Naval History of the American Revolution - Chapters XIV-XV



CHAPTER XIV
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1780

South Carolina and Georgia, far from the seat of the Continental 
government and from the headquarters of the army, were peculiarly exposed 
to attack, yet for more than two years after the unsuccessful attempt of 
the British to take Charleston in 1776, they were not seriously menaced. 
In December, 1778, however, the English got possession of Savannah, and 
during the next year they determined upon another effort to capture the 
whole lower South. Admiral D'Estaing spent more than half of 1779 in the 
West Indies, where, with the exception of the conquest of Grenada, he 
reaped little glory in his encounters with the British. Up to this time 
the actual assistance he had rendered to the American cause was slight and 
there was general dissatisfaction with the meagre results thus far derived 
from the French alliance. D'Estaing's aid being now requested in 
frustrating the British designs on the South, he appeared off the coast of 
Georgia, September 1, 1779, with a powerful fleet, although he had been 
ordered back to France, and joined General Lincoln in an attempt to 
recapture Savannah. Through delay, however, the opportunity was lost and 
their assault when made was unsuccessful. D'Estaing then sailed for France 
and Lincoln fell back on Charleston. General Clinton sailed from New York 
for South Carolina late in December, 1779 (Mahan, 365-376; Narr. and Crit. 
Hist., vi, 519-524; Stevens, 1203, 1238, 1246, 1247, 2010, 2011, 2023; 
Almon, vii, 244-248, viii, 182, 298, ix, 65; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 146-
149; Channing, iii, 300.)

The full extent of the benefit derived from the French alliance was not 
appreciated at that early day in America. Its effect on the British 
imagination and the potential weight of the French fleet, its mere 
presence on the ocean, were not inconsiderable. An intercepted letter from 
General Clinton to Lord George Germain, dated Savannah, January 30, 1780, 
captured on a British packet by an American privateer, gives a view of the 
military situation as seen by English eyes and discloses a state of mind 
not free from apprehension. Clinton seems to have been impressed by the 
strength of Washington's army and of its position and devoted his energies 
before going South to strengthening the defenses of New York. "The violent 
demonstrations of the rebels," he wrote, "which threatened a determined 
attack on the post at New York in conjunction with a large naval and land 
armament under Count d'Estaing, then directing itself against the garrison 
at Savannah, necessarily turned our whole endeavours to defeat so alarming 
a combina tion.... Not a moment was to be lost in such a critical 
conjuncture, for every moment was important and expected to come with the 
account of d'Estaing's appearance before our harbour." Washington not only 
had a superior position in the Highlands, but likewise along the shore to 
the east, where "every advantage of water was also in his power by the 
Sound and, under protection of the French fleet, exposed us to the most 
perplexing embarrassments. Assailable in so many points and every instant 
expecting d'Estaing, we had but time to look towards and take measures for 
our own defence and the occasion required us to put forward our best 
exertions. I do not reckon among the lesser misfortunes of the last year 
the operations of d'Estaing on the American coast, the vast relief thereby 
given to the Rebel trade and the injury which it brought upon our's, the 
impression it carried home to the minds of the people, of our lost 
dominion of the sea, and the disposition of the French to give them every 
assistance reconcileable with the general objects of the war, to compleat 
our ruin on the Continent." (Almon, x, 36, 37, reprinted from Pennsylvania 
Journal, April 8, 1780. See Channing, iii, 300, 301.)

Commodore Whipple's squadron, consisting of the frigates Providence, 
Boston, and Queen of France, and the Ranger, arrived at Charleston 
December 23, 1779. An officer of the Providence wrote home: "On our 
arrival here we found our designs against the enemy frustrated, as they 
had not attempted nor is it probable they will attempt any thing against 
this town this season." This was written January 8, 1780. Three days later 
he added: "Since writing the above, we have received an account that the 
enemy are building flat boats and making preparations for another 
expedition against this town, which they say is to commence as soon as 
their reinforcement arrives from New York. If they should attempt it, I 
believe it will terminate as much to their dishonour as their cause and 
actions deserve, as the town and river are well fortified." (Independent 
Chronicle, February 24, 1780.) January 24, the Providence and Ranger went 
to sea for a short cruise. The same officer says: "On our way to Tybee in 
Georgia we captured 3 transports, a brig of 14 guns and two armed sloops, 
which were loaded with cloathing, some military stores, a few infantry, 
about forty light dragoons of Lord Cathcart's legion, 7 or 8 officers, as 
many passengers, two horses, and military furniture for forty others, 
which they were obliged to throw overboard in some heavy gales on their 
passage. By these vessels we learn that 140 sail left New-York about 4 
weeks before, under convoy of 6 or 7 ships of the line and several 
frigates, with troops destined for Savannah. Then we proceeded to Tybee, 
at the bar of which we saw a very considerable number of ships at anchor 
(five of them appeared to be above 36 guns) and a variety of smaller 
vessels, &c. The object of our voyage was to take some of their 
transports, that we might gain intelligence of their strength and make 
what discoveries we could with respect to their situation at Tybee; this 
being done we returned on Thursday [January 27]. The force of the enemy 
must be great, considering the number of vessels employed to transport 
them. Some say that Sir Henry Clinton commands in person, others Lord 
Cornwallis. Let it be who it may, I believe we shall have a pretty serious 
affair of it. There can be no doubt but their intention is to carry this 
town." (Independent Chronicle, April 6, 1780.)

General Lincoln had about four thousand men at Charleston and the defenses 
of the city were strengthened as far as possible. General Clinton landed, 
February 11, south of the town and advanced upon it and invested it on the 
land side with ten thousand troops, while a British fleet under Admiral 
Arbuthnot, consisting of one fifty-gun ship, two forty-fours, and four 
thirty-twos, with smaller vessels, lay outside. On account of shallow 
water inside the bar, there was no practicable anchorage from which the 
American vessels could operate to advantage in defense of the channel and 
dispute the passage of the bar by the British. To inquiries of General 
Lincoln on this point a board of three naval captains and five pilots 
replied, February 27, that there was no anchorage within three miles of 
the bar. "In the place where the ships can be anchored, the bar cannot be 
covered or annoyed . . . Our opinion is that the ships can do most 
effectual service for the defence and security of the town, to act in 
conjunction with Fort Moultrie, which we think will best answer the 
purpose of the ships being sent here . . . Our reasons are that the 
channel is so narrow between the fort and the middle ground, that they may 
be moored so as to rake the channel and prevent the enemy's troops being 
landed to annoy the fort." (Tucker, 132-134.) The sinking of hulks or 
other obstructions in this narrow part of the channel was apparently not 
attempted. The Americans destroyed the lighthouse and ranges; also Fort 
Johnson, on the south side of the harbor, to prevent its falling into the 
hands of the enemy. This work was done by Captain Tucker of the Boston. In 
addition to the Continental ships the South Carolina navy furnished four 
vessels for the defense of Charleston, two of which, the Bricole, 44, and 
the Truite, 26, had been purchased from France; the other two were the 
General Moultrie, 20, and the Notre Dame, 16. Two French ships in the 
harbor, L'Aventure, 26, and Polacre, 16, also took part.

In his report of May 14 to the British Admiralty, after telling of landing 
the army, Admiral Arbuthnot says: "Preparations were next made for passing 
the squadron over Charles-town bar, where [at] high water spring tides 
there is only nineteen feet water. The guns, provision and water were 
taken out of the Renown, Roebuck, and Romulus, to lighten them, and we lay 
in that situation on the open coast in the winter season of the year, 
exposed to the insults of the enemy for sixteen days, before an 
opportunity offered of going into the harbour, which was effected without 
any accident on the 20th of March, notwithstanding the enemy's galleys 
continually attempted to prevent our boats from sounding the channel . . . 
The rebel naval force . . . made an appearance of disputing the passage up 
the river at the narrow pass between Sullivan's island and the middle 
ground, having moored their ships and galleys in a position to make a 
raking fire as we approached Fort Moultrie, but on the squadron arriving 
near the bar and anchoring on the inside, they abandoned that idea, 
retired to the town, and changed their plan of defence. The Bricole, Notre 
Dame, Queen of France, Truite and General Moultrie frigates, with several 
merchant ships, fitted with chevaux de frize on their decks, were sunk in 
the channel [of the Cooper River] between the town and Shute's Folly; a 
boom was extended across, composed of cables, chains and spars, secured by 
the ship's masts, and defended from the town by strong batteries of 
pimento logs, in which were mounted upwards of forty pieces of heavy 
cannon. . . . As soon as the army began to erect their batteries against 
the town I took the first favourable opportunity to pass Sullivan's 
Island, upon which there is a strong fort and batteries, the chief defence 
of the harbour; accordingly I weighed at one o'clock on the 9th [of April] 
with the Roebuck, Richmond, Romulus, Blonde, Virginia, Raleigh, and 
Sandwich armed ship, the Renown bringing up the rear, and passing through 
a severe fire, anchored in about two hours under James Island, with the 
loss of twenty- seven seamen killed and wounded." The total loss of the 
British fleet during the operations about Charleston was twenty-three 
killed and twenty-eight wounded. "The Richmond's foretop-mast was shot 
away and the ships in general sustained damage in their masts and rigging; 
however, not materially in their hulls. But the Acetus transport, having 
on board a few naval stores, grounded within gun-shot of Sullivan's Island 
and received so much damage that she was obliged to be abandoned and 
burnt." (Almon, x, 45, 46.)

