 
with a convoy which returned upon seeing a British squadron outside. The 
General Washington managed to elude the enemy and got to sea. Upon 
approaching Cape Francois she fought an action with a British privateer 
and captured another vessel which she sent into port. At Cape Francois, 
Barney learned of Rodney's victory over de Grasse and found the remnant of 
the French fleet under the Marquis de Vaudreuil, who a little later took 
his ships to Boston. The letters of Robert Morris, which Barney had with 
him, procured for him the escort of a French sixty-four-gun ship, to 
insure the safety of his mission, which was the shipment of a large 
quantity of specie from Havana to the United States. All this was 
accomplished, and the Washington again ran by the British fleet off the 
Delaware capes, and, after destroying a number of the enemy's barges in 
the bay, returned to Philadelphia, July 17 (Barney, ch. x; Freeman's 
Journal, July 24, 1782; Independent Chronicle, August 8, 1782; Mag. Amer. 
Hist., March, 1878, Matthewman's narrative.) Under orders of Morris, dated 
October 7, 1782, the General Washington sailed for France with dispatches 
for Franklin; after a short passage she arrived at L'Orient before the end 
of the month. In January, 1783, she sailed on the return voyage and 
arrived at Philadelphia, March 12 (Barney, ch. xi; Barry, 184; Boston 
Gazette, March 24, 1783; Adams MSS., December 18, 1782, Barney to Adams.)

The Alliance sailed from New London, August 4, 1782, on a cruise. Soon 
after leaving port she recaptured a prize brig. Barry sent home a 
narrative of this cruise, dated L'Orient, October 18, saying that he 
"proceeded as fast as possible off Bermudas; in my way I took a schooner 
from that place for Halifax. After cruizing off there for twelve or 
fifteen days, I retook a sloop from New London and sent her for Cape 
Francois. Finding the prizes I had taken of little value either to myself 
or country and in all likelihood should be obliged to return into port 
soon for want of men, was determined to alter my cruizing ground. I 
therefore thought it best to run off the banks of Newfoundland. In my way 
there I fell in with a whaling brigantine with a pass from admiral Digby; 
I mann'd her and sent her for Boston. A few days after, off the banks of 
Newfoundland, I took a brigantine from Jamaica bound to London, loaded 
with sugar and rum, and sent her for Boston; by this vessel I found the 
Jamaica fleet were to the eastward of us. I then carried a press of sail 
for four days; the fifth day I took two ships that had parted from the 
fleet. After manning them and having a fresh gale westwardly, I thought 
best to order them for France; a day or two after, I took a snow and a 
ship belonging to the same fleet. Being short of water and a number of 
prisoners on board, the westwardly winds still blowing fresh, and in 
expectation of falling in with some more of them, I thought it best to 
proceed to France, with a determined view to get those I had already taken 
in safe, and after landing the prisoners, to put out immediately; but 
meeting with blowing weather and a high sea, I lost the rails of the head 
and was in great danger of losing the head, which accident obliged me to 
put in here where I arrived yesterday with the above four prizes. After 
repairing the damages and getting what the ship may want, I shall put to 
sea on a cruize. I have likewise to inform you that the Ramilies, admiral 
Graves' ship, foundered, but all the crew were saved, several of which 
were on the prizes I took." (Freeman's Journal, December 18, 1782.) Some 
days later the Continental packet General Washington, Captain Barney, came 
into L'Orient. Captain Henry Johnson of the Continental navy, who had been 
in command of a privateer, was in Bordeaux at the same time. Several 
officers of the Alliance, being dissatisfied at not having received their 
pay, refused obedience to the captain and Barry ordered them under arrest. 
He was unable to obtain others to take their places, and was obliged to 
sail with inexperienced lieutenants promoted from the lower grades (Barry, 
chs. xvi, xvii; Boston Gazette, August 12, 1782; Mass. Spy, January 2, 
1783.)

