Naval History of the American Revolution - Chapter VII



CHAPTER VII
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1777

Owing to various causes the thirteen frigates provided for by Congress in 
1775 were much delayed in fitting out and going into commission, and some 
of them never got to sea. The Warren and Providence were perhaps the first 
to be completed, but the difficulty of manning them and the occupation of 
Newport and the lower bay by the British kept them in port. Commodore 
Hopkins hoisted his pennant on the Warren early in December, 1776, perhaps 
before, and anchored her in the Providence River. He had with him also the 
frigate Providence, the ship Columbus, the brig Hampden, and the sloop 
Providence. January 2, 1777, Hopkins, having been informed that the 
British frigate Diamond was aground near Warwick Neck below the mouth of 
the river, went down to the vicinity in the sloop Providence. The Diamond 
managed to get off during the night; for allowing her to escape Hopkins 
was much criticized. Writing, March 13, to William Ellery, the commodore 
says in self-defense that as it was blowing very hard it was thought best 
not to try to get the frigates down the river. When he arrived on the 
scene in the Providence he "found the Diamond ashore on a shoal which runs 
off S. W. from Patience, about half a mile from that Island and a little 
more S. E. from Warwick Neck, and as there is about eleven feet of water 
on that shoal at low water and not a very hard bottom and the tide about 
half down, she did not careen. There lay about one mile and a half" away 
"a fifty gun ship with her top-sails loose and her anchor apeak, who, as 
the wind was, could have fetch'd within pistol shot of the Diamond, but 
the wind blowing so hard was I think the reason of her not coming to sail. 
The truth is the ships could not have got down, and if the wind had not 
blow'd so hard and they could, it would not in my judgment have been 
prudent, neither should I have ordered them down, as the enemy's ships 
could have come to sail with any wind that our ships could and a great 
deal better, as they lay in a wide channel and we in a narrow and very 
crooked one . . . I went ashore at Warwick and saw Colonel Bowen, who told 
me he had sent for two eighteen -pounders, and in less than half an hour 
they came. I went on board the sloop and we dropp'd down under the ship's 
stern a little more than musket shott off, it being then a little after 
sun sett. We fired a number of shott, which she returned from her stern 
chacers. The ship careen'd at dusk about as much as she would have done 
had she been under sail. After they had fired about twenty-six shott from 
the shore, they ceased and soon after hail'd the sloop and said they 
wanted to speak with me. I went ashore and was informed they were out of 
ammunition. I offer'd them powder and stuff for wads, but we had no shott 
that would do. They sent to Providence for powder and shott and I went on 
board the sloop and sent some junk ashore for wads. Soon after they hail'd 
again from the shore and I went to see what they wanted and gave Capt. 
Whipple orders not to fire much more, as I thought it would do but little 
execution, it being night and could not take good aim with the guns. When 
I got on shore, the officer that commanded there desir'd I would let them 
have some bread out of the sloop, which I sent the boat off for, but the 
people not making the boat well fast, while they were getting the bread 
she drifted away and I could not get aboard again. The ship by lightening 
got off about 2 o'clock the same night, and on the whole, as the ship was 
on a shoal almost under cover of a 50 gun ship and got off again before it 
was possible to have done anything with our frigates, I thought it of no 
moment." (R.I. Hist. Mag., October, 1886; Hopkins, 167-177.) Another ship 
took the Diamond's station and soon after this an abortive attempt was 
made to destroy her with a fireship (R. I. Hist. Mag., January, 1886, 
journal of Lieutenant Trevett.) Commodore Parker, commanding the British 
fleet at Newport, wrote to the Admiralty, January 7: "The Continental 
Fleet is in Providence River, beyond our reach at present." (Brit. Adm. 
Rec., A.D. 486. See also Ibid., December 11, 1776.)

Hopkins was ordered by the Marine Committee, January 21, to get the Warren 
and Providence to sea as soon as possible, to cruise from Rhode Island to 
Virginia. But the commodore's active sea service in the navy had already 
come to an end. As the result of a petition signed by some of the Warren's 
officers and of the Marine Committee's examination of one of them, Captain 
John Grannis of the marines, Congress resolved, March 26, that "Esek 
Hopkins be immediately and he is hereby suspended from his command in the 
American Navy." After passing the remainder of the year under suspension, 
the commodore was formally dismissed from the service January 2, 1778. 
April 4, 1777, Captains John B. Hopkins, Abraham Whipple, and Dudley 
Saltonstall were instructed to make every effort to get to sea with the 
frigates Warren, Providence, and Trumbull, in search of British transports 
and merchantmen; but these vessels were doomed to idle away the entire 
year in their native rivers (Hopkins, 185-203; Jour. Cont. Congr., March 
26, 1777, January 2, 1778; Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 225-230 (February 19, 
1777), 235; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 50, 65 (January 21, April 4, 1777)

The plans of the Marine Committee for preying upon British commerce and 
the movements of American armed vessels in general might have been 
effectually hindered if the British commander had adopted the suggestions 
offered to General Howe by Lord George Germain, who wrote March 3, 1777, 
that the King was of the "opinion that a warm diversion upon the coasts of 
the Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire would not only impede the levies 
for the Continental Army, but tend much to the security of our trade, and 
indeed it scarcely admits a doubt but that these benefits must inevitably 
result from such an arrangement. For as on one hand, it is scarcely to be 
expected that those provinces will part with men when their presence must 
be wanted for the internal defence of their own respective districts, so 
on the other, a salutary check will unavoidably be put to the successes of 
the rebel privateers, when we have destroyed or taken possession of their 
ports. It is, therefore, the King's pleasure that Lord Howe and you take 
this matter into your serious consideration so far as your intended plan 
will admit." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 58.)

Early in the year the Marine Committee had intended sending to the West 
Indies, and along the southern coast as far as Pensacola and the 
Mississippi, a squadron composed of the Alfred and Cabot, then at Boston, 
and the Columbus, sloop Providence and Hampden, in the Providence River, 
all under the command of John Paul Jones; but the project was not carried 
out, owing, as Jones believed, to the opposition of Commodore Hopkins 
(Mar. Com. Letter Book, 52, 54 (February 1, 5, 1777); Pap. Cont. Congr., 
58, 117-121, 191, 197 (February 28, March 1, 1777); Sands, 58, 59, 64.) 
The Columbus and Hampden remained in Narragansett Bay several months. The 
sloop Providence, Captain Jonathan Pitcher, ran the blockade of the 
British fleet in the lower bay in February, passing "so near a 50 gun ship 
about 2 A.M. as to hear them talking on board." She went into New Bedford 
and then made a cruise to the eastward. Off Cape Breton she captured a 
transport brig with a small body of soldiers for Burgoyne's army. This 
vessel did not surrender, however, without resistance. John Trevett, 
lieutenant of marines on the Providence, says that the "brig bore down on 
us and began a fire at long shot; we ran from her about one hour, until we 
got in good order for action, when we took in sail and let her come up 
close along side. The sea being smooth, we cut away all her colors in 
forty minutes and they began to be slack, but in a few minutes they began 
to fire as brisk as ever and cut our sails and rigging badly; it lasted 
about forty minutes longer, when we cut away her main-topmast. We hailed 
them without a trumpet, being close on her starboard quarter, to know 
whether they gave up or not, and the answer was 'yes.' . . . We found she 
was direct from England and that she had 25 soldiers and two officers on 
board, besides the crew, and was loaded with King's stores and bound for 
Quebec." The Providence soon afterwards returned to New Bedford (R.I. 
Hist. Mag., April, 1886.)

The brig Cabot, Captain Joseph Olney, also cruised to the eastward, and in 
March, while off the coast of Nova Scotia, she was chased by the British 
frigate Milford. The captain ran her ashore and had just time to escape 
with his crew; they afterwards, it is said, seized a schooner and made 
their way back to Boston. The Milford, "after a wearisome struggle of 14 
days, got the Continental Brig Cabot . . . off, and sent her to Halifax, 
where she arrived and is now fitting out with the greatest expedition for 
sea." (Boston Gazette, June 16, 1777; Continental Journal, April 10, 1777; 
Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 607 (log of the Milford.) The Cabot 
was taken into the British navy; she is believed to have been the first 
vessel of the Continental navy to be captured, except the Lexington, which 
was recaptured.

On April 23 the Marine Committee ordered to sea the Alfred, Captain 
Hinman, then at Boston, and the sloop Providence, which, after returning 
from her eastern cruise, had been put under the command of Captain John P. 
Rathburne. The vessels were to cruise separately "in such Latitudes as 
will be most likely to fall in with and intercept the enemies Transport 
vessels coming to reinforce or supply their Army at New York." Continuing 
their instructions the Committee wrote: "You are to use your true 
endeavours to take, burn, sink, or destroy as many of the enemies Vessels 
of every kind, as it may be your good fortune to fall in with. The Prizes 
you may be lucky enough to take you will send into such Ports of the 
United States as you shall think will be the safest and most convenient
. . . It is expected from every Commander in our Navy that he use his 
officers and people well, still preserving strict discipline and decorum; 
that Prisoners be treated with humanity; and that great care be taken of 
the ships, their materials and stores, all which we desire you will 
carefully observe and advise us of your proceedings by every opportunity. 
We expect your most dilligent exertions will be used to execute these 
orders with all possible dispatch and in the best manner for the service 
of your Country." The Alfred was to return to port by July 1 and then 
receive fresh orders. The Providence was to cruise three months, and if, 
on returning to port, she found no further instructions, she was then to 
take in provisions and proceed on another three months' cruise (Mar. Com. 
Letter Book, 70, 71 (April 23,1777) The Alfred seems to have performed no 
important service under these orders. Indeed she probably did not go to 
sea at all before July; very likely she was unable to enlist a crew in 
time.

In June the sloop Providence sailed from New Bedford, and off Sandy Hook 
saw a ship, brig, schooner, and sloop standing to the southeast and 
followed them. "About 3 P.M.," says Lieutenant Trevett in his journal, "we 
came up with the ship, the other vessels being near to her weather bow, 
and hailed her. She had her pennant and ensign flying, but gave us no 
answer and we gave her a bow gun, intending to break her cabin windows. We 
drew very near her, but the wind being scant we found we could not get to 
windward, so we bore away and went under her lee, as near as we could, and 
gave her a good broadside. She immediately gave us as good a one and run 
us aboard on our starboard quarter and hung there about five minutes, 
until she broke all our sweeps that were lashed there. At the same time 
the brig of 10 guns and the schooner of 8 [guns] lost no time, all three 
of them firing into us at once. As the ship fell off she gave us her 
starboard broadside and we shot ahead of them with our sails and rigging 
much cut to pieces. We then bore away, all hands employed in fixing our 
rigging. We had but a poor crew at this time. Our loss was our sailing 
master, Capt. George Sinkins of Newport, who was killed, and only two or 
three men slightly wounded. We hove him overboard, got our rigging 
repaired as soon as possible, and made sail for the ship. We came up with 
her just after sunset with a determination to board her, for we well knew 
if we carried the ship that the rest of the vessels would fall into our 
hands. We ran within half Pistol shot and gave her a full broadside, but 
all three of them played their part so well we gave it up." The schooner 
was taken, however, and from her it was learned that the ship carried 
sixteen guns. After this the Providence cruised several weeks in the Gulf 
Stream. A sail was seen, acting strangely, and was chased, and upon coming 
up with her in the night, she was found to be an abandoned ship, evidently 
French, under full sail; rudderless, though otherwise in good condition. 
It being apparently impracticable to get her into port, she was burned to 
prevent her falling into British hands. The Providence returned to New 
Bedford in August (R.I. Hist. Mag., April, 1886.)

