Naval History of the American Revolution - Chapters I-II



CHAPTER I
THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES, 1775

The Americans of the eighteenth century were notably a maritime people and 
no better sailors were to be found. The British colonies were close to the 
sea, and were distant from each other, scattered along a coast line of 
more than a thousand miles; so that, in the absence of good roads, 
intercommunication was almost altogether by water. The ocean trade also, 
chiefly with England and the West Indies, was extensive. Fishing was one 
of the most important industries, especially of the northeastern colonies, 
and the handling of small vessels on the Banks of Newfoundland at all 
seasons of the year trained large numbers of men in seamanship. The whale 
fishery likewise furnished an unsurpassed school for mariners.

A considerable proportion of the colonists, therefore, were at home upon 
the sea, and more than this they were to some extent practiced in maritime 
warfare. England, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was at 
war with various foreign nations a great part of the time, and almost from 
the beginning of the colonial period American privateers and letters of 
marque scoured the ocean in search of French or Spanish prizes. Large 
fleets were fitted out and manned by provincials for the expedition under 
Phips against Quebec in 1690 and for Pepperrell's successful descent upon 
Louisburg in 1745. Privateering during the French and Indian War of 1754 
furnished a profitable field for American enterprise and gave to many 
seamen an experience which proved of service twenty years later. Even in 
times of peace the prevalence of piracy necessitated vigilance, and nearly 
every merchantman was armed and prepared for resistance (See Weeden's 
Economic and Social History of New England, chs. v, ix, xiv, xvi; and 
Atlantic Monthly, September and October, 1861, for journal of Captain 
Norton of Newport, 1741. See Appendix I for authorities.)

It would seem, then, that American seamen at the opening of the Revolution 
had the training and experience which made them the best sort of raw 
material for an efficient naval force. The lack of true naval tradition, 
however, and of military discipline, and the poverty of the country, 
imposed limitations which, together with the overwhelming force of the 
enemy, seriously restricted the field of enterprise. Nevertheless, the 
patriotic cause was greatly aided and independence made possible by the 
activities of armed men afloat.

The navigation laws of Great Britain were naturally unpopular in the 
colonies, and their stricter enforcement after the peace of 1763, together 
with the imposition of new customs duties, led to almost universal efforts 
to evade them. In 1764 the British schooner St. John was fired upon by 
Rhode Islanders, and in 1769 the armed sloop Liberty, engaged in the 
suppression of smuggling, made herself so obnoxious to the people of 
Newport that they seized and burned her. In 1772 the schooner Gaspee, on 
similar duty, was stationed in Narragansett Bay and caused great annoyance 
by stopping and examining all vessels. The people were exasperated at the 
arrogant behavior of her commander, who in many cases exceeded his 
authority. On the 9th of June, as the Gaspee was chasing a vessel bound 
from Newport to Providence, she ran aground about seven miles from 
Providence; she was hard and fast and the tide was ebbing. After nightfall 
a party of men in boats descended the river from Providence and attacked 
the schooner. After a short contest, in which the commanding officer of 
the Gaspee was wounded, she was captured. The prisoners and everything of 
value having been removed, she was set on fire and in a few hours blew up. 
Little effort was made to conduct this affair secretly, and yet in spite 
of the diligent inquiry of a court of five commissioners, all of whom were 
in sympathy with the British ministry, no credible evidence could be 
adduced implicating any person; showing a practical unanimity of feeling 
in the colony (R. I. Colony Records, vi, 427-430, vii, 55-192; Bartlett's 
Destruction of the Gaspee; Staple's Destruction of the Gaspee; Channing's 
United States, iii, 124-127, 151.)

The first public service afloat, under Revolutionary authority, was 
perhaps the voyage of the schooner Quero, of Salem, Captain John Derby, 
despatched to England by the Massachusetts Provincial Congress with the 
news of the Battle of Lexington. She sailed April 29, 1775, some days 
later than General Gage's official despatches and arrived at her 
destination nearly two weeks ahead of them (Essex Institute Collections, 
January, 1900; Century Magazine, September, 1899.)

Early in May, 1775, the British sloop of war Falcon of sixteen guns, 
Captain John Linzee, seized two American sloops in Vineyard Sound; "on 
which the People fitted out two Vessels, went in Pursuit of them, retook 
and brought them both into a Harbour, and sent the Prisoners to Taunton 
Gaol." (New England Chronicle, May 18, 1775; American Archives, Series IV, 
ii, 608.)

The islands in Boston Harbor had long been used by the colonists for 
pasturage and were well stocked with cattle and sheep which the British 
troops in the town took measures to secure for their consumption. Soon 
after the battle of Lexington they succeeded in carrying off all the 
livestock on Governor's and Thompson's Islands. The Americans, May 27, 
with the intention of forestalling similar raids, landed between two and 
three hundred men on Hog Island who attempted to bring off the cattle and 
sheep, while a detachment of about thirty men crossed over to Noddle's 
Island (East Boston) for the same purpose, when "about a hundred Regulars 
landed upon the last mentioned and pursued our Men till they had got 
safely back to Hog Island; then the Regulars began to fire very briskly by 
Platoons upon our Men. In the mean time an armed Schooner with a Number of 
Barges came up to Hog Island to prevent our People's leaving said Island, 
which she could not effect; after that several Barges were towing her back 
to her Station, as there was little Wind and flood Tide. Our People put in 
a heavy Fire of small Arms upon the Barges, and two 3 Pounders coming up 
to our Assistance began to play upon them and soon obliged the Barges to 
quit her and to carry off her Crew; After which our people set Fire to 
her, although the Barges exerted themselves very vigorously to prevent it. 
She was burnt [the next day] upon the Way of Winisimet Ferry. We have not 
lost a single Life, although the Engagement was very warm from the armed 
Schooner (which mounted four 6 Pounders and 12 swivels), from an armed 
Sloop that lay within Reach of Small Arms, from one or two 12 Pounders 
upon Noddle's Island, and from the Barges which were all fixed with 
swivels." (Boston Gazette, June 5,1775.) The American loss was four 
wounded, one of whom died two days later; that of the British was said to 
be twenty killed and fifty wounded. The stock, amounting to over four 
hundred sheep, about thirty cattle and some horses, were brought away by 
the provincials. During the siege of Boston various other attempts, 
successful and unsuccessful, were made to bring away live stock from the 
islands of the harbor, thereby reducing the possible sources of food 
supply of the British shut up in the town (Sumner's History of East 
Boston, 367-389; Frothingham's Siege of Boston, 108, 109, 225; Green's 
Three Military Diaries, 86; Almon's Remembrancer, i, 112; Amer. Archives, 
IV, ii, 719; Boston Gazette, June 5, 1775; N. E. Chronicle, May 25, June 
15, July 27, October 5, 1775.)