The Alliance sailed from L'Orient, December 8, on a cruise. January 8, 
1783, she arrived at Martinique, where Barry found orders to proceed to 
Havana. On the way thither he was chased by a British fleet and again by a 
seventy- four and a frigate. At Havana he found the twenty-gun ship Due de 
Lauzun, which had been purchased by Morris for the Continental navy. 
Barry's orders were to sail at once for the United States with this vessel 
in company and with a quantity of specie for the use of Congress. After a 
delay of about three weeks, owing to the fact of the port of Havana being 
closed by an embargo, the Alliance and the Due de Lauzun, Captain Green, 
sailed March 6. On the 10th, they saw three sail, which gave chase. The 
strangers turned out to be the British frigates Alarm and Sybil, and the 
sloop Tobago. The headmost, which seems to have been the Alarm, got within 
gunshot of the Alliance and they exchanged fire, while the other two were 
fast coming up with the Lauzun. She was a dull sailer and Barry feared 
that if he stood by her, both American ships would be captured. He advised 
Green to heave his guns overboard and ran off before the wind, and all but 
two or three of them were accordingIy thrown over. Another sail soon 
appeared which was recognized as a French ship of fifty guns that had been 
seen at Havana. Barry was thereupon encouraged and looked for help from 
this ship. At this time the Alliance had dropped astern, nearer the 
Lauzun, and the Alarm shortened sail and held off from them. The Sybil got 
within gunshot of the Lauzun and opened fire with her bow chasers, which 
was returned by the Lauzun with stern chasers. Barry ran between them in 
order to give Green a chance to get away. The other two British ships kept 
at a distance to windward; the French ship also lay to. Kessler, the mate 
of the Alliance, says: "Captain Barry went from gun to gun on the main 
deck, cautioning against too much haste and not to fire until the enemy 
was right abreast. He ordered the main topsail hove to the mast, that the 
enemy (who had already fired a Bow gun, the shot of which struck into the 
cabin of the Alliance) might come up as soon as he was abrest, when the 
action began and before an half hour her guns were silenced and nothing 
but Musketry was fired from her. She appeared very much injured in her 
hull. She was of 32 guns and appeared very full of men, and after an 
action of 45 minutes She sheered off." (Barry, 223.) The Alliance lost ten 
wounded, one of them mortally; the Sybil, two killed and six wounded.

The log of the Sybil records that the American vessels were sighted at 
half-past five in the morning and the British then gave chase; at eleven 
the Alliance showed Continental colors. At half-past eleven "the Comr 
(Commodore, evidently meaning the Alarm.) fired two or three broadsides at 
the large ship, who returned it; we were at this time about 3 miles astern 
of the Comre. The Tobago was abreast of us carrying a press of sail to get 
up." Twenty minutes later the Sybil got into action with the Alliance and 
received considerable injury to sails and rigging. At half-past twelve "a 
large ship bore down to the ship we Engaged, wch obliged us to sheer off." 
(Brit. Adm. Rec., Ships' Logs, No. 875.) Kessler's story continues: "As 
soon as the ship which we had engaged hove from us, her consorts joined 
her and all made sail, after which the French ship came down to us and 
Captain Barry asked them why they did not come down during the action. 
They answered that they thought we might have been taken and the signal 
known and the action only a sham to decoy him. His foolish idea thus 
perhaps lost us the three frigates." (Barry, 224.) They then chased the 
British, but the French ship was slow and the pursuit was abandoned. The 
voyage was then continued. The Alliance and Due de Lauzun became separated 
off Cape Hatteras. Finding two British cruisers off the Delaware capes, 
the Alliance bore away for Newport, arriving there March 20. The Lauzun 
got into Philadelphia on the 21st. The Alliance a few days later went up 
to Providence, where in due time the crew were paid off and discharged 
(Barry, ch. xviii; Independent Chronicle, February 27, 1783; Continental 
Journal, February 27, 1783.)