Meanwhile Captain Jones remained on shore, having held out to him 
successively various promises of active employment afloat. The 
disappointment of his expectation of taking a squadron to sea occurred a 
few weeks after his arrival at Boston in the Alfred, in December, 1776. In 
March he was appointed to command one of three vessels which Congress had 
ordered to be purchased at Boston. In May he was directed to proceed to 
France in the ship Amphitrite, which had brought over military stores, and 
after his arrival there the American Commissioners were expected, by order 
of Congress, to procure for him the command of a frigate. These Plans were 
abandoned in turn; and June 14, 1777, he was given command of the new 
eighteen-gun ship Ranger, just built at Portsmouth. On the same day it was 
resolved in Congress: "That the flag of the thirteen United States be 
thirteen stripes alternate red and white; that the Union be thirteen 
stars, white in a blue field, representing a new constellation." Jones is 
said to have hoisted this flag on the Ranger for the first time it was 
ever raised on any man-of-war. For several months after that be was busy 
fitting out his ship. The Ranger was one hundred and sixteen feet long 
over all, twenty-eight feet wide, and measured three hundred and eight 
tons. She mounted eighteen six-pounders; she was pierced for twenty-six 
guns, but Jones considered her too light a ship for so heavy an armament 
(Sherburne, 36-40; Sands, 66-70; 7ones MSS., Jones to Morris, April 7, 
July 28, 1777; Remick's Kittery in the Revolution, 9, 10, gives the Ranger 
14 nines and 4 sixes; Admiral Arbuthnot reported in 1780 (Brit. Adm. Rec., 
A.D. 486, May 23,1780) that she mounted 20 sixes.)

The Randolph, built at Philadelphia, was one of the first of the frigates 
to be ready for service, but the close blockade of Delaware Bay held her 
and other Continental vessels in port several weeks; then there was 
further delay due to ice in the river. January 30, 1777, the frigate was 
ordered to sail "the moment the Ice will permit," accompanied by the 
Hornet and Fly and a convoy of merchantmen, to be escorted "fairly off to 
sea." In these orders, signed for the Marine Committee by Robert Morris, 
Captain Biddle received general instructions as to his conduct. "For your 
encouragement in this service," says Morris, "I must observe that there 
are no Cruizing Ships an over match for you, except the two Deckers, for 
altho you think you have not seamen enough, yet that is just their case; 
except the Roebuck there is none of them half manned, therefore you have 
only to avoid two Deckers or engaging when there is more than one in 
sight. Any of their other single ships you need not fear, especially if 
you can persuade your men to board. Remember what a glorious exploit it 
will be, to add one of their frigates or 20 Gun ships to our navy in a few 
days after you get out, and if the Randolph has but Heels, I think you can 
and will do it; you will then get seamen Plenty. If your ship sails 
remarkably fast, you may take libertys with them. If she does not, be more 
cautious and try to find out her trim . . . You'l observe that many 
merchant vessels are expected in with valuable Stores to this port, 
therefore you'l afford them all possible protection and had best keep in 
their tract as long as you can." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 49 (January 30, 
1777) As soon as the ice would permit, about February 1, the Randolph, 
Hornet, and Fly proceeded down the river with their convoy and got safely 
to sea (Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, App., 4, 49, 57, 115, 137, 147 (Morris to 
Hancock, December 14, 30, 1776, January 3, 26, February 4, 10, 1777)

Morris wrote further instructions for Biddle February 15 and forwarded 
them to him by the Fly, which had returned to port. The Randolph was now 
to proceed to the West Indies. The Marine Committee had decided to send 
all the armed vessels at Philadelphia to those islands. Biddle was given 
letters to William Bingham, the navy agent at Martinique, and to other 
persons at St. Eustatius, Curacao, Cape Francois, and Mole St. Nicholas, 
to whom he was to apply in turn, until he had a full cargo of military 
stores and supplies for the army, to be brought back at once to the safest 
port. The Dutch government had prohibited the exportation of such supplies 
to America, but the traffic was still conducted on a large scale, in Dutch 
as well as French ports. Arms, ammunition, and clothing were brought from 
Europe to the West Indies for transshipment to the United States. It was 
hoped that these stores could be procured in sufficient quantity and 
without delay at Martinique. "These supplies are exceedingly necessary for 
the service of the ensuing campaigne and you cannot render your Country a 
more essential service than by bringing them soon and safe in . . . As you 
command the first American frigate that has got out to sea, it is expected 
that you contend warmly on all necessary occasions for the honor of the 
American flag. At every foreign port you enter, salute their forts and 
waite on the Governor General or Commander in Chief, asking the liberty of 
their ports for the ships of the United States of America. Take care that 
your people do not molest their Trade nor Inhabitants nor in any shape 
disturb that good understanding we have with them." Prizes were to be sent 
into Martinique, St. Eustatius, or other ports, where the cargoes might be 
sold, if to greater advantage, the vessels, however, being always brought 
to American ports. "As the British men of war on the West India stations 
are not often well manned, it would give great eclat to our Naval Service 
it you can make prize of one or more of them and if so, you will do well 
to tempt some of their best warrant officers, such as Boatswains, Gunners, 
Quarter Masters and their several mates, to enter our service, for we 
would wish you to bring both these and plenty of Common Sailors home, to 
assist in manning our other ships of war." Seamen from other prizes also, 
and in the various ports visited, were to be procured for the service when 
possible. "When your errand to the West Indies is compleated, you'l 
observe it is mentioned already that you are to return to some safe port 
in these United States of America. The uncertainty of the fate of war 
makes us cautious of saying positively which shall be the best port. There 
is little doubt but this [Philadelphia] will be the most convenient to 
receive the stores at, being most centrical and probably not very distant 
from the scenes of action, and as you are well enabled to defend yourself 
against most single ships and capable, we hope, of outsailing any of the 
enemies, it appears that you might venture to call at Cape Henlopen or 
Cape May for intelligence, without incurring the charge of rashness, and 
we will endeavour to keep out some small Cruizers about the time you are 
expected, to give you information." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 55 (February 
15, 1777) Signals were prescribed for communication with the shore and 
with other vessels. Most unfortunately the Randolph had not proceeded far 
on her voyage before she encountered a heavy gale, in which she was 
dismasted and was obliged to put into Charleston in a crippled condition. 
Before arriving there a mutiny broke out among English sailors on board, 
but was soon quelled. March 29 the Sachem, Captain James Robinson, was 
sent to Martinique with duplicates of the dispatches for Bingham which the 
Randolph had not been able to deliver (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 55, 57, 58 
(February 15, 17, 18, 1777), 59 (February 5, 1777), 64 (March 29, 1777); 
Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, app., 151, 177 (February 10, 19, 1777); Port 
Folio, October, 1809; Amer. Hist. Review, viii (July, 1903), 687.)

The Raleigh, Hancock, and Boston were the only others of the thirteen 
frigates that cruised at sea during 1777. The Virginia, built at 
Baltimore, was ready for sea early in the year, and her commander, Captain 
James Nicholson, received instructions in April to proceed to the West 
Indies, but, owing to the close blockade of Chesapeake Bay by the British, 
she could not get out. Repeated orders were sent to Nicholson to get the 
Virginia to sea, but she was forced to remain idle in port throughout the 
whole year (Ibid., 51, 66, 85, 86, 104, 108, 116, 117 (January 24, April 
8, 29, May 1, October 23, November 6, December 2, 12, 1777) The occupation 
of New York and Philadelphia by the British, in 1777, prevented the 
frigates Montgomery and Congress, in the Hudson River, and the Delaware, 
Washington, and Effingham, in the Delaware River, from rendering active 
sea service; and the New York frigates were destroyed before the end of 
the year, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy (Ibid., 65 
(April 8, 1777); Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, app., 4, 9, 21 (December 14, 16, 
21, 1776); Almon, v, 425-431.) The Trumbull did not leave the Connecticut 
River, where she was built, until 1779; and, as already related, the 
Warren and Providence were held in port more than a year after they were 
ready for sea.

In April, 1777, an expedition was sent by General Howe from New York 
against Connecticut under the command of General Tryon, the royal governor 
of New York. A landing was made at Fairfield, whence they proceeded to 
Danbury and destroyed a large quantity of public stores. Upon returning to 
their ships the British were harassed by a small force of Americans under 
Generals Arnold, Wooster, and Silliman. Arnold wrote to Governor Trumbull 
of Connecticut, April 30: "After the enemy reimbark'd they imediately 
weighed Anchor and stood for Huntington harbour, Long Island, where they 
doubtless are at this time. I think it very probable they have in 
Contemplation the Destroying the Continental Frigate [Trumbull] at 
Saybrook, which may be easily effected by a few small Tenders, as there is 
no Battery or Armed Vessell to Cover her. If she cannot be got over the 
Barr & secured in harbour, will it not be prudent to move her up the river 
to some place of greater safety? I know not If your honour or the 
Continental agents have the Direction of her; that she is greatly exposed 
& ought to be secured, there is no doubt. I should Imagine she might be 
easily got over the barr with proper lighters & an Easterly wind, & 
secured In Guilford, Sachems head, or New Haven, where she might be got in 
readiness for the Seas." (Trumbull MSS., vi, 90. See also Ibid., 87, 96, 
letters of General Silliman (April 29,1777) on the operations against 
Tryon and of Captain John Shipman (May 1, 1777) on the dangerous situation 
of the frigate Trumbull.)

In view of this clear statement of the frigate's situation, we learn with 
surprise that - apparently in response to the orders of April 4, but 
possibly to earlier orders that have not been preserved - Captain 
Saltonstall went to sea and on April 12 wrote a letter to the Marine 
Committee dated "on board the Continental ship of war Trumbull," off the 
Virginia capes, saying: "I have the pleasure to acquaint you that at one 
P.M. I fell in with two transports from England, one of eight, the other 
of ten guns. They engaged us three glasses, when they struck
their colours. They killed seven of our men and wounded eight more. We 
shattered them in a terrible manner and killed and wounded numbers of 
their crews. I have the pleasure to inform you that our people behaved 
well and with much courage." (Almon, v, 135.) It is obvious that 
Saltonstall's "Continental ship of war" could not have been the frigate 
Trumbull, which was securely shut up in the river. It is likely that, 
owing to the importance of the service to be performed, a vessel was 
impressed, chartered, or borrowed for the occasion, perhaps the ten-gun 
sloop Trumbull, a Connecticut privateer (The sloop Trumbull is known to 
have been in commission at this time. Saltonstall's name appears in a list 
of Connecticut privateers as commander of the Governor Trumbull, a 20-gun 
ship, though probably at a later date. See Conn. State Records, i, 567; 
Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 212, 214, 225, 229, 231, 256; Papers New 
London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 28; Nav. Rec. of Am. Rev. (calendar) 478; Conn. 
Gazette, July 18,1777; Data from the Library of the Navy Department.)