Josiah Quincy in a letter to John Adams, dated September 22, 1775, 
proposed a plan for making the investment of Boston complete and so 
forcing the capitulation of the besieged British army. His proposal was to 
build five forts, three of them on Long Island, so placed as to command 
the channels of the harbor, including the narrows which were guarded by 
the enemy's men-of-war in Nantasket Roads; these ships could be driven out 
by the fire of the forts. He would then sink hulks in the narrows. No 
ships could thenceforth pass in or out and "both Seamen and Soldiers, if 
they don't escape by a timely Flight, must become Prisoners at 
Discretion." Quincy also thought that "Row Gallies must be our first mode 
of Defence by Sea." (Adams MSS.)

Near the eastern frontier of Maine, in a situation most exposed to British 
attack, lay the little seaport of Machias. The one staple of the town was 
lumber, and this the inhabitants exchanged at Boston for the various 
supplies they needed. In the spring of 1775 food was scarce, for the 
previous year's crops had failed. Consequently a petition, dated May 25, 
was sent to the General Court or Provincial Congress of Massachusetts at 
Watertown, begging for provisions and promising to send back lumber in 
return. News of the fight at Lexington and Concord had lately reached 
Machias and had stirred the patriotism of the people, who in spite of 
their isolated position, were in the main devoted to the provincial cause 
and had their committee of safety and correspondence. A committee of the 
General Court reported June 7 in favor of sending the provisions. 
Meanwhile Captain Ichabod Jones, a merchant engaged in trade with Machias, 
had proceeded from Boston to that place with two sloops, the Unity and the 
Polly, loaded with provisions and escorted by the armed schooner 
Margaretta under the command of Midshipman Moore of the British navy. They 
arrived June 2 and Jones took measures to procure a return cargo of lumber 
for the use of the British troops in Boston. As the only means of 
obtaining the much needed provisions it was voted in town meeting, 
notwithstanding the opposition of a large minority of staunch patriots, to 
allow Jones to take his lumber. He proceeded accordingly to distribute the 
provisions, but to those only who had voted in his favor. The patriots, 
under the lead of Benjamin Foster and Jeremiah O'Brien, were determined to 
prevent the shipping of the lumber to Boston. On Sunday, June 11, an 
unsuccessful attempt was made to capture Jones and the officers of the 
Margaretta while at church. They took the alarm and Jones fled to the 
woods, where he was taken some days later; the officers escaped to their 
vessel. Moore then threatened to bombard the town (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., 
vi (April, 1895), 124-130.)

"Upon this a party of our men went directly to stripping the sloop [Unity] 
that lay at the wharf and another party went off to take possession of the 
other sloop which lay below & brought her up nigh a wharf & anchored in 
the stream. The Tender [Margaretta] did not fire, but weighed her anchors 
as privately as possible and in the dusk of the evening fell down & came 
to within musket shot of the sloop, which obliged our people to slip their 
cable & run the sloop aground. In the meantime a considerable number of 
our people went down in boats & canoes, lined the shore directly opposite 
to the Tender, & having demanded her to surrender to America, received for 
answer, 'fire & be damn'd'; they immediately fired in upon her, which she 
returned and a smart engagement ensued. The Tender at last slipped her 
cable & fell down to a small sloop commanded by Capt. Tobey & lashed 
herself to her for the remainder of the night. In the morning of the 12th 
she took Capt. Tobey out of his vessel for a pilot & made all the sail 
they could to get off, as the wind & tide favored; but having carried away 
her main boom and meeting with a sloop from the Bay of Fundy, they came 
to, robbed the sloop of her boom & gaff, took almost all her provisions 
together with Mr. Robert Avery of Norwich in Connecticut, and proceeded on 
their voyage. Our people, seeing her go off in the morning, determined to 
follow her.

"About forty men armed with guns, swords, axes & pitch forks went in Capt. 
Jones's sloop under the command of Capt. Jeremiah O'Brien; about twenty, 
armed in the same manner & under the command of Capt. Benj. Foster, went 
in a small schooner. During the chase our people built them breastworks of 
pine boards and anything they could find in the vessels that would screen 
them from the enemy's fire. The Tender, upon the first appearance of our 
people, cut her boats from her stern & made all the sail she could, but 
being a very dull sailor they soon came up with her and a most obstinate 
engagement ensued, both sides being determined to conquer or die; but the 
Tender was obliged to yield, her Capt. was wounded in the breast with two 
balls, of which wounds he died next morning. Poor Mr. Avery was killed and 
one of the marines, and five wounded. Only one of our men was killed and 
six wounded, one of which is since dead of his wounds. The battle was 
fought at the entrance of our harbour & lasted for near the space of one 
hour. We have in our possession four double fortifyed three pounders & 
fourteen swivels and a number of small arms, which we took with the 
Tender, besides a very small quantity of ammunition." (Coll. Maine Hist. 
Soc., vi, 130, 131 (report of Machias Committee of Correspondence, June 
14, 1775). Foster's schooner is said to have run aground and to have taken 
no part in the battle. The Unity returned to Machias with the Margaretta 
as her prize. O'Brien's five brothers were with him in this enterprise 
(Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., 1847, January, 1891, April, 1895; New England 
Magazine, August, 1895; Massachusetts Magazine, April, 1910; Sherman's 
Life of Jeremiah O'Brien, chs. ii-v; Boston Gazette, July 3, 1775.)