After the return of the frigate Deane from her cruise in the spring of 
1782, Captain Nicholson was relieved of his command, for what reason is 
not clear; he was tried by a court martial in September, 1783, and 
honorably acquitted. Meanwhile, in September, 1782, the name of the ship 
was changed to Hague and "on Monday 11th instant John Manly, Esq., Captain 
in the American navy was appointed to the command of the Continental 
frigate Hague in this harbour, agreeable to an order from the Hon. Robert 
Morris, Esq., principal Agent of Marine, investing said command in the 
senior officer resident in the department. Capt. Manly, at 2 P.M. of the 
same day, repaired on board, attended by his principal officers, and was 
welcomed with united acclamations; 13 guns were fired in honor of the 
appointment, the ship beautifully decorated with colours and every 
possible demonstration of joy expressed a general satisfaction." 
(Independent Chronicle, September 26, 1782.) Manley had recently returned 
from a long imprisonment in England. The Hague made a cruise in the West 
Indies and took several prizes. In January, 1783, she was chased by a 
British ship and ran aground near Guadaloupe. Manley wrote, January 26: "I 
have already acquainted you that I have been drove on shore, after a 36 
hours chace, by a 50 gun ship, and lay at the mercy of her incessant fire 
for two days, who with the assistance of a 74 and two other sail of the 
line to back her, were not very sparing of a heavy and brisk cannonade. 
However, without a man killed and only one slightly wounded and my damages 
repaired in hull, masts, &c. &c., it is with pleasure I look to the 
prospect of getting out to-morrow for Martinico, Fort Royal, for heaving 
down." (Independent Chronicle, February 27, 1783.) The Hague returned to 
Boston not long after and was soon put out of commission (Boston Post, 
December 14, 1782, November 8, 1783; Boston Gazette, December 16,1782, 
January 27, February 3, March 3, 1783; Essex Inst. Coll., January, 1909.)

After his return to America in the Ariel, in February, 1781, Captain Jones 
spent another long period on shore, waiting for an important command and 
again doomed to disappointment. Before be left France, Jones received an 
intimation that the America, seventy-four, would be reserved for him 
(Jones MSS., November 8,1780), and June 26, 1781, he was appointed to 
command her by a unanimous vote of Congress. In August, he went to 
Portsmouth to superintend the completion of the ship. This work had 
previously been conducted by Captain Barry. Instead of being nearly ready 
to launch, as Jones had been led to expect, he found her only partly 
built. He calls her the largest seventy-four in the world, one hundred and 
eighty-two feet, six inches long on the upper gun deck, a hundred and 
fifty feet on the keel, and with an extreme breadth of fifty feet, six 
inches; she measured nineteen hundred and eighty-two tons. She was to 
mount thirty eighteen-pounder's on the lower gun-deck, thirty-two twelves 
on the upper deck, and fourteen nines on the quarter-deck and forecastle, 
all long guns. Her full complement would have been six hundred and twenty-
six officers and men. Jones remained in Portsmouth more than a year, 
scarcity of money causing the accustomed delay in the construction of the 
ship. Delay and other difficulties, however, also resulted from lack of 
experience, among those employed on the work, in building so large a ship. 
In constant fear of parties landing from the enemy's squadron, for the 
purpose of destroying the ship, it was necessary to keep a guard of 
workmen and citizens at night for her protection. Several times the 
enemy's boats appeared in the river at night, and twice, coming close, 
were fired upon. August 13, 1782, the Magnifique, a ship of the line 
belonging to the French fleet of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, at that time 
entering Boston Harbor, ran aground on Lovell's Island and was lost. 
September 3, the Continental Congress, being "desirous of testifying on 
this occasion to his Majesty the sense they entertain of his generous 
exertions in behalf of the United States: Resolved, That the agent of 
marine be and he is hereby instructed to present the America, a 74 gun 
ship, in the name of the United States, to the Chevalier de la Luzerne for 
the service of His Most Christian Majesty." So Jones again lost a fine 
ship. He remained at Portsmouth, however, until after the launch of the 
America, which took place November 6, 1782. The ship remained less than 
four years in the French service, being condemned as unseaworthy in 1786, 
and broken up. Immediately after the launching, Jones returned to 
Philadelphia. With the consent of Congress be made a cruise to the West 
Indies in Vaudreuil's fleet. Upon news of the conclusion of peace be again 
returned to Philadelphia, and later was sent by Congress to France in 
order to prosecute claims for prize money, still unpaid and due for the 
capture of the Serapis and other vessels (Sherburne, 227-238; Sands, 328-
352; Almon, xv, 24; U. S. Nav. Inst. Proc., xxxiv (June, 1908), 573-580; 
Amer. Cath. Hist. Res., April, 1904; Boston Gazette, August 19, November 
11, 1782; Independent Chronicle, November 14, 1782; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 
244, 245 (November 6, 1779); Archives de la Marine, B4 185, 304-307, 310-
316, 318, 319. For the prosecution of the prize claims, see Paullin's 
Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, ch. i.)