Although the frigates Hancock and Boston had received cruising orders in 
the fall of 1776, such was the delay in fitting them out that they did not 
get to sea until May, 1777. The frigate Milford and other vessels of the 
enemy had long been a terror to American navigators in eastern waters and 
the need of regular fighting ships more powerful than the state cruisers 
and privateers was greatly felt. The General Court of Massachusetts 
resolved, April 24, that the Hancock and Boston ought to put to sea at 
once in pursuit of the Milford. It was arranged that the Continental 
frigates should be accompanied for twenty-five days by nine privateers, 
including two or three of considerable force, and by any others that 
should be ready by May 1. The commanders of these privateers, serving 
under Captains Manley and McNeill of the Hancock and Boston, were to be 
put upon the same footing for the time being as regular officers and their 
vessels were to be insured by the state (Mass. Court Rec., April 24, 26, 
1777.) As a squadron, this assemblage of vessels amounted to nothing. With 
proper cooperation it might have constituted a force capable of meeting 
with some prospect of success any British squadron it was likely to fall 
in with. But the privateers took no part whatever in the cruise after the 
first few days; becoming separated, they were soon dropped behind by the 
frigates.

Another unfortunate circumstance, which may have had much to do with 
events soon to happen, was the lack of cordial relations between the 
captains of the frigates. Such being the case, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Dr. Samuel Cooper should have had forebodings when he 
wrote to John Adams, April 3, 1777: "Manly and McNeal do not agree. It is 
not, I believe, the Fault of the first . . . If they are not better 
united, infinite Damage may acrue." (Adams MSS.) Another of Adams's 
correspondents, Dr. William Gordon, wrote to him June 5: "The frigates 
have been sailed about a fortnight. Maritime affairs have been most 
horridly managed. We have beaten G. B. in dilatoriness & blunders. Where 
the fault hath lain I know not, but the credit of the Continent & Congress 
requires amendment." (Ibid.)

The squadron sailed from Boston May 21. Within six days the privateers had 
all parted from the frigates, some by choice, the others through bad 
weather. May 29 a brig was captured; she belonged to a fleet of transports 
under convoy of the Somerset, of sixty-four guns, and a frigate. "At break 
of day the 30th," says Captain McNeill, "we discover'd the Somersett and 
three large Ships under her Convoy. Capt. Manley was not convinced of the 
size of our Opponent untill she was within Shott of him, when very luckily 
for him the Hancock's Heels saved his Bacon. She nevertheless pursued him 
with great earnestness untill I tack'd upon her Convoy, who was a good way 
astern of her at that time. As soon as she saw me within random Shott of 
them, she left Capt. Manley & return'd to their protection; she then 
chac'd me about Six hours, but not being able to come up with me, she 
rejoin'd her Convoy just as night came on. Capt. Manley & myself then 
Steer'd to the Eastw'd and Northw'd in hopes of falling in with some 
others of the fleet, but saw no Enemy except a few miserable Fishermen 
untill Saturday June the Seventh, on the Morning of which day we fell in 
with the Fox, a British Frigate of 28 Guns Commanded by Capt. Patrick 
Fotheringham. She at first meant to Engage, but thought I was best to try 
her Heels, which would have effectually Saved her from me, but the Hancock 
coming up with her, an Action ensued which did not end untill after we 
came up, by which time the Hancock & the Fox were both very much damaged." 
(N.H. Geneal. Record, January, 1907 (McNeill to Marine Committee, July 16, 
1777) A seaman on the Boston says of the fight: "At 6 A.M. Capt. Manly & 
she Exchanged some guns and then she Run & we in full Chace after her ... 
Betwixt the hours of 12 & one P.M. Capt. Manly Began to Engage Broadside & 
Broadside, our ship coming up fast as Posable; at last up we came and gave 
them a Noble Broadside which made them to strike a medeatly a Bout half 
after one." (N. H. Geneal. Record, January, 1907 (McNeill to Marine 
Committee, July 16, 1777)

According to the British account the Hancock was sighted from the Fox at 
five o'clock in the morning and the Boston soon afterwards. Captain 
Fotheringham says that after a half-hour's action with the Hancock, "I 
could plainly see that the other Ship to Windward was of nearly the same 
Force as the one I was engaged with, which was of thirty-two guns." He 
then tried to escape, hoping to fall in with some friendly cruiser or to 
draw the American ships apart, "but notwithstanding all the Sail I could 
make, the Ship I had before engaged came up with me about Noon and engaged 
me very close till a Quarter after one, when the other Ship came up and 
raked me and carried away my Main Yard," and did other damage. At half-
past one the Fox would no longer answer her helm, and with one enemy on 
the bow and another on the quarter, she could not bring guns to bear on 
them. "I therefore at Quarter before two gave the Ship up in order to save 
my People." The Fox lost her lieutenant of marines and one man killed and 
ten wounded, two of them mortally; she was short of her full complement by 
thirty-three men (Brit. Adm. Rec., Courts Martial, No. 5309.) Admiral 
Montagu wrote from St. John's to Germain, June 11: "I was yesterday made 
very unhappy by a letter I received from Captain Fotheringham of his 
Majesty's ship Fox, acquainting me that he was taken the 7th instant by 
two American privateers on the banks, one called the Hancock of 32 guns 
and 347 men, the other of 28 guns called the Boston, full of men, the 
largest commanded by Manly, the other by McNeal." (Stopford-Sackville 
MSS., 69.)

Continuing his report of the cruise McNeill says: "The weather proving 
unfavourable for some time afterwards, we were severall days fitting the 
Fox & Capt. Manley his own Ship. I had sent my first Lieut. (Mr Browne) on 
board the Fox the day she was taken, but Captain Manley refused giving him 
the Command & I was finaly obliged to withdraw him for the sake of peace. 
I urged Capt. Manley to make the best of our way to Charlestown, South 
Carolina, there to Join Captain Biddle, fitt & clean our Ships, & then to 
Cruise for the West India Fleet untill towards the fall of the year, by 
which time our own Coast would probably be clear & we might return without 
any risque compared with what must be now Expected. He at first attended 
to my proposal, but afterwards did as he pleas'd; the event will prove 
whether I judge right or not. In short we loiter'd away three weeks or a 
Month before we sett our faces homeward, by which time the Coast of New 
England from Cape Sable as far as New York was so cover'd with cruisers 
that there was no escaping them.

"On Sunday the 6th of July, being 15 leagues to the Eastwd of Cape Sable, 
we took a Sloop from Louisburgh bound for Halifax, but delaying some time 
with her, we were chac'd towards evening by three Ships. We also being 
three, we did not make any efforts to avoid those Ships in Course of the 
night; on the Contrary Capt. Manley Tow'd the Sloop before spoken of 
untill next morning, by which time one of the Ships was a head of us and 
Tack'd upon us, the Second Ship, which was a two decker, was on our Lee 
quarter about three Leagues from us, and the third Ship about as far right 
a Stern. Capt. Manley then thought proper to sett fire to the Sloop & 
quitted her and endeavour'd to make the best of our way, but the first 
Ship being up within Shott about noon, we exchanged some Shott with her at 
a distance & then having spoke Capt. Manley, we agreed to tack and Engage 
her. We immediately Tack'd and Capt. Manley begun the Action with his head 
to the Northward & the Enemy on the opposite Tack, we being close under 
the Hancock's Stem, also fell in with the Enemy in our turn and Exchanged 
about five broad Sides with her. Her Shott was so well aim'd that some of 
them pass'd through our Ship under the wale, so that we could not Tack 
upon the Enemy untill we had stop'd those holes; this was however done in 
a few Minutes, but not before the two deck Ship had goten very near us. 
Unfortunately the Fox did not tack at the same time we did, by which means 
the Enemy got between her and us and she was obliged to pass under the 
fire of the first Ship above mention'd and the fire of the two deck Ship 
also. Capt. Manley seeing that the Fox was beyond Saveing, put about and 
stood to the Southd, the Fox bore away and run to the Eastwd, and we kept 
the Wind to the Northwd. The two deck Ship then put about and follow'd the 
Hancock, leaving the Fox and me to the other two Ships. The Fox fled and 
defended herself bravely, haveing also some advantage in point of Sailing; 
we were constrain'd to keep the Wind for our own Security, being neither 
able to run from nor fight such force as then appear'd to Leward." (N. H. 
Geneal. Rec., January, 1907.)

The vessel described by McNeill as a two-decker was the British forty-four-
gun ship Rainbow, Commodore Collier, and she was accompanied by the ten-
gun brig Victor. The third vessel, which appeared about the same time, was 
the frigate Flora of thirty-two guns. Collier says in his report that July 
6, in the afternoon, being twelve leagues southwest of Cape Sambro, he 
first sighted the American squadron. Night came on, and the next morning 
the American ships, with a sloop in company, were five or six miles 
distant. They set fire to the sloop and at six o'clock another sail was 
observed "standing towards the rebel ships." This vessel was thought to be 
an American also and trying to join the others. "About Ten in the Morning 
the Enemy's Ships went away lasking, and Three Quarters of an Hour 
afterwards I was surprized to see several Shot exchanged between the 
sternmost of them and the Stranger who had last joined and whom I had 
hitherto looked upon as another of their Fleet. I then hoisted my Colours, 
shortly after which the two sternmost of the Rebel Frigates hawled their 
Wind, whilst the headmost kept away about two Points from it. This brought 
the English Ship (which I afterwards found was the Flora) more abreast of 
them, who passed to Windward, exchanging a Broadside with each and 
pursuing the Fugitive, who from the Alteration two or three Times of her 
Course, seemed uncertain which to steer. The Flora gained fast upon her, 
which she perceiving, hawled her Wind again and soon afterwards tacked and 
stood after her Comrades, exchanging a Broadside with the Flora as they 
passed each other. I was just putting about after the two Ships when I 
observed this Manoeuvre of the Rebel Frigate, which made me stand on 
something longer before I tacked, hoping to get her within Reach of my 
Guns as she passed us. I accordingly did so, but had not the good Fortune 
to bring down either a Mast or Sail by my Fire. I tacked immediately after 
her and soon afterwards saw the headmost Rebel Frigate put about; she 
passed me just out of Gunshot to Windward and appeared a very fine Ship of 
34 Guns with Rebel Colours flying. One of the Gentlemen of my Quarter Deck 
had been a Prisoner lately at Boston and knew her to be the Hancock, on 
board of whom Manley commanded, the Sea Officer in whom the Congress place 
great Confidence and who is the Second in Rank in their Navy. The Ship I 
had fired upon I found outsailed me and soon after my tacking, went away 
lasking; whilst the other Frigate kept her wind. I then saw with Concern 
that one of the three must unavoidably escape, if they thus steered 
different Courses. I therefore judged it best to put about and follow the 
Hancock, which appeared the largest Ship. Whilst I was in Stays the Flora 
passed me very near, in Pursuit of the Ship I had fired upon. It was about 
Two o'Clock in the Afternoon of Monday the 7th of July that I tacked after 
Manley, who seemed at first rather to outsail the Rainbow, but I 
understood afterwards that to endeavour making his Ship sail better, he 
started all his Water forward and by that Means put her out of Trim. An 
Hour before the Close of Day he altered his Course and kept away large; 
however, we got so near to him before dark as enabled us by Means of a 
Night-glass to keep Sight of him all Night. At Dawn of Day she was not 
much more than a Mile ahead of me, soon after which we saw a small Sail to 
Leeward which we found to be the Victor Brig, who as we passed fired at 
the Rebel Frigate and killed one of the Men at the Wheel, but was not able 
from bad sailing to keep up or come near any more. About Four in the 
Morning I began firing the Bow chace upon her, with occasional Broadsides 
loaded with Round and Grape, as I could bring them to bear, some of which 
struck her Masts and Sails. Half an Hour past Eight I was so near as to 
hail her and let them know that if they expected Quarter, they must strike 
immediately. Manley took a few Minutes to consider and a fresher Breeze 
just then springing up, he availed himself of it by attempting to set some 
of the Steering Sails on the other Side. I therefore fired into him, upon 
which he struck the Rebel Colours to His Majesty's Ship, after a Chace of 
upwards of 39 Hours." (London Chronicle, August 26, 1777.)

To make the story more complete we may quote from the report of Captain 
Brisbane of the Flora. "On the 7th Instant at day break, Cape Sable 
bearing N. N. E. about fourteen Leagues, we discovered three Sail of Ships 
and a Sloop on our weather Quarter and a Sail on our Lee Quarter, standing 
to the Westward on the same Tack the Flora was. I thought it my duty to 
see what they were, tacked and stood towards them, upon which the Sloop, 
that was towed by the headmost ship, was cast off and set on fire. We 
passed within point blank shot to leeward of the three Ships, hoisted our 
Colours and fired a Shot at the headmost to show theirs, which they paid 
no attention to, fired a second at the Sternmost, stood on and as soon as 
we could fetch their wake, tacked and followed them.

At 9 A.M., Upon their finding that we weathered and came up with them, 
they formed a line ahead, hoisted Continental Colours, and began firing 
their Stern Chace. At 10 the two sternmost Ships shortened Sail, tacked 
and came close under our lee Quarter. Exchanging Broadsides as we passed 
each other, we stood on to the Ship who had not tacked, gave her our fire 
which she returned; she attempted to stay, missed and wore, which gave us 
an opportunity of raking her. We then wore and gave chace after her, the 
two other Ships being at this time close upon a Wind on different tacks. 
During this transaction we run considerably to leeward, which gave the 
Ship on our lee Quarter an opportunity of joining us fast, and upon her 
being abreast of our Chace, she tacked and proved to be His Majesty's Ship 
the Rainbow. She fired several well pointed Shot at the Chace, one of the 
Enemy soon afterwards tacked and stood to the South West, the Rainbow 
tacked and followed her; we continued standing to the northward after the 
Chace, who, upon the Rainbow's tacking, kept away more from the wind and 
set steering Sails and soon afterward began firing her Stern Chace at us. 
At 6 P.M. we came up close to her, upon which she struck her Colours and 
proved to be his Majesty's Ship the Fox, that had been taken a month 
before that by the Hancock and Boston, Continental Ships, on the Banks of 
Newfoundland. The Ship that we afterwards learned to be the Boston was, at 
the time the Fox struck, as far to windward as we could but discover the 
head of her Topsails out of the Water." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, 
August 28,1777, No. 2.)

The British took their prizes into Halifax. In his report Collier says the 
Hancock had two hundred and twenty-nine men on board, her complement being 
two hundred and ninety; and according to a letter of his to Germain, she 
carried thirty-two guns, chiefly twelve-pounders, and was "said to be the 
largest and fastest sailing frigate ever built . . . Manly seem'd filled 
with rage and grief at finding he had so easily surrendered to a ship of 
only 44 guns, believing all along that it was the Raisonable, of 64 guns, 
who was chasing him." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 69, 70; London Chronicle, 
August 26, 1777; Boston Gazette, July 28, August 11, 18, 1777;Almon, v, 
262; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, August 28, 1777, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, Captains' Letters, No. 1611.2 (Collier to Stephens, July 12, 1777), 
Captains' Logs, Nos. 360, 762 (logs of Flora and Rainbow). No report by 
Captain Manley appears to be accessible.) The Hancock appears to have been 
one of the very best and fastest of the Continental frigates, and if 
Manley had not made the mistake of altering her trim in the vain attempt 
to improve her speed, he might have escaped from the Rainbow. Failing in 
this, he should have made a spirited resistance, in which, by some lucky 
accident, he might possibly have succeeded in reversing the result; or by 
crippling his adversary, have been able to escape. Manley's record in the 
naval service up to this time had been excellent and his reputation was 
high among friends and foes. Collier, in his letter to Germain, says of 
him: "We have all long wished to get this man into our possession, from 
his talents and intrepidity, and fortunate it is that we have clone so, as 
he was beginning to shew the Americans what they had not been accustomed 
to, the seeing of one of his Majesty's ships in their possession, for he 
had just taken the Fox of 28 guns . . . Every body here is overjoyed at 
the capture of Mr. Manly, esteeming him more capable of doing mischief to 
the King's subjects than General Lee was." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 70. 
General Charles Lee had been taken prisoner by the British several months 
before.) Manley rendered very efficient service also in the later years of 
the war, but on this occasion he failed to stand the test. He should not 
have feared to exchange a few shots, even in the belief that he was 
engaging the Raisonable, and would then soon have discovered that he had 
only a forty-four to deal with. We shall see that a few months later his 
fellow-officer, Captain Biddle, was not afraid to engage a sixty-four, 
with no thought, apparently, of striking his flag before the last 
extremity. Manley was sent a prisoner to New York, where he remained many 
months. The loss of the Hancock was almost a calamity. She was taken into 
the British service under the name of the Iris and fought only too 
effectually against her old companions in the Continental navy.

Meanwhile the Boston escaped and found her way to Wiscasset. In his report 
to the Marine Committee, which was dated at that place July 16, Captain 
McNeill relates his proceedings since losing sight of his consorts on the 
7th: "In a few hours we saw two more of the Enemy about two points on our 
weather bow; from these we were obliged to tack to the Southwd . . . After 
Standing two hours to the Southwd we espied another Ship bearing S. W. of 
us, who appeared to be in chace towards us. I then hove about to the 
Northwd again & stood on untill Nine o'Clock the Evening; the chace coming 
down upon us very fast all the time. As soon as the Moon was down I tack'd 
and Stood to the Southwd and in less than an hour saw the Lights of the 
Chacing Ship Standing athwart our Stern about 3/4 of a Mile from us. On 
Tuesday Morning the 8th Current I saw five Sail of the Enemy to the Leward 
of me, three on the Lee bow and two on the Lee Quarter, at the same time 
saw Cape Sable bearing N.N.E., five leagues. The Wind coming to the 
Southwd I stood across the Bay of Fundy, determin'd to Shelter myself in 
the first port I could make and get intellegence, which happened to be 
this river where I arriv'd on Thursday the 10th Instant. On my arrival 
here I found that the Milford Frigate had been in about fourteen days past 
& that she had penetrated up as far as we now are, Namely at Wichcasset 
point. There is scarce a day, but one or two of the Enemys Ships are Seen 
off the Mouth of this river and the Coasting Vessells are very much 
distress'd. In this my present Situation I am much at a Loss what to do, 
my Ship's Company are so diminished by Manning the Fox & the Men otherwise 
Lost since we Sail'd from Boston; my Ship is very Fowl . . . and besides 
that, we cannot make her Sail fast, trim which way we will . . . We have 
certain Accounts of twelve Sail of the Enemys Cruisers between Cape Ann & 
Cape Sable, severall of whom are large Ships." (N. H. Geneal. Rec., 
January, 1907.) Perhaps the size of the British fleet cruising in eastern 
waters was magnified in McNeill's imagination. In due time he brought his 
ship back to Boston, where his reception was not cordial. He was severely 
blamed for not having come to the Hancock's rescue and was held by public 
opinion in large degree responsible for the loss of that ship. He was 
tried by court-martial and suspended (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 109 (November 
12,1777); Adams MSS., October 9, 1777, McNeill to John Adams, complaining 
of conditions in the navy.)

At Charleston, where the Randolph had put in for repairs after being 
dismasted, Captain Biddle received orders from the Marine Committee, dated 
April 26 and 29, to cruise in the West Indies and later attempt to 
intercept a British fleet of merchantmen which was expected to leave 
Jamaica under convoy about July 26. In the first of these orders, April 
26, the Committee wrote: "Your letter of the 14th instant is the only one 
we have received since the misfortune of carrying away your Masts or 
indeed since you left the Capes of Delaware, so that we are strangers to 
the cause and manner of that unfortunate accident . . . We observe with 
infinite concern that your people have been and remain Sickly'; this has 
happened in so many of our Ships that we cannot help atributing it to some 
cause that may with proper care & attention be removed. You should 
therefore insist that your Officers do frequently see the Ship thoroughly 
and perfectly cleansed, aloft and below from Stem to Stern, burn Powder 
and wash with vinigar betwixt Decks, order Hammocks, all bedding and bed 
Cloths and Body Cloaths daily into the quarters or to be aired on Deck, 
make the people keep their persons cleanly and use exercise, give them as 
frequent changes of wholesome food as you can, Fish when you can get it 
and fresh food in Port. Ventilate the Hold and between Decks constantly. 
In short, cleanliness, exercise, fresh air and wholesome food will restore 
or preserve health more than medicine and it is deserving the utmost 
attention of any or every officer to preserve the Health & Spirits of the 
men." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 73 (April 26, 1777)