Joseph Wheaton, one of the Unity's crew, wrote many years later a detailed 
account of the action. He says that the Margaretta, after having replaced 
her broken boom, "was Making Sail when our Vessel came in Sight; then 
commenced the chace, a Small lumber boat in pursuit of a well armed 
British vessel of war - in a Short time she cut away her three boats. 
Standing for sea while thus pursuing, we aranged our selves, appointed 
Jeremiah Obrien our conductor, John Steele to steer our Vessel, and in 
about two hours we received her first fire, but before we could reach her 
she had cut our rigging and Sails emmencely; but having gained to about 
one hundred yards, one Thomas Neight fired his wall piece, wounded the man 
at the helm and the Vessel broached too, when we nearly all fired. At this 
moment Captain Moore imployed himself at a box of hand granades and put 
two on board our Vessel, which through our crew into great disorder, they 
having killed and wounded nine men. Still two ranks which were near the 
prow got a second fire, when our bowsprit was run through the main shrouds 
of the Margarette and Sail, when Six of us Jumped on her quarter deck and, 
with clubed Muskets drove the crew from their quarters, from the waist 
into the hold of the Margarette; the Capt. lay mortally wounded, Robert 
Avery was killed and eight marines & Saylors lay dead on her deck, the 
Lieutenant wounded in her cabin. Thus ended this bloody affray." (Adams 
MSS., Wheaton to President Adams, February 21, 1801. See another account 
by Wheaton in Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., ii (January, 1891), 109.) Wheaton 
says that fourteen of the Americans were killed and wounded.

According to the British account the Americans attempted to board the 
Margaretta with boats and canoes during the night before the battle, but 
were beaten off. In the next day's chase Foster's schooner continued in 
company with the Unity to the end. As these vessels approached they were 
received by the Margaretta with a broadside of swivels, small arms, and 
hand grenades, but they both came alongside, the Unity on the starboard 
and the schooner on the larboard bow (British Admiralty Records, Admirals' 
Despatches 485, July 24, 1775, No. 2.)

The General Court of Massachusetts resolved, June 26, 1775: "That the 
thanks of this Congress be, and they are hereby given to Capt. Jeremiah 
O'Brien and Capt. Benjamin Foster and the other brave men under their 
command, for their courage and good conduct in taking one of the tenders 
belonging to our enemies and two sloops belonging to Ichabod Jones, and 
for preventing the ministerial troops being supplied with lumber; and that 
the said tender, sloops, their cargoes remain in the hands of the said 
captains O'Brien and Foster and the men under their command, for them to 
improve as they shall think most for their and the public advantage until 
the further action of this or some future Congress." (Coll. Maine Hist. 
Soc., vi, 132.) The Unity was fitted out with the Margaretta's guns, 
renamed the Machias Liberty and put under Jeremiah O'Brien's command; she 
was presumably chosen as a cruiser in preference to the Margaretta, on 
account of her superior sailing qualities.

About a month after the capture of the Margaretta the British schooner 
Diligent, carrying eight or ten guns and fifty men, and the tender 
Tapnaquish, with sixteen swivels and twenty men (Wheaton (Adams MSS.) 
gives these vessels a smaller number of men and guns), appeared off 
Machias. The captain of the Diligent going ashore in his boat was seized 
by a small party of Americans stationed near the mouth of the bay and sent 
to Machias. Jeremiah O'Brien in the Machias Liberty and Benjamin Foster in 
another vessel were then sent down the river, found the British vessels 
and took them without firing a gun. According to Wheaton, O'Brien 
subsequently cruised in the Bay of Fundy and took a number of British 
merchant vessels (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., ii (1847), 246, ii (January, 
1891), 111; Life of O'Brien, ch. vi; Massachusetts Mag., January, 1910.)

Foster and O'Brien were next sent by the Machias Committee of Safety to 
Watertown to report their exploits to the Provincial Congress. Under their 
charge went also the prisoners taken in the Margaretta, Diligent and 
Tapnaquish together with Ichabod Jones. They proceeded as far as Falmouth 
(Portland), a week's voyage, by water. The ruthless burning of Falmouth by 
the British under Captain Henry Mowatt several weeks later is supposed to 
have been, in part at least, an act of retaliation for the capture of the 
British vessels at Machias. The journey of O'Brien and Foster from 
Falmouth to Watertown was made by land and took about ten days. On August 
11th the prisoners were delivered at Watertown by their captors, who about 
the same time reported also to General Washington at the headquarters of 
the army in Cambridge. They petitioned the Provincial Congress for the 
privilege of raising a company of men among themselves at the expense of 
the Province, to be used in the defense of Machias and to give occupation 
to numbers of young men who in the distress of war times were without 
means of support. They also asked that the officers of the Machias Liberty 
be given commissions and that men be stationed on board her, this vessel 
to be supplied and equipped and used for the defense of the town, which 
might easily be blockaded by a small force. The petitions were favorably 
received by the Congress and O'Brien was appointed to command both the 
Machias Liberty and the Diligent. These vessels were thereby taken into 
the service of the colony and became the nucleus of the Massachusetts 
navy. O'Brien soon returned to Machias in order to oversee the fltting out 
of his vessels (O'Brien, ch. vi; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 346, 354; Records of 
General Court of Massachusetts, August 21, 23,1775; Massachusetts Spy, 
August 16, 1775.)

Off Cape Ann, August 9, 1775, the British sloop of war Falcon, Captain 
Linzee, fell in with two schooners from the West Indies, bound to Salem. 
One of these schooners, says a report from Gloucester, was "soon brought 
to, the other taking advantage of a fair wind, put into our harbour, but 
Linzee having made a prize of the first, pursued the second into the 
harbour and brought the first with him. He anchored and sent two barges 
with fifteen men in each, armed with muskets and swivels; these were 
attended with a whale boat in which was the Lieutenant and six privates. 
Their orders were to seize the loaded schooner and bring her under the 
Falcon's bow. The Militia and other inhabitants were alarmed at this 
daring attempt and prepared for a vigorous opposition. The barge-men under 
the command of the Lieutenant boarded the schooner at the cabbin windows, 
which provoked a smart fire from our people on the shore, by which three 
of the enemy were killed and the Lieutenant wounded in the thigh, who 
thereupon returned to the man of war. Upon this Linzee sent the other 
schooner and a small cutter he had to attend him, well armed, with orders 
to fire upon the damn'd rebels wherever they could see them and that he 
would in the mean time cannonade the town; he immediately fired a 
broadside upon the thickest settlements and stood himself with diabolical 
pleasure to see what havock his cannon might make . . . Not a ball struck 
or wounded an individual person, although they went through our houses in 
almost every direction when filled with women and children . . . Our 
little party at the waterside performed wonders, for they soon made 
themselves masters of both the schooners, the cutter, the two barges, the 
boat, and every man in them, and all that pertained to them. In the 
action, which lasted several hours, we lost but one man, two others 
wounded, one of which is since dead, the other very slightly wounded. We 
took of the men of war's men thirty-five, several were wounded and one 
since dead; twenty-four were sent to head-quarters, the remainder, being 
impressed from this and the neighboring towns, were permitted to return to 
their friends." (Pennsylvania Packet, August 28, 1775; N. E. Chronicle, 
August 25, 1775.)