One of the latest naval exploits of the war was the capture of a British 
privateer in Long Island Sound by a detachment of forty men from the army. 
Colonel Tallmadge, in a report to General Washington, dated Greenfield, 
Connecticut, February 21, 1783, says: "Yesterday the Enemy's Vessel was 
discovered near Stratford Point, when at 2 o'Clock P.M. the troops were 
embarked in a fast sailing Vessel prepared for that purpose, which was 
commanded by Capt. Hubbel, and at 4 P.M. they came up with her, when she 
gave a discharge of her Cannon followed by her Swivels and Musketry (our 
troops being concealed) till both Vessels met, when the troops rose, gave 
the Enemy one discharge of Musketry and boarded them with fixed Bayonets. 
The Captain of the Privateer was killed and only three or four of his Men 
were wounded, two of them supposed mortally wounded. Tho' Captain Hubbel's 
Vessel was much damaged in her Hull, Spars & Rigging, Yet not a man on 
board was killed or wounded. Captain Brewster, who commanded the Troops, 
as well as the other Officers and Soldiers on board, deserve Commendation 
for the Spirit and Zeal with which this Service has been performed. The 
Privateer is called the Three Brothers, was commanded by Captain 
Johnstone, mounting eleven Carriage Guns, four Swivels and twenty-five 
Stand of small Arms, and navigated by twenty-one men." (Pap. Cont. Conqr., 
152, 11, 87.)

The battle between the Alliance and the Sybil was doubtless the last naval 
action of the Revolution, with the possible exception of some privateering 
exploit. Provisional articles of peace had been signed at Paris, November 
30, 1782, and January 20, 1783, an armistice had been arranged. In 
compliance with this, dispatches were sent to belligerents on land and sea 
proclaiming the cessation of hostilities. In the newspapers appeared the 
following order signed by Robert Morris: "To all Captains, Commanders, 
Masters and other officers of armed vessels, commissioned by the United 
States in Congress assembled, and to all others whom it shall or may in 
any wise concern: According to the orders of the United States in Congress 
unto me given on the 24th day of this present month of March, I do hereby 
recall all armed vessels cruising under commissions from the United States 
of America, whereof you will please to take notice. Done in the Marine 
Office of the United States of America, this twenty-fifth day of March, in 
the Year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three." (Mass. 
Spy, April 17, 1783.) The signing of the definitive treaty, September 3, 
1783, and its ratification by Congress, January 14, 1784, were the 
remaining steps necessary for the establishment of peace.

In the spring of 1783, there were five vessels remaining of the 
Continental navy: the frigates Alliance, Hague, and Bourbon, the first two 
only in commission, and the ships General Washington and Duc de Lauzun. In 
1782, three hundred and eighty-three letters of marque were granted by the 
Continental Congress to private armed vessels; in 1783, the number dropped 
to twenty-two (Naval Records (calendar), 217-495.)

The British navy increased during 1782 from five hundred and fifty-one 
vessels of all classes to six hundred and eight; vessels in commission 
from three hundred and ninety-eight to four hundred and thirty. In 1782, 
there were seventy vessels on the North American station, and in January, 
1783, there were sixty- two, besides more than twice as many in the West 
Indies. The total number of seamen and marines was one hundred thousand in 
1782 and in the following year there were ten thousand more (Hannay, ii, 
211; Schomberg, ii, 68, 124, iv, 418, 420; Clowes, iii, 327, 328.)

In the last two years of the war England lost five hundred and fifteen 
vessels taken by her enemies, and recaptured or ransomed a hundred and 
thirteen of them; she captured one hundred and eighty-six, of which only 
three were retaken. According to the same authority the total number of 
merchantmen and privateers captured from the British during the whole war 
was thirty-one hundred and seventy-six, eighty-nine of them belonging to 
the latter class; of this total eight hundred and ninety-three were 
retaken or ransomed. From her enemies England took during the war thirteen 
hundred and fifty-one, including two hundred and sixteen privateers; of 
all these only twenty-eight were recaptured (Ibid., 396. Unfortunately, in 
these tables Americans cannot be distinguished from other enemies, after 
1777.) Of the regular navy of England there were taken, destroyed, burnt, 
foundered or wrecked daring the war, two hundred and three vessels; of 
those captured, eighteen were retaken (Ibid., iv, 109-113. For other 
estimates, see Almon, xvi, 190, 191; Schomberg, v, 41-43.)

The ships of the Continental navy were gradually disposed of, their crews 
disbanded, and this interesting organization passed into history. The Duc 
de Lauzun was loaned to the French minister, converted into a transport, 
and sent to France, where she was sold. The Bourbon was launched at 
Middletown, Connecticut, July 31, 1783, and in September was advertised 
for sale. Meanwhile the Hague had been advertised in August; she was 
described as being of five hundred and seventeen tons burden, ninety-six 
feet long on the keel and thirty-two feet wide. These two vessels soon 
passed into private hands. The General Washington was employed as a packet 
until the summer of 1784, when she also was sold. The Alliance was 
retained a year longer. There was a strong sentiment in favor of keeping 
this ship permanently in the national service, and on January 15, 1784, a 
committee of Congress reported that the honor of the flag and the 
protection of the coast required her repair. Many felt, however, that all 
naval expenditure should cease. The question was deliberated from time to 
time until May 23, 1785, when considerations of economy prevailed and a 
committee of Congress recommended the sale of the frigate. She was 
accordingly sold in August, 1785 (Barney, 148; Barry, 258; Independent 
Chronicle, August 7, 1783; Boston Post, August 30, September 13, 1783; 
Pap. Cont. Congr., 26, 441, 443 (April 11, 18, 1783), 28, 213, 221, 225 
(January 15, March 30, 1784, May 23,1785), 137, 2, 677 (July 22, 1783); 
Jour. Cont. Congr., April 21, 1783, June 3, 1785.)

Adequate naval protection was needed at the close of the Revolution and 
has been ever since, and will be, until international arbitration has 
taken the place of war. Even before the sale of the Alliance, the 
Algerines began their aggressions upon American commerce. With this 
frigate as the flagship of a small squadron, with John Paul Jones in 
command, the insolence of the Barbary pirates might have been checked at 
the outset, saving much blood and money and avoiding humiliation. It may 
be affirmed with confidence that with a suitable naval force our troubles 
with France and England during the wars of the French Revolution and 
Empire might have been prevented. In the summer of 1782 there was 
published a newspaper letter "On the Subject of an American Navy"; it was 
signed "Leonidas." It pointed out the importance of commerce and naval 
protection and recommended a fleet of five ships of the line and ten 
frigates (Independent Chronicle, September 5, 1782, from the Penn. 
Gazette.) In a report on the condition of the navy, July 31, 1783, Robert 
Morris urged the need of a fleet, but advised against taking any steps 
until funds should be obtained. Lack of money was necessarily the 
determining factor (Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, 2, 725. For John Adams's views 
of sea power in general and of American needs, see Wharton, iii, 542, 543, 
833, 834.)