The Marine Committee planned to collect as many vessels as possible to act 
in concert against the expected Jamaica fleet, in the hope of capturing a 
number of them. General orders dated April 29 were issued, addressed to 
the commanders of vessels designated to take part in the enterprise. They 
were to rendezvous at Abaco, one of the Bahama Islands, July 25, the 
senior captain was to take command as commodore, and they were to hold a 
council of war and decide upon the best cruising ground, the most 
effectual disposition of their ships, and a code of signals. "The 
Commodore or Council of war are empowered to order or do anything they may 
think necessary or essential to enable the Squadron to perform the 
intended Service, whether pointed out by the Committee or not." All 
information obtained regarding the Jamaica fleet must be reported to the 
commodore. "These things done, and the sooner they are accomplished the 
better, the Squadron must weigh and sail under the Signals and Orders of 
the Commodore to the appointed Station, which we suppose will be near the 
Havannah." While waiting for the Jamaica fleet the time should be spent in 
drill and repeating signals. "The men should be constantly exercised at 
the Guns, and infinite pains taken on board every Ship to sweeten the Air 
and keep not only the Ship clean but the Men so in their Cloathing and 
Persons. During this Cruize there is little doubt but Prizes will be taken 
by the Squadron before the Jamaica fleet appears and such may be sent into 
Georgia or Carolina, but in doing this care must be taken that no ship is 
much weakened by sending away their men in such Prizes. Should they be of 
little value it may probably be best to burn them and encourage the seamen 
found on board to enter our Service by offering them share of Prize Money 
to be taken, Pay and allowance equal to those already engaged, and 
assurance of good treatment." Inasmuch as "the main object of this 
enterprize appears the Jamaica Fleet, it must be the business of the 
Commodore to keep the Frigates together until he finds out the strength of 
the Convoy, and if it be such as he judges he can cope with, with a 
tolerable prospect of success, he is to make the proper disposition for 
attacking to the best advantage and engage their ships of war, whilst all 
the smaller vessels are employed in attacking and taking the Merchantmen. 
It must be remembered that the enemy generally send home for Convoy such 
of their Ships of war as have been long in the West Indies. They are 
frequently foul and ill manned, which are circumstances favourable for 
engaging them, even if they should appear of superior force. If you can 
but make Prizes of the Convoy or any part of them, we think it will then 
be in the power of the Squadron to take any number of the Merchantmen, and 
such as cannot be manned and brought into Port may be sunk or Burned. 
Should the Convoy consist of such or so many Ships as it would be folly or 
rashness to engage, the Squadron in that case had best to seperate and 
hover after the fleet; for as we have little doubt but most of our ships 
will outsail theirs, being cleaner, you may in this manner pick up a vast 
many of their Merchant ships, altho protected by Superior force." If after 
this service the squadron should be too distant from the seat of 
government to receive fresh orders, the Commodore must call a Council of 
war of all the Commanders, with him, and any enterprize or expedition 
planned by that Council, that has for its object the service of the United 
States of America, to distress or disable the enemies of these States or 
to Capture their Ships of war or Merchantmen, will meet our approbation & 
if executed with vigour, will merit the praise of all America. Our ships 
should never be Idle. The Navy is in its infancy and a few brilliant 
strokes at this Era would give it a Credit and importance that would 
induce seamen from all parts to seek the employ, for nothing is more 
evident than that America has the means and must in time become the first 
Maritime power in the world." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 78 (April 29,1777)

The Andrew Doria, Captain Isaiah Robinson, the sloop Surprise, Captain 
Benjamin Dunn, and the Fly, Captain Elisha Warner, were ordered in April 
to clear the Cape May channel of British ships, and a little later the 
Independence, Captain John Young, was instructed to warn vessels away from 
Chesapeake and Delaware Bays. In May the Andrew Doria and Surprise, 
together with the Columbus, Captain Hoysted Hacker, still blockaded in 
Narragansett Bay, were ordered to repair to the rendezvous at Abaco, where 
they were expected to meet the Randolph and cruise after the Jamaica 
fleet. This promising and well conceived project seems never to have been 
carried out or even entered upon, presumably because a sufficient number 
of vessels, especially frigates, could not be brought together (Mar. Com. 
Letter Book, 68, 69 (April 18, 1777), 73 (April 26, 1777), 77, 78 (April 
29, 1777), 86, 88 (May 2, 1777), 90 (May 13, 1777), 91 (May 16, 1777)

The Randolph sailed some time during the summer and early in September was 
off Charleston. Biddle reported: "I have the Pleasure to acquaint You that 
on the fourth of Sept. 30 Leags. S. E. of Charles Town Barr I met with and 
took, after a little Resistance, the True Britain, Thomas Venture Master, 
of twenty six-pounders and seventy-four Men, the Brig Charming Peggy, 
Capt. Lyon, both Laden with Rum for the British Army and Navy and bound 
from Jamaica to New York, The Ship Severn, Capt. Henderson, of eight four-
pounders, who had been taken by an American Cruizer on His passage from 
Jamaica to London And Retaken by the True Britain, Also a French Brig 
laden with salt going from the West Indies for Charles Town, Which Capt. 
Venture had made Prize of. There was a small Sloop in Company with those 
Vessels that made Her escape, the Weather being Squally, whilst I was 
Manning the Rest. I Arrived Safe here with my Prize the 7th inst. I have 
not laid Claim to Salvadge for the French Brig, as I thought it would be 
most agreeable to Congress to give her up. . . The Randolph's Bottom is 
very foul, having lain in this Port the three worst Months in the Year 
since We Cleared; And Being apprehensive that the Worms will Ruin Her 
Bottom unless they are soon destroyed, I have thought Proper and am 
preparing to heave Her down. I shall be as expeditious as possible and 
hope to be Ready to execute any Orders You may Please to send by the 
Return of the Express. I cannot omit telling You that My Officers have on 
every Occasion given me the greatest Satisfaction. Two better Officers are 
not met in the Service than Barnes and Mcdougall, My first and second 
Leiuts. And the Men I took from here behaved exceeding well." (Pap. Cont. 
Congr., 78, 2, 241 (Biddle to Morris, September 12, 1777) The Marine 
Committee issued orders to Biddle, dated October 24, to proceed to France 
as soon as his ship could be made ready for the voyage. Upon his arrival 
there he was to report to the American Commissioners and await their 
directions, in the mean time making a short cruise in European waters, if 
it should seem advisable (lbid., 237, 241; Mar. Cont. Letter Book, 105 
(October 24,1777); Port Folio, October, 1809.)

Captain Thomas Thompson, of the frigate Raleigh at Portsmouth, received 
instructions, dated April 29, to cruise against vessels bound to New York 
until June, but if he could not obtain suitable guns for his ship he was 
to proceed directly to France for them; in July he was to open sealed 
orders. As late as May 22, according to information furnished to Admiral 
Howe, the Raleigh had only six or eight of her thirty-two guns mounted. At 
this time there were at Portsmouth, besides the frigate, the Ranger and 
three or four large privateers. The keel of the America of seventy-four 
guns had just been laid. It was nearly the middle of August when the 
Raleigh went to sea and set sail for France. Probably she had received her 
guns by that time and her voyage was in the service of Congress and the 
American Commissioners at Paris. She was accompanied by the Alfred, 
Captain Hinman, who had also received sailing orders in April, which 
directed him after cruising in the Atlantic to return to Boston for fresh 
instructions (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 70, 81, 84 (April 23, 29, 1777), 92 
(June 1, 1777), 102 (September 6, 1777); Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 487, June 
29, 1777, No. 10; Remick, 216 (list of Raleigh's crew); N. R. Geneal. 
Rec., April, July, October, 1905.)

The third day after sailing for France a small schooner from New York was 
taken by the Raleigh, on board of which Captain Thompson found "275 
Spanish milled dollars, 137 counterfeited bills of 30 dollars each, in 
imitation of the bills emitted by Congress May the 10th, 1775, and 40 
counterfeited bills of seven dollars each, imitating the Massachusetts 
sword-in-hand money; the whole making 4390 dollars which I shall commit to 
the flames after preserving samples. The schooner being of little value we 
burnt her." The most important events of the passage are told in 
Thompson's report, dated at sea September 28, 1777, in latitude 49° 35' 
north, Iongitude 13° 13' west: "At daylight Sept. 2 we took a snow called 
the Nancy . . . being part of the Windward Island fleet, which had 
outsailed her the day before. Having by this capture discovered the 
situation of the fleet and found that they were convoyed by the Camel, 
Druid, Weazel and Grass. hopper ships of war, the former a very large, 
lofty ship, carrying twenty-two 12-pounders . . . we made sail in quest of 
the fleet and next morning discovered them from the mast head. At sun-set 
we were near enough to distinguish the leading ship as well as their 
number, which was sixty sail, bearing East by North; the wind being then 
west, I made a signal as being one of the fleet left astern, for I had 
possessed myself of the signal from the prize. I hailed Capt. Hinman and 
told him my intention was to run into the fleet in the morning and attack 
the convoy, which I thought we were able to destroy; I therefore ordered 
him to keep close under the Raleigh's stern until we come alongside the 
Commodore, which ship we would both attack. Unluckily in the night the 
wind shifted to North; the fleet then hauled up close to the wind, which 
brought us to leeward; in the morning it came to blow fresh. At daylight 
we saw the body of the fleet bearing about N.E. at two or three leagues 
distance, steering East North East. We made sail and the Raleigh soon 
fetched up to the fleet under double reefed topsails, but the Alfred, 
being tender-sided, could not carry sail and therefore fell a great way to 
leeward and astern. I could not take in any sail for fear of being 
discovered to be a strange ship; we therefore kept our sails shaking in 
the wind, thinking the Alfred might come up, but Capt. Hinman made signal 
that his ship was overpressed with sail. Seeing no chance of his coming up 
and being fearful of being discovered, I determined to make sail and stand 
into the fleet and take my chance alone. While we were laying to, most of 
the merchant ships had got ahead into the fleet; however, I hauled in and 
passed a few of them and desired them to go under the Commodore's stern. 
By this they took us to be some British frigate which had joined the 
fleet. I stood on close to the wind, making for one of the ships of war 
which was to the windward of all the fleet, repeating the Commodore's 
signals. Our ports were down and our guns housed and we shot up alongside 
within pistol shot; then we up sails, out guns, hoisted Continental 
colours and bid them strike to the Thirteen United States. Sudden surprize 
threw them into confusion and their sails flew all aback, upon which we 
complimented them with a gun for each State, a whole broadside into their 
hull . . . Our second broadside was aimed at their rigging, which had its 
desired effect . . . In about a quarter of an hour all hands quitted 
quarters on board the British man of war, we cleared her decks totally; 
not a man was seen nor a gun fired on board her for twenty minutes before 
we left her. She lay like a log alongside of us entirely at the mercy of 
our shot, which flew very thick; we fired twelve broadsides, besides a 
constant fire from our musquetry. We were alongside of her forty-five 
minutes; when we left her she seemed to be water logged and in a most 
shattered condition. During this little engagement my officers and men 
behaved with the greatest fortitude and resolution, particularly the green 
hands . . . My intention was to sink the enemy's ship, if I could not 
bring her off, and I should have effectually sunk her in a few minutes 
more, could we have staid. Our firing had thrown the fleet into confusion. 
A squall prevented them from seeing us at first; when it cleared up, one 
was running one way and one another, some upon the wind and some before 
it. Their Commodore and the other ships of force tacked and stood right 
for us, but had not the wind favoured him and we drifted to leeward, he 
could not have fetched us and I should certainly have sunk the ship. 
However, I staid by her until he came pretty near, and we being in danger 
of being surrounded, I made sail and ran down to the Alfred, who was lying 
about four miles to the leeward . . . When we had got pretty near the 
Alfred, I took in top gallant sails and shortened sail to wait for the 
British Commodore, but he soon tacked and stood again into the fleet." 
(Almon, v, 403, 404.)