Captain Linzee, who makes the date of the affair August 8, states in his 
report to the admiral at Boston that having anchored in Gloucester harbor 
he "sent Lieut. Thornborough with the Pinnace, Long Boat and Jolly Boat, 
mann'd and arm'd in order to bring the Schooner out, the Master coming in 
from sea at the same time in a small tender, I directed him to go and 
assist the Lieutenant. When the Boats had passed a Point of Rocks that was 
between the Ship and Schooner, they received a heavy fire from the Rebels 
who were hidden behind Rocks and Houses, and behind Schooners aground at 
Wharfs, but notwithstanding the heavy fire from the Rebels, Lieut. 
Thornborough boarded the Schooner and was himself and three men wounded 
from Shore. On the Rebels firing on the Boats, I fired from the ship into 
the Town, to draw the Rebels from the Boats. I very soon observed the 
Rebels payed little attention to the firing from the ship and seeing their 
fire continued very heavy from the schooner the Lieutenant had boarded, I 
made an attempt to set fire to the Town." Hoping that by this means the 
attention of the Americans would be directed to saving their houses, so 
that the schooner could be brought off, Linzee sent a party ashore to fire 
the town; but the powder used for the purpose was set off prematurely, 
"one of the Men was blowed up," and the attempt failed. The town was then 
bombarded. "About 4 o'clock in the afternoon the lieutenant was brought on 
board under cover of the Masters' fire from the Schooner, who could not 
leave her. All the Boats were much damaged by the shots and lay on the 
side of the Schooner next to the Rebels; on my being acquainted with the 
situation of the Master, I sent the Prize Schooner to anchor ahead the 
Schooner the Master was in and veer alongside to take him and People away, 
who were very much exposed to the Rebels' fire, but from want of an 
officer to send her in, it was not performed, the Vessel not anchored 
properly." The master, despairing of succor, surrendered about seven in 
the evening "with the Gunner, fifteen Seamen, Seven Marines, one Boy, and 
ten prest Americans." The next morning the Falcon weighed anchor and 
proceeded to Nantasket Roads (Magazine of History, August, 1905.)

Several other affairs, of little importance in themselves, showed the 
readiness of the provincials for action upon the water at an early period, 
before there was naval organization of any kind to give authority to their 
acts (Boston Gazette, September 11, October 2, 9, 1775; Penn. Packet, 
September 4, 1775.) Boston being the seat of war at this time, most of the 
maritime events naturally took place in New England waters during the 
first year. As early as August, 1775, however, a South Carolina sloop, 
sent out by the Council of Safety, captured a British vessel on the 
Florida coast (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 180.)

The situation of affairs in America, as is well known, caused great 
concern in England for a considerable time before the actual outbreak of 
the rebellion. Of all the measures proposed by whig or tory for the 
adjustment of the difficulty, probably the wisest, for the conservation of 
the empire, was suggested by Viscount Barrington, the Secretary at War; 
but wisdom availed little with the British ministry of that day. 
Barrington's advice was given in a series of letters written in the years 
1774 and 1775 to the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary for the Colonies 
(Political Life of William Wildman, Viscount Barrington, by his brother 
Shute (London, 1814), 140-152.) His opinion was that the colonies could 
not be subdued by the army, and that even if they could, the permanent 
occupation of America by a large force would be necessary, a source of 
constant exasperation to the colonists and of enormous expense to the 
government. The troops, he thought, should be withdrawn to Canada, Nova 
Scotia, and East Florida, and there quartered "till they can be employed 
with good effect elsewhere." The reduction of the rebellious colonies 
should be left to the navy. November 14, 1774, he writes: "The naval force 
may be so employed as must necessarily reduce the Colony [Massachusetts] 
to submission without shedding a drop of blood." (Ibid., 141.) A few weeks 
later, December 24, he goes a little more into detail. Speaking especially 
of New England he says: "Conquest by land is unnecessary, when the country 
can be reduced first by distress and then to obedience by our Marine 
totally interrupting all commerce and fishery, and even seizing all the 
ships in the ports, with very little expense and less bloodshed." As to 
the colonies south of New England, "a strict execution of the Act of 
Navigation and other restrictive laws would probably be sufficient at 
present." A few frigates and sloops could enforce those laws and prevent 
almost all commerce - "Though we must depend on our smaller ships for the 
active part of this plan, I think a squadron of ships of the line should 
be stationed in North America, both to prevent the intervention of foreign 
powers and any attempt of the Colonies to attack our smaller vessels by 
sea." "The Colonies will in a few months feel their distress; their 
spirits, not animated by any little successes on their part or violence of 
persecution on ours, will sink; they will be consequently inclined to 
treat, probably to submit to a certain degree." (Barrington, 144-147.) 
Concessions could then be made without loss of dignity, the mistake of 
imposing further obnoxious taxes being avoided. Barrington wrote on the 
same subject to Dartmouth the next year; and also to Lord North, August 8, 
1775, saying: "My own opinion always has been and still is, that the 
Americans may be reduced by the fleet, but never can be by the army." 
(Ibid., 151)



CHAPTER II
NAVAL ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION

The events already related took place under the stress of circumstances, 
most of them unauthorized by Continental or Provincial Congress. It is now 
necessary to interrupt the narrative of naval operations in order to 
sketch briefly the various sources of authority and the administrative 
systems under which acted the different classes of vessels throughout the 
course of the war. These classes were: First, Continental vessels; second, 
the state navies; third, the privateers, commissioned either by the 
Continental government or by the various states, and in some cases by both 
(In the preparation of so much of this chapter as relates to the 
administration and organization of the American naval forms, Paullin's 
Navy of the American Revolution has been closely followed. See also Am. 
Arch., IV, iii, 1888-1904, 1917-1957; Works of John Adams, ii, 462-464, 
469, 470, 479-484, iii, 6-12.)