To prevent the British passing up the Cooper River the Americans sunk 
eleven vessels, including those mentioned in Arbuthnot's report. Possibly 
these vessels, or others less valuable than some of them, might have been 
sunk to better advantage in the channel below Fort Moultrie, before the 
British crossed the bar. It might also with some reason be maintained that 
the squadron should have made a more vigorous defense of the channel at 
that point in conjunction with the fort; when by a lucky chance a few 
broadsides might have been able to cripple one or more of the British 
ships while they were passing through the narrowest places under a raking 
fire and in a disadvantageous position. Instead of that, the Americans 
retired up the river, which they attempted to block. The Ranger and two 
galleys were stationed above the obstructions while the guns and crews of 
the other naval vessels were sent ashore to reinforce the batteries. The 
British lines gradually drew closer to the town and American batteries on 
the north side of the Cooper River were taken. A bombardment began April 
12. A few entries in the log of the Ranger tell the story of the closing 
days of the siege. April 15: "Enemy Kept up A Constant Cannonading." May 
7: "At 6 A.M. we could plainly discover that Our people had Evacuated Fort 
Moultrie & that the enemy had taken Possession of it; at 7 they hoisted 
their flag on it." May 8: "This morning the Enemy sent in a Flag of truce, 
Which Caused a Total cessation of arms." May 9: "At 9 P.M. the enemy began 
A most Desperate Cannonading, Throwing Shells, and firing of small arms, 
[which] Continued all night, with very little loss on our side." May 10: 
"The enemy still Keeping A constant firing of Cannon, Throwing of Shells, 
Carcases, &c." Here the record abruptly ends. Lincoln capitulated May 11 
and Whipple's squadron fell into the hands of the enemy. The Providence, 
Boston, and Ranger were taken into the British service, the two latter 
under the names Charlestown and Halifax. The officers were paroled and 
sent to Philadelphia (Tucker, ch. vii; Almon, x, 38-53; Andrew Sherburne, 
26-29; Log of the Ranger; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 162 (Arbuthnot to 
Germain, May 15, 1780); Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., April, 1891, Journal 
of Lieutenant Jennison; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 263, 264 (February 22, 
1780); Boston Gazette, April 17, July 10, 1780; Independent Chronicle, May 
11, 1780; Dawson, ch. lix; Narr. and Crit. Hist., vi, 524-527; Channing, 
iii, 317, 318.)

The frigate Trumbull, which was launched in 1776, remained in the 
Connecticut River where she was built until 1779, unable to pass over the 
bar at the mouth of the river. It is said that at the suggestion of 
Captain Hinman she was finally floated over by means of a number of casks 
full of water placed along her sides, held together by ropes passing under 
the keel and then pumped out, which lifted the ship sufficiently to carry 
her over the bar. She was taken to New London and fitted for sea. 
Meanwhile another frigate, the Bourbon, was being built on the Connecticut 
River. It was hoped that she would soon be at sea and Captain Thomas Read 
was ordered to command her, but for lack of money it was necessary to 
suspend work on her and she was not finished in time to take part in the 
war. Captain James Nicholson was appointed to command the Trumbull, 
September 20, 1779, but it was not until April 17, 1780, that cruising 
orders were sent to him. The Board of Admiralty, which had succeeded the 
Marine Committee in the administration of naval affairs, intended that the 
Trumbull should cruise in company with other Continental ships, but not 
with privateers; of such joint expeditions the board disapproved. 
Meanwhile, apparently awaiting an opportunity to get a number of vessels 
together, the orders of April 17 were repeated May 22; they prescribed a 
cruise for the Trumbull alone until the end of June (Papers New London 
Hist. Soc., IV, i, 47; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 238, 240, 241, 243, 252, 
274, 276, 280, 285, 288 (September 20, October 6, 12, 21, December 18, 
1779, April 7, 11, 17, May, 12, 22, 23, 1780).

The Trumbull sailed from New London late in May and had not been long at 
sea when she fell in with the British letter of marque Watt and was soon 
engaged in one of the hardest-fought naval actions of the war. In 
Nicholson's account of the battle he says: "At half past ten in the 
morning of June [1st], lat. 35. N. long. 64 W. we discovered a sail from 
the mast-head and immediately handed all our sails, in order to keep 
ourselves undiscovered until she came nearer to us, she being to windward. 
At eleven we made her to be a large ship from the deck, coming down about 
three points upon our quarter; at half past eleven we thought she hauled a 
point more astern of us. We therefore made sail and hauled upon a wind 
towards her, upon which she came right down upon our beams; we then took 
in our small sails, hauled the courses up, hove the maintop-sail to the 
mast, got all clear for action, and waited for her.

"At half past eleven we filled the main-top (the ship being then about gun-
shot to windward of us) in order to try her sailing, also that by her 
hauling up after us we might have an opportunity of discovering her 
broadside. She immediately got her main tack out and stood after us; we 
then observed she had thirteen ports of a side, exclusive of her briddle 
ports, and eight or ten on her quarter deck and forecastle. After a very 
short exhortation to my people they most chearfully agreed to fight her; 
at twelve we found we greatly outsailed her and got to windward of her; we 
therefore determined to take that advantage. Upon her observing our 
intention she edged away, fired three shot at us and hoisted British 
colours as a challenge; we immediately wore after her and hoisted British 
colours also. This we did in order to get peaceably alongside of her, upon 
which she made us a private signal and upon our not answering it she gave 
us the first broadside, we then being under British colours and about one 
hundred yards distant. We immediately hoisted the Continental colours and 
returned her a broadside, then about eighty yards distance, when a furious 
and close action commenced and continued for five glasses, no time of 
which we were more than eighty yards asunder and the greater part of the 
time not above fifty; at one time our yard-arms were almost enlocked. She 
set us twice on fire with her wads, as we did her once; she had difficulty 
in extinguishing her's, being obliged to cut all her larboard quarter 
nettings away.

"At the expiration of the above time my first Lieutenant, after consulting 
and agreeing with the second, came aft to me and desired I would observe 
the situation of our masts and rigging, which were going over the side; 
therefore begged I would quit her before that happened, otherwise we 
should certainly be taken. I therefore most unwillingly left her, by 
standing on the same course we engaged on; I say unwillingly, as I am 
confident if our masts would have admitted of our laying half an hour 
longer alongside of her, she would have struck to us, her fire having 
almost ceased and her pumps both going. Upon our going ahead of her she 
steered about four points away from us. When about musquet shot asunder, 
we lost our main and mizen topmast and in spite of all our efforts we 
continued losing our masts until we had not one left but the foremast and 
that very badly wounded and sprung. Before night shut in we saw her lose 
her maintopmast. I was in hopes when I left her of being able to renew the 
action after securing my mast, but upon inquiry found so many of my people 
killed and wounded and my ship so much of a wreck in her masts and 
rigging, that it was impossible. We lost eight killed and thirty one 
wounded; amongst the former was one lieutenant, one midshipman, one 
serjeant of marines, and one quarter gunner; amongst the latter was one 
lieutenant, since dead, the captain of marines, the purser, the boatswain, 
two midshipmen, the cockswain, and my clerk, the rest were common men, 
nine of which in the whole are since dead. No people shewed more true 
spirit and gallantry than mine did; I had but one hundred and ninety-nine 
men when the action commenced, almost the whole of which, exclusive of the 
officers, were green country lads, many of them not clear of their sea-
sickness, and I am well persuaded they suffered more in seeing the masts 
carried away than they did in the engagement.

"We plainly perceived the enemy throw many of his men overboard in the 
action, two in particular which were not quite dead; from the frequent 
cries of his wounded and the appearance of his hull, I am convinced he 
must have lost many more men than we did and suffered more in his hull. 
Our damage was most remarkable and unfortunate in our masts and rigging, 
which I must again say alone saved him; for the last half hour of the 
action I momently expected to see his colours down, but am of opinion he 
persevered from the appearance of our masts. You will perhaps conclude 
from the above that she was a British man of war, but I beg leave to 
assure you that it was not then, nor is it now my opinion; she appeared to 
me like a French East-Indiaman cut down. She fought a greater number of 
marines and more men in her tops than we did, the whole of which we either 
killed or drove below. She dismounted two of our guns and silenced two 
more; she fought four or six and thirty twelve pounders, we fought twenty-
four twelve and six sixes. I beg leave to assure you that let her be what 
she would, either letter of marque or privateer, I give you my honour that 
was I to have my choice tomorrow, I would sooner fight any two-and-thirty 
gun frigate they have on the coast of America, than to fight that ship 
over again; not that I mean to degrade the British men of war, far be it 
from me, but I think she was more formidable and was better manned than 
they are in general." (Almon, x, 225-227.)