The vessel engaged by the Raleigh was the fourteen-gun sloop of war Druid. 
According to the report of Lieutenant Bourchier of the Druid, "on the 4th 
of September, in the latitude 40.33. N., longitude 50.17. W., at half past 
four in the evening, we discovered a strange sail on our larboard quarter, 
bearing West and steering for us. We were then (from the irregularity of 
the fleet) about five miles distant from the Camel, to windward, repeating 
the signal for the convoy to go under the Camel's stern and obliging those 
ships to bear down; the Weazle at a great distance to leeward and out of 
our sight. We cleared ship for action and turned all hands to quarters. At 
five o'clock she came within pistol shot, when I could plainly perceive 
her to be a rebel privateer mounting 38 or 40 guns, her decks and tops 
full of men. She hailed and desired us to strike to the honour of the 
Congress's colours, hoisted her ensign, and began to engage. The first 
broadside sent a shot through Captain Carteret's thigh bone and killed the 
master. I then took the command on the quarter deck and continued the 
action. At half past five she came close alongside and kept an irregular 
but very hot firing. At six she made sail ahead. I attempted to do the 
same and keep her broadside on, but the shattered condition of the rigging 
rendered the sails almost useless to the ship. As the head-sails only were 
of service, we edged away and kept her nearly on our bow till twenty 
minutes past six. She then had the wind abaft, sheared off, hauled down 
her colours, and made sail. I attempted to wear ship and rake her, but the 
rigging being entirely shot to pieces, could not bring her round. I then 
tried to make what sail I could and pursue the enemy, but found most of 
the masts and yards wounded . . . with four feet ten inches water in the 
bold. At half past seven we brought to, with our foresail and mizen on our 
larboard tack, to plug the shot holes between wind and water, clear the 
wreck and pump the ship out. I then perceived another rebel privateer 
laying to, bearing S.S.W. six or seven miles off, and by her appearance I 
suppose she mounted about 20 guns. The Camel was then in chace about two 
or three miles distant; soon after, the Weazle spoke to us and gave chace 
also." (Almon, v, 402.)

Conditions on board the Camel, the British commodore's ship, are set forth 
in her log. "Fresh Breezes & Squally Wr. At 1 P.M. fired 2 guns & made the 
Signal for the fleet to come under our Stern; the headmost Vessels paying 
no attention to the Signal, Fired 3 Shott at them to bring them to. At 5 
fresh Breezes & Hazy Wr. Heard the report of a No. of Guns fired in the 
No. Wt. Quarter, which we imagined was an Action, from the unusual 
quickness of their Firing. Wore Ship with all possible speed & stood 
towards the report, when the Haze dispersing, we perceiv'd His Majesty's 
Sloop Druid in close engagement with a large Rebel Priva [teer] of 36 
Guns, which she Beat off & upon perceiving us to be in chase of her, made 
off under all the Sail she could possibly Croud, as did another Rebel 
privateer which lay to Leeward of Her. Continued in Chase of them till 
Night, when we lost sight both of them & the Convoy." (Brit. Adm. Rec., 
Captains' Logs, No. 156 (log of the Camel); also No. 4172 (log of the 
Druid)

The Raleigh's loss was one killed and two wounded. The Druid had six 
killed and twenty-six wounded, of whom five, including the captain, died 
of their wounds. The Raleigh and Alfred followed the fleet several days, 
but without again exchanging shots with the enemy. Thompson says: "We have 
since challenged him for three days successively to come out of his fleet 
and engage us, but he declines the challenge. Himself and the other armed 
ships keep close together a little astern of the fleet and fine weather 
favours them; we wait for a storm and then, if any advantage offers, 
intend to make the best use of it, but we must not venture among them as 
they are now prepared, neither can we trust to the Alfred's sailing. Had 
she been a stiff ship and sailed equally well with the Raleigh, we should 
in all probability have destroyed the convoy and dispersed the whole 
fleet, badly manned as we are, having only 180 men, chiefly green hands. I 
cannot trust to working the ship were I to go into the fleet, but if the 
enemy will attack where we have room, we are able to defend ourselves or 
destroy them. I could at first have cut off several of the merchantmen, 
but must by that means have been discovered and thereby have lost our 
chance at the King's ships; and I am determined never to wax against 
merchantmen where I have an opportunity of waxing against the King. I 
should have preferred sinking that ship to the richest capture in the 
fleet." These excuses seem inadequate. John Paul Jones found the Alfred 
capable of giving excellent service. If Thompson had been an enterprising 
officer, it is difficult to believe that he would have allowed this rich 
fleet to get away without leaving a single prize in his hands. As to 
warring against merchantmen, American commanders had express orders to 
pursue fleets under convoy and make as many captures as possible. The 
ships and cargoes were needed by the impoverished Continental government, 
and every blow struck at the enemy's commerce helped a little to turn the 
scale in this closely contested war. In due time the Raleigh and Alfred 
arrived in France; also the sloop Independence, Captain Young, which had 
been sent out with dispatches (Almon, v, 401-405; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 
99 (to Captain Young, July 5, 1777)

Early in the year 1777 the sloop Revenge, American privateer of ten guns, 
Captain Joseph Sheffield, cruising to the windward of Barbadoes, is 
reported to have fought four hours with two British ships, each carrying 
fourteen guns, and to have captured one of them. The ship Thomas, a prize 
of the Revenge and presumably this same one, was recaptured by the sloop 
of war Unicorn while running into Newport, not knowing it was occupied by 
the British (Boston Gazette, February 24, 1777; London Chronicle, May 3, 
1777; William's Liverpool Privateers, 195-198.) The report came from New 
York, March 24, that within two months the British men-of-war stationed 
about Chesapeake and Delaware Bays had taken seventy American ships and 
privateers (London Chronicle, May 10, 1777.) The frigate Pearl fell in 
with the privateers Teaser, 18, and Resolution, 14, with a convoy of three 
merchantmen. An engagement of an hour and a half followed, when a gun on 
the Resolution burst and she struck. The Pearl also took two of the 
merchantmen, but the other and the Teaser escaped (Ibid, June 10, 1777.)

The British naval schooner Prince William, of eight guns, was captured, 
and her captain, writing from Boston Prison, May 13, says: "In my last I 
acquainted you of my success in taking American prizes, but my fortune now 
is quite the reverse. On the 2d of this month, falling in with the Spy, an 
American privateer snow of 12 guns, my vessel was taken after an 
engagement of three glasses and brought into this port, where myself and 
crew are prisoners. Boston harbor swarms with privateers and their prizes; 
this is a great place of rendezvous with them. The privateersmen come on 
shore here full of money and enjoy themselves much after the same manner 
the English seamen at Portsmouth and Plymouth did in the late war; and by 
the best information I can get there are no less than fifteen foreign 
vessels lately arrived in the harbour with cargoes of various articles." 
(Almon, v, 173; London Chronicle, July 3, 1777.)

A letter from Nantucket, dated May 15, gives this account: "The 11th inst. 
Capt. Simpkins, commander of the Fortune, Provincial ship of war of 22 
guns, 4 cohorns, and 18 swivels, fell in with the English brig Boscawen, 
of 18 six-pounders, near this port, and after an engagement of upwards of 
an hour the latter was taken and carried for Boston. We saw the action, 
which was continued a considerable time very resolute by both parties and 
seemed to us rather doubtful. The Captain of the brig was wounded and the 
officer that was second in command was killed." (Almon, v, 174.)

On the 12th of July the ship Pole of Liverpool, in latitude 50° north, 
longitude 20° west, "fell in with the Tartar, a rebel privateer mounting 
20 nine-pounders on the main deck, 8 four-pounders on the quarter-deck and 
4 four-pounders on the forecastle, full of men, supposed two hundred at 
least . . . She bore down on the Pole under English colours, enquired from 
whence she came and whether she was a King's ship. Being answered in the 
affirmative, the captain gave orders to hoist the Thirteen Stripes and 
fire away, on which the engagement began and continued from five until 
about twenty minutes past eight, when the privateer sheered off. Captain 
Maddock [of the Pole] had two mates and a passenger wounded and supposes 
that near one half of the people belonging to the privateer must be killed 
or wounded, he having cleared their forecastle of men three different 
times and says he heard dreadful cries among them. The Pole had 16 six-
pounders and only forty people, passengers included." (Williams, 205 
(quoting a Liverpool paper). In Williams's list of Liverpool privateers 
(Appendix iv) the Pole is given 24 guns and 100 men.)

Many privateers cruised in the West Indies, and besides those that came 
out from the United States, some were fitted out at Martinique under 
American commanders, with French and Spanish crews and commissioned by the 
American naval and commercial agent, William Bingham. Prices rose in the 
British islands on account of the large amount of property taken by 
Americans. Admiral Young, commanding the British station in the Leeward 
Islands, reported the capture of many of these privateers (Almon, v, 141-
143, 168, 171, 198, 199; Boston Gazette, June 2, October 13, 1777; London 
Chronicle, April 22, August 5, 1777; Williams, 200, 201.) The privateer 
Revenge, Captain Isaac Freeborn, sailed from Martha's Vineyard for the 
West Indies December 9, 1777. "About ten Days after, we fell in with a 
Privateer Schooner, gave her a couple of Shot and she run. About 8 Days 
after, we fell in with and took the Ship York, from Glasgow bound to 
Barbadoes, laden with dry Goods, some Provisions, &c. which was sent into 
Martineco. About 4 Days after, fell in with a large English Ship of 18 
Guns, which was too much for us. We afterwards came across a fleet of 
about 100 Sail, to Windward of Barbadoes, but they being convoy'd by 5 
Frigates and it blowing a hard Gale, we could do nothing with them. We 
then bore away for Martineco, sprung our Mast and carried away our 
Topmast, but luckily got in and found our Prize safe." (Boston Gazette, 
March 9, 1778. For further accounts of privateering in 1777, see Coll. 
Essex Inst., July, 1890; Continental Journal, December 25, 1777; 
Connecticut Gazette, July 18, 1777; London Chronicle, March 18, April 10, 
1777; Pickering MSS., xvii, 50; Engagements by Sea and Land, 78, 79.)

Under orders issued March 14, 1777, by the Massachusetts Board of War the 
brigantines Tyrannicide, Captain Jonathan Haraden, and Massachusetts, 
Captain John Fisk, of the state navy, sailed together March 24 on a cruise 
to the coasts of Ireland, England, and France. The brigantine Freedom, 
Captain John Clouston, had already sailed March 8, under the same 
authority and for the same cruising ground. April 1, in longitude 15° 
west, Clouston reported having taken three prizes. He arrived at Paimboeuf 
May 1, having made twelve captures in all. April 2 the Massachusetts and 
Tyrannicide, in latitude 41° 30' north and longitude 45° west, took the 
ship Chaulkly, and April 8, ten degrees farther east, the Tyrannicide took 
the bark Lonsdale after a three hours' engagement, while the Massachusetts 
was chasing another vessel. Just two weeks after this, in about 48° north 
and 16° west, they "fell in with a fleet of 9 sail bound to the Westward, 
one of 60 & one of 14 Guns, British Ships of War, with 7 Transports from 
Plymouth for New York. Being a Fresh gale we could not bare down on them; 
however, finding one Brig to lay a stern, we took the liberty to take her 
under Convoy. She had on board 63 Troops, Hessens Chussers, with their 
accountrements compleat." (Mass. Arch., clii, 165.) The Massachusetts 
arrived at Nantes May 21, and Fisk reported: "I have not the pleasure to 
acquaint you that the Tyrannicide is here with me, but am sorry to 
acquaint you that on the seventeenth Instant at Nine in the Morning we 
gave chase to a Ship standing to the Eastward and came up fast. At three 
got within two miles of the ship, then saw three Sail in the N. E. bearing 
down to us; one of said Sail brought our chase too & hoisted English 
colours. I bore away and made sail from them; the Ship gave me chase. 
Capt. Haraden bore away also; the ship came up with us fast. At Nine at 
Night I haul'd my Wind; Capt. Haraden bore away before the wind. At half 
after nine, lost sight of Capt. Haraden and soon after, lost sight of the 
Ship. At ten, saw three flashes of Guns, which I suppose the Ship fired at 
Capt. Haraden and I am afraid the Ship took him, as I have not heard nor 
seen anything of him since." (lbid., 216.) Fisk had taken eight prizes 
since leaving Salem. He sailed for home in June, having on board four 
passengers, including General Pulaski. July 12, from a schooner Fisk 
learned of Haraden's safe arrival at Bilbao, after having been obliged to 
throw overboard guns and stores to escape the British ship. The 
Massachusetts arrived at Marblehead July 23, forty-four days from Nantes. 
The Freedom had arrived at Boston two weeks earlier; she had taken sixteen 
prizes, of which six had probably been retaken. The Tyrannicide came 
later, getting into Boston August 30 (Mass. Arch., cli, 415, 416, clii, 
134, 135, 144, 160, 165, 178, 182, 189, 216, 220, 230, 271, 292; Boston 
Gazette, June 2, 9, July 14, September 1, 1777; Continental Journal, June 
12, 1777; London Chronicle, May 3, 1777; Massachusetts Mag., April, 
October, 1908.)

In the Massachusetts Council, August 6, 1777, the following measure was 
adopted: "Whereas our Enemies have several small Cruisers upon this Coast, 
& even in Boston Bay, which have taken several of our Coasting Vessels & 
greatly Obstructed our Navigation; And as the Continental & State Vessels, 
as also most of the Private Vessels of War, are improper to be employed 
for Clearing the Coast of these Vermin, therefore Resolved, That the Board 
of War be & they hereby are directed, without Delay, to take such Measures 
for taking or destroying all such Cruisers as aforesaid, as they shall 
judge most proper." (Mass. Arch., Revolutionary Rolls, xliv, 268.) The day 
before, the Board of War had instructed Captain Fisk, who had returned 
from France two weeks before, to cruise in the track of homeward-bound 
West Indiamen and "to use your utmost Endeavours to take, burn, sink & 
destroy all armed and other Vessels, together with their Cargoes, 
belonging to the Subjects of the King of Great Britain, Enemies to the 
United States of America & the natural Rights of Mankind." (Mass. Arch., 
cli, 426.) Captain Fisk soon set sail again in the Massachusetts, and on 
the afternoon of August 19 "saw three sail to the Eastward. We gave chase 
[and] at 4 found them to be two Schooners and a Ship. We soon saw the two 
Schooners was attacking the Ship & after a few shot they fell a stern and 
the Ship tack'd & made sail for us. At 5 we came up to the Ship & found 
she wore British Colours; we gave her a Broadside [and] she struck to the 
American Arms." (lbid., clii, 271.) This was the ship Johnson, bound from 
Liverpool to New York, and the schooners were the privateers Speedwell and 
Active of Boston. August 31, in latitude 36° 28' north, longitude 51° 
west, the Massachusetts fell in with a vessel bound from St. Christopher 
to Belfast, which had sailed with a British fleet of a hundred and thirty 
sail under the convoy of four men-of-war. This was probably the same fleet 
that the Raleigh and Alfred fell in with a few days later. At this time 
Captain Fisk had three Massachusetts privateers cruising with him; they 
were the schooner Dolphin of Marblehead and the brigantines Hampden of 
Salem and Gloucester of Cape Ann. In October, Fisk reported the capture of 
two brigs (Mass. Arch., clii, 330, 362, 391; Massachusetts Mag., October, 
1908.)

The brigs Tyrannicide, Captain Haraden, Hazard, Captain Simeon Sampson, 
and Freedom, Captain Clouston, cruised during the fall. The Hazard had 
just been added to the Massachusetts navy. The brig Independence had been 
captured by the enemy in the spring; and in September or October the 
Freedom was taken by the British frigate Apollo, and Clouston was sent to 
the prison-ship Felicity at New York. Regulations for the government of 
the Massachusetts navy, based on those of the Continental navy, had been 
adopted in March (Mass. Arch., cli, 430, clii, 414, cliii, 2, 3, clvii, 
93, 103, 113; Mass. Court. Rec., March 21, 1777; Massachusetts Mag., 
April, July, 1908, January, April, 1909.)

The waters about Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were a favorite cruising 
ground, during the Revolution, for the armed ships and privateers of 
Massachusetts and other New England states, and many visits were paid to 
the Grand Banks and to the comparatively defenseless shores of those 
provinces. Admiral Montagu wrote from St. John's, June 11, 1777: "The 
American privateers have been very troublesome on the banks and have 
committed great depredations among the fishermen, notwithstanding I have 
dispatched the men-of-war as they arrived to the different parts of the 
fishing bank to cruize for their protection. It gives me great concern to 
be obliged to inform your Lordship that the privateers cruizing in these 
seas are greatly superior in number and size to the squadron under my 
command and without a large force is sent out to me, the bank fishery is 
at a stand." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 69 (Montagu to Germain). The 
"privateers" which most worried the admiral at this time were the frigates 
Hancock and Boston.) In August, Commodore Collier having learned of a 
projected expedition against Nova Scotia from Machias, sailed for that 
place with the Rainbow, 44, the frigates Blonde, 32, and Mermaid, 28, and 
the brig Hope, 18. An important object of the enterprise was to serve as a 
diversion in favor of General Burgoyne, then approaching Saratoga. 
Collier's squadron arrived in Machias Bay on the 13th and the frigates 
anchored, as there was not water enough for them to ascend the river. The 
Hope, however, was sent up, and a contemporary account says that her 
commander, Lieutenant "Dawson, kept under Way till he came opposite a 
Breastwork thrown up about half a Mile from the Town, garrisoned with only 
twelve Men, when he saluted it with a Broadside which was returned from a 
two-Pounder and two Swivels several Rounds, when Dawson sent his Boat to 
go ashore, but a few of our Men being in Ambush just where they were about 
to Land, as soon as they came within Musket-shot an Indian, who desired 
the first Shot, fired and kill'd the Man at the Bow Oar, when they 
immediately put back for the Brig. After which a Number of Boats with 
about 300 Marines and Mariners went ashore and burnt two Dwelling Houses, 
two Barns full of Hay and a Grist Mill. By this Time about 150 of the 
Militia had Mustered, who attack'd and drove the Enemy off; on seeing 
which, Dawson weigh'd Anchor and was endeavoring to get down, when he 
luckily ran a-ground and our People attacked him, with Small Arms only, so 
warmly as not a Man durst shew his Head above Deck till the above Boats 
came to tow him off, which our People beat off, having killed upwards of 
60 of the Enemy; and 'tis thought that if a very thick Fog had not arose, 
they would have near Kill'd all the Enemy, if not destroy'd Dawson. Our 
Loss was only one, Mr. James Foster, Killed, and Mr. Jonas Farnsworth 
Wounded, though not dangerous." (Boston Gazette, September 8, 1777.) The 
British reported a loss of three killed and eighteen wounded. The 
squadron, having accomplished little, got under way a few days later and 
sailed back to Halifax. Collier was much criticized for the failure of 
this expedition, which, according to General Massey, the commander at 
Halifax, "might have prevented the Misfortunes that attend'd Lt. Genl. 
Burgoyne's Army." Collier claimed a victory, saying that he took a fort 
and thwarted American designs against Nova Scotia (Almon, iv, 139, 140; 
Amer. Hist. Rev., x (October, 1904), 69; Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., April, 
1895; Proc. Cambridge Hist. Soc., v (1910), 70, 71; N. E. Magazine, 
August, 1895; Engagements by Sea and Land, 108; Hist. Man. Com., Amer. 
MSS. in Royal Inst., ii, 156, 209 (Massey to Howe, November 26, 1777, 
March 15, 1778)

General Howe took possession of Philadelphia September 26, 1777, and 
Admiral Howe, who had brought the British fleet around from the Head of 
Chesapeake Bay after landing the army, arrived in Delaware Bay October 4, 
an advance-squadron of his fleet having preceded him. The Americans, 
however, still held the defenses of the river, which prevented the British 
fleet from approaching the city and establishing the communications 
necessary for supplying the British army. These defenses consisted of 
forts, obstructions, and vessels. On a small island near the west bank of 
the river just below the month of the Schuylkill was situated Fort 
Mifflin, and opposite, at Redbank, New Jersey, was Fort Mercer, while 
three or four miles below this, at Billingsport, New Jersey, was another 
fort; and halfway between these last two was a battery. The obstructions 
were planted opposite this lower fort and also between Forts Mifflin and 
Mercer. They were heavy frames of timber or chevaux-de-frise sunk in the 
bottom of the river, from which projected beams sharpened and shod with 
iron, pointing downstream. Of the floating defenses the Continental navy 
furnished the new frigate Delaware, of twenty-four guns, and the Andrew 
Doria, Hornet, Wasp, Fly and Racehorse, with possibly the Mosquito and 
Sachem; also the xebecs Repulse and Champion. The Pennsylvania navy 
contributed to the cause its whole fleet: the ship Montgomery and over 
forty smaller craft, including galleys, armed boats, floating batteries, 
and fireships. The frigates Washington and Effingham were up the river, 
above Philadelphia, were still unfinished, and could be of no service. The 
combined Continental and state fleet was under the command of Commodore 
John Hazelwood, of the Pennsylvania navy. The British fleet engaged 
comprised two ships of sixty-four guns each, one of fifty guns, one forty-
four, two frigates, and a number of smaller vessels, including a ship 
which carried sixteen twenty-four-pounders. Howe's flagship, the Eagle, of 
sixty-four guns, remained below, opposite Chester.