Public vessels cruising under Continental authority comprised not only the 
Continental navy, strictly speaking, including vessels fitted out in 
France, but also the fleets organized by Washington in Massachusetts Bay 
in 1775 and later in New York; by Arnold on Lake Champlain in 1776 and by 
Pollock in 1778 on the Mississippi River.

General Washington took the first actual step towards placing a 
Continental force upon the sea by fitting out the schooner Hannah, which 
sailed from Beverly September 5, 1775, and returned to port two days later 
with a prize. An important measure in making effective the siege of 
Boston, then in progress, was the intercepting of supplies coming to the 
town by water; the supplies being at the same time of the utmost value to 
the American army investing the town. Before the end of the year seven 
other vessels, officered and manned from the army, were fitted out by 
Washington. The next year he organized a similar but smaller fleet at New 
York (see next chapter.)

The first official suggestion of a Continental navy came from the Assembly 
of Rhode Island which, August 26, 1775, declared "that the building and 
equipping an American fleet, as soon as possible, would greatly and 
essentially conduce to the preservation of the lives, liberty and property 
of the good people of these colonies," and instructed the delegates from 
that province in the Continental Congress "to use their whole influence at 
the ensuing congress for building at the Continental expence a fleet of 
sufficient force for the protection of these colonies." (Am. Arch., IV, 
iii, 231.) The Rhode Island delegates presented their instructions to 
Congress October 3 and this brought the matter fairly before that body. 
Discussion of these instructions was postponed from time to time and it 
was several weeks before definite action was taken on them. Meanwhile 
intelligence had been received of the sailing from England of two brigs 
laden with military supplies bound to Quebec. The practicability of 
intercepting these vessels was considered in Congress October 5. Strong 
opposition was developed on the part of a vociferous minority to any 
participation of the Continental government in maritime warfare; to them 
it appeared sheer madness to send ships out upon the sea to meet the 
overwhelming naval force of England. After a lively debate the matter was 
referred to a committee consisting of John Adams, John Langdon, and Silas 
Deane. Upon the recommendation of this committee it was decided to 
instruct Washington at once to procure two Massachusetts cruisers for that 
service and to request the cooperation of the governors of Rhode Island 
and Connecticut (Journals of Continental Congress, October 3, 5, 1775; Am. 
Arch., IV, iii, 950, 1038, 1888-1890.)

Elbridge Gerry wrote from Watertown, October 9, 1775, to Samuel Adams, 
then a member of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia, saying: "If the 
Continent should fit out a heavy ship or two and increase them as 
circumstances shall admit, the Colonies large privateers, and individuals 
small ones, surely we may soon expect to see the coast clear of cutters." 
(Am. Arch., IV, iii, 993.)

On the advice of the committee appointed October 5, Congress voted on the 
13th to fit out two vessels, one of them to carry ten guns, to cruise 
three months to the eastward in the hope of intercepting British 
transports. Another committee of three was appointed to inquire into the 
expense. October 30, 1775, is an important date in naval legislation. 
Congress resolved to arm the second of the vessels already provided for 
with fourteen guns and also authorized two additional vessels which might 
carry as many as twenty and thirty-six guns respectively, "for the 
protection and defence of the United Colonies." By this vote Congress was 
fully committed to the policy of maintaining a naval armament. On the same 
day a committee of seven was formed by adding four members to those 
already appointed (Jour. Cont. Congr., October 6, 7, 13,17, 30, 1775.) 
This committee was the first executive body for the management of naval 
affairs. It was known as the Naval Committee and the members were John 
Langdon of New Hampshire, John Adams of Massachusetts, Stephen Hopkins of 
Rhode Island, Silas Deane of Connecticut, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, 
Joseph Hewes of North Carolina, and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina.

During the closing months of 1775 much legislation necessary for the 
organization of the navy was enacted by Congress on the recommendation of 
the Naval Committee. In the beginning there was strong opposition to all 
enterprises of a naval character, but it gradually broke down before the 
arguments of the more far-sighted and reasonable members. November 10 the 
Marine Corps was established. On the 25th captures of British ships of 
war, transports, and supply vessels were authorized and the several 
colonies were advised to set up prize courts. The apportionment of the 
shares in prizes was prescribed. In the case of privateers all the 
proceeds went to the owners and captors; in the case of Continental or 
colony cruisers two thirds of the value of a prize when a transport or 
supply vessel, one half when a vessel of war, went to the government, 
while the captors took the rest. November 28, "Rules for the Regulation of 
the Navy of the United Colonies" (See Appendix II) were adopted. These 
early navy regulations were brief, relating chiefly to discipline and 
prescribing the ration and pay. The rules provided for courts martial, but 
not for courts of inquiry; there was much subsequent legislation on the 
subject of naval courts. Pensions for permanent disability and bounties, 
to be awarded in certain cases, were provided for, the necessary funds for 
which were to be set apart from the proceeds of prizes. The rules of 
November 28 were framed by John Adams and were based on British 
regulations. Adams was a leader in all this early legislation and the part 
he took in the founding of the Revolutionary navy was important and 
influential (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 10, 17, 23, 24, 25, 28, 1775; 
Adams's Works, iii, 7-11; Am. Arch., IV, v, 1111.)

In November the Naval Committee purchased four merchant vessels under the 
provisions of October 13 and 30, to be converted into men-of-war. These 
vessels, as named by the committee, were the ships Alfred and Columbus and 
the brigs Cabot and Andrew Doria. The first was named in honor of the 
supposed founder of the English navy, the second and third for famous 
discoverers, and the fourth for the great Genoese admiral. Other vessels 
were authorized and purchased from time to time, the first of which was a 
sloop called the Providence (Adams, iii, 12; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1938; 
.Jour. Cont. Congr., December 2, 1775.)