Captain Jones was a close student of naval science and his opinions, 
freely expressed, are of interest and value. In 1777, he prepared "A Plan 
for the Regulation and Equipment of the Navy, drawn up at the request of 
the Honorable the President of Congress." He proposed to establish a 
dockyard for building and fitting out ships in each of three sections of 
the country, the eastern, middle, and southern, and to divide the navy 
into three squadrons, one to rendezvous at each dockyard. The 
qualifications and duties of the officers at these yards were set forth in 
detail. The chief officers, or Commissioners, one from each yard, were to 
hold yearly conferences at Philadelphia with the Board of Admiralty, to 
whom they were to report on conditions at the yards. "The Authority of the 
Commissioners must by no means extend to the destination of Ships or their 
internal Government, it being their Province only to keep the Navy in fit 
Order for Sea service and it being the Province of Commanders in the Navy 
to govern their Ships according to the Rules and Regulations established 
by the supreme Power of Congress and to follow the Instructions which they 
may Receive from the board of Admiralty or their deputies, or from Senior 
or Flag Officers. Consequently Commanders of Squadrons or of single Ships 
have a right to call on the Commissioners or Agents for supplies whenever 
they are in want of them, being always accountable to Senior Officers in 
their division for their Conduct, but more especially so to the Board of 
Admiralty. As the extent of the Continent is so great that the most 
advantageous Enterprize may be lost before Orders can arrive within the 
eastern and Southern districts from the board of Admiralty, it will 
perhaps be expedient to appoint deputies for executing the Office of High 
Admiral within these extreme districts, to continue in Office only during 
the Pleasure and at all times accountable to the Board of Admiralty. 
Perhaps one deputy to the Eastward and another to the Southward may be 
found equal to the Business, but the number in each department ought not 
to exceed three. They ought to be Men of inviolable Secrecy, who inherit 
much discernment and Segacity and are endowed with consummate Knowledge in 
Marine Affairs. Besides pointing out proper Services for single Ships and 
for Squadrons, it may be the duty of the deputies, with the assistance of 
three or more of the most Judicious commanders of the Fleet who may be 
named by the board of Admiralty, to examine the abilities of Men who apply 
for Commissions, and make report to the Board, also to examine divers 
Persons who now bear Commissions in the Service and whoe's Abilities and 
accomplishments are very suspicious and uncertain; the board may do the 
same within the middle district . . . It may also be expedient to 
establish an Academy at each Dockyard under proper masters, whoe's duty it 
should be to Instruct the Officers of the Fleet when in Port in the 
Principles and Application of the Mathematicks, Drawing, Fencing and other 
manly Arts and Accomplishments. It will be requisite that young Men serve 
a certain time in Quality of Midshipmen or Master's mate, before they are 
examined for Promotion. And the necessity of Establishing an Hospital near 
each Dockyard, under the care of Skilful Physicians, is self evident." 
(Jones MSS., April 7, 1777.)

Writing to Robert Morris, September 22, 1782, Jones says: "I have many 
things to offer respecting the formation of our navy, but shall here limit 
myself to one, which I think a preliminary to the formation and 
establishment of a naval constitution suitable to the local situation, 
resources and prejudices of the Continent. The constitution adopted for 
the navy in the year 1775 and by which it has been governed ever since, 
and crumbled away I may say to nothing, is so very defective that I am of 
opinion it would be difficult to spoil it. Much wisdom and more knowledge 
than we possess is, in my humble opinion, necessary to the formation of 
such a naval constitution as is absolutely wanting . . . We are a young 
people and need not be ashamed to ask advice from nations older and more 
experienced in marine affairs than ourselves . . . My plan for forming a 
proper corps of sea officers is by teaching them the naval tactics in a 
fleet of evolution . . . When in port the young officers should be obliged 
to attend at the academies established at each dock-yard, where they 
should be taught the principles of every art and science that is necessary 
to form the character of a great sea officer; and every commission officer 
of the navy should have free access and be entitled to receive instruction 
gratis at those academies. All this would be attended with no very great 
expense and the public advantage resulting from it would be immense. I am 
sensible it cannot be immediately adopted and that we must first look 
about for ways and means, but the sooner it is adopted the better . . . In 
time of peace it is necessary to prepare and be always prepared for war by 
sea." (Sherburne, 232, 233.)