Naval History of the American Revolution - Chapters XII-XIII



CHAPTER XII
THE PENOBSCOT EXPEDITION, 1779

For the third time within a century a military expedition of importance 
and magnitude, considering the resources of the community, was fitted out 
at Boston for service against a foreign enemy. In 1690 the forces of the 
colony under Phips attempted the conquest of Quebec; in 1745, led by 
Pepperell, they captured Louisburg (Expeditions against Acadia under. 
Colonels Church and March in 1704 and 1707 might also be mentioned.); and 
now in 1779 the citizens of Massachusetts assumed, practically alone, the 
burden of a new enterprise, an effort to repel an invasion of their 
territory. About the middle of June eight hundred or more British troops 
from Halifax, convoyed by three sloops of war under the command of Captain 
Mowatt, entered Penobscot Bay and took possession of the peninsula of Maja-
bagaduce or Bagaduce, now called Castine. The object of this move was the 
establishment of a new province, furnishing a home for many of the 
numerous loyalists under British protection in Nova Scotia and elsewhere 
and at the same time serving as a bulwark for British possessions farther 
east and as an advanced military post convenient for operating against New 
England (Hist. Man. Com., Amer. MSS. in Royal Inst., i, 284 (Germain to 
Clinton, September 2, 1778), 381 (Clinton to General McLean, February 11, 
1779), 393, 415, 436, 440 (correspondence relating to proposed seizure of 
Penobscot), 452-462 (letters of McLean, Mowatt, etc., from Penobscot, 
June, 1779)

When the news of the British occupation reached Boston the General Court 
was in session, and it was soon determined to drive out the enemy, if 
possible, before he had had time to strengthen his position. Preparations 
were made with energy and a military and naval force was soon organized, 
although the full number of militia called for could not be obtained. 
Application was made to the Continental Congress for the services of three 
national vessels at that time in Boston Harbor and they accompanied the 
expedition. New Hampshire contributed one vessel. All the rest of the 
force was made up and the expense borne by Massachusetts (The principal 
original authorities for the Penobscot Expedition are: Mass. Archives and 
Rev. Rolls; General Lovell's Journal, published by Weymouth Hist. Soc., 
1881; Journal of the Privateer Ship Hunter, printed in Hist. Mag., 
February, 1864; various papers in Wheeler's History of Castine; letters 
published by the State of Massachusetts in Proceedings of the General 
Assembly relating to the Penobscot Expedition, 1780; contemporary 
newspapers, e.g., Boston Gazette, August 9, September 27, December 27, 
1779, March 18, 25, April 1, 8, 15, 1782; Boston Post, July 10, 1779; 
Continental Journal, January 6, 1780; London Chronicle, September 25, 28, 
1779; Brit. Adm. Records, Captains' Letters and Cptains' Logs; Almon, 
viii, 352-359. See also Town, 102-115.)

The fleet organized for this enterprise consisted of nineteen armed 
vessels and twenty or more transports. The Continental vessels were the 
frigate Warren, 32, Commodore Saltonstall, the brig Diligent, 14, Captain 
Brown, and the sloop Providence, 12, Captain Hacker. The state navy 
furnished the brigs Hazard, Active and Tyrannicide of fourteen guns each, 
commanded by Captains Williams, Hallet, and Cathcart. The Diligent and the 
Active had recently been taken from the British. In addition to these six 
vessels, twelve privateers were taken into the service of the state, the 
owners being guaranteed against loss. Four of these privateers carried 
twenty guns each and four others eighteen guns, while of the remaining 
four there was one sixteen, two fourteens, and one eight. Eight of the 
privateers were ship-rigged. One vessel was furnished by New Hampshire, 
the twenty-gun ship Hampden, a privateer temporarily taken into the 
service of that state. The fleet carried over two hundred guns, a large 
proportion of them probably light ones, and more than two thousand men; 
Saltonstall was in command. The military force on board the transports it 
had been intended to recruit to the number of fifteen hundred men, but 
owing to hurried preparations, less than a thousand apparently embarked on 
the fleet; and they, according to the testimony of the officers, were a 
very inferior set of men, even for militia. These troops were under the 
orders of General Solomon Lovell, with General Peleg Wadsworth second in 
command and Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Revere in charge of the artillery 
(Court Records, June 24, 1779.)

On June 25, the General Court made provision for "Nine tons of Flour or 
Bread, Nine Tons of Rice, Eighteen Tons of Salt Beef, six hundred Gallons 
of Rum, six hundred Gallons of Molasses, Five hundred stand of Fire Arms." 
(Court Records.) On July 13, Commodore Saltonstall was instructed by the 
Board of War "to take every measure & use your utmost Endeavours, to 
Captivate, Kill or destroy the Enemies whole Force both by Sea & Land, & 
the more effectually to answer that purpose, you are to Consult measures & 
preserve the greatest harmony with the Commander of the Land Forces, that 
the navy & army may Cooperate & assist each other." (Mass. Archives, cxlv, 
39.) It would have been well if this injunction had been strictly heeded. 
Lack of cooperation between army and navy, a cause that has brought 
disaster upon many a joint expedition, was to have its baleful effect on 
this. Another source of weakness was Saltonstall's incompetency. It was 
also unfortunate that the necessity for prompt action, with a view to 
forestalling reinforcements of the enemy, made it impracticable to enlist 
the number of men that had been considered essential for the success of 
the enterprise. Moreover, for the important and difficult work in 
prospect, that of assaulting fortifications, a fair proportion at least of 
regular troops should have been incorporated with the force. The fleet 
sailed from Boston July 19. They proceeded first to Townsend (Boothbay 
Harbor), the appointed rendezvous, where it had been expected that the 
full complement of men would be made up, but the general was disappointed. 
Unwilling to delay, he set sail again on the 24th (Weymouth Hist. Soc., 
1881, Sketch of Lovell, ch. vii.)

Information of the departure of this expedition reached English ears no 
earlier perhaps than might have been expected. Commodore Collier wrote 
from New York July 28: "I received this morning certain intelligence that 
an armament sailed from Boston on the 21st instant to attack his Majesty's 
new settlement in Penobscot River . . . I intend putting to sea at 
daylight tomorrow," (Almon, viii, 356.) in pursuit. While the sloop 
Providence was fitting out at Boston, Lieutenant Trevett, who had long 
served on board that vessel, decided to remain at home and attend to his 
private business, saying that he had "no particular inclination to go to 
Penobscot, for I think the British will get information either at New York 
or Newport before our fleet can get ready to sail and if they do, I know 
that three or four large British ships can block them in and that will be 
the last of all our shipping." (R. I. Hist. Mag., October, 1886.)

The fleet arrived in Penobscot Bay July 25, in the afternoon. There were 
three British sloops of war in the harbor, the North, of twenty, and the 
Albany and Nautilus of eighteen guns each. Nine of the American ships, in 
three divisions, stood towards these vessels, hove to and engaged them. 
There was a brisk fire for two hours without much effect. In a report to 
the President of the Massachusetts Council, dated three days later, 
General Lovell says: "I the same evening attempted to make a lodgment on 
Majorbagaduce, but the wind springing up very strong, I was obliged to 
desist, lest the first division might suffer before they could be 
supported by the second. On the 26th I took possession with the marines, 
supported by General Wadsworth's division, of an island in the harbour, 
beat them off, took 4 pieces of artillery and some ammunition." (Boston 
Gazette, August 9, 1779.) The landing was made on Nautilus Island, also 
known as Banks Island. Captain Cathcart of the Tyrannicide says of this 
affair that "on the 26th July a Council was held on board the Warren, 
where it was agreed that each Ship or Armed Vessel should furnish such a 
Number of Marines to take possession of Banks's Island on the South side 
of the Entrance of Bagaduce River under cover of the Sloop Providence, 
Brig Pallas & Defence." (Rev. Rolls, xxxix, 113.) An officer on board the 
ordnance brig, presumably Revere, gives another account of this episode, 
dated July 29, saying that "the marines attacked an island where the enemy 
had a battery of 2 guns; they were commanded by Captain Welsh of the 
Warren. I sent one field piece to support them; they landed under cover of 
three vessels. The enemy quitted it with precipitation, left their colours 
flying and four pieces of cannon, two of them not mounted. We immediately 
built a battery there and mounted two 18 and one 12 pounder. This island 
is directly opposite to the enemy and commands the mouth of the harbour." 
(Boston Gazette, August 9, 1779.) This battery forced the British ships to 
shift their anchorage further up the harbor (Hist. Mag., February, 1864; 
Wheeler, 293, Journal of John Calef; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, Nos. 
23 and 630, logs of the Albany and Nautilus.)

On the 27th there seems to have been lack of harmony between the military 
and naval commanders and a misunderstanding about the landing of the 
marines in an attack on the peninsula of Bagaduce. The importance of 
prompt and energetic action was appreciated by some of the subordinate 
naval officers, who presented to the commodore on that day a petition in 
which they "Would Represent to your Honour that the most spedy Exertions 
should be used to accomplish the design we came upon. We think Delays in 
the present Case are extremely dangerous, as our Enemies are daily 
Fortifying and Strengthening themselves & are stimulated so to do, being 
in daily Expectation of Reinforcement"; they did not wish to advise or 
censure, but only "to express our desire of improving the present 
Opportunity to go Immediately into the Harbour & Attack the Enemy's 
Ships." (Mass. Archives, cxlv, 50.) It was the opinion of these officers 
that the capture of the British post at Bagaduce would be greatly 
facilitated and hastened by removing the ships which supported it. By 
evening arrangements had been made for landing the marines on the 
peninsula. At three the next morning the commodore ordered Cathcart "to 
begin to fire into the Woods with an Intent to scower them of the Enemy, 
which was Immediately obey'd." (Rev. Rolls, xxxix, 113.)

Early on July 28 the attack was made on Bagaduce. The Warren engaged the 
British ships at long range and they moved still farther up the harbor, to 
escape the fire of the battery on Nautilus Island. Lovell says: "This 
morning I have made my landing good on the S. W. head of a Peninsula which 
is 100 feet high and almost perpendicular, very thickly covered with bush 
and trees. The men ascended the precipice with alacrity and after a very 
smart conflict we put them to the rout. They left in the woods a number 
killed and wounded and we took a few prisoners; our loss is about 30 
killed and wounded. We are within 100 rods of the enemies main fort, on a 
commanding piece of ground. I hope soon to have the satisfaction of 
informing you of the capture of the whole army." (Boston Gazette, August 
9, 1779.) "We landed in three divisions," says Colonel Revere, "the 
marines on the right, Col. Mitchell on the left, and Col. Mc. Cobb, the 
volunteers and my corps in the centre. The land being so mountainous and 
full of wood that our cannon could not play, I landed with my small arms, 
the whole force under cover of two ships and three brigs, who drew near 
the shore and kept up a constant fire into the woods till we began to 
land. The enemy's greatest strength lay upon our right, where the marines 
landed; they had three hundred in the woods. As soon as the right landed 
they were briskly attacked. The enemy had the most advantageous place I 
ever saw; it is a bank above three hundred feet high and so steep that no 
person can get up it but by pushing himself up by bushes and trees, with 
which it is covered. In less than 20 minutes the enemy gave way and we 
pursued them. They left twelve dead on the spot, 8 wounded and about 10 
prisoners. We lost about 35 killed and wounded. We took possession of a 
height near their fort and are now building a battery to play upon them. I 
expect to put two 18 pounders, one 12, two 4, and a howitz on shore this 
day. I am in hopes that if the ships go into the harbour today [July 29], 
as it is said they will, and take their ships, we shall have an easy 
conquest. In the afternoon we took another battery of three 6 pounders, 
upon which they abandoned it and went into their fortress." (Boston 
Gazette, August 9, 1779.) Another officer puts the American loss at ten 
killed and twenty wounded (lbid.; Wheeler, 295; Hist. Mag., February, 
1864.)