Definite action was taken in Congress on the Rhode Island instructions 
December 11, when a committee of twelve was "appointed to devise ways and 
means for furnishing these colonies with a naval armament." Two days later 
this committee "brought in their report, which being read and debated was 
agreed to as follows: That five ships of thirty-two guns, five of twenty-
eight guns, three of twenty-four guns, making in the whole thirteen, can 
be fitted for the sea probably by the last of March next, viz: in New 
Hampshire one, in Massachusetts Bay two, in Connecticut one, in Rhode 
Island two, in New York two, in Pennsylvania four, and in Maryland one. 
That the cost of these ships so fitted will not be more than 66,666 2/3 
dollars each on the average, allowing two complete suits of sails for each 
ship, equal in the whole to 866,666 2/3 dollars."

Of these frigates, the Raleigh, of 32 guns, was built at Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire; the Hancock, 32, and the Boston, 24, at Salisbury and 
Newburyport on the Merrimac River; the Warren, 32, and the Providence, 28, 
at Providence; the Trumbull, 28, at Chatham on the Connecticut River; the 
Montgomery, 28, and the Congress, 24, at Poughkeepsie on the Hudson River; 
the Randolph, 32, Washington, 32, Effingham, 28, and Delaware, 24, at or 
near Philadelphia on the Delaware River; and the Virginia, 28, at 
Baltimore. The actual number of guns on a ship was generally in excess of 
the rate; a thirty-two gun frigate commonly carried about thirty-six guns. 
With a few exceptions these frigates were armed with no guns heavier than 
twelve-pounders. The smaller vessels of the Revolutionary navy carried 
only four and six-pounders. All were long guns; the light, short, large-
calibre guns called carronades had not yet come into general use. Some 
vessels carried a secondary battery, mounted on deck or in the tops, of 
small light mortars called coehorns or of swivels, which were light guns 
mounted on pivots. December 13, 1775, the day when these thirteen frigates 
were provided for, is another important date in the early history of the 
navy. On the 14th a committee of thirteen was chosen by ballot to 
superintend the construction and equipment of the frigates (Jour. Cont. 
Congr., December 11, 13, 14, 1775. See Appendix V.)

From descriptions of three of these frigates, furnished nearly two years 
later to Admiral Howe, commanding the British fleet on the North American 
station, we are able to get an idea of their appearance and dimensions. 
The Hancock is describedas follows, beginning with the figure head: "A 
Man's Head with Yellow Breeches, white Stockings, Blue Coat with Yellow 
Button Holes, small cocked Hat with a Yellow Lace, has a Mast in lieu of 
an Ensign Staff with a Latteen Sail on it, has a Fore and Aft Driver Boom, 
with another across, Two Top Gallant Royal Masts, Pole mizen topmast, a 
whole Mizen Yard and mounts 32 Guns, has a Rattle Snake carved on the 
Stern, Netting all around the Ship, Stern Black and Yellow, Quarter 
Galleries all Yellow." "Principal Dimensions of the Rebel Frigate Hancock. 
Length on the upper Deck, 140 ft. 8 ins. Breadth on Do. 30.2. Length of 
Keel for Tonnage, 116.2 3/4. Extreme Breadth, 35.2. Depth in the Hold, 
10.7. Burthen in Tons, 764. Heigth between Decks, 5.6. Do. in the Waste, 
5.0. Size of the Gun Ports, fore & aft, 2.7. up & down, 2.2. Length on the 
Quarter Deck, 57.8. Length on the Forecastle, 31.3. Draught of Water, 
afore, 14.0, abaft, 15.10. Heigth of the Ports from the Surface of the 
Water, Forward, 9.0, Midships, 8.2, Abaft, 9.2." Then the Boston: "An 
IndianHead with a Bow and Arrow in the Hand, painted White, Red and 
Yellow, Two top gallant Royal Masts, Pole mizen topmast on which she 
hoists a Top gallant Sail, painted nearly like the Hancock with Netting 
all round, has a Garf, a Mast in room of an Ensign Staff with a Latteen 
Sail on it, and mounts 30 guns." "Dimensions of the Armed Ship named the 
Delaware...Length on the Gun Deck, 121 Feet; Keel for Tonnage, 96; Extreme 
Breadth, 32.6. The Ship lately built, Mounts twenty four Guns on the Upper 
Deck; And when furnished with proper Artillery, capable of carrying twelve 
Pounders with great facility." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Adm. Desp. 487, August 
28, 1777, nos. 7 and 8; A. D. 488, November 23, 1777, no. 3.) The figures 
for the Warren and Providence, from the journal of the committee in charge 
of building those ships, are: length on the gun deck, 132 feet, 1 inch and 
124.4, respectively; keel 110.10 3/4 and 102.8 1/2; beam, 34.5 1/2 and 
33.10 3/8; hold 11, and 10.8. The committee voted to have a few eighteen 
pounders cast for these two frigates, and accordingly some guns of that 
weight were mounted on them (Magazine of History, December, 1908, and 
February, 1909. For the whole journal see lbid., November, 1908, to April, 
1909. See Archives de la Marine, B7 459 (Whipple's letter of May 31, 1778)

Meanwhile, November 2, 1775, the Naval Committee had been given power by 
Congress to "agree with such officers and seamen as are proper to man and 
command " the vessels they had purchased and were fitting out. On the 5th 
the committee selected Esek Hopkins, an old sea captain of Providence and 
brother of Stephen Hopkins, for the command of this little fleet (Field's 
Life of Hopkins, 78.) December 7 John Paul Jones "was appointed Senior 
Lieut. of the Navy." (Jones MSS., October 10, 1776; Sands's Life of Jones, 
33.) On the 22d the Naval Committee "laid before Congress a list of the 
officers by them appointed, agreeable to the resolutions of Congress, viz: 
Ezek Hopkins, Esqr., commander-in-chief of the fleet. Captains, Dudley 
Saltonstall, Esqr., of the Alfred, Abraham Whipple, Esqr., of the 
Columbus, Nicholas Biddle, Esqr., of the Andrew Doria, John Burrows 
Hopkins, Esqr., of the Cabot. 1st lieutenants, John Paul Jones [etc.] ... 
Resolved, That the pay of the commander-in-chief of the Fleet be 125 
dollars per calendar month. Resolved, That commissions be granted to the 
above officers agreeable to their rank in the above appointment." In 
addition to those named above there were in the list four other first 
lieutenants, five second lieutenants, and three third lieutenants (Jour. 
Cont. Congr., November 2, December 22, 1775.) This is the beginning of a 
list of officers for the Continental navy which, in the course of the war 
and including marine officers and those commissioned in France, contained 
nearly three hundred and thirty names (See Appendix VI.) There were in 
addition medical officers, pursers, midshipmen, and warrant officers of 
whom no lists have been preserved. The largest number of petty officers, 
seamen, and marines in the navy at any one time may have been about three 
thousand.