Some further details are given in a letter of Gilbert Saltonstall, captain 
of marines on the Trumbull. "As soon as she discovered us she bore down 
for us. We got ready for action, at one o'clock began to engage, and 
continued without the least intermission for five glasses, within pistol 
shot. It is beyond my power to give an adequate idea of the carnage, 
slaughter, havock and destruction that ensued. Let your imagination do its 
best, it will fall short. We were literally cut all to pieces; not a 
shroud, stay, brace, bowling or any other of our rigging standing. Our 
main top-mast shot away, our fore, main, mizen, and jigger masts gone by 
the board, two of our quarter-deck guns disabled, thro' our ensign 62 
shot, our mizen 157, main-sail 560, foresail 180, our other sails in 
proportion. Not a yard in the ship but received one or more shot, six shot 
through her quarter above the quarter deck, four in the waste, our 
quarter, stern, and nettings full of langrage, grape and musket ball. We 
suffered more than we otherwise should on account of the ship that engaged 
us being a very dull sailer. Our ship being out of command, she kept on 
our starboard quarter the latter part of the engagement. After two and a 
half hours action she hauld her wind, her pumps going; we edged away, so 
that it fairly may be called a drawn battle." (Independent Chronicle, July 
6, 1780.)

In another letter, of June 19, Saltonstall says: "Our troubles ceased not 
with the engagement. The next day, the 2nd, it blew a heavy gale of wind, 
which soon carried away our main and mizen masts by the board, the fore 
topmast followed them and had it not been for the greatest exertions, our 
foremast must have gone also, it being wounded in many places, but by 
fishing and propping it was saved. . . . We remained in this situation 
till the next day, the 3rd, our men having got a little over the fatigue 
of the engagement and the duty of the ship; the gale abating we got up 
jury masts and made the best shift. In the night the gale increased again 
and continued from that time till we got soundings on George's Banks in 45 
fathoms of water the 11th instant. We got into Nantasket the 14th, the day 
following into the harbor." (Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 55.)

The Watt, greatly shattered, got into New York June 11. The accounts of 
her force vary somewhat. She seems to have mounted twenty-six twelve-
pounders and from six to ten sixes. Her crew was reported to number two 
hundred and fifty, but one New York paper made it one hundred and sixty-
four. Her commander, Captain Coulthard, describing the action, says: " Saw 
a large ship under the lee bow, bearing N. W. by W., distant about three 
or four miles; supposed her to be a rebel vessel bound to France and 
immediately bore down upon her. When she perceived we were standing for 
her she hauled up her courses and hove too. We then found her to be a 
frigate of 34 or 36 guns and full of men and immediately hoisted our 
colours and fired a gun; she at the same time hoisted Saint George's 
colours and fired a gun to leeward. We then took her for one of his 
Majesty's cruizing frigates and intended speaking to her, but as soon as 
she saw we were getting on her weather quarter, they filled their topsails 
and stood to the eastward. We then fired five guns to bring her to, but 
she having a clean bottom and we foul and a cargo in, could not come up 
with her. Therefore, finding it a folly to chace, fired two guns into her 
and wore ship to the westward; at the same time she fired one gun at us, 
loaded with grape shot and round, and wore after us. Perceiving this, we 
immediately hauled up our courses and hove too for her.

"She still kept English colours flying till she came within pistol shot on 
our weather quarter; she then hauled down English colours and hoisted 
rebel colours, upon which we instantly gave her three cheers and a 
broadside. She returned it and we came alongside one another and for above 
seven glasses engaged yard arm and yard arm; my officers and men behaved 
like true sons of Old England. While our braces were not shot away, we box-
hauled our ship four different times and raked her through the stern, shot 
away her main topmast and main yard and shattered her hull, rigging and 
sails very much. At last all our braces and rigging were shot away and the 
two ships lay along-side of one another, right before the wind; she then 
shot a little ahead of us, got her foresail set and run. We gave her 
t'other broadside and stood after her; she could only return us two guns. 
Not having a standing shroud, stay or back- stay, our masts wounded 
through and through, our hull, rigging and sails cut to pieces, and being 
very leaky from a number of shot under water, only one pump fit to work, 
the other having been torn to pieces by a twelve pound shot, after chasing 
her for eight hours, lost sight and made the best of our way to this port. 
We had eleven men killed, two more died the next day, and seventy-nine 
wounded." (Almon, x, 142, 143; Massachussetts Spy, August 17, 1780; Boston 
Gazette, June 5, 19, July 24, August 28, 1780; Independent Chronicle, July 
6, September 7, 1780; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 51-56; 
Williams, 273.)

The Board of Admiralty continued to develop plans for a cruise by a 
squadron under Nicholson, who was the senior captain of the navy. The 
Confederacy, Captain Harding, which had been temporarily repaired at 
Martinique after her dismasting and had returned to Philadelphia about May 
1, the Deane, Captain Samuel Nicholson, brother of the commodore, and the 
Saratoga, a new eighteen-gun sloop of war commanded by Captain Young, 
were, with the Trumbull, to make up the squadron. These ships were all 
that remained of the Continental navy, in commission at this time, except 
the Alliance. The Deane had made a successful cruise early in the year, 
taking a number of prizes. She and the Saratoga were ready for sea in 
June, but the Confederacy and Trumbull were in need of extensive repairs. 
Nicholson received a Letter from the Board of Admiralty, dated June 30, 
congratulating him upon "the gallantry displayed in the Defence" of his 
ship in his recent action with the Watt and urging "exertions in Speedily 
refitting" her. The long-looked-for reinforcement from France, consisting 
of five thousand troops under General Rochambeau, sailed from Brest May 1, 
convoyed by seven ships of the line commanded by Admiral de Ternay, and 
arrived at Newport July 12; this place had been evacuated by the British 
in October, 1779. It was intended by Congress that the Continental 
squadron should keep a lookout for an expected second division of the 
French fleet from Brest and warn them of the situation of the British 
fleet, and should also cooperate with De Ternay; this was in accordance 
with the wish of General Washington, but no union of these forces took 
place. All the French ships were blockaded by the British - the second 
division in Brest, and De Ternay in Newport by a superior force under 
Arbuthnot, who had returned from Charleston (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 259, 
262, 266, 281, 284, 285, 298, 312, 815, 322 (January 31, February 15, 28, 
May 2, 12, June 30, August 11, 14, 28, 1780); Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 12, 5 
(February 4, 1780), 37, 223, 287, 311 (April 11, August 1, 6, 1780); 
Boston Post, April 20, 1780; Boston Gazette, May 1, 1780; Mahan, 382, 383.)

The Mercury, a packet in the employ of Congress which had been stationed 
in Delaware Bay, set sail in August for Holland under the command of 
Captain Pickles, having on board as passenger Henry Laurens, who was sent 
on an important mission to the Dutch government. The Mercury was convoyed 
for a short distance by the Saratoga and early in September was captured 
by a British frigate off the Banks of Newfoundland. The dispatches, 
including a draft of a treaty with Holland, were thrown overboard, but 
unfortunately did not sink and were recovered by the British. Laurens was 
confined about a year in the Tower of London (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 295, 
311, 315 (June 19, August 11, 14,1780); Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 431 (July 
18, 1780); Stevens, 930, 931.)

Many instructions were issued for the movements of the Continental 
squadron. August 11, the Trumbull was ordered on a two weeks' cruise off 
the coast, in a letter which required of Commodore Nicholson that "all 
such prizes as you may take and send into this port are to be directed to 
the care of the Board of Admiralty, the prizes which you may be Obliged 
through necessity to send into Other Ports you are to direct to the care 
of the Continental Agent of the district. You are always to Observe that 
you are to give the preference to this port as a place to which you are to 
direct your prizes when winds, weather and Other circumstances will admit 
of it without being more hazardous than elsewhere. The Deane and Saratoga 
will Sail in Company with you and under your Orders; you will therefore 
prepare and give to the Captains or commanding Officer of each of those 
Ships such instructions as may be necessary for regulating the Cruize . . .
You will also when at the Capes employ some of your Crew in catching Fish, 
which will Afford a healthful variety of food to them and save your flesh 
Provisions. You are to see that the Ships company of the little fleet 
under your command frequently are disciplined in the exercise of the great 
Guns and Small Arms, to render them more expert in time of Battle, and 
that OEconomy, frugality, neatness and good Order are punctually 
Observed." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 312.) August 19, the Saratoga was 
ordered to sea with sealed instructions "of a Secret Committee of 
Conferrence with the Minister of France," which the Board of Admiralty 
surmised might take her to the West Indies. On the 29th the Trumbull was 
ordered on a three weeks' cruise on the Atlantic coast with the Deane, and 
two weeks later this cruise was extended and the Saratoga was to endeavor 
to join them. Renewed instructions as to cooperation with the French were 
included in nearly all the board's letters. As late as August 31, the 
Confederacy was still unfit for active service, being "the only 
Continental frigate now within Harbour, but neither manned Or victualed 
for the Sea." The Deane made a three weeks' cruise off the coast of South 
Carolina in September, but "without taking anything worth naming," 
according to Richard Langdon, son of the president of Harvard College, who 
was on board. This caused disappointment, for success had been depended 
upon "to equip three quarters of our navy, which is now in this river, 
viz: the Confederacy, Trumbull and Deane frigates." (Independent 
Chronicle, January 25, 1781.) The Saratoga took four valuable prizes, at 
least one of which was more heavily armed than herself; they were all 
recaptured, however. The ships were in port a large part of the time 
preparing for sea under difficulties which caused endless delay. These 
difficulties as might be expected were mostly financial and not only 
hindered repairs on the vessels in commission, but prevented the 
completion of those under construction, the frigate Bourbon in the 
Connecticut River and the seventy-four-gun ship America still on the 
stocks at Portsmouth. The Board of Admiralty appealed to the governors of 
the New England States and to other persons of influence for help, but at 
this period of the war money had become the scarcest of all commodities. 
William Vernon, of the Eastern Navy Board, writing, November 10, about 
naval matters to William Ellery, then a member of the Board of Admiralty, 
says that Captain Samuel Nicholson had recently "arrived from Phila. 
having leave of absence . . . to come to Boston, his younger Brother John 
Nicholson being appointed to the Command of his ship the Deane Frigate, 
which he is to resume the Command of at the end of her present Cruise; he 
further informs that all the Continental Ships were to sail from the 
Delaware in consequence. That it was reported, when their Cruise was up, 
they were to go into the Chesapeake to recruit their Stores and Men; this 
message he verily believes was agreed upon. Which if true we are extreem 
sorry to hear, not that we as a Board can receive any injury, on the 
contrary shall get clear of a great deal of Trouble and Fatigue, but are 
fearful the Public are in much danger of Looseing the small remains of 
their Navy, at least of their being rendered useless for a Time, as it 
certainly cannot be difficult for British ships of superior Force to block 
up if not Capture them; moreover if this should not be the case, can 
stores of every kind be supplied in Virginia or Maryland, can Men be 
obtained to Mann the Deane and Trumbul, whose Time must be expired at 
their Arrival in the Chesapeake ? Indeed we think they were entitled to 
their discharge upon their Arrival in the Delaware from their last Cruise; 
they certainly were shiped for a Cruise only, upon no other Terms have we 
at any Time been able to Mann our ships. If we do not keep faith with the 
Seamen, our expectations are at an end of even Manning the Ships. I speak 
in regard to the Trumbul and Deane; perhaps it may be otherwise with the 
Confederacy and Saratoga, they may be shiped upon the New invitation of 
Entering for 12 Months. I have given you these hints not officially, 
meerly as my private opinion and that of my Colleage and make no doubt 
they will have their proper weight with you and that upon your joining the 
board of Admiralty at Phila., will suggest to them what shall in your 
judgment appear consonant to the benefit and Interest of the Public." 
(Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 268.) Another matter taken up by the Board 
of Admiralty in 1780 was the systematic attempt to obtain, through navy 
boards and other agents, all the information possible as to the numbers, 
character, and movements of the British naval forces at all points between 
Newfoundland and the West Indies (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 265, 289, 290, 
291, 294, 300, 303, 304, 308, 310, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317, 318, 319, 321, 
322, 331 (February 22, May 30, June 16, July 7, 21, August 4, 11, 14, 19, 
22, 29, 31, September 14, 1780); Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 265, 269, 273, 517 
(July 21, November 6, 1780); Penn. Packet, October 24, 1780; Publ. R. I. 
Hist. Soc., viii, 264-269; Barney, 84-86.)

The Massachusetts navy, which had lost all of its vessels in commission in 
the ill-fated Penobscot expedition, was about this time reinforced by the 
largest and most powerful ship in the state service during the Revolution. 
This was the twenty-six-gun frigate Protector, which was built on the 
Merrimac River and launched in 1779, but not ready for sea until the 
spring of 1780. In December, 1779, she narrowly escaped destruction by a 
fire at the wharf where she was moored. March 21, 1780, the following 
action was taken by the Massachusetts General Court: "Whereas it is 
absolutely necessary to increase the Naval Force of this State to defend 
the Trade and Sea Coasts thereof, Therefore Resolved, that the Board of 
War be and they are hereby directed to procure and fit for the Sea with 
all possible dispatch Two Armed Vessels to carry from Twelve to Sixteen 
Guns each." Under this and supplementary acts a ship called the Mars was 
purchased in April and another was built and named the Tartar; the latter, 
however, was not finished until 1782. Captain Williams was put in command 
of the Protector; among her midshipmen was Edward Preble, who afterwards 
became famous. In January it had been intended to send her to Europe, but 
in May, after having made a short cruise, Williams was ordered by the 
Board of War on another, as far east as the Banks of Newfoundland and 
south to the thirty-eighth parallel and to the track of vessels from the 
West Indies, meanwhile making occasional visits to the coast of Maine. 
Captain Sampson was appointed to command the Mars, and in June was ordered 
to Nantes for goods needed by the army; he sailed early in August. On June 
22, the General Court expressed disapproval of robberies said to have been 
committed along the Nova Scotia shore by Massachusetts privateers and 
resolved that in the future privateers must give bonds for the abolition 
of such evils (Mass. Court Rec., March 15, 21, April 20, May 5, June 22; 
Mass. Archives, cli, 506, cliii, 320, 345; Massachusetts Mag., July, 
October, 1910; Amer. Hist. Rev., x, 69; Boston Post, April 20, 1780.)

On her cruise to the eastward the Protector fought a hard battle on the 
Banks of Newfoundland of which the captain gives an account in his 
journal. "Friday, June 9, 1780, wind W. S. W. At 7 A.M. saw a large ship 
to windward bearing down for us under English colours; she hauled up her 
courses in order for action. At 11 A.M. we came along-side of her under 
English colours, hail'd her; she answered from Jamaica. I shifted my 
colours & gave her a broadside. She soon returned us another. The action 
was heavy for near 3 glasses, when unfortunately she took fire and soon 
after blew up; got out our boats to save the men, took up 55 of them. 
Among them was the 3d mate and the only officer sav'd; the greatest part 
of them very much wounded and burnt. She was called the Admiral Duff, a 
large ship of 32 guns, commanded by Richard Stranger, from St. Kitts and 
St. Eustatia laden with sugar and tobacco, bound to London." (Boston 
Gazette, July 24, 1780.) The Protector lost one killed and five wounded 
out of her complement of two hundred.

This event was narrated in greater detail many years later by Luther 
Little, a midshipman on the Protector and brother of the first lieutenant, 
George Little. The midshipman says that on the morning of the battle there 
was a fog and when it "lifted, saw large ship to windward under English 
colors, standing down before the wind for us, we being to leaward. Looked 
as large as a 74. Concluded she was not a frigate. All hands piped to 
quarters. Hammocks brought up and stuffed in the nettings, decks wet and 
sanded &c . . . We stood on under cruising sail. She tried to go ahead of 
us and then hove to under fighting sail. We showed English flag. She was 
preparing for action. We steered down across her stern & hauled up under 
her lee quarter, breeching our guns aft to bring them to bear. Our first 
It. hailed from the gangboard . . . Our capt. ordered broadside and colors 
changed. She replied with 3 cheers and a broadside. Being higher, they 
overshot us, cutting our rigging. A regular fight within pistol range. In 
a hf hour a cannon shot came thro' our side, killing Mr. Scollay, a 
midshipman who commanded the 4th 12-pounder from the stem. His brains flew 
over my face and my gun, which was the third from the stern. In an hour 
all their topmen were kld by our marines, 60 in no. and all Americans. Our 
marines kld the man at their wheel & the ship came down on us, her cat-
head staving in our quarter galley. We lashed their jib-boom to our main 
shrouds. Our marines firing into their port holes kept them from charging. 
We were ordered to board, but the lashing broke & we were ordered back. 
Their ship shooting alongside nearly locked our guns & we gave a 
broadside, wh. cut away her mizen mast and made gt havoc. Saw her sinking 
and her maintopgallantsail on fire, wh run down her rigging and caught a 
hogshead of cartridges under her quarter deck and blew it off. A charge of 
grape entered my port hole. One passed between my backbone and windpipe 
and one thro' my jaw, lodging in the roof of my mouth & taking off a piece 
of my tongue, the other thro' my upper lip, taking away part, and all my 
upper teeth. Was carried to cockpit; my gun was fired only once after. I 
had fired it 19 times. Thinking I was mortally wounded they dressed first 
those likelier to live. Heard the surgeon say 'he will die.' The Duff 
sunk, on fire, colors flying. Our boats had been injured, but were 
repaired as well as possible & sent to pick up the swimmers; saved 55, one 
half wounded. Then first It confided to me that many were drowned rather 
than be made captives. Some tried to jump from the boats. Our surgeons 
amputated limbs of 5 of them. One was sick with W. India fever and had 
floated out of his hammock between decks. The weather was warm and in less 
than 10 days 60 of our men had it. Among those saved were 2 American 
captains & their crews, prisoners on board the Duff. One of the Am. 
captains told us that Capt. Strang had hoped we were a Continental 
frigate, when he first saw us." (Manuscript in Harvard College Library.) 
While cruising off Nova Scotia with a great deal of sickness on board, the 
Protector fell in with the Thames, a British frigate of thirty-two guns. 
After a running fight of several hours the Protector escaped. She returned 
to Boston August 15. In the fall she made another cruise, first running to 
the eastward and then to the West Indies (Mass. Archives, cliii, 385; 
Boston Gazette, July 17, 24, August 21, 1780; Adventures of Ebenezer Fox, 
ch. iv, v; Clark, i, 102,103; Sabine's Life of Preble, ch. i.)