Immediately upon occupying Philadelphia the British erected batteries 
along the river-front for the defense of the city. The frigate Delaware, 
Captain Alexander, and a number of smaller vessels promptly advanced and 
opened fire on the batteries before they were finished. The Delaware 
anchored within five hundred yards, and unfortunately, on the ebb tide, 
she got aground and was exposed to such a heavy fire from British field 
artillery that Alexander was induced to strike his flag and the frigate 
fell into the enemy's hands; by far the strongest American ship in the 
river was thus lost at the very outset. The advance-squadron of the 
British fleet, led by the Roebuck, 44, came up the river as far as the 
lower obstructions soon after October 1. On that day the fort at 
Billingsport, being weakly garrisoned, was abandoned by the Americans on 
the approach of a detachment of the enemy's army. Two days later the fort 
was taken possession of by the British under the fire of American galleys. 
Meanwhile the ships had been and continued to be attacked night and day by 
American fire-rafts and galleys and were forced to drop lower down the 
river. The log of the frigate Liverpool for October 1 says: "At 7 P.M. the 
Rebels sent a Large Fire Raft down the River to burn us & from their 
Gallies fir'd Several Shot at us; weigh'd & Dropt a Little lower Down & 
fir'd a number of Shot at their Gallies." The same log mentions nine fire-
rafts being sent down the river under cover of galleys on the night of 
October 14, and other logs note frequent instances. There seems to have 
been little difficulty in grappling these rafts from boats and towing them 
ashore. Beset with such impediments the British proceeded to remove the 
lower chevaux-de-frise and finally succeeded in cutting away a part of it, 
affording a passage for their largest ships. On October 15 this passage 
was made seventeen fathoms wide, and on the 19th the channel through the 
obstruction was buoyed.

By the 22d the fleet had warped through. Late on that day three battalions 
of Hessians under Colonel Donop assaulted Fort Mercer at Redbank, but were 
repulsed with heavy loss by the garrison of six hundred men under Colonel 
Christopher Greene; Donop was mortally wounded. The British attempted to 
aid this assault by sending some of their vessels up to bombard the fort. 
The Augusta, 64, the Roebuck, the frigates Pearl and Liverpool, the sloop 
of war Merlin, and a galley "work'd up the River in order to engage the 
Rebel Vessels and prevent their firing on our Troops, who appear'd to be 
much gall'd from the Enemies Shipping; 1/2 past 5 the Rebel Galleys &c. 
began firing on us, which was return'd by the Roebuck, Augusta & 
Cornwallis Galley." (Log of the Pearl.) The British ships were checked by 
the American fleet, which also greatly annoyed the Hessians during their 
advance and retreat. During the night the Augusta and Merlin got aground. 
Early the next morning, October 23, Fort Mifflin was attacked by the 
British fleet and by batteries thrown up on the Pennsylvania bank of the 
river. Aided very effectually by the American fleet, the fort made a 
successful resistance. About ten o'clock the Augusta took fire, in what 
way is not certainly known; she blew up about noon before all her crew 
could be saved. The Merlin was set on fire and was also destroyed. 
Commodore Hazelwood, in a report to the president of Pennsylvania, says: 
"On the 22d, about 4 o'clock, the attack was made on the Fort at red bank, 
in which a part of our Galleys was engaged in flanking the Enemy round the 
works and was of great use there; the rest of the Galleys and floating 
batteries were at Billingsport some time before. The ships that came was 
the Augusta, a new 64, the Roebuck, 44, two Frigates, the Merlin, 18 guns, 
and one Galley of a 32-pounder, all of which we drove down, and in going 
down the Augusta and Merlin ran aground below our upper chevaux de frise, 
which we discovered early in the morning of the 23d. I immediately hoisted 
the signal to engage them and soon after, the engagement became general. 
We had engaged our 12 galleys and the two floating batteries and all 
behaved extremely well; the rest of our Fleet could not be brought timely 
to act with us. We had against us the Augusta of 64, who had her broadside 
below and aloft constantly playing on us, with the Roebuck and two 
Frigates and their Galley; and had the Roebuck laid fast, she would have 
shared the same fate, but she was drove from her station before the 
Augusta got on fire." (Sparks MSS., 1, 108, 109 (October 29, 1777)

After this repulse the British erected more powerful batteries on the 
shore opposite Fort Mifflin and mounted on them heavy guns from the fleet. 
A second attack was made November 10. On the 15th the fleet came up for a 
general assault, and the armed ship Vigilant, mounting sixteen twenty-four-
pounders, was brought into the narrow western channel within a hundred 
yards of Fort Mifflin. This stronghold was nearly destroyed by the 
tremendous bombardment that now followed, and during the night was 
evacuated by the garrison, who passed over to Fort Mercer at Redbank. 
Commodore Hazelwood and his officers were criticized for inefficient naval 
support given to Fort Mifflin. Lack of cordial cooperation between the 
Continental and Pennsylvania forces and between army and navy was 
doubtless the cause. A few days later Fort Mercer was also evacuated. The 
American fleet was now left entirely without protection. Several of the 
galleys and smaller vessels of the Pennsylvania navy ran by the city in 
the night and escaped up the river. All the others were destroyed to 
prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy, who now completely 
controlled the bay (Dawson, ch. xxix, xxx; Clark, i, 55-60; Bradford, chs. 
xxv, xxviii-xxxvii; Almon, v, 426-430, 499-503; Annual Register, xx (1777),
133, 134, 137-139; Penn. Archives, II, i; Mag. Amer. Hist. March, 1878; 
United Service, September, 1890; Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., April, 1887, 
April, 1902; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, Nos. 157, 293, 548, 675, 
906, 931, 1100 (lop of the Camilla, Eagle, Liverpool, Pearl, Somerset, 
Strombolo, and Zebra), Masters' Logs, No. 1633 (log of the Camilla); 
Pickering MSS., v, 60. In Narr. and Crit. Hist., vi, ch. v, and in 
Bradford, are interesting maps.)

In December, David Bushnell made an unsuccessful attempt to destroy some 
of the British fleet in the Delaware by means of floating torpedoes. In 
his account of the affair Bushnell says: "I fixed several kegs under 
water, charged with powder to explode upon touching anything, as they 
floated along with the tide. I set them afloat in the Delaware, above the 
English shipping at Philadelphia, in December 1777. I was unacquainted 
with the river and obliged to depend upon a gentleman very imperfectly 
acquainted with that part of it, as I afterwards found. We went as near 
the shipping as we durst venture; I believe the darkness of the night 
greatly deceived him, as it did me. We set them adrift to fall with the 
ebb upon the shipping. Had we been within sixty rods I believe they must 
have fallen in with them immediately, as I designed; but as I afterwards 
found, they were set adrift much too far distant and did not arrive until 
after being detained some time by the frost. They advanced in the daytime 
in a dispersed situation and under great disadvantages. One of them blew 
up a boat with several persons in it, who imprudently handled it too 
freely and thus gave the British that alarm which brought on the battle of 
the Kegs." (Amer. Philosophical Transactions, iv, 303, quoted in Clark, i, 
71. See Barry, 60.) It was said that the British were apprehensive of 
further attempts of the same kind.

The Continental sloop Providence, Captain Rathburne, which had returned to 
New Bedford in August, set sail again in November and cruised off the 
coast of South Carolina. On a bright moonlight night a sail was seen and 
"in a few minutes," says Lieutenant Trevett, "she run under our lee 
quarter, gave us a broadside without any courtesy and run ahead of us. 
Capt. Rathbone ordered the boatswain to call all hands to quarters as 
still as he could and not use his call. The Privateer, as she proved to 
be, bore away and coming up again was soon alongside; we were all ready 
for them and as soon as they made the first flash, we gave them a yankee 
welcome with a handsome broadside. They up helm and ran to the eastward 
and not having a man hurt of any consequence, we made sail after them." 
The chase showed a lantern and we knew by their throwing out that signal 
that there was an enemy not far off and we fired no more cannon at her, 
but we continued the chase and found we gained on her every hour. Day 
appeared and the look-out man reported a large ship under the land . . . 
About sunrise we neared the Privateer so much that the Lieut. from the 
round house fired several times at us." His fire was returned, "as he made 
a fine mark to be shot at, standing on the round house. We had not fired 
more than three shot before we saw him fall and instantly the Privateer 
got in the wind, and we were alongside of her in a few minutes, when we 
boarded her and found it was her Lieutenant we had shot and he fell on the 
man steering at the wheel. He had a handsome brace of pistols at his side 
when he laid dead on deck. We found five men badly wounded on board; our 
shot went into one quarter and out through the other and she was badly 
shattered. The ship we saw to windward was a frigate and the officers of 
the privateer we captured were on board of her the day before and were to 
meet her next day off Charleston Bar. We got so far to the eastward that 
we stood for Georgetown." (R.I. Hist. Mag., April, 1886.) There the 
Providence remained until January.

Almost interminable delay seems to have been the universal experience in 
fitting out American men-of-war and enlisting their crews; and the Ranger 
at Portsmouth was no exception. Captain Jones frequently reported his ship 
in most respects ready for sea, but he says that with all his industry he 
could not get a single suit of sails completed until the 20th of October. 
He had perhaps less than the usual difficulty in enlisting men, and speaks 
of them as "an orderly and well disciplined crew . . . of one hundred and 
forty odd." (Jones MSS., to Morris, October 30, 1777. For a list of the 
crew, see Remick, 211.) He finally set sail for France November 1. On the 
voyage he took two prizes which he sent into Nantes and arrived there 
himself December 2. In his report to the Marine Committee he says: "I 
found the Ranger very Crank, owing to the improper quality of her Ballast 
and to her being rather over Masted, to remedy which I purpose to shorten 
her lower Masts and Ballast with lead." Her sailing "falls short of the 
general expectation for the Above reasons and on account of the foulness 
of her Bottom, which, except a partial cleaning in July, hath not been 
seen since she came off the Stocks." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 137 (Jones to 
Marine Committee, December 10, 1777)) Jones communicated at once with the 
American Commissioners, Franklin, Deane, and Lee, and forwarded the 
dispatches of the Secret Committee of Congress (Sands, 70, 71; Jones MSS., 
August 17, 24, October 30, 1777, letters to Morris and Hewes; Pap. Cont. 
Congr., 58, 133, 137, (December 5, 10, 1777, Jones to American 
Commissioners and to Marine Committee)

In 1777, Congress, through its Committee of Foreign Affairs, had begun to 
interest itself in the question of extending the activities of the navy 
into distant seas. The hopelessness of coping with the British navy was 
becoming more apparent, and visions of the wealth that might be secured 
from unprotected commerce appealed to the imagination. In December, 1777, 
the Committee of Foreign Affairs suggested to the American Commissioners 
in Paris that they send some of the Continental frigates from France to 
the Indian Ocean, with the hope of intercepting England's China trade. 
This project was considered impracticable by the Commissioners, who had, 
however, already advised and continued to urge an attack upon the British 
whale fishery off the coast of Brazil and in the Arctic Ocean. The whaling 
fleet was not only unprotected, but was manned by Americans, chiefly 
prisoners who had been given the choice of serving on these ships or on 
men-of-war. Notwithstanding these and other schemes, it does not appear 
that either public or private ships of war during the Revolution, with 
perhaps one or two unimportant exceptions, ever cruised farther from home 
than the West Indies and the coast of Europe (Wharton, ii, 325, 440, 673, 
818, iii, 385; Archives de la Marine, B1 87, 269.)