On the 29th, according to Cathcart, it was agreed that the ships should go 
in and attack the enemy's squadron, but the next day, at a council of war 
on board the Warren, Saltonstall said there was no sufficient reason for 
the ships' going in. At this time, July 30, a galley arrived from Boston 
and three days later was sent back with Lovell's dispatches. Frequent 
councils were held on the Warren, but with little result. The marines gave 
some assistance to the army, but with this exception the navy was of 
little service. The commodore, upheld by the privateer captains, remained 
inactive day after day, apparently incapable of coming to a decision. He 
seems to have feared the exposure of his ships to the fire of the fort 
while attacking the enemy's ships and to have insisted that the fort 
should be captured first; whereas Lovell's force was insufficient to 
justify an assault on the stronghold supported as it was by the British 
ships. Meanwhile the army erected batteries at different points for the 
reduction of the fort, if possible, and for the annoyance of the little 
squadron, which it would seem might easily have been captured, destroyed, 
or driven away at the outset of operations by the vastly superior American 
fleet. August 6, Lovell notes in his journal: "I wrote a Letter to the 
Commodore desiring an answer whether he wou'd or whether he wou'd not go 
in with his Ships & destroy the Shipping of the Enemy, which consist only 
of three Sloops of war, when he returned for answer, if I wou'd storm the 
fort he wou'd go in with his Ships, upon which I called a Council, the 
result of which was that in our present situation it was impracticable, 
with any prospect of Success." A simultaneous attack by army and navy 
might have succeeded. Lovell. himself, perhaps, was moved by excess of 
prudence; but he lacked confidence in his men.

Notwithstanding the steadiness with which the militia, with the help of 
the marines, carried the precipitous heights of Bagaduce on July 28, part 
of their subsequent behavior convinced the general of their unreliable 
character. He continued to urge more naval activity and wrote to the 
commodore August 11: "The destruction of the Enemy's ships must be 
effected at any rate, although it might cost us half our own." (Wheeler, 
310; Lovells Journal; Rev. Rolls, xxxix, , 113; Hist. Mag., February, 
1864.)

Meanwhile the commodore had had a somewhat ridiculous adventure August 7, 
described in Lovell's journal: "A Boat from the Hazard with Comr 
Saltonstall, Capts Waters, Williams, Salter, Holmes & Burke were a 
reconnoitering up a Cove nigh the Enemy's Ships; on their discovering them 
they immediately sent 8 Boats armed, to hem them in. They so far succeeded 
that they made a prize of the Boat, but the Gentlemen took to the Bush and 
escaped being made prisoners." After a circuitous tramp through the woods 
the naval officers rejoined their friends.

Immediately after the council of war on August 6 another express had been 
sent to Boston with dispatches from the general, but with no report from 
the commodore. The Navy Board of the Eastern District noticed this 
omission in a letter to Saltonstall dated August 12, in which they went on 
to say: "We have for sometime been at a loss to know why the enemy's ships 
have not been attacked, nor does the result of this Council give us any 
satisfaction on that head; it is agreed on all hands that they are at all 
times in your power. If, therefore, your own security or the more 
advantageous operations of the army did not require it, why should any 
business be delayed to another day, that may as well be done this? Our 
apprehensions of your danger have ever been from a reinforcement to the 
enemy; you can't expect to remain much longer without one. Whatever, 
therefore, is to be done, should be done immediately, both to prevent 
advantages to the enemy and delays if you are obliged to retreat. As we 
presume you would avoid having these ships in your rear while a 
reinforcement appears in front, or the necessity of leaving them behind 
when you retire yourself; with these sentiments we think it our duty to 
direct you to attack and take or destroy them without delay, in doing 
which no time is to be lost, as a reinforcement are probably on their 
passage at this time. It is therefore our orders that as soon as you 
receive this you take the most effectual measures for the capture or 
destruction of the enemy's ships, and with the greatest dispatch the 
nature and situation of things will admit of." (Proc. of Gen. Assembly, 
26.) These urgent instructions, signed by William Vernon and James Warren, 
might possibly have produced some effect, had they been issued and 
forwarded several days earlier; but it was too late, as was also an 
application to General Gates for aid, which had recently been made by the 
Massachusetts Council.

By the time the American forces had been in Penobscot Bay between two and 
three weeks the fort on Bagaduce peninsula, which at first had been a mere 
breastwork, was becoming stronger every day and was already a formidable 
structure. At last, August 13, when General Lovell, hoping for succor from 
Boston, was still besieging this work and preparing for a possible 
assault, the enemy's reinforcements appeared. The Active and Diligent 
since July 30 had been cruising off "the Mouth of the Bay in order to make 
the earliest Discoveries of an Enemy's Approach," when "on the 13th Inst. 
2 P.M. Discovered five Sail Standing into the Bay." (Mass. Archives, cxlv, 
207.) Two others came in sight, making a force of one ship of the line, 
five frigates and a sloop of war. The Diligent ran in at once to notify 
the commodore and the Active joined the fleet the next day. There was a 
disposition at first, no doubt encouraged by the more resolute commanders, 
to make a stand with the fleet, and the ships were drawn up in the form of 
a crescent, but at another council it was decided that the British fleet 
was too strong to engage and that the only alternative must be adopted, 
which was to run up the river. The captains evidently had no confidence in 
their leader and little hope of his making a determined resistance.

Meanwhile, upon first receiving information of the approach of British 
reinforcements, the army had hastily embarked on the transports and the 
whole fleet made every effort to get as far up the river as possible. All 
but two of the vessels escaped capture, yet only to be destroyed by their 
crews after landing, to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands. The 
New Hampshire privateer Hampden and the ship Hunter, one of the largest 
and best of the Massachusetts privateers, were taken by the British. The 
Hunter was run ashore and her crew escaped before capture. Captain Salter 
of the Hampden says that when the fleet got under way the enemy was a 
league and a half astern and that he set all sail, but "my Ship Sailing 
heavey the enemy Soon came up With me, three frigetes, and fiered upon 
[me] one after ye outher, & cutt away my rigen & Stages &c, and huld me 
Sundrey times & wounded Sum of my men. I found it Emposable to Joyane our 
fleet again; was obliged to Strik, all thou Contray to my well." (Mass. 
Archives, cxlv, 44; Wheeler, 302 (Calef's journal)

The British squadron that caused this reverse of fortune for the American 
arms consisted of the sixty-four-gun ship Raisonable, two thirty-two-gun 
frigates, the Blonde and Virginia, the Greyhound of twenty-eight guns, and 
the Camilla and Galatea of twenty guns each, and the fourteen-gun sloop 
Otter, and was under the command of Commodore Collier. He received 
information of the expedition July 28, and sailed from Sandy Hook August 
3. According to the log of the Blonde, at half-past twelve in the 
afternoon of August 15, "the Rebel fleet got under weigh & formed a Line 
of Battle, we, the Galatea & Virginia being the Headmost ships, the 
Reisonable, Greyhound & Camilla about 6 or 7 miles a starn." At half-past 
one "saw the Rebels forming a Line of Battle; us together with the 
Virginia & Galatea pursued the 21 sail of Rebels & Drove them before us 
without the Return of a single shot. At 3 two Ships & a Brigg hauld round 
to the S. W., trying to get Down the western passage of Long Island; us & 
the Galatea hauld close to the North End & cut off their Retrait. They 
then wore & stood after the Body of the fleet; the Galatea Pursued the 
Brigg & Drove her on shore, we then standing after the Ships & fired 
several shot at them. At 4 one of the Ships run on shore, ye Galatea sent 
her 2 Boats to Board her, but finding the Rebels to be armed on the Beach, 
returned on bd & made sail after us, leaveing them to the Command of our 
Rere, the Albany, Nautilus & North Just Coming out of Magebacduce River. 
At 1/2 past 4 fired several shot at the other ship & Huld Her, as did the 
Virginia. At 5 she struck to us; sent a Boat with an Officer to board Her, 
which she did, & made sail after us. At 6 upewards of 20 sail of small 
Vessels run on shore, the most of them they set fire to, which Oblig'd us 
to anchor." At seven o'clock the Greyhound got into shoal water and 
anchored. About the same time the Americans set fire to a sloop and sent 
her down the river. "Sent 2 Boats man & armed, Cut her Loose & twod Her on 
shore; sent 3 Boats to Board a schooner & bring her to Anchor, she proved 
to be Laden with provisions. At 10 saw the Skyrocket on fire, at 1/2 pst 
saw the Greyhound afloat again; Virginia anchord with the Greyhd 1/2 a 
mile below us. At 8 Discovered Numbr of small boats passing to & fro from 
the small Craft to the shore Forts; a Broadside of Round & Grape shot at 
them. At 9 the Boats returned from ye prize Hamdon of 22 Guns. At 5 A.M. 
made sigI for all Lieuts that the Boats mand & armed to attack the small 
Vessels. At 11 made the Signal & weighd, But the wind falling cam, . . . 
sent the pinnace to Reconnitre the Enemys Vessels." The next day the 
Blonde with other British vessels continued the pursuit up the river; they 
saw the Warren on fire two miles above, "heard the Explosation & saw the 
smoke of several Vessels on fire above her." The loss on board the Albany, 
North, and Nautilus during the siege was trifling: four killed, nine 
wounded, and eight missing (Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Letters, No. 1612, 
2 (Collier, August 20,1779), No. 2121, 16 (Mowatt, September 19, 1779), 
Captains' Logs, Nos. 23, 118, 157, 420, 630 (logs of the Albany, Blonde, 
Camilla, Greyhound and Nautilus)

The British fleet, although carrying fewer men and fewer but doubtless 
much heavier guns than the American, was far too powerful for an 
irregular, heterogeneous armament, made up mostly of undisciplined 
privateers to engage, with any hope of success. Unity of action and mutual 
support in an emergency could not be expected of such a force. The 
committee of the Massachusetts General Court, which inquired into the 
affair, reported, October 7, that the total destruction of the fleet was 
occasioned principally by "the Commodore's not exerting himself at all at 
the time of the retreat in opposing the enemy's foremost ships in 
pursuit." With the pursuing British extended over a long line, a resolute 
and skillful commander, backed by disciplined and subordinate captains, 
might have struck a blow of some effect at the enemy; but probably under 
the circumstances the best course was followed in depriving them of a 
number of valuable prizes. The fault lay in the earlier, inexcusable 
inaction. Collier sailed from Sandy Hook August 3. Before that date, if 
the small British squadron in the bay had been disposed of at the outset 
and if proper support had been given to the army, General Lovell should 
have been able to carry the half-finished fort and would probably have 
been in possession of the whole region, even with his inadequate force. 
The legislative committee of inquiry expressed the opinion that if Lovell 
had "been furnished with all the men ordered for the service or been 
properly supported by the Commodore, he would probably have reduced the 
enemy"; and added that the naval commanders in the service of the state 
"behaved like brave, experienced, good officers throughout the whole 
expedition." (Boston Gazette, December 27, 1779; Proc. of Gen. Assembly, 
27-29.)

The need of reinforcing Lovell had been appreciated and when the 
Massachusetts Council applied to General Gates, August 8, a regiment of 
the Continental army, of four hundred men, was detailed for this service. 
They did not get away from Boston, however, until after the disaster at 
Penobscot. Upon receiving information of this, August 19, they at once put 
into Portsmouth in the fear of falling in with some of Collier's ships 
(lbid., 21; Thacher's Military Journal, 166-168.) If the inadequacy of 
Lovell's force had been realized in the beginning and the reinforcement 
had been asked for at once, it would have reached the Penobscot in time. 
The whole affair is a record of blunders and lack of foresight.

Leaving the wrecks of their fleet strewn along the banks of the river, the 
unhappy soldiers and sailors of the Penobscot expedition found their way 
back to Boston through the wilderness. The disaster had a depressing 
effect in Massachusetts. A heavy debt, estimated at seven million dollars, 
was imposed upon the state, but the humiliation of the affair was felt 
even more keenly. As General Sullivan said of it, the expense was "not so 
distressing as the disgrace." (Sparks MSS., xx, 2.) It has been held that 
this enterprise was not only mismanaged and doomed to failure, but was ill-
conceived and would have been comparatively useless, at least not 
justifying the cost, even if successful; but another view may perhaps with 
some reason be entertained. In the first place the establishment of a 
hostile post within striking distance of Boston naturally caused 
apprehension and its removal was an object worth considering. Moreover, 
success justifies much, and more than material advantage is to be 
considered. In this case victory would have brought prestige to the 
American arms and would in some degree have inspired confidence in the 
ultimate happy conclusion of the war, with animating effect on the 
supporters of the patriotic cause, who had met with much discouragement.

The end of Saltonstall's career in the Continental service was near. The 
committee of inquiry reported that the principal reason for the disaster 
was "want of proper spirit and energy on the part of the Commodore." 
(Boston Gazette, December 27, 1779.) It is an interesting question for 
speculation whether a more "proper spirit and energy " would have been 
displayed by Captain Hopkins, who had recently been displaced by 
Saltonstall in command of the frigate Warren, and who otherwise would 
doubtless have led the American fleet into Penobscot Bay. A few weeks 
after the report of the committee, Saltonstall was tried by court martial 
on board the frigate Deane in Boston Harbor and was dismissed from the 
navy.

The British held Bagaduce until the end of the war, but they were not 
entirely unmolested. Just within a year the sting of defeat was in a 
slight measure alleviated, according to the following account of a small 
but successful expedition: "A few days ago a detachment from the troops 
under General Wadsworth went up Penobscot-river, having pass'd the fort in 
whale-boats in the night, and took two sloops which had been weighing up 
some of the cannon lately belonging to our privateers which were burnt 
there. They had got 8 cannon on board and were coming down the river, 
little expecting to be conducted by our people; but Capt. Mowat had the 
mortification to see them passing down by the fort, out of his reach 
however, in triumph. They fired at the fort to vex the enemy and got safe 
away. Mowat followed them to Campden, but General Wadsworth having drawn 
up his men and made a breastwork to frighten the enemy, he and his ship 
were obliged to meach back again, and we are in full possession of the 
vessels which were intended to invest our coasts. General Wadsworth has 
taken 40 prisoners, including the men who were on board these vessels." 
(Boston Gazette, July 10, 1780; Almon, x, 227.)



CHAPTER XIII
A CRUISE AROUND THE BRITISH ISLES, 1779

The frigate Alliance, Captain Landais, with Lafayette on board, arrived at 
Brest February 6, 1779, after a passage of twenty-three days from Boston. 
The voyage had not been without incident. Two vessels were captured and 
the frigate lost her main topmast in a storm. February 2 a mutiny was 
discovered among the English and Irish sailors on board. The difficulty of 
recruiting ships' crews for the regular naval service, chiefly due to the 
superior attractions of privateering, had led to the practice in some 
cases of enlisting British prisoners, who were willing in this manner to 
escape confinement. In the case of the Alliance the disinclination of 
Americans to sail under a French captain had increased the difficulty and 
accordingly many British subjects were taken. The unreliable character of 
such crews is illustrated in this instance. Among the ringleaders of the 
conspiracy were John Savage, master-at-arms, and William Murray, sergeant 
of marines. Murray confessed, saying "that Savage and he, with 70 more, 
had agreed to take the ship and carry her into some part of England or 
Ireland, and force one of the Lieutenants to take command of her. He said 
the plan they had laid to take her was, that they were to divide 
themselves into four divisions, the first to take the magazine, the other 
three at the same time to force the cabbin, wardroom, and quarter deck, 
then to take command of the arm-chests, and in case of opposition, they 
were to point the fore-castle guns aft and fire them, the guns being 9 
pounders and all loaded. The party that was to go to the magazine were to 
kill the Gunner, Carpenter and Boat-swain; the other punishments for the 
other officers and French gentlemen were thus: Captain Landais was to be 
put in irons and sent in the cutter, without victuals or drink; the 
Lieutenants were to walk overboard on a plank from the ship side, unless 
they would take charge of her and navigate the ship into England; the 
marine officers and the Doctor were to be hanged, quartered, and hove 
overboard; the sailing Master was to be tied up to the mizzen-mast, 
scarrified all over, cut to pieces, and hove overboard." (Independent 
Chronicle, April 29, 1779, Murray's testimony under oath, vouched for by 
an officer of the ship.) Lafayette was to be put in irons and sent to 
England. Thirty-eight of the mutineers were confined in irons on shore to 
await trial. The disposition of these prisoners caused embarrassment, for 
there were not enough American naval captains in France to organize a 
court martial for their trial and it would be inconvenient and expensive 
to send them back to America. Franklin suggested exchanging them for 
Americans as prisoners of war. The Marine Committee, however, could "think 
of no better method of disposing of them than Sending them out to this 
Continent by different Vessels, proportioning the number to each Vessel, 
so as not to render it dangerous or inconvenient: and upon their Arrival, 
if Sufficient evidence can be had, it is our intention to bring them to 
trial by Court Martial (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 236 (September 17, 1779, 
letter to Franklin); Wharton, iii, 188; Boston Gazette, April 19, 26, 
1770; Independent Chronicle, April 22, 29, 1779; Archives de la Marine, B8 
16 (Fevrier, 1779.)

After his return to Brest in May, 1778, with his prize the Drake, Captain 
Jones spent more than a year on shore, perhaps the most trying year of his 
life, beset with every sort of vexation and disappointment. To begin with, 
his drafts on the American Commissioners, for the support of his crew and 
prisoners and the refitting of his ship, were dishonored for lack of 
funds. Jones had never received any pay for his own services and he now 
made himself personally responsible for these necessary expenses. There 
was great and apparently unnecessary delay in disposing of the Ranger's 
prizes, so that the officers and men were kept waiting indefinitely for 
their prize money. At this time, too, began the long and weary wait for 
another and larger ship. There still seemed a chance that through the 
French Minister of Marine, de Sartine, Jones would get the Indien after 
all, and it was proposed by Franklin that he should man her partly with 
French and partly with American prisoners received in exchange for those 
he had taken on his cruise. But on account of the outbreak of hostilities 
between France and England, which soon followed, the Dutch government, 
anxious to maintain neutrality, would not allow the Indien to leave 
Holland. Other schemes were proposed, among them the command of a squadron 
of French ships under the American flag to cruise in the Baltic, but owing 
to the natural jealousy of French officers, and other causes, every plan 
fell through. After nearly endless correspondence without result, Jones 
determined to go himself to Versailles and personally urge his claims, 
taking the advice, it is said, given in "Poor Richard's Almanac," and 
hoping that by direct solicitation something might be accomplished. This 
hope was realized, for Sartine took more interest in his affairs and the 
result was the purchase, in January, 1779, of an East Indiaman called the 
Duc de Duras (Sands, 96-149; Sherburne, 66-86; Archives de la Marine, B1 
89, 179, 183, 185, 203, 207.)

This vessel was fourteen years old, unsound, and a dull sailer, but though 
Jones had insisted on the necessity for his purpose of a fast-sailing 
ship, he accepted the Duras and at once entered upon the work of 
converting her into a man-of-war. With the consent of Sartine and in honor 
of Poor Richard and of his faithful friend and benefactor, Franklin, Jones 
called his ship the Bonhomme Richard. She was at L'Orient and several 
American seamen were enlisted there. Months were spent in preparation for 
a cruise against the enemy. The Alliance, which was to have returned 
directly to America, was detained by Franklin and put under Jones's 
orders; and three French vessels also, making in all a respectable 
squadron. The agent of the French government in the arrangements was M. de 
Chaumont, a zealous adherent of the American cause who had given his house 
at Passy free of rent to the American Commissioners. It was intended that 
Lafayette should accompany the expedition with a considerable military 
force and an attack on Liverpool, Lancaster, Bristol, Bath, and Whitehaven 
was contemplated; it was proposed to take nearly fifteen hundred infantry 
besides a small body of cavalry and six pieces of light artillery. This 
project, however, was abandoned and Lafayette did not go. Later, an 
invasion of England was planned, for which a large French and Spanish 
fleet was collected, and Jones was to make a diversion in the north, but 
the main part of this scheme also was given up. It remained now for the 
American squadron to cruise independently. The ships were finally ready 
for sea about the middle of June, 1779. There was trouble on board the 
Alliance which caused Jones annoyance and perplexity, not knowing at first 
where to place the blame. It was owing to lack of harmony between the 
captain of the frigate and his officers and crew. Landais had a 
temperament which made impossible anything like efficient cooperation 
between himself and either superiors or inferiors (Sands, 149-158; 
Sherburne, 86-94; Archives de la Marine, B4 172, 99-102, 128.)

The Bonhomme Richard was not well adapted for purposes of war, being 
clumsily built, slow-sailing, and structurally weak. There was discussion 
as to the number and weight of guns she should carry. Jones wished a main 
battery of twenty-eight eighteen-pounders and they were ordered to be 
cast, but the ship was not strong enough to bear the strain and lighter 
guns were deemed necessary. The only ones that could be obtained in time 
for the cruise were old French guns, many of which had been condemned. On 
the gun-deck were mounted twenty-eight twelve-pounders, and on the 
forecastle and quarter deck six or eight nines, while in the gun-room on 
the after part of the deck under the main battery six eighteen-pounders 
were placed, ports having been cut for them, too close to the surface of 
the water to be of use in a moderately rough sea. Jones had as first 
lieutenant, at the outset, Robert Robinson, who was soon succeeded, 
however, by Richard Dale, an excellent officer who had served in the 
Virginia navy and the Continental navy and had twice escaped from Mill 
Prison. The crew of the ship was heterogeneous. Out of two hundred and 
twenty-seven officers and men (This list of 227 in Sherburne is of a later 
date and evidently incomplete, some of the French officers and all the 
marines being omitted. A reprint of the original muster-roll, dated July 
26, 1779, is contained in The Logs of the Serapis, Alliance, Ariel, edited 
by Captain John S. Barnes, New York, 1911; this list, comprising 254 
names, differs considerably from Sherburne's, which is accounted for by 
many changes soon afterwards made in the personnel.) there were seventy-
nine Americans, mostly exchanged prisoners, eighty-three English, Irish, 
and Scotch, including Jones himself, a few Scandinavians, and nearly 
thirty Portuguese; the nationality of most of the others is not stated. 
Besides these there were a hundred and thirty-seven French soldiers acting 
as marines. The Alliance, by far the best ship in the squadron, carried 
twenty-eight twelve-pounders and eight nines, and rather more than two 
hundred men. The Pallas, Captain Cottineau, was a merchantman or privateer 
fitted out as a thirty-two-gun frigate; her battery consisted of twenty-
six nines and six fours, and her crew of about two hundred and fifty men. 
The Cerf, Captain Varage, was an eighteen-gun cutter and a fine vessel of 
her class. The Vengeance, Captain Ricot, was a twelve-gun brigantine 
(Sherburne, 95, 100, 133-144, 221; Sands, 156,157; Archives de la Marine, 
B1 89, 215, 225-239, B1 91, 51, B4 158, 143, 184, B4 172,128.)

Jones's ideas about the kind of service he was now to enter upon are 
expressed in a memorandum he had drawn up January 21, 1779, while waiting 
for the orders of the minister to take command of the Bonhomme Richard. "I 
am but a young Student in the Science of Arms and therefore wish to 
receive instruction from Men of riper Judgement and greater experience, 
but to me the grand Object of Partizan War is, when a fair opening 
presents itself, to strike an unexpected Blow, which being well directed 
must in the nature of things be severly felt. The Man who is to be 
entrusted with the Chief Command of such enterprizes, ought to be worthy 
of confidence, and if he is, too much cannot be shown him. It seems to be 
his province to adopt such enterprizes as circumstances may throw him in 
the way of, with a prospect of success, and which being effected will tend 
the most to distress and distract the Enemy. A principal object or 
Enterprize may with propriety be thought of long before it is executed, 
but ought not to be committed to writing nor communicated to any person 
other than the commander in chief, and by him only to his Officers and Men 
at a proper time and Place. To effect anything of consequence, it may be 
necessary to embark a Body of 400 heigh Spirited and well disciplined 
Troops exclusive of the compliment of Seamen and Marines. Five Ships may 
be of infinite Service. I would recommend two small ones rather than one 
larger size, as more objects than one may present themselves. But Tho' in 
some cases large Vessels may not be necessary for Five Ships, yet the 
small ones ought to sail very fast, that they may hold way with the 
Principal Ship or Ships on which they are to attend. The passage will thus 
be performed in the shortest space of time that is possible and these five 
Ships may be made useful as light Cruizers, should a Variety of the 
Enemies Ships be met with at any one time on the Passage. One fast sailing 
Cutter or other Vessel of Eight or Ten Guns might be of much Utility, as 
well in a Partizan War to cover the Troops in landing and in retreat as in 
Cruizing against the Enemies Commerce on the Ocean. No Cruizing Frigate 
with unlimited orders ought to be sent to Sea without being attended by 
one of these Vessels, and the Bottoms should be sheathed with Copper. If I 
have the Ministers Authority, I will send a trusty person or two to 
enquire into on the spot and view the exact strength & Situation of a 
place or two of great Importance. It will be proper to be provided with 
Two light Field pieces and a number of Scaling Ladders, &ca . . . But the 
Commanding Officer of the Troops will be better able to Judge of the 
Articles necessary for any land Operation, and his Opinion may easily be 
obtained without telling him why it is Asked. It will be a necessary 
caution to Suffer no person concerned in the preparation of the Five Ships 
to know for what services they are prepared and with which Ships they are 
to act. Some false Idea may be whispered to them as a Secret." (Jones MSS.)

Jones had general instructions from Franklin, who was always moved by 
humane considerations. The concluding passages are: "As many of your 
officers and people have lately escaped from English prisons, either in 
Europe or America, you are to be particularly attentive to their conduct 
towards the prisoners which the fortune of war may throw into your hands, 
lest the resentment of the more than barbarous usage by the English in 
many places towards the Americans should occasion a retaliation and 
imitation of what ought rather to be detested and avoided for the sake of 
humanity and for the honour of our country. In the same view, although the 
English have wantonly burnt many defenceless towns in America, you are not 
to follow this example, unless when a reasonable ransom is refused, in 
which case your own generous feelings as well as this instruction will 
induce you to give timely notice of your intention, that sick and ancient 
persons, women and children may be first removed." (Sands, 152-154 (April 
27, 1779) Shortly before sailing, de Chaumont, who seems not always to 
have been discreet, required Jones and the other captains to sign an 
agreement or concordat, which gave the subordinate commanders a degree of 
independence and freedom of action incompatible with strict discipline and 
efficient cooperation (lbid., 165; Sherburne, 94; Mackenzie's Life of Paul 
Jones, i, 153. For the Concordat, see Archives de la Marine, B4 158, 144, 
Sherburne, 200, and Appendix VIII.)

The squadron sailed, June 19, from Groix Roads, near L'Orient, with a 
convoy, which was escorted to Bordeaux and other ports. On the night of 
the 20th the Bonhomme Richard and Alliance fouled each other, carrying 
away the Richard's jib-boom and the Alliance's mizzen-mast. Jones 
considered Landais responsible for this accident, but Lieutenant Robinson 
of the Richard was court-martialed and dismissed (Jones MSS., August 8,
1779.) The next evening the Cerf captured a fourteen-gun sloop, but was 
obliged to abandon the prize on the approach of a superior force. June 29, 
the Bonhomme Richard fell in with two frigates. Jones says: "They appeared 
at first earnest to engage, but their courage failed and they fled with 
precipitation, and to my mortification outsailed the Bon homme Richard and 
got clear. I had, however, a flattering proof of the martial spirit of my 
crew and am confident that had I been able to get between the two, which 
was my intention, we should have beaten them both together." (Sherburne, 
96.) In spite of Jones's good opinion of his crew, serious mischief on 
board his ship was brewing at this time. An incipient mutiny among the 
British sailors was discovered, the design being to take possession of the 
ship and send Jones a prisoner to England. Many of these undesirable 
persons were discharged early in August and forty-three Americans, who had 
recently arrived in a cartel from English prisons, were recruited. The 
Portuguese contingent in the crew was also enlisted at this period. Most 
of the month of July seems to have been spent in preparing for an extended 
cruise. According to the instructions of Franklin, dated June 30, 1779, 
which had been virtually dictated by Sartine, the squadron was to cruise 
to the north of the British Isles and at the end of about six weeks put 
into the Texel, whence it was to convoy vessels from Holland to France 
(Sands, 158-163; Sherburne, 94-102; Jones MSS., July 28, 29, 1779, Jones 
to Gourlade & Moylan and to Lieutenant Lunt, and courts martial of Robert 
Towers and others; Archives de la Marine, B1 89, 270, B1 91, 178, B4 158, 
132, 184.)

A few days before sailing, Commodore Jones issued instructions to his 
captains requiring careful attention to his signals and obedience to his 
orders. They were to keep their stations and "never to chase so as to lose 
company with the squadron." Sealed orders were given them appointing 
rendezvous at different places in case of separation. The squadron sailed 
from Groix Roads August 14, 1779, on a cruise which became famous. Two 
French privateers, Le Monsieur, 38, and La Grandville, 12, had joined the 
expedition, but they soon dropped out. On the 23d, the squadron was off 
Cape Clear. Two prizes had been taken since leaving port and sent back to 
L'Orient. A third was now taken by boats, there being no wind. In the 
evening, as it was still calm, Jones sent his barge ahead to tow the 
Bonhomme Richard, fearing she might be swept by the tide into a dangerous 
position. "Soon after sunset," says the commodore, "the villains who towed 
the ship, cut the tow rope and decamped with my barge. Sundry shots were 
fired to bring them to without effect; in the meantime the master of the 
Bon homme Richard, without orders, manned one of the ships boats and with 
four soldiers pursued the barge, in order to stop the deserters. The 
evening was clear and serene, but the zeal of that officer, Mr. Cutting 
Lunt, induced him to pursue too far, and a fog which came on soon 
afterwards prevented the boats from rejoining the ship, although I caused 
signal guns to be frequently fired. The fog and calm continued the next 
day till towards evening. In the afternoon Capt. Landais came on board the 
Bon homme Richard and behaved towards me with great disrespect, affirming 
in the most indelicate manner and language that I had lost my boats and 
people through my imprudence in sending boats to take a prize. He 
persisted in his reproaches, though he was assured . . . that the barge 
was towing the ship at the time of elopement and that she had not been 
sent in pursuit of the prize. He was affronted because I would not the day 
before suffer him to chase without my orders and to approach the dangerous 
shore I have already mentioned, where he was an entire stranger and when 
there was not sufficient wind to govern a ship. He told me he was the only 
American in the squadron and was determined to follow his own opinion in 
chasing when and where he thought proper, and in every other matter that 
concerned the service, and that if I continued in that situation three 
days longer, the squadron would be taken." (Sherburne, 109, 110; Sands, 
166-168.)

The Cerf was sent in to look for the lost boats, but she too disappeared. 
She was unable to overtake the boats, lost sight of the squadron, sprung 
her mainmast in a gale a few days later, was chased by a vessel of 
superior force, and finally returned to France, arriving at Paimboeuf 
September 4. Meanwhile the Bonhomme Richard remained a short time near the 
place where these occurrences had taken place. It was afterwards learned 
that Lunt was taken prisoner. Besides him the Richard lost by this mishap 
another officer and twenty of her best seamen. A gale on the night of the 
26th compelled the flagship to stand off and the next morning only the 
Vengeance was in sight. Jones thought that Landais purposely kept out of 
the way. The Bonhomme Richard and Vengeance kept to the northward and on 
September 1 were off Cape Wrath, where they fell in with the Alliance and 
a prize she had taken. The same day a British letter of marque was 
captured. Contrary to Jones's orders these two prizes were sent by Landais 
to Bergen in Norway, where they were given up to the British consul by the 
Danish authorities; they became a loss to the captors for which Denmark 
refused to make restitution. Landais continued to behave in an 
insubordinate manner. September 2, the Pallas appeared. The squadron 
cruised a few days between the Orkney and Shetland Islands and some 
unimportant prizes were taken. September 5, a gale came on which blew four 
days and was followed by contrary winds, so that land was not again seen 
until the 13th, when the Cheviot Hills were sighted. Jones had with him 
the Pallas and Vengeance, the Alliance having again disappeared. Two 
colliers were taken on the 14th (Sands, 169-171, 245-247; Sherburne, 110-
112; Archives de la Marine, B1 89, 274, B4 158, 150, 186, B8 16 (Aout, 
Septembre, 1779)

Jones now planned an important enterprise. In his report to Franklin, 
dated October 3, 1779, he says: "Knowing that there lay at anchor in Leith 
road an armed ship of 20 guns, with two or three fine cutters, I formed an 
expedition against Leith, which I purposed to lay under a large 
contribution, or otherwise to reduce it to ashes." (Sherburne, 112.) He 
prepared a summons addressed to the magistrates of Leith, in which he 
tells them: "I do not wish to distress the poor inhabitants; my intention 
is only to demand your contribution towards the reimbursement which 
Britain owes to the much injured citizens of America." (lbid., 106.) This 
is an allusion to the depredations committed by the British in Chesapeake 
Bay, Long Island Sound, and elsewhere.

His report continues: "Had I been alone, the wind being favorable, I would 
have proceeded directly up the Firth and must have succeeded, as they lay 
there in a state of perfect indolence and security, which would have 
proved their ruin. Unfortunately for me, the Pallas and Vengeance were 
both at a considerable distance in the offing, they having chased to the 
southward; this obliged us to steer out of the Firth again to meet them. 
The captains of the Pallas and Vengeance being come on board the Bon homme 
Richard, I communicated to them my project, to which many difficulties and 
objections were made by them; at last, however, they appeared to think 
better of the design, after I had assured them that I hoped to raise a 
contribution of 200000 pounds sterling on Leith, and that there was no 
battery of cannon there to oppose our landing. So much time, however, was 
unavoidably spent in pointed remarks and sage deliberation that night, 
that the wind became contrary in the morning. We continued working to 
windward up the Firth without being able to reach the road of Leith, till 
on the morning of the 17th, when being almost within cannon shot of the 
town, having everything in readiness for a descent, a very severe gale of 
wind came on, and being directly contrary, obliged us to bear away, after 
having in vain endeavored for some time to withstand its violence. The 
gale was so severe that one of the prizes that had been taken on the 14th 
sunk to the bottom, the crew being with difficulty saved. As the alarm by 
this time had reached Leith by means of a cutter that had watched our 
motions that morning, and as the wind continued contrary (though more 
moderate in the evening), I thought it impossible to pursue the enterprise 
with a good prospect of success, especially as Edinburgh, where there is 
always a number of troops, is only a mile distant from Leith; therefore I 
gave up the project." (Sherburne, 112; Sands, 171-175.)

The cutter spoken of by Jones as having watched his motions was one of 
several revenue cutters specially fitted out and armed for service against 
the American squadron, some of them having been placed under the orders of 
the admirals commanding various naval stations. As early as August 19 the 
alarm excited by the approach of Jones had caused orders for hasty 
preparations to watch his movements and to check them as far as possible. 
This particular cutter, having been sent out to reconnoitre, sailed at 
daybreak, September 17. The captain reported that he "found himself within 
Pistol Shot of the fifty Gun French Ship, upon which he tacked about and 
afterwards retook a prize they had taken in the Mouth of the Firth, but a 
French twenty four Gun Frigate immediately made up and obliged him to 
abandon the Prize . . . The French Squadron consists of a fifty Gun Ship, 
a twenty four Gun Frigate and a Brig mounting ten Guns. The Ships sail ill 
and they say they are determined to come up to Leith Road. The Commander 
of the fifty Gun Ship is said to be acquainted with the Coast. Both the 
fifty Gun Ship and Frigate are painted Black. The fifty Gun Ship has a 
White Bottom and very clumsy mast head." (Minutes of the Scottish Board of 
Customs, 197.) This information was immediately sent to the Commissioners 
of the Treasury (Minutes of the Scottish Board of Customs, 191-198, 205, 
206; Minutes of the Irish Board of Customs, 23, 24, 33, 36. See also 
Sands, 173, 174, notes; London Chronicle, September 14, 18, 1779; British 
Admiralty Records, Captains' Letters, No. 2305, 1 (September 20, 23, 1779)

Jones could not excite the interest of his French captains in other plans. 
They were getting uneasy at his remaining so long on the coast and 
threatened to desert him. Therefore the squadron sailed south and in the 
course of a few days several prizes were taken. September 21, they were 
off Flamborough Head. Two brigs were captured and a fleet of vessels was 
chased, one of which ran ashore, but night put an end to operations. The 
next day a fleet appeared coming up from the south, but put back upon 
seeing the Bonhomme Richard. On signal two pilots came aboard the Richard 
and informed Jones that 'a king's frigate lay there in sight, at anchor 
within the Humber, waiting to take under convoy a number of merchant ships 
bound to the northward. The pilots imagined the Bon homme Richard to be an 
English ship of war and consequently communicated to me the private signal 
which they had been required to make. I endeavored by this means to decoy 
the ships out of the port, but the wind then changing and with the tide 
becoming unfavorable for them, the deception had not the desired effect 
and they wisely put back. The entrance of the Humber is exceedingly 
difficult and dangerous and, as the Pallas was not in sight, I thought it 
not prudent to remain off the entrance; I therefore steered out again to 
join the Pallas off Flamborough Head. In the night we saw and chased two 
ships until three O'clock in the morning, when being at a very small 
distance from them, I made the private signal of recognizance which I had 
given to each captain before I sailed from Groaix; one half of the answer 
only was returned. In this position both sides lay to till daylight, when 
the ships proved to be the Alliance and the Pallas." (Sherburne, 113, 114; 
Sands, 176-180. For another account of the cruise up to this time, see 
Life of Nathaniel Panning, 33-43.)

The events of the memorable day that followed are best told in the words 
of Jones himself: "On the morning of that day, the 23d . . . we chased a 
brigantine that appeared laying to to windward. About noon we saw and 
chased a large ship that appeared coming round Flamborough Head from the 
northward, and at the same time I manned and armed one of the pilot boats 
to send in pursuit of the brigantine, which now appeared to be the vessel 
that I had forced ashore. Soon after this a fleet of forty-one sail 
appeared off Flamborough Head, bearing N. N. E. This induced me to abandon 
the single ship, which had then anchored in [Bridlington] Bay; I also 
called back the pilot boat and hoisted a signal for a general chase. When 
the fleet discovered us bearing down, all the merchant ships crowded sail 
towards the shore. The two ships of war that protected the fleet, at the 
same time steered from the land and made the disposition for the battle. 
In approaching the enemy I crowded every possible sail and made the signal 
for the line of battle, to which the Alliance showed no attention. Earnest 
as I was for the action, I could not reach the commodore's ship until 
seven in the evening, being then within pistol shot, when he hailed the 
Bon homme Richard; we answered him by firing a whole broadside." The 
English ships were the Serapis and Countess of Scarborough. Jones says 
that at dusk they had tacked with a view to running under Scarborough 
Castle, but that he had headed them off. The pilot boat, which had been 
sent away and then recalled, contained sixteen of the Richard's best men 
under the second lieutenant, Henry Lunt. The boat was unable to get back 
before dark and Lunt then deemed it imprudent to go alongside. So the ship 
lost the services of these men when they were most needed (Sherburne, 114; 
Sands, 180, 181. Jones's report to Franklin, dated October 3, 1779, is 
supplemented by the journal of his campaigns presented to Louis XVI, Jones 
MSS., January 1, 1786 (quoted in Sands)

Jones took his station on the quarter-deck, while on the poop was a French 
volunteer officer with twenty marines. Richard Dale, first lieutenant, was 
in charge of the gun-deck. The tops, commanded by midshipmen, were manned 
by marines and sailors, twenty in the main, fourteen in the fore, and nine 
in the mizzen-top. They were armed with swivels, coehorns, and muskets and 
were ordered to clear the enemy's tops before turning their fire upon his 
decks (Fanning, 43, 45.)

The report goes on: "The battle being thus begun was continued with 
unremitting fury. Every method was practised on both sides to gain an 
advantage and rake each other, and I must confess that the enemy's ship, 
being much more manageable than the Bon homme Richard, gained thereby 
several times an advantageous situation, in spite of my best endeavors to 
prevent it. As I had to deal with an enemy of greatly superior force, I 
was under the necessity of closing with him, to prevent the advantage 
which he had over me in point of manoeuvre. It was my intention to lay the 
Bon homme Richard athwart the enemy's bow, but as that operation required 
great dexterity in the management of both sails and helm and some of our 
braces being shot away, it did not exactly succeed to my wishes. The 
enemy's bowsprit, however, came over the Bon homme Richard's poop by the 
mizen mast and I made both ships fast together in that situation, which by 
the action of the wind on the enemy's sails, forced her stern close to the 
Bon homme Richard's bow, so that the ships lay square alongside of each 
other, the yards being all entangled and the cannon of each ship touching 
the opponent's side.

"When this position took place it was eight o'clock, previous to which the 
Bon homme Richard had received sundry eighteen pounds shot below the water 
and leaked very much. My battery of 12-pounders, on which I had placed my 
chief dependance, being commanded by Lieut. Dale and Col. Weibert and 
manned principally with American seamen and French volunteers, were 
entirely silenced and abandoned. As to the six old 18-pounders that formed 
the battery of the lower gun-deck, they did no service whatever; two out 
of three of them burst at the first fire and killed almost all the men who 
were stationed to manage them. Before this time too, Col. De Chamillard, 
who commanded a party of twenty soldiers on the poop, had abandoned that 
station after having lost some of his men; these men deserted their 
quarters. I had now only two pieces of cannon, 9-pounders on the quarter 
deck, that were not silenced, and not one of the heavier cannon was fired 
during the rest of the action. The purser, Mr. Mease, who commanded the 
guns on the quarter deck, being dangerously wounded in the head, I was 
obliged to fill his place and with great difficulty rallied a few men and 
shifted over one of the lee quarter-deck guns, so that we afterwards 
played three pieces of 9-pounders upon the enemy. The tops alone seconded 
the fire of this little battery and held out bravely during the whole of 
the action, especially the main top where Lieut. Stack commanded. I 
directed the fire of one of the three cannon against the main-mast with 
doubleheaded shot, while the other two were exceedingly well served with 
grape and canister-shot to silence the enemy's musketry and clear her 
decks, which was at last effected.

"The enemy were, as I have since understood, on the instant of calling for 
quarters, when the cowardice or treachery of three of my under officers 
induced them to call to the enemy. The English commodore asked me if I 
demanded quarters and, I having answered him in the most determined 
negative, they renewed the battle with double fury. They were unable to 
stand the deck, but the fire of their cannon, especially the lower 
battery, which was entirely formed of 18-pounders, was incessant. Both 
ships were set on fire in various places and the scene was dreadful beyond 
the reach of language. To account for the timidity of my three under 
officers, I mean the gunner, the carpenter, and the master-at-arms, I must 
observe that the two first were slightly wounded, and as the ship had 
received various shots under water, and one of the pumps being shot away, 
the carpenter expressed his fear that she would sink and the other two 
concluded that she was sinking, which occasioned the gunner to run aft on 
the poop, without my knowledge, to strike the colors. Fortunately for me, 
a cannon ball had done that before by carrying away the ensignstaff; he 
was therefore reduced to the necessity of sinking, as he supposed, or of 
calling for quarter and he preferred the latter.

"All this time the Bon homme Richard had sustained the action alone and 
the enemy, though much superior in force, would have been very glad to 
have got clear, as appears by their own acknowledgments and their having 
let go an anchor the instant that I laid them on board, by which means 
they would have escaped, had I not made them well fast to the Bon homme 
Richard. At last, at half past nine o'clock, the Alliance appeared and I 
now thought the battle at an end, but to my utter astonishment he 
discharged a broadside full into the stern of the Bon homme Richard. We 
called to him for God's sake to forbear firing into the Bon homme Richard, 
yet he passed along the off side of the ship and continued firing. There 
was no possibility of his mistaking the enemy's ship for the Bon homme 
Richard, there being the most essential difference in their appearance and 
construction; besides, it was then full moonlight and the sides of the Bon 
homme Richard were all black, while the sides of the prizes were yellow. 
Yet, for the greater security, I showed the signal of our reconnoissance 
by putting out three lanthorns, one at the head (bow), another at the 
stern (quarter), and the third in the middle, in a, horizontal line. Every 
tongue cried that he was firing into the wrong ship, but nothing availed; 
he passed round firing into the Bon homme Richard's head, stern, and 
broadside, and by one of his vollies killed several of my best men and 
mortally wounded a good officer on the forecastle.

"My situation was really deplorable. The Bon homme Richard received 
various shots under water from the Alliance, the leak gained on the pumps, 
and the fire increased much on board both ships. Some officers persuaded 
me to strike, of whose courage and good sense I entertain a high opinion. 
My treacherous master-at-arms let loose all my prisoners without my 
knowledge and my prospect became gloomy indeed." The prisoners were much 
frightened, believing that the ship was sinking, and were at once put to 
work at the pumps; otherwise, by reinforcing the enemy, they would surely 
have turned the scale in his favor. "I would not, however, give up the 
point. The enemy's main-mast began to shake, their firing decreased, ours 
rather increased, and the British colors were struck at half an hour past 
ten o'clock." (Sherburne, 115-117; Sands, 181-186; Memoires, de Paul 
Jones, 76-104, which differs in details from the report of October 3; 
MacKenzie, i, ch. viii; Scribner's Magazine, August, 1898, article by 
Captain Mahan; Jones MSS., September 24, 1779; Log of Bonhomme Richard; 
Independent Chronicle, February 17, 1780.)

Lieutenant Dale, who was in command of the gun-deck, gives further 
details. He says that the Bonhomme Richard's first broadside was instantly 
returned by the Serapis. "Our position being to windward of the Serapis, 
we passed ahead of her and the Serapis coming up on our larboard 
[starboard ?] quarter, the action commenced abreast of each other. The 
Serapis soon passed ahead of the Bon homme Richard and when he thought he 
had gained a distance sufficient to go down athwart the fore foot to rake 
us, found he had not enough distance and that the Bon homme Richard would 
be aboard him, put his helm a-lee, which brought the two ships on a line, 
and the Bon homme Richard having headway, ran her bows into the stern of 
the Serapis. . . . As we were unable to bring a single gun to bear upon 
the Serapis, our topsails were backed, while those of the Serapis being 
filled, the ships separated. The Serapis wore short round upon her heel 
and her jibboom ran into the mizen rigging of the Bon homme Richard; in 
this situation the ships were made fast together with a hawser, the 
bowsprit of the Serapis to the mizenmast of the Bon homme Richard, and the 
action recommenced from the starboard sides of the two ships. With a view 
of separating the ships, the Serapis let go her anchor, which manoeuvre 
brought her head and the stern of the Bon homme Richard to the wind, while 
the ships lay closely pressed against each other. A novelty in naval 
combats was now presented to many witnesses, but to few admirers. The 
rammers were run into the respective ships to enable the men to load, 
after the lower ports of the Serapis had been blown away to make room for 
running out their guns . . . Neither the repeated broadsides of the 
Alliance, given with the view of sinking or disabling the Bon homme 
Richard, the frequent necessity of suspending the combat to extinguish the 
flames which several times were within a few inches of the magazine, nor 
the liberation by the master-at-arms of nearly 500 prisoners (As there 
were but four hundred and seventy-two prisoners altogether, after the 
cruise (Pap. Cont., Congr., 193, 211, December 16, 1779), there were 
probably less than two hundred on board the Bonhomme Richard at the time 
of the battle), could change or weaken the purpose of the American 
commander. At the moment of the liberation of the prisoners, one of them, 
a commander of a 20 gun ship taken a few days before, passed through the 
ports on board the Serapis and informed Captain Pearson that if he would 
hold out only a little while longer, the ship alongside would either 
strike or sink, and that all the prisoners had been released to save their 
lives." (Sherburne, 121, 122; Sands, 190-194. See also Fanning, 46-56.)

Nathaniel Fanning, a midshipman on the Bon homme Richard stationed in the 
maintop, says that the enemy's tops had been silenced within an hour, and 
it was not long after that before "the topmen in our tops had taken 
possession of the enemy's tops, which was done by reason of the Serapis's 
yards being locked together with ours, that we could with ease go from our 
main top into the enemy's fore top; and so on, from our fore top into the 
Serapis's main top. Having knowledge of this, we transported from our own 
into the enemy's tops, . . . hand granadoes, &c, which we threw in among 
the enemy whenever they made their appearance." (Fanning, 50.) In the 
course of time the quarter-deck of the Serapis was entirely cleared, 
largely by this fire from the tops; and their execution extended below 
decks. In serving the main battery of the Serapis, many eighteen-pounder 
cartridges had accumulated on the gun-deck, which led to a catastrophe. 
Fanning says: "A single hand granado having been thrown by one of our men 
out of the main top of the enemy, designing it to go among the enemy who 
were huddled together between her gun decks, it on its way struck on one 
side of the combings of her upper hatch-way and rebounding from that, it 
took a direction and fell between their decks, where it communicated to a 
quantity of loose powder scattered about the enemy's cannon." The hand 
grenade, upon bursting, ignited the powder and the cartridges, the fire 
running from one to another, and "made a dreadful explosion." (Fanning, 
53.) "The effect," says Dale, "was tremendous; more than twenty of the 
enemy were blown to pieces, and many stood with only the collars of their 
shirts upon their bodies." (Sherburne, 122.) This disaster doubtless 
hastened the end of the battle.

In his report of October 6, 1779, to the British Admiralty, Captain 
Pearson of the Serapis says, "that on the 23d. ult. being close in with 
Scarborough, about eleven o'clock, a boat came on board with a letter from 
the Bailiffs of that corporation, giving information of a flying squadron 
of the enemy's ships being on the coast and of a part of the said squadron 
having been seen from thence the day before, standing to the southward. As 
soon as I received this intelligence I made the signal for the convoy to 
bear down under my lee and repeated it with two guns; notwithstanding 
which, the van of the convoy kept their wind, with all sail stretching out 
to the southward from under Flamborough head, till between twelve and one, 
when the headmost of them got sight of the enemy's ships, which were then 
in chace of them. They then tacked and made the best of their way under 
shore for Scarborough &c., letting fly their top-gallant sheets and firing 
guns; upon which I made all the sail I could to windward, to get between 
the enemy's ships and the convoy, which I soon effected. At one o'clock we 
got sight of the enemy's ships from the masthead and about four we made 
them plain from the deck to be three large ships and a brig; upon which I 
made the Countess of Scarborough's signal to join me, she being in shore 
with the convoy. At the same time I made the signal for the convoy to make 
the best of their way. . . .

"At half past five, the Countess of Scarborough joined me, the enemy's 
ships then bearing down upon us with a light breeze at S. S. W. At six, 
tacked and laid our head in shore, in order to keep our ground the better 
between the enemy's ships and the convoy, soon after which we perceived 
the ships bearing down upon us to be a two-decked ship and two frigates, 
but from their keeping end on upon us, on bearing down, we could not 
discern what colours they were under. At about 20 minutes past seven, the 
largest ship of the three brought to on our larboard bow, within musket 
shot. I hailed him and asked what ship it was; they answered in English, 
the Princess Royal. I then asked where they belonged to; they answered 
evasively, on which I told them, if they did not answer directly I would 
fire into them. They then answered with a shot which was instantly 
returned with a broadside, and after exchanging two or three broadsides, 
he backed his topsails and dropped upon our quarter within pistol shot, 
then filled again, put his helm a-weather, and run us on board upon our 
weather quarter and attempted to board us, but being repulsed he sheered 
off; upon which I backed our topsails in order to get square with him 
again, which as soon as he observed, he then filled, put his helm a-
weather and laid us athwart hawse. His mizen shrouds took our jib boom, 
which hung him for some time, till at last gave way and we dropt along 
side of each other head and stern, when the fluke of our spare anchor 
hooking his quarter, we became so close fore and aft, that the muzzles of 
our guns touched each others sides. In this position we engaged from half 
past eight till half past ten, during which time, from the quantity and 
variety of combustible matters which they threw in upon our decks, chains, 
and in short into every part of the ship, we were on fire not less than 
ten or twelve times in different parts of the ship and it was with the 
greatest difficulty and exertion imaginable at times that we were able to 
get it extinguished. At the same time the largest of the two frigates kept 
sailing round us the whole action and [raking] us fore and aft, by which 
means she killed or wounded almost every man on the quarter and main decks.

"About half past nine, either from a hand grenade being thrown in at one 
of our lower deck ports, or from some other accident, a cartridge of 
powder was set on fire, the flames of which running from cartridge to 
cartridge all the way aft, blew up the whole of the people and officers 
that were quartered abaft the main-mast, from which unfortunate 
circumstance all those guns were rendered useless for the remainder of the 
action, and I fear the greatest part of the people will lose their lives. 
At ten o'clock, they called for quarters from the ship alongside and said 
they had struck. Hearing this, I called upon the Captain to know if they 
had struck, or if he asked for quarters, but no answer being made, after 
repeating my words two or three times, I called for the boarders and 
ordered them to board, which they did; but the moment they were on board 
her, they discovered a superior number laying under cover with pikes in 
their hands, ready to receive them; on which our people instantly 
retreated into our own ship and returned to their guns again until half 
past ten, when the frigate coming across our stern and pouring her 
broadside into us again, without our being able to bring a gun to bear on 
her, I found it in vain and in short impracticable, from the situation we 
were in, to stand out any longer with the least prospect of success. I 
therefore struck." (Almon, ix, 46; Sherburne, 124; British Admiralty 
Records, Captains' Letters, No. 2305.1 (October 6, 1779)

The Bonhomme Richard carried eight nine-pounders on her quarter-deck and 
forecastle, twenty-eight twelve- pounders on the gun-deck and six 
eighteens on the lower deck. Her broadside weight of metal, therefore, was 
two hundred and fifty-eight pounds. The loss of her eighteens at the very 
outset at once reduced this to two hundred and four pounds. The Serapis 
was a fine, new, double decked ship, rated a forty-four, but carrying 
fifty guns: twenty eighteens on the lower gun-deck, twenty nines above, 
and ten sixes on the quarter-deck and forecastle, giving her a broadside 
of three hundred pounds to the Richard's two hundred and four. This 
statement, however, does not fully express her superiority, as heavy guns 
are far more effective in proportion than light ones; that is to say, two 
eighteens can do much more execution than three twelves. The number of men 
on board the Bonhomme Richard at the time of the battle, allowing for 
desertions and those absent in prizes and in the two boats of Henry and 
Cutting Lunt, was probably not much over three hundred; Jones makes it 
three hundred and twenty-two and thinks that a further deduction should be 
made on account of the men blown up by the bursting of the eighteen-
pounders at the first fire (Mem. de Paul Jones, 97.) The crew of the 
Serapis appears to have been of very nearly the same size, but more 
homogeneous and reliable in character. The number of casualties was very 
large in both ships. Jones estimates his loss at a hundred and fifty 
killed and wounded, without specifying the proportion of each (Sherburne, 
174.) Pearson states that the Serapis had forty-nine killed and sixty-
eight wounded, but that the list is incomplete (Almon, ix, 48.) Both ships 
suffered severely. "With respect to the situation of the Bon homme
Richard," says her commander, "the rudder was cut entirely off the stern 
frame and the transums were almost entirely cut away; the timbers, by the 
lower deck especially, from, the mainmast to the stern, being greatly 
decayed with age, were mangled beyond my power of description." Both sides 
of the ship for a great distance were wholly shot away, leaving little 
support for the upper deck, and projectiles passed through without hitting 
anything. Dead and wounded were lying in heaps. "A person must have been 
an eyewitness to form a just idea of the tremendous scene of carnage, 
wreck and ruin that everywhere appeared. Humanity cannot but recoil from 
the prospect of such finished horror and lament that war should produce 
such fatal consequences." (Sherburne, 117.) The mainmast and mizzen-
topmast of the Serapis fell overboard immediately after her surrender and 
she was otherwise much injured.

It was Jones's indomitable determination not to yield that won this 
battle. Pearson, in surrendering to what he considered a superior force, 
did so before that force, through the added weight of the Alliance, had 
become more than a merely potential one. That the Serapis, moreover, so 
greatly superior in sailing qualities, so much more manageable, even with 
the disadvantage of her leeward position, should have allowed the clumsy 
Bonhomme Richard to get alongside and grapple her, does not indicate the 
best seamanship.

There seems to have been a prevalent belief in England just after the 
battle, expressed in a letter of Lord North, that the Serapis succeeded in 
beating off the Bonhomme Richard and was then obliged to strike to the 
Alliance (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 145.) It is certain that Pearson 
greatly exaggerated the part taken by Landais in the engagement. It is 
established by the overwhelming weight of testimony that the Alliance 
fired just three broadsides, all of them after the two chief contestants 
were lashed together; and that these broad-sides damaged the Bonhomme 
Richard more than they did the Serapis. Many shot-holes found on the port 
side of the Richard must have been made by the fire of the Alliance, for 
that side was never turned towards the Serapis. Many officers of the 
squadron, both American and French, suspected Landais of treachery, and 
according to their testimony he admitted that he would have been well 
pleased at the surrender of the Richard, which would have given him an 
opportunity to enter the contest, capture both ships and reap the glory 
(Sherburne, 156-171.)

Meanwhile the Pallas and the Countess of Scarborough had fought an 
engagement. It was supposed on board the Bonhomme Richard at the time that 
it was the Alliance that engaged the Scarborough ( Log of the Bonhomme 
Richard.) Of this action Jones says in his report of October 3: "Captain 
Cottineau engaged the Countess of Scarborough and took her after an hour's 
action, while the Bon homme Richard engaged the Serapis. The Countess of 
Scarborough is an armed ship of 20 six-pounders and was commanded by a 
King's officer. In the action the Countess of Scarborough and the Serapis 
were at a considerable distance asunder, and the Alliance, as I am 
informed, fired into the Pallas and killed some men. If it should be asked 
why the convoy was suffered to escape, I must answer that I was myself in 
no condition to pursue and that none of the rest showed any inclination, 
not even Mr. Ricot [in the Vengeance], who had held off at a distance to 
windward during the whole action ... The Alliance too was in a state to 
pursue the fleet, not having had a single man wounded or a single shot 
fired at her from the Serapis, and only three that did execution from the 
Countess of Scarborough at such a distance that one stuck in the side and 
the other two just touched and then dropped into the water. The Alliance 
killed one man only on board the Serapis. As Captain de Cottineau charged 
himself with manning and securing the prisoners of the Countess of 
Scarborough, I think the escape of the Baltic fleet cannot so well be 
charged to his account." (Sherburne, 119.)

Captain Piercy of the Countess of Scarborough, in his report to Captain 
Pearson, has left the only detailed account of the fight between his ship 
and the Pallas. "About two minutes," he says, "after you began to engage 
with the largest ships of the enemy's squadron, I received a broadside 
from one of the frigates, which I instantly returned and continued 
engaging her for about twenty minutes, when she dropt astern. I then made 
sail up to the Serapis, to see if I could give you any assistance, but 
upon coming near you I found you and the enemy so close together and 
covered with smoke that I could not distinguish one ship from the other; 
and for fear I might fire into the Serapis instead of the enemy, I backed 
the main-top-sail in order to engage the attention of one of the frigates 
that was then coming up. When she got on my starboard quarter she gave me 
her broadside, which, as soon as I could get my guns to bear (which was 
very soon done), I returned and continued engaging her for near two hours, 
when I was so unfortunate as to have all my braces, great part of the 
running rigging, main and mizen top-sail sheets shot away, seven of the 
guns dismounted, four men killed and twenty wounded, and another frigate 
coming up on my larboard quarter." Piercy then surrendered (Almon, ix, 48.)

Captains Pearson and Piercy were subsequently tried by a court martial, 
the verdict of which was that they and their officers and men "have not 
only acquitted themselves of their duty to their country, but have in the 
execution of such duty done infinite credit to themselves by a very 
obstinate defence against a superior force." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Courts 
Martial, No. 5315 (March 10, 1780).

These contests attracted much attention on shore and many spectators 
viewed the scene from Flamborough Head and Scarborough. Bright moonlight 
made objects visible at a distance and the spectacle must have been 
impressive. A letter from Scarborough says: "Soon after our arrival on 
Thursday evening we were told there was an engagement at sea; I 
immediately threw up the sash of the room I was in and we had a fair view 
of the engagement, which appeared very severe, for the firing was 
frequently so quick that we could scarce count the shots." (London 
Chronicle, September 30, 1779. See also Hist. Man. Com., Report xiv, App. 
i, 21.)

After the battle the Bonhomme Richard was on fire in several places and 
was leaking rapidly. There was five feet of water in the hold, one pump 
had been shot away, and the three others were barely able to keep the 
water from gaining, in a smooth sea. "The fire broke out in various parts 
of the ship," says Jones, "in spite of all the water that could be thrown 
to quench it and at length broke out as low as the powder magazine and 
within a few inches of the powder. In that dilemma I took out the powder 
upon deck, ready to be thrown overboard at the last extremity, and it was 
10 o'clock the next day, the 24th, before the fire was entirely 
extinguished . . . After the carpenters, as well as Capt. de Cottineau and 
other men of sense, had well examined and surveyed the ship (which was not 
finished before five in the evening), I found every person to be convinced 
that it was impossible to keep the Bon homme Richard afloat so as to reach 
a port if the wind should increase, it being then only a moderate breeze. 
I had but little time to remove my wounded, which now became unavoidable 
and which was effected in the course of the night and next morning. I was 
determined to keep the Bon homme Richard afloat and if possible to bring 
her into port. For that purpose the first lieutenant of the Pallas 
continued on board with a party of men to attend the pumps, with boats in 
waiting ready to take them on board in case the water should gain on them 
too fast. The wind augmented in the night and the next day, on the 25th, 
so that it was impossible to prevent the good old ship from sinking. They 
did not abandon her till after 9 o'clock; the water was then up to the 
lower deck and a little after ten I saw with inexpressible grief the last 
glimpse of the Bon homme Richard. No lives were lost with the ship, but it 
was impossible to save the stores of any sort whatever. I lost even the 
best part of my clothes, books and papers; and several of my officers lost 
all their clothes and effects." (Sherburne, 117,118; Sands, 186-189. See 
Fanning, 61, for a description of the sinking of the Bonhomme Richard.)

Just after the action seven Englishmen of the Richard's crew stole a boat 
from the Serapis and escaped ashore, where they gave an account of the 
cruise and battle and of Jones's intentions as they understood them 
(London Chronicle, September, 28, 30, 1779; Boston Gazette, January 3, 
1780.) The eye-witness at Scarborough says that the day after the 
engagement "six sail were seen about two leagues off at sea, much 
shattered, one of which, a large ship, had lost her mainmast; they kept 
their station all that day. Yesterday morning [September 25] they were 
gone to the northward, as is supposed, for the wind would not suit for any 
other quarter." (London Chronicle, September 30, 1779.) They had 
apparently drifted off before the wind, as they were not yet in a 
condition to make sail.

The situation of the squadron on the British coast was becoming dangerous, 
and yet before flight was possible a vast amount of work was to be done in 
repairing the injuries to the Serapis sufficiently to make her seaworthy. 
Jones took command of her when the Bonhomme Richard sank and after 
strenuous exertions, at 1 A.M. September 28, according to her journal, 
"Gott up a Jury Main Mast." By evening the squadron was ready to sail and 
the commodore signalled to stand to the westward, and a few hours later, 
to the eastward. Meanwhile on the very day of the battle Admiral Hardy, 
commanding the Channel fleet, who had received orders to send a strong 
force in search of the American squadron, dispatched five ships on that 
duty (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 95, September 23,1779.) A letter from 
Bridlington, September 24, says that in the opinion of the sailors who had 
escaped ashore "Jones's plan was to destroy Scarborough, Bridlington and 
Hull, with some other places; and that he intended landing at Flamborough 
yesterday morning, but the sea ran too high." (London Chronicle, September 
30, 1779.) It was reported from Hull, September 26, that the squadron was 
still visible from Flamborough Head that morning steering north, and that 
it was scarcely out of sight when four British vessels appeared in pursuit 
(London Chronicle, September 30, 1779.) The correspondent who had been 
watching events from Scarborough says that on the same morning "eight of 
our ships of war appeared in sight, and which are gone in search of Jones."

The state of mind along the east coast of England at the time is reflected 
in a letter of the Marquis of Rockingham, written to Lord Weymouth 
September 28. Speaking of the defenses of Hull he says: "I shall not 
hesitate to say that from an Attack by Frigates or Ships of War it was 
entirely without defence; the Artillery in the Fort - its only defence - 
were unserviceable both from the Carriages being entirely rotten and also 
from most of the Guns which carried any Weight of Metal being honeycombed 
and dangerous to Use . . . A ship of 60 Guns can lay, even at low Water, 
within less than 400 Yards of the Town. In Paul Jones's Squadron the 
largest Vessel was a 40 Gun Ship, so that whatever Force he had could have 
come up. It appeared to me that not only from the Information of a Man who 
had been put by Paul Jones into a prize and who had assisted very 
principally in securing the men and bringing her in with the Assistance of 
a Hull Pilot, but also from the Size and Number of Ships in Paul Jones's 
Squadron, that there could not be any Number of Soldiers or Marines on 
Board," or that any force could be landed which could not be repelled by 
the militia of the neighborhood, insuring the safety of Hull and its 
shipping. "I conceived very differently in regard to an attempt being made 
by the Squadron coming up Humber. I therefore pressed as much as I 
possibly could that every Effort should be made to prepare Batteries and 
get what Artillery could be had . . . At the Meeting on Friday Morning 
Intelligence came that the Serapis and Countess of Scarborough had been 
seen shortening sail, covering the Baltic Fleet and waiting for Paul
Jones"; and later "that the Engagement was begun, but it growing dark, the 
Event of a very Warm Action was not known . . . The Unfortunate Event of 
their being Captured after a most Severe Engagement came to our Knowledge 
at Hull on Friday Evening, when the Mayor immediately called a Meeting, 
and at which the Proposition of preparing Batteries was unanimously 
adopted." (Amer. Hist. Review, April, 1910.)

The British ships in search of Jones did not find him, although he was 
"tossing about to and fro in the North Sea for ten days in contrary winds 
and bad weather, in order to gain the port of Dunkirk, on account of the 
prisoners." Notwithstanding the instructions governing the cruise named 
the Texel as the port of destination, Jones wished to put into Dunkirk, so 
as to place his prizes and prisoners at once under French jurisdiction, 
and it would have saved him much annoyance had this been possible. The 
other captains, however, insisted upon carrying out the letter of the 
instructions and bore away for the Texel. Jones was forced to follow or to 
proceed alone to Dunkirk and he chose the former alternative. The squadron 
anchored off the Texel October 3, 1779 (Sands, 200; Sherburne, 120. 
Fanning, 64-66, says they were chased into the Texel by a British 
squadron, which remained outside the bar.)

The commodore spent nearly three months at the Texel refitting his ships 
and then waiting for an opportunity to get away, being blockaded by a 
British squadron cruising outside. The purpose of the French Minister of 
Marine in making the Texel the objective point of the cruise was that a 
convoy might be furnished for a number of vessels loaded with naval and 
military stores which it was desired to bring to France. Also it was hoped 
that the Indien might be taken into a French port, and the French 
ambassador to Holland, to whom Jones reported on his arrival, wished to 
obtain from the Dutch government authority for the sale of the ship to 
some merchant who could place her under a neutral flag. Nothing of this 
sort, however, was accomplished, and the only useful purpose served by the 
presence of the squadron in neutral waters was increasing the estrangement 
between England and Holland which ultimately led to war, manifestly to the 
advantage of the United States. If Jones could have gone directly to the 
French port of Dunkirk, much vexation and embarrassment would have been 
saved and he could readily have disposed of his prizes and prisoners. The 
British ambassador at the Hague, upon the arrival of the squadron, made a 
vehement protest to the Dutch government, and demanded ,that these ships 
and their crews may be stopped and delivered up, which the pirate Paul 
Jones of Scotland, who is a rebel subject and criminal of the state, has 
taken." (Sherburne, 129.) The Dutch, however, moved slowly in the matter 
and refused to commit themselves as to the legality of the captures. Jones 
was allowed time to refit his ships and was permitted to land his wounded, 
so that they might be cared for in a fort which was placed at his 
disposal. He entered into an agreement with Captain Pearson, according to 
which the wounded prisoners were to be guarded and cared for at the 
expense of the United States and later exchanged for Americans (lbid., 128-
133, 174; Sands, 200-218; Wharton, iii, 356, 397; Archives de la Marine, 
B1 91, 188, B4 158, 175.)

In consequence of the charges against him Captain Landais was ordered back 
to Paris by Franklin, October 15. With respect to these charges, twenty-
five in number, and formally drawn up October 30, there was a practical 
unanimity of opinion among the officers of the squadron as to the 
reprehensible conduct of Landais during the cruise. Four officers of the 
Alliance, including the first lieutenant, attested that several people on 
board that ship "told Captain Landais at different times that he fired 
upon the wrong ship; others refused to fire." (Sherburne, 156-171.) 
Sometime after the departure of Landais, Jones took command of the 
Alliance, all the other vessels having been put under the French flag to 
avoid complications with Holland. Arrangements were made for the exchange 
of prisoners and the disposal of prizes. The squadron had taken more than 
enough prisoners to procure the release by exchange of all the Americans 
confined in England. The plan adopted was to exchange Jones's prisoners 
for French at the Texel, France agreeing to give the same number of 
English in France for the Americans in England. Jones was offered a French 
commission, which would further have facilitated matters, but he 
resolutely refused it and saved the Alliance from being also placed under 
the French flag. His situation was daily growing more uncomfortable, as 
the Dutch were unwilling longer to disregard the importunity of the 
British ambassador. He was at last peremptorily ordered by the Dutch 
admiral to depart with the first favorable wind. He was ready to sail 
December 1, and then waited nearly four weeks for an opportunity. On the 
13th, he wrote to Franklin: "We hear that the enemy still keeps a squadron 
cruising off here, but this shall not prevent my attempts to depart 
whenever the wind will permit. I hope we have recovered the trim of this 
ship, which was entirely lost during the last cruise, and I do not much 
fear the enemy in the long and dark nights of this season. The ship is 
well manned and shall not be given away. I need not tell you I will do my 
utmost to take prisoners and prizes in my way from hence." (Sands, 239; 
Wharton, iii, 425.) About this time Captain Conyngham, who had escaped 
from prison in England and had crossed over to Holland, came aboard the 
Alliance. At last, with a favoring east wind, the ship got away from the 
Texel December 27, 1779, and succeeded in running the blockade of the 
British squadron outside (Sands, 218-243; Sherburne, 145-152, 174-184, 
219; Wharton, iii, 378, 379, 424, 425, 430, 431, 535; Archives de la 
Marine, B4 172, 140.)

With her best American colors flying, the Alliance "passed along the 
Flemish banks and getting to windward of the enemy's fleets of observation 
in the North Sea," ran through the Straits of Dover in full view of the 
British fleet in the Downs. During the night of December 28 several 
vessels were seen and the next morning the frigate passed "the Isle of 
Wight, in view of the enemy's fleet at Spithead, and in two days more got 
safe through the channel, having passed by windward in sight of several of 
the enemy's large two-decked cruising ships." (Sands, 243, 244.) Jones 
then cruised a week or more to the southward and off Cape Finisterre. 
January 8, 1780, he captured a brig which he sent to America. He went into 
Coruna January 16, where he was well received by the Spanish. Conyngham 
left the Alliance here and joined a ship bound to America. Jones sailed 
again, January 28, for another cruise off Cape Finisterre, but meeting 
with no success, put into Groix Roads February 10. At L'Orient, Jones 
found the Serapis awaiting condemnation. She and the Countess of 
Scarborough and Pallas had gone from the Texel to Dunkirk, whence the 
Serapis had proceeded to L'Orient. She was eventually sold there, and the 
Countess of Scarborough at Dunkirk (Sherburne, 184-190, 219; Fanning, 76-
79; Log of the Alliance; Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1899; Jones 
MSS., February 10, 12, 1780, Jones to Gourlade & Moylan and to Franklin; 
Archives de la Marine, B1 93, 33, 36, 97, 99, B4 172, 145, 152, B8 16 
(Janvier, 1780)

The situation of the United States respecting naval conditions at the end 
of 1779 was relatively better than in the two previous years; the falling 
off was proportionately less. The heavy annual loss in frigates was less 
heavy; there were fewer frigates to lose, and the Warren was the only one 
dropped from the list. The loss of the sloop Providence was keenly felt 
because of her very useful and successful career. Other small vessels that 
passed away were the sloop of war General Gates, the brig Diligent, the 
cutter Revenge and the sloop Argo. Of the original thirteen frigates there 
still remained the Providence, Trumbull, and Boston; the Trumbull had at 
last made her escape from the Connecticut River, but was not yet ready for 
sea. The Deane, Queen of France, and Ranger also remained; and two prime 
thirty-two-gun frigates, the Alliance and Confederacy, first went into 
active service in 1779. Vessels still under construction were slowly 
progressing towards completion. The four vessels fitted out in France to 
cruise under the American flag were for temporary service only. 
Unfortunately the prize ship Serapis was not procured for the Continental 
navy; no money was available for her purchase. The achievements of the 
navy during the year were gratifying. The several successful cruises in 
American waters and the brilliant exploits of Jones added reputation to 
the service. The Penobscot expedition was chiefly a local affair and the 
gloom produced by the disaster did not, in its full intensity at least, 
overspread the whole country.

In 1779, privateering played a still more important part in naval warfare 
than before. Two hundred and nine commissions were granted by the 
Continental Congress to private armed vessels, eighty more than the number 
of the previous year. The enterprise of the separate states also in this 
mode of sea-service continued to develop and increase. Greater activity 
was likewise displayed by the English. From August, 1778, to April, 1779, 
one hundred privateers were fitted out in Liverpool, aggregating more than 
twenty-four thousand tons, mounting sixteen hundred and fifty guns and 
with crews numbering more than seventy-four hundred men. A list of British 
privateers fitted out at New York, published in April, comprised one 
hundred and twenty-one vessels, including two of thirty-six guns each, one 
thirty, one twenty-eight, and thirty others of twenty or more guns, the 
whole manned by about ninety-six hundred men. Another list, compiled for 
Admiral Gambier, February 27, "of Private Ships and Vessels of War 
belonging to the Port of New York, now at Sea," contains sixty-nine names. 
Many American vessels were taken by these privateers, of which, however, 
many in turn were captured (Naval Records (calendar), 217-495, list of 
Continental letters of marque; London Chronicle, April 1, 29, 1779; 
Massachusetts Spy, April 29, June 3, 1779; Boston Post, March 13, 27, 
1779; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, February 27, 1779.)

During the year 1779, the British navy increased, in the total number of 
ships, from four hundred and thirty-two to four hundred and eighty-one; 
ships in commission, from three hundred and seventeen to three hundred and 
sixty-four. Seventy thousand men manned the navy. On the North American 
station a smaller fleet was maintained than during the two preceding 
years. With enemies on the continent of Europe to provide against, a 
larger part of the naval force was kept at home or employed in other seas. 
Only about sixty vessels were stationed in North America and less than 
half of these were frigates or larger ships. A powerful fleet was held in 
the West Indies (Hannay, 211; Schomberg, i, 453; Almon, viii, 314, 315, 
Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, April 3, A. D. 486, August 30, 1779, lists of 
ships employed under Admirals Gambier and Arbuthnot.)

It is stated that in 1779, five hundred and sixteen vessels, of which 
twenty-nine were privateers and the others merchantmen, were captured from 
the British by their enemies; how many of them by Americans does not 
appear. One hundred and eleven of these were retaken or ransomed. During 
the same time the British took two hundred and sixty-nine vessels from 
their enemies, of which thirty-one were privateers, and five were 
recaptured (Clowes, iii, 396.) Other lists cover too short a period of 
time to be of value and presumably have been included in the above 
compilation (Almon, ix, 343, 350, 351, 3540 358.) The Continental navy 
captured forty-four vessels, including three regular men-of-war and 
several privateers, letters of marque, and armed transports (Neeser, ii, 
28, 30, 288.)