Captain Elisha Hart, of the private armed sloop Retaliation, ten guns and 
fifty men, wrote from New London, September 29, 1780, to Governor Trumbull 
of Connecticut, that he had sailed on the 22d along the south side of Long 
Island to Sandy Hook and towards the Narrows, in New York Harbor. Several 
sloops were seen coming down from New York. The Retaliation chased them 
and overhauled one that was standing for Staten Island. "I discovered She 
Had no Guns," says Hart, "but appeared full of Men Elligantly Dressed. I 
then Supposed her to be a Pleasure Boat from the fleet, which I then Saw 
Lying In the Narrows and was within One League of them and in full View of 
the City and More than a League within the Guard Ships." Captain Hart got 
out sweeps, came up fast on the chase and hailed her, but her commander 
was very suspicious and refused to come on board the Retaliation. "I then 
ordered Down my English Colours, Ran out my Bow Guns and Told him if He 
did not Come on Board I would Sink Him Immediately. He then Hove out his 
Boat and Come on Board. I Immediately Man'd the Prize and Took out the 
Prisoners." They were forty-seven in number, including a captain, a 
lieutenant, and two sergeants; they were a captain's guard, sent to 
relieve guard at the lighthouse. An armed sloop from near the guardship 
approached, but bore away upon the Retaliation's heaving to for her. The 
prize was brought safely into New London (Trumbull MSS., xiii, 41; 
Continental Journal, October 5, 1780; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 
18.)

Alexander Murray, who was afterwards a lieutenant in the Continental navy, 
commanded the letter of marque Revenge in 1780; she carried eighteen six-
pounders and fifty men and was fitted out at Baltimore for a voyage to 
Holland. Having collected a convoy of fifty sail in Chesapeake Bay, some 
of them armed, Murray attempted to get to sea, but upon the appearance of 
a squadron of British privateers, consisting of an eighteen-gun ship, a 
sixteen-gun brig, and three schooners, his convoy, with the exception of 
two vessels, deserted him and fled. The Revenge alone engaged the ship and 
brig with both broadsides, lying between them, and beat them both off 
after a hard-fought action of more than an hour. The two vessels with him 
kept the three schooners occupied until the convoy had time to escape into 
Hampton Roads. Murray returned to port to repair damages and then once 
more set sail. On the Banks of Newfoundland he captured a letter of marque 
brig. He pursued his voyage, but unluckily fell in with a large British 
fleet of men-of-war and transports, was chased by a frigate and captured. 
Not long afterwards Murray was exchanged (Clark, i, 117; Port Folio, May, 
1814. For further accounts of privateering and prizes in 1780, see Boston 
Gazette, March 6, 20, May 1, July 3, 24, 31, September 4, November 6, 
1780; Massachusetts Spy, August 17, 1780; Continental Journal, October 19, 
1780; Penn. Gazette, July 19, 1780; London Post, May 1, August 4, 1780; 
Pickering MSS., xxxiii, 280; Almon, x, 55, 60, 265-267; Clark, i, 116, 
119; Virginia Hist. Register, July, 1853; Tucker, ch. viii; Papers New 
London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 16; R. I. Hist. Mag., July, 1884.)

A source of embarrassment to British naval administration during the war 
was jealousy and ill feeling among the officers of the navy. One instance 
was a bitter quarrel between Admirals Keppel and Palliser in 1778. Admiral 
Rodney came out to the West Indies early in 1780 and remained there most 
of the time until 1782. His relations with other officers seem seldom to 
have been pleasant, and lust of prize money interfered at times with the 
discharge of duty. His first exploit was an encounter with a French fleet 
under the Comte de Guichen, which led to contentions with his captains due 
to misunderstanding about signals. In September, Rodney went to New York 
for a short stay, arriving just in time to fall into a large amount of 
prize money, which came to him as senior officer on the station and would 
otherwise have gone to Admiral Arbuthnot. This occasioned a disagreeable 
quarrel between them. In a letter dated October 19, 1780, Rodney says to 
Arbuthnot: "I am honoured with your letter of the 16th Instant and am 
sorry that my Conduct has given you offence; none was intended on my part 
... It was not inclination or Choice that brought me to America; it was 
the Duty I owed my King and Country. I had flattered myself it would have 
met with your approbation. I am sorry it has not, but I own I have the 
vanity to think it will meet with His approbation whose it is the greatest 
Honor a Subject can receive. Your Anger at my partial interfering (as you 
term it) with the American War not a little surprises me. I came to 
Interfere in the American War, to Command by Sea in it and do my best 
Endeavours towards the putting an end thereto. I knew the Dignity of my 
own Rank and the power invested in me by the Commission I bear entitled me 
to take the supreme Command, which I ever shall do on every Station . . . 
unless I meet a Superior Officer ... Your having detached the Raisonable 
to England without my knowledge, after you had received my orders to put 
your self under my command, is I believe unprecidented in the Annals of 
the British Navy." (Brit. Adm m. Rec., A. D. Leeward Islands, vii.)

On October 30, Rodney wrote to the Admiralty: Vice Admiral Arbuthnot 
having taken it into his head to be highly Offended at me for doing what I 
thought my duty to His Majesty and the Public and acquainting me by letter 
dated the 16th Instant that he would remonstrate to their Lordships 
against my Conduct, I think it a duty I owe myself to transmit to the 
Admiralty Board Copies of My Orders and Letters to Mr. Arbuthnot with his 
answers to Me (His Superior officer), that their Lordships may Judge which 
of us has most cause to trouble them with Complaints. . . . That I have 
been extremely tender in issuing Orders to Vice Admiral Arbuthnot and been 
attentive towards paying him every respect due to his Rank, the inclos'd 
letters I am sure will convince their Lordships. If in his Answers to me 
his letters have not been penn'd with that Cordiality which ought to pass 
between Officers acting in the Public Service, I am sorry for him, they 
effect not Me. I am ashamed to mention what appears to Me the real cause 
and from whence Mr. Arbuthnot's chagrene proceeds, but the proofs are so 
plain that Prize Money is the Occasion that I am under the necessity of 
transmitting them . . . On my arrival at New York I found it necessary
. . . to give Mr. Arbuthnot Orders to put himself under My Command, not 
only for the better carrying on the Public Service, but likewise to 
prevent any Litigious Suits relative to Prize Money, which Mr. Arbuthnot 
had given me but too much reason to expect . . . I can solemnly assure 
their Lordships that I had not the least conception of any other Prize 
Money on the Coast of America but that which would be most honourably 
obtain'd by the destruction of the Enemy's Ships of War and Privateers, 
but when Prize Money appear'd predominant in the mind of my Brother 
Officer, I was determin'd to have my Share of that Bounty so graciously 
bestow'd by His Majesty and the Public . . . I flatter'd myself I should 
have had the honour even of Mr. Arbuthnot's approbation of my Conduct. I 
am sorry I have not, but if I am so happy as to meet with that of their 
Lordships, it will more than fully compensate." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 
Leeward Ids., vii; Mahan, 377-382; Hannay, ii, 226-229, 244-251; Belcher, 
i, 293, 301, 302; Channing, iii, 824; Nav. Rec. Soc., iii, 1, 2. For 
Arbuthnot's complaints against Rodney, see Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 486, 
September 30, October 29, 1780.) Rodney returned to the West Indies in 
December.



CHAPTER XV
EUROPEAN WATERS IN 1780

After his arrival at L'Orient in February, 1780, Captain Jones had to 
endure another long period of waiting on shore, but was occupied for some 
time in giving the Alliance a thorough overhauling; for lack of money this 
was less complete than he had hoped. In the first place the ship had been 
put out of trim by the arrangement of the ballast, which, Jones says, 
"Captain Landais has extended along the ceiling from the stern-post to the 
stem; an idea that I believe he may without vanity call his own." Besides 
correcting this, repairs were necessary and Jones proposed to have the 
ship coppered. Another object of his desire was the purchase of the 
Serapis, and he says in the same letter, which was written to Franklin, 
February 13: "I wish she could be made the property of America." 
(Sherburne, 186.) He seems to have had an idea that the French government 
would bear the cost of repairs on the Alliance. Franklin wrote to him, 
February 19: "As to refitting your ship at the expense of this court, I 
must acquaint you that there is not the least probability of obtaining it, 
and therefore I cannot ask it. I hear too much already of the 
extraordinary expense you made in Holland to think of proposing an 
addition to it, especially as you seem to impute the damage she has 
sustained more to Capt. Landais's negligence than to accidents of the 
cruize. The whole expense will therefore fall upon me and I am ill 
provided to bear it, having so many unexpected calls upon me from all 
quarters. I therefore beg you would have mercy upon me, put me to as 
little charge as possible and take nothing that you can possibly do 
without. As to sheathing with copper, it is totally out of the question. I 
am not authorised to do it, if I had money; and I have not money for it, 
if I had orders. The purchase of the Serapis is in the same predicament
. . . Let me repeat it, for God's sake be sparing, unless you mean to make 
me a bankrupt or have your drafts dishonored for want of money in my hands 
to pay them." (Sherburne, 189, 190.) In spite of difficulties, however, 
the ship was in fine condition by the middle of April. Jones took on board 
of her twenty-eight eighteen-pounders and twelve nines, the guns that had 
been made for the Bonhomme Richard, but were not ready in time; besides 
which it had been decided that eighteens were too heavy (lbid., 221; 
Archives de la Marine, B1 89, 225. Probably these guns were to be 
transported to America, not mounted on the Alliance.) Jones expected to 
return to America in the Alliance, but wished before he left France to 
settle his own and his men's affairs. His prizes had not yet been sold and 
his crew were without wages, without prize money, and without clothes. In 
order to expedite matters, Jones made another trip to Paris and obtained 
the promise of an early sale. Franklin advanced a sum of money to supply 
the immediate needs of officers and men. The French government loaned the 
ship Ariel of twenty guns to accompany the Alliance to America and assist 
in transporting a large amount of clothing and military supplies for the 
Continental army. Many exchanged American prisoners arrived from England 
who would be available for her crew. Jones was received in Paris with 
marked distinction and was presented by the King with a gold-hilted sword 
and the cross of the Order of Military Merit; the latter in the following 
year, after having obtained the approval of Congress (Sands, 247-262; 
Sherburne, 185-197; Archives de la Marine, B1 93, 45, 283, 285, B4 172, 
176.)

About this time the project of another cruise to the north, under the 
command of Commodore Jones, was formed. It is outlined in the following 
paper drawn up by Jones and dated June 10: "It is understood that a 
considerable Number of the King's Frigates are likely to remain unarmed 
and unemployed in the Ports, through the Scarcity of French Seamen. To Man 
these the Government might ask of Congress the Services of Commodore Jones 
and of a sufficient Number of American Officers and Sailors, of which 
there are about 500 now Prisoners in England, whose exchange will 
naturally take place in two or three Months and who being arrived here 
might easily be engaged and retained for that purpose. Commodore Jones is 
now bound for America, from whence with the permission of Congress he 
might return in about four Months with the Alliance and probably with one 
or two other American Frigates, on board of which and of such Merchant 
Ships as would gladly put themselves under his Convoy he could embark and 
bring over a considerable number of chosen Supernumerary officers and 
Seamen to be joined with those expected from England and to such others as 
might be collected in France, and the whole employed in manning the French 
Frigates in Question, which during Commodore Jones's absence might be put 
in some degree of readiness. Should the Serapis be bought by the King, it 
would be advisable to employ her in this Service. In this way a squadron 
of Frigates from America and of fast sailing French Frigates, sloops &c. 
manned by Americans might be easily formed, capable of rendering very 
essential services to the Common Cause, by destroying the Enemies 
Commerce, alarming their Coasts, taking their Towns &c. &c. It would be 
expedient to embark a few hundred of good French Troops on board the 
different Vessels of War, to serve as Marines and to assist in making 
descents &c. Commodore Jones can and at any time will point out to 
Government many desirable undertakings for the Armament in Question, but 
as the utmost secrecy is necessary to render them successful and as 
changes of Winds and a variety of circumstances may render it expedient to 
change the operations of this Force, he would desire and expect to be left 
at full Liberty to act according as situations and circumstances may in 
his own opinion appear for the best." This proposition was favorably 
received by the French Ministry, but apparently owing to the inability of 
Congress to take the necessary steps on their part and to other 
circumstances, it came to nothing (Archives do la Marine, B4 172, 188, 
199; Sherburne, 208-211.)

During Jones's absence from L'Orient, Landais, instigated by Arthur Lee, 
encouraged a spirit of discontent almost amounting to mutiny among the 
crew of the Alliance. The men were led to believe that Jones was 
responsible for their not receiving the prize money due them, and they 
demanded the restoration of Landais to the command of the ship. Apparently 
Jones here again, as on the Ranger, suffered from the lack of a warm 
personal regard for him on the part of his men, who, repelled by his 
demeanor, never understood his devotion to their interests. The former 
officers and men of the Bonhomme Richard, however, stood by him. Lee 
expressed the opinion that as Landais's commission had not been revoked, 
nor had he been relieved by order of Congress, he was still legally in 
command of the Alliance. Jones wrote to Robert Morris: "I am convinced 
that Mr. Lee has acted in this matter merely because I would not become 
the enemy of the venerable, the wise and good Franklin, whose heart as 
well as head does and will always do honor to human nature." (Wharton, 
iii, 821; Sands, 278.) In regard to the legality of Landais's commission, 
the Board of Admiralty in a report to Congress a few months later observed 
that "Captain Landais regained command of the Alliance by the advice of 
Mr. Lee, notwithstanding his suspension by Dr. Franklin, who by the 
direction of the Marine Committee had the sole management of our marine 
affairs in Europe." (Sands, 321.) John Adams, however, believed that the 
Marine Committee lacked authority to confer upon Franklin the power to 
remove the commander of a ship. Commodore Gillon of South Carolina, at 
that time in France, also took the part of Landais. The French ministry 
declined to take sides in the controversy. June 13, after Jones's return 
from Paris but during his temporary absence from the ship, Landais went on 
board and took command. To avoid trouble which might be serious and lead 
to bloodshed, Jones relinquished his claim to the command (Ibid., 262-280; 
Sherburne, 197-207; Hale, ch. xvii; Archives de la Marine, B4 172, 166, 
197, 198, 204-210, 231, 237-242, 244, 245, 248, 255, 261.)

About the 1st of July the Alliance sailed for America with Arthur Lee on 
board as passenger, but without the clothing so much needed by the army. 
The conduct of Captain Landais became so erratic during the voyage that 
the safety of the ship, crew, and passengers seemed imperiled. After vain 
appeals to him it became necessary to relieve him forcibly of the command, 
which devolved upon the first lieutenant. This was on August 10, in 
latitude 41° 30' north, longitude 59° west. The ship was then taken into 
Boston, where she arrived, August 16. Captain Barry was appointed to 
command the Alliance September 5. She remained in Boston Harbor during the 
rest of the year and on board of her was convened the court martial, of 
which Barry was president, for the trial of Captain Landais and his first 
lieutenant, James Degge. As a result, they were both dismissed from the 
navy (Pap. Cont. Congr., 193, 451-595, 597, 599, 631, 639, 655, 679, 705, 
757, 773 (August 10, September 22, November 10, 29, 1780, January 5, 6, 
25, 1781); Mar. Com. Letter Book, 328 (September 5, 1780); Lee MSS., 
August 5, 10, December 20, 1780; Boston Gazette, August 21, 1780; Archives 
de la Marine, B8 16 (Juin, 1780)

After the departure of the Alliance from France, Jones was occupied in 
getting ready for his own return to America. "He obtained a crew for the 
Ariel, that was ordered by government to be fully armed and equipped. He 
embarked such a quantity of arms and powder as with provision for only 
nine weeks filled the ship even between decks. He hoped to make the 
passage in a favourable season of the year, but was detained by contrary 
and stormy winds in the road of Groix from the 4th of September till the 
8th of October. He then sailed with a fair wind and pleasant weather, but 
the next night the Ariel was driven by a violent tempest close to the 
rocks of the Penmarque, a terrible ledge between L'Orient and Brest. The 
ship could show no sail, but was almost buried under the water, not having 
room to run before the wind and having several feet water in the hold. 
Finding the depth of water diminish fast, Captain Jones in the last 
extremity cast anchor, but could not bring the ship's head to the wind. 
Sometimes the lower yard-arms touched the water. Captain Jones now had no 
remedy left but to cut away the foremast. This had the desired effect and 
the ship immediately came head to the wind. The main-mast had got out of 
the step and now reeled about like a drunken man. Foreseeing the danger of 
its either breaking off below the gundeck or going through the ship's 
bottom, Captain Jones ordered it to be cut away. But before this could be 
done, the chain-plates gave way and the main-mast breaking off by the gun- 
deck carried with it the mizen-mast; and the mizen-mast carried away the 
quarter-gallery. In that situation the Ariel rode in the open ocean to 
windward of perhaps the most dangerous ledge of rocks in the world for two 
days and near three nights, in a tempest that covered the shore with 
wrecks and dead bodies and that drove ships ashore from their anchors even 
in the port of L'Orient. It was perhaps fortunate that the Ariel lost her 
masts, since no anchors could have held her so long had the masts stood. 
By the help of jury-masts, erected after the gale, the Ariel returned to 
L'Orient." (Sands, 294, journal prepared for the King.) It then took 
several weeks to refit the Ariel, and Jones made an unsuccessful effort to 
obtain a better ship. During this time he made further arrangements in 
regard to the prize money due himself and officers and men, which had not 
yet been paid. Franklin wrote to him, December 4: "I shall strongly 
solicit the payment of the prize money, which I understand is not yet 
received from the king. I hope soon to see an end of that affair, which 
has met with so many unaccountable obstructions. I enclose despatches for 
Congress, which are to be sunk in case of danger. I wish you to make the 
best of your way to America and that you may have a prosperous voyage." 
(Sands, 299.) The Ariel sailed December 18 (lbid., 294-300; Sherburne, 211-
213; Archives do la Marine, B4 172, 271-274, 277.)

The account of this voyage is given in Jones's journal. "After a variety 
of rencounters he, in the latitude 26° north and longitude of Barbadoes, 
met with a remarkably fast sailing frigate belonging to the enemy's navy. 
Captain Jones endeavoured to avoid speaking with that ship and as night 
approached, he hoped to succeed, notwithstanding her superior sailing. He 
was, however, mistaken, for the next morning the ships were at a less 
distance asunder than they had been the evening before, although during 
the night the officers of the watch had always informed Captain Jones the 
sail continued out of sight. An action now became unavoidable and the 
Ariel was prepared for it. Every thing was thrown overboard that 
interfered with the defence and safety of the ship. Captain Jones took 
particular care, by the management of sails and helm, to prevent the enemy 
from discovering the force of the Ariel, and worked her so well as not to 
discover any warlike appearance or preparation. In the afternoon the Ariel 
fired now and then a light stern-chaser at the enemy from the quarterdeck 
and continued to crowd sail as if very much alarmed. This had the desired 
effect and the enemy pursued with the greater eagerness. Captain Jones did 
not suffer the enemy to come close up till the approach of night, when 
having well examined his force, he shortened sail to meet his approach.

"When the two ships came within hail of each other they both hoisted 
English Colours. The person whose duty it was to hoist the pendant on 
board the Ariel had not taken care to make the other end of the halliards 
fast, to haul it down again to change the Colours. This prevented Jones 
from an advantageous manoeuvre he had intended and obliged him to let the 
enemy range up along the lee-side of the Ariel, where he saw a battery 
lighted for action. A conversation now took place between the two ships, 
which lasted near an hour, by which Captain Jones learned the situation of 
the enemy's affairs in America. The captain of the enemy's ship said his 
name was John Pindar. His ship had been constructed by the famous Mr. Peck 
of Boston, built at Newburyport, owned by Mr. Tracy of that place, 
Commanded by Captain Hopkins, the son of the late Commodore Hopkins, and 
had been taken and fitted out at New York and named the Triumph by Admiral 
Rodney. Captain Jones told him he must put out his boat and come on board 
and show his commission, to prove whether or not he really did belong to 
the British navy. To this he made some excuses, because Captain Jones had 
not told him who he was, and his boat he said was very leaky. Captain 
Jones told him to consider the danger of refusing. Captain Pindar said be 
would answer for twenty guns and that he himself and every one of his 
people had shown themselves Englishmen. Captain Jones said he would allow 
him five minutes only to make his reflection. That time being elapsed, 
Captain Jones backed a little in the weather-quarter of the enemy, ran 
close under her stern, hoisted American Colours, and being within short 
pistol shot on the lee-beam of the enemy, began to engage.

"It was past seven o'clock and as no equal force ever exceeded the 
vigorous and regular fire of the Ariel's battery and tops, the action 
while it lasted made a glorious appearance. The enemy made a feeble 
resistance for about ten minutes. He then struck his Colours. The enemy 
then begged for quarter and said half his men were killed. The Ariel's 
fire ceased and the crew, as usual after a victory, gave cries of joy. To 
'show themselves Englishmen,' the enemy filled their sails and got on the 
Ariel's weather-bow, before the cries of joy had ended on board the Ariel. 
Captain Jones, suspecting the base design of the enemy, immediately set 
every sail he could to prevent her escape, but the enemy had so much 
advantage in sailing that the Ariel could not keep up and they soon got 
out of gun shot. The English captain may properly be called a knave, 
because after he surrendered his ship, begged for and obtained quarter, he 
basely ran away, contrary to the laws of naval war and the practice of 
civilized nations. A conspiracy was discovered among the English part of 
the Ariel's crew immediately after sailing from France. During the voyage 
every officer and even the passengers had been constantly armed and kept a 
regular watch, besides a constant guard with fixed bayonets. After the 
action with the Triumph the plot was so far discovered that Captain Jones 
confined twenty of the ringleaders in irons till his arrival. Captain 
Jones arrived at Philadelphia on the 18th February, 1781, having been 
absent from America three years, three months and eighteen days." (Sands, 
300-302; Sherburne, 213, 214; Boston Gazette, March 12, 1781.)

Among the American privateers in France commissioned by Franklin was one 
owned by Frenchmen in Dunkirk named the Black Prince, a small cutter armed 
with sixteen three- and four-pounders and thirty-two swivels, which proved 
such a prizetaker that the owners obtained from the American minister a 
commission for another, which they called the Black Princess. The latter 
at first carried eighteen two-, three-, and four-pounders and twenty-four 
swivels, but later a much heavier armament. These two vessels, manned 
chiefly by English and Irish smugglers with a few Americans, cruised with 
remarkable success during 1779 and 1780. There were disadvantages in 
giving commissions to vessels owned by foreigners and likely to be manned 
by the refuse of the seafaring population, but as Franklin said, "The 
prisoners brought in serve to exchange our countrymen, which makes me more 
willing to encourage such armaments, though they occasion a good deal of 
trouble." (Wharton, iii, 364.) The Black Prince was commanded, for a time, 
at least, by Captain Stephen Merchant, who, after leaving her, returned to 
America, arriving in Boston about March 1, 1780. According to Merchant, 
"this ship was fitted out at Dunkirk under a Continental commission and 
colours . . . She went round the coasts of Britain and Ireland and in less 
than three months took 37 prizes; three of them were retaken, 4 burnt 
after taking out what was valuable, all the rest were either ransomed or 
arrived safe in port, by which the lowest men have made a little fortune. 
By instructions from Dr. Franklin the Captain was prohibited doing 
mischief above high water mark. This generous prohibition he punctually 
observed, though he had it frequently in his power to land and distress 
the inhabitants of Britain on their remotest coasts. He had not heard of 
their burning Fairfield in Connecticut, of which State he is a native, or 
he would have been strongly tempted to have transgressed his orders by a 
just retaliation. Being once in want of water and some refreshments on the 
coast of Scotland, he sent his boat to a small town and demanded a supply, 
promising security to the inhabitants and their property in case his 
demand was complied with. It was refused; upon which he approached the 
town with his ship and saluted it with a broadside. A white flag was 
immediately displayed by the inhabitants and the Black Prince was not only 
supplied with water, but with cattle, sheep, poultry and every refreshment 
the place could afford and the commander chose to receive." (Independent 
Chronicle, March 9, 1780.)

The Black Prince was afterwards commanded by Captain Dowlin, and in April, 
1780, captured a Dutch ship called the Flora with an English cargo. 
Franklin at once ordered the removal and condemnation of the cargo and the 
release of the vessel with payment of damages, giving his reasons in a 
letter to Vergennes, dated June 18. It was just at this time that Russia 
and other maritime powers were forming the Armed Neutrality for the 
protection of their commerce from the interference of belligerents by 
enforcing the doctrine that "free ships make free goods," always most 
obnoxious to England. This principle had been incorporated in a treaty 
which the United States was trying to negotiate with Holland, but which 
the Dutch had hitherto failed to accept. Franklin, therefore, felt 
justified in acting under the old law of nations, although he was well 
known to be a strong advocate of the principles of the Armed Neutrality.

In his letter to Vergennes he explains his position on the subject of 
privateering and especially of vessels fitted out by Frenchmen under the 
American flag. ,I beg leave to observe," he says, "that by the express 
words of the commission granted to them they are directed to submit the 
prizes they shall carry into any port in the dominions of a foreign state 
to the judgment of the admiralty courts established in such ports or 
states, and according to the usages there in force. Several of our first 
prizes brought into France were, if I mistake not, so judged; and it was 
not upon any request of mine that such causes were afterwards referred to 
me, nor am I desirous of continuing to exercise that jurisdiction. If 
therefore the judgment I have given in the case of the Flora is not 
approved and the Council of Prizes will take the trouble of re-examining 
and trying that cause and those of all other prizes to be brought in 
hereafter by American cruisers, it will be very agreeable to me and, from 
the very terms above mentioned of the commission, I think it will also be 
agreeable to the Congress. Nor do I desire to encourage the fitting out of 
privateers in France by the King's subjects with American commissions. I 
have had many applications of the kind which I have refused, advising the 
owners to apply for the commissions of his majesty. The case of the Black 
Prince was particular. She had been an old smuggler on the coasts of 
England and Ireland, was taken as such and carried into Dublin, where her 
crew found means to break prison, cut their vessel out of the harbor and 
escaped with her to Dunkerque. It was represented to me that the people, 
being all English and Irish, were afraid to continue their smuggling 
business, lest if they should be again taken they might be punished as 
British subjects for their crime at Dublin, and that they were willing to 
go a privateering against the English; but speaking no other language, 
they imagined they might, if taken, better pass as Americans if they had 
an American commission than as Frenchmen if under a French commission. On 
these grounds I was applied to for a commission, which I granted believing 
that such a swift vessel with a crew that knew so well all parts of the 
enemy's coasts might greatly molest their coasting trade. Her first 
success occasioned adding the Black Princess by the same owners, and 
between them they have taken and sent in or ransomed or destroyed an 
amazing number of vessels; I think near eighty. But I shall continue to 
refuse granting any more commissions except to American vessels; and if, 
under the circumstances above represented, it is thought nevertheless 
inconvenient that the commissions of the Black Prince and Princess should 
continue, I will immediately recall them." (Wharton, iii, 802.)

Franklin wrote to the President of Congress, August 10, that these two 
vessels had taken in eighteen months nearly a hundred and twenty prizes. 
In the summer of 1780 the Black Prince was wrecked on the French coast, 
but the Princess, under the command of Captain Edward Macatter, continued 
cruising, and between June 20 and July 10 made twenty-eight captures. 
Vergennes advised the recall of these privateers' commissions. Franklin 
replied, August 15, that he had already recalled them and added: "I have 
had no other interest in those armaments than the advantage of some 
prisoners to exchange for my countrymen." (lbid., iv, 33.) These two 
vessels were the only ones owned and fitted out in France that had been 
granted commissions by Franklin. In August it was ordered by the King that 
the prizes of American privateers should be judged by the French Council 
of Prizes (lbid., iii, 364, 682, 801-803, iv, 26, 33; Continental Journal, 
March 9, 1780; London Post, July 21, 1780; Proc. U. S. Naval Inst., xxxvii 
(September, 1911), 954-960; Hale, ch. xvi; Williams, 278.)

The ship Mars of the Massachusetts navy sailed from Boston for Nantes 
about the 1st of August. On September 13, Captain Sampson reported to the 
Board of War: "I have the pleasure of informing you of my safe arrival at 
the Entrance of the River Loyer in the Ship Mars the 10th Inst., after a 
Passage of Forty-four days, and embrace the earliest opportunity to 
acquaint you of the same. During my Passage I had favourable Winds untill 
abt the Twentieth of Augt, when I had got as far to the Eastwd as the 
Long. 20.0 W., then taking the Winds to the Southd & Eastwd & having a 
very Strong Northwardly Current and my ship very foul and after trying her 
trim everyway, found her to sail very Indifferently; was drove to the 
northward of Ushant, wch greatly Retarded my Passage. During my passage I 
gave Chase to several Vessels wch I had every reason to believe them to be 
English, but to my great mortiflcation could not speak with any of them. 
On the 7th Augt I spoke a Dutch Ship from Curiso bound to Amsterdam and on 
the 11th with a Dean from St. Croix bound to Copenhagen. On the 31st, in 
Latt. 49.40 N., Long. 11. W., I gave chase to a Brig, who seeing me in 
Chase of her, hove too. She proved to be ... from St. Jube bound to Cork 
loaded with Salt, Commanded by a Portugue. The Capt. came on board with 
his Portugue papers and told me his cargo belonged to himself. I sent an 
Officer on board him to search for more papers, who found concealed in the 
Captain's State Room a number of Letters directed to Merchants in Cork 
[containing] Sufficient Papers to prove her Cargo was Consigned to [one of 
these merchants]; upon which I took the Captain & Seven Portugue out and 
sent [a prize master in her] to proceed for Boston. My Reasons for sending 
her to America was that her Cargo would not have been Valuable in Europe 
but would be in Great Demand in America ... On the 8th Inst. at 25 Leagues 
to the Westward of Belle Isle at 10 A.M. I saw several Sail to the S. W. 
and a Ship and a Sloop under my Lee; I kept on my Cruise to the S. E. The 
ship & sloop Standing by the wind in order to speak to me, I perseved the 
Sloop to come up with me very fast. At 5 p.m. the Sloop, which was an 
English Cutter mounting twenty-two Guns, came along side of me and at 5 
minutes past 5 P.M. the action began wch lasted One hour & 5 minutes, but 
my Ship being very foul and very heavy to work and not more than half Mand 
& a very large Swell running, gave the Cutter every advantage possible 
during the action, as she could sail round me at her pleasure, but after 
her engaging me rather better than an hour she thot proper to shear of to 
the Ship, & I having my Crotchet yard shot away and imagining her consort 
the ship to be an English Privateer and knowing it Impossible to come up 
with the Cutter, did not think proper to give her chase. During the Action 
my Officers and men behaved with great Spirit; my loss during the action 
was two men killed, viz. Mr. Nathan Haskell, Lt. Marines, and Thoms 
Ransford." (Massachusetts Mag., October, 1910; Mass. Rev. Rolls, xxxix, 
215; Mass. Archives, cliii, 400.) The Mars returned to Boston later in the 
year.

The Portuguese ambassador at Paris having complained of the seizure by the 
Mars of the vessel belonging to one of his countrymen and of alleged ill 
treatment, Franklin advised sending the claim to America, and wrote to the 
President of Congress, December 3, saying: "I hope the Congress may think 
flt to take some notice of this affair and not only forward a speedy 
decision, but give orders to our cruisers not to meddle with neutral ships 
for the future, it being a practice apt to produce ill blood and contrary 
to the spirit of the new league, which is approved by all Europe; and the 
English property found in such vessels will hardly pay the damages brought 
on us by the irregular proceedings of our captains in endeavoring to get 
at such property." (Wharton, iv, 180.) Congress had already, on October 5, 
"Resolved, That the board of admiralty prepare and report instructions for 
the commanders of armed vessels commanded by the United States conformable 
to the principles contained in the declaration of the Empress of all the 
Russias on the rights of neutral vessels. That the ministers 
plenipotentiary from the United States, if invited thereto, be and hereby 
are respectively empowered to accede to such regulations conformable to 
the spirit of the said declaration as may be agreed upon by the Congress 
expected to assemble in pursuance of the invitation of her Imperial 
majesty." (Wharton, iv, 81.)

The privateer General Pickering of Salem, a ship of a hundred and eighty 
tons commanded by Captain Haraden, carrying sixteen six-pounders and forty-
seven men, on a voyage to Spain fell in with a twenty-gun British cutter, 
May 29, 1780, and beat her off after an action of an hour and three 
quarters. Three days later, in the Bay of Biscay, the Pickering captured a 
schooner called the Golden Eagle with fourteen nine-pounders, eight fours, 
and fifty-seven men. June 4, while proceeding towards Bilbao, she fell in 
with the British privateer Achilles armed with twenty-two nine-pounders 
and eighteen other guns and with a crew of a hundred and thirty men. She 
was a very much larger ship than the Pickering. They fought nearly three 
hours at close range and the Achilles then sheered off and sailed away, 
the Pickering being unable to follow. This battle was fought close to the 
Spanish coast and was watched by a multitude of people (Independent 
Chronicle, August, 10, 17, 1780; Hunt's Merchants, Mag., February, 1857; 
Clark, i, 114.)

During the year 1780 the Continental navy suffered the loss of nearly half 
its fleet at the fall of Charleston: the Providence, Boston, Queen of 
France, and Ranger. Of the thirteen frigates provided for in 1775, the 
Trumbull alone remained at the end of the year, and this ship with the 
frigates Alliance, Confederacy, and Deane and the sloop of war Saratoga 
comprised the whole navy in commission, except the Ariel loaned by France 
and only temporarily on the list. The America and Bourbon were still far 
from completed and were destined never to go to sea in the Continental 
service. Little had been accomplished by the navy during the year; few 
prizes of any considerable value or importance had been taken. The hotly 
contested action of the Trumbull with the Watt enhanced somewhat the 
reputation of a service that had suffered from the shortcomings of zealous 
and brave but untrained officers.

As the navy dwindled, privateering continued to thrive and grow. The 
number of private armed vessels commissioned by the different states 
doubtless increased considerably, though figures are not accessible. The 
Continental Congress issued three hundred and one letters of marque in 
1780, ninety-two more than in 1779 (Naval Records (calendar), 217-495.) 
Although it is evident that privateers were increasing in numbers, there 
seem to be fewer accounts of their cruises than in previous years.

The increase in the total number of ships of the British navy during 1780 
was from four hundred and eighty-one to five hundred and thirty-eight; of 
these, three hundred and ninety-six were in commission at the end of the 
year, as compared with three hundred and sixty-four twelve months earlier. 
The navy employed eighty-five thousand seamen and marines, an increase of 
fifteen thousand. In the fall there were fifty-nine vessels of all classes 
on the North American station, including two of ninety guns each, eleven 
seventy-fours, five sixty-fours, three forty-fours, and fourteen frigates. 
Earlier in the year the number seems to have been considerably smaller. 
There were eleven vessels at Newfoundland and a strong fleet in the West 
Indies (Hannay, ii, 211; Schomberg, ii, 1, iv, 353-364; Brit. Adm. Rec., 
A. D. 486, September 30, 1780, List of Ships and Vessels Employed under 
the orders of Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot.)

According to the table of losses and captures, already cited for previous 
years, the enemies of England in 1780 took five hundred and ninety-six of 
her vessels, of which fifteen were privateers and the rest merchantmen; of 
these, two hundred and sixty-two were retaken or ransomed. During the same 
time the British captured from their enemies two hundred and thirty-seven 
vessels including thirty-four privateers; of this total only four were 
recaptured (Clowes, iii, 390.)