Uniforms for the officers of the navy were adopted by the Marine Committee 
September 5, 1776, but probably they were not commonly worn, as few 
officers could afford a complete outfit. For line officers a blue coat 
with red lapels, blue breeches, and red waistcoat were prescribed; for 
marine officers, a green coat faced with white and with a silver epaulette 
on the right shoulder, white waistcoat and breeches and black gaiters (Am. 
Arch., V, ii, 181.)

It has generally been supposed that the intention of Congress in making 
Hopkins commander-in-chief was to give him the same rank that Washington 
held in the army. It seems more likely, however, that Congress merely 
meant to give him command of this particular fleet. The wording of his 
appointment by the Naval Committee and of the resolutions quoted above, 
together with the fact that each of the captains was assigned, also by 
resolution of Congress, to a specified vessel, would indicate this. 
Stephen Hopkins, writing to Esek November 6, 1775, says: "You will 
perceive by a letter from the Committee, dated yesterday, that they have 
pitched upon you to take the Command of a Small Fleet, which they and I 
hope will be but the beginning of one much larger." (Hopkins, 78.) A 
resolution of Congress dated January 2, 1778, states that Hopkins "was 
appointed commander in chief of the fleet fitted out by the Naval 
Committee." (Jour. Cont. Congr., January 2, 1778.) He does not appear to 
have been mentioned officially and authoritatively, that is to say by the 
Naval or Marine Committee, though he was once by a special committee 
(Sands, 310.), as the commander-in-chief of the navy. In addition to his 
own fleet, several other Continental vessels cruised in 1776, which do not 
seem to have been under his orders (see ch. V) Hopkins was an elderly man 
at this time, having been born in 1718. He had spent much of his life at 
sea and was a privateersman in the French and Indian War (Hopkins, ch. i.)

Of the members of the committee of thirteen chosen December 14, 1775, "for 
carrying into execution the resolutions of Congress for fitting out armed 
vessels," ten had served on the committee of twelve which had recommended 
building the frigates and five had been members of the original Naval 
Committee. This new committee, consisting of one representative from each 
colony, became the second executive body for the administration of naval 
affairs. It was called the Marine Committee and was at first constituted 
as follows: Josiah Bartlett of New Hampshire, John Hancock of 
Massachusetts, Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island, Silas Deane of 
Connecticut, Francis Lewis of New York, Stephen Crane of New Jersey, 
Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, George Read of Delaware, Samuel Chase of 
Maryland, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, Joseph Hewes of North Carolina, 
Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina, and John Houston of Georgia. The 
membership changed from time to time. The Naval Committee continued in the 
meantime to occupy itself in fitting out the small fleet of vessels 
purchased for the service and placed under the command of Commodore 
Hopkins, and to prepare for an expedition which was being planned. January 
25,1776, although the Marine Committee had already taken charge of general 
naval affairs, Congress voted to leave the direction of this fleet to the 
Naval Committee, which soon afterwards, this duty being accomplished, 
ceased to exist (Jour. Cont. Congr., January 25,1776.) The Marine 
Committee employed agents to supervise the construction of the frigates in 
the distant colonies, taking charge itself of those at Philadelphia. 
Before the end of the year 1775 the organization of a Continental navy was 
achieved.

In the course of time the mass of details connected with naval 
administration became too much for the Marine Committee easily to handle. 
Prize agents in the various seacoast towns were appointed to superintend 
the trial and condemnation of the prizes taken by Continental cruisers. 
Most of the prize agents were also Continental agents, in which capacity 
they performed various other duties of a naval sort. John Bradford at 
Boston had the most important of these agencies (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1113, 
1114.) For the further relief of the Marine Committee and at their 
suggestion, Congress appointed three persons, November 6, 1776, "to 
execute the business of the navy, under the direction" of the committee. 
This body of three was known as the Navy Board and the men appointed to 
serve on it were John Nixon and John Wharton of Pennsylvania and Francis 
Hopkinson of New Jersey. The lack of maritime knowledge and experience 
among members of Congress was keenly felt at this time. William Ellery of 
Rhode Island, who had recently become a member of the Marine Committee, 
wrote home to his friend William Vernon, November 7, 1776, "The Conduct of 
the Affairs of a Navy as well as those of an Army We are yet to learn. We 
are still unacquainted with the systematical Management of them." 
(Publications of R.I. Hist. Soc., viii (January, 1901), 201.) April 19, 
1777, another committee of three was authorized, to take charge of naval 
affairs in New England; the men selected for this board were William 
Vernon of Rhode Island, James Warren of Massachusetts, and John Deshon of 
Connecticut. The first of these boards was then called the Navy Board of 
the Middle Department or District, the second the Navy Board of the 
Eastern Department, or they were called the boards at Philadelphia and at 
Boston respectively (Jour. Cont. Congr., April 23, November 6,1776, April 
19,1777.)

The Eastern Navy Board, owing to its distance from the seat of government 
at Philadelphia, was allowed more discretion and became a more important 
body than that of the middle department. The greater naval activity in New 
England waters, due to remoteness from the centre of military operations, 
put more work and responsibility on the eastern board. Its original 
members retained office several years without change. Their instructions, 
dated July 10, 1777, imposed upon them "the Superintendance of all Naval 
and Marine Affairs of the United States of America within the four Eastern 
States under the direction of the Marine Committee" in "whatever relates 
to the Building, Manning, and fitting for Sea all Armed Vessels of the 
United States built, or ordered by the Congress to build in the Eastern 
Department, and to provide all materials and Stores necessary for that 
purpose." They were "to keep an exact Register of all the Officers, 
Sailors, and Marines in the Continental Navy fitted and Manned within" the 
eastern district, and were "empower'd to order Courts Martial." They were 
also instructed to keep strict account of expenditures and to do many 
other things (Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 207-210.)

With further experience it became apparent that the Marine Committee was 
too large and its members too deficient in special knowledge of naval 
science to admit of prompt, capable, and expert handling of the affairs 
entrusted to them. In October, 1776, John Paul Jones wrote to Robert 
Morris (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1106; Sands, 55) that efficiency in naval 
administration could only be obtained by the appointment of a competent 
board of admiralty. William Ellery wrote to William Vernon, February 26, 
1777: "The Congress are fully sensible of the Importance of having a 
respectable Navy and have endeavoured to form and equip One, but through 
Ignorance and Neglect they have not been able to accomplish their Purpose 
yet. I hope however to see One afloat before long. A proper Board of 
Admiralty is very much wanted. The Members of Congress are unacquainted 
with this Department. As One of the Marine Committee I sensibly feel my 
Ignorance in this Respect." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 204.) For three 
years, however, little was done in the way of improving administration 
except the appointment of the navy boards and agents. Finally, October 28, 
1779, upon the recommendation of the Marine Committee a Board of Admiralty 
was established by Congress. This was a body of five members, two of whom 
were to be members of Congress, while the other three, called 
commissioners, were to be men possessing a knowledge of naval matters. A 
quorum of three was necessary for the transaction of business. The Marine 
Committee then came to an end, but the navy boards at Philadelphia and 
Boston and the navy agents were retained under this reorganization (Jour. 
Cont. Congr., June 9, October 28, 1779.)

Positions on the Board of Admiralty were declined by several to whom they 
were offered, and it was not only difficult to keep two congressional 
members continuously on the board, but it proved to be impossible to find 
three suitable persons willing to serve as commissioners. Consequently the 
membership was never full and the work of the board was much interrupted 
by frequent lack of a quorum. As first organized, in December, 1779, the 
Board of Admiralty contained three members: Francis Lewis of New York, 
commissioner; James Forbes of Maryland and William Ellery of Rhode Island, 
congressional members. A few months later Forbes died and his place was 
taken by James Madison of Virginia. The Board of Admiralty was much 
hampered by half-hearted cooperation on the part of Congress and by want 
of money. Its membership dwindled to a point where nothing could be done 
in default of a quorum, until finally, in the summer of 1781, it passed 
out of existence (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 26, December 3, 7, 8, 1779.)

Meanwhile, February 7, 1781, Congress had passed a resolution putting the 
affairs of the navy under a single head, to be called the Secretary of 
Marine. No one was found, however, to take the place and the office was 
never filled. Robert Morris, who as Superintendent of Finance had close 
relations with the navy, gradually assumed direction of naval affairs as 
the Board of Admiralty became more and more helpless. August 29 Congress 
voted to appoint an Agent of Marine to take charge of naval matters until 
a secretary could be found, and September 7 it placed these affairs under 
the care of the Superintendent of Finance until an agent could be 
appointed. The navy boards were abolished, although the board at Boston 
continued its functions several months longer. The result of it all was 
that Morris continued to direct naval affairs, as Agent of Marine, during 
the remainder of the war. He had already served on the Marine Committee 
and his great ability, business experience, and familiarity with maritime 
affairs made him the best executive head that the navy could have had 
(Jour. Cont. Congr., February 7, August 29, September 7, 1781.)

By way of summary it is perhaps well to review in a few words the history 
of the administration of the Continental navy. The first executive of the 
service was the Naval Committee which in 1775 began the work of organizing 
a navy. Next came the Marine Committee which directed naval affairs for 
four years, ending in December 1779. Then followed the Board of Admiralty 
which managed the department a year and a half, when, in the summer of 
1781, Robert Morris took charge and as Agent of Marine remained at the 
head of the navy until after the end of the war.

As soon as representatives of the United States had established themselves 
in France, naval affairs became an important part of their duties. This 
began in July, 1776, with Silas Deane, the first American agent. After the 
arrival of Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee in the following December, to 
serve with Deane as commissioners, they shared the duties with him, 
although he still continued to exercise special supervision of naval 
matters until the spring of 1778, when he was superseded as commissioner 
by John Adams. After this, Franklin did the largest share of naval work, 
and from the time of his assuming the office of minister to France in 
February, 1779, he had sole charge of naval affairs abroad until the end 
of the war. This naval office in Paris had agents in various ports of 
France and in a few of Spain and Holland. It performed many functions, 
such as buying, building, manning, and fitting out vessels and providing 
naval stores, commissioning officers, directing cruises, disposing of 
prizes, exchanging prisoners, and commissioning privateers. Besides this 
office in France the naval interests of the United States in the West 
Indies and in Louisiana were entrusted to agents. These were William 
Bingham at Martinique, and Oliver Pollock in New Orleans (Paullin, ch. ix; 
Wharton's Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, letters of Deans 
and Franklin; Hale's Franklin in France.)

The sentiment of local independence and the loose federation of the 
colonies, united only for mutual protection, naturally led to individual 
action, and the need that each state felt of the defense of its own 
shores, too urgent to wait for the deliberations of the Continental 
Congress, brought about the establishment of separate small navies; so 
that, in addition to the Continental navy, eleven of the thirteen states 
maintained armed vessels, New Jersey and Delaware being the exceptions. 
Naval administration in the various states was generally, at the outset, 
in charge of the Committee of Safety, and later, of the state executive or 
of a board which had under its care naval affairs alone or in combination 
with military affairs. The state navies varied much in size and force. 
Being used chiefly for coast defense, the vessels were usually smaller 
than those of the Continental navy, and many of them were merely boats and 
galleys adapted for operating in shallow waters. Some of the state ships, 
however, were ocean cruisers of considerable size and force (For the state 
navies, see Paullin, chs. xi-xvii.)

The first American armed vessels commissioned by any public authority were 
two sloops fitted out by Rhode Island, June 15, 1775. The people of this 
colony had been annoyed by the British frigate Rose, cruising in 
Narragansett Bay. These sloops immediately went to sea under the command 
of Abraham Whipple, and on the same day, June 15, chased ashore and 
destroyed a tender of the Rose (Boston Gazette, July 3, 1775; Historical 
Magazine, April, 1868; Am. Arch., IV, ii, 1118; Hopkins, 63-67; Brit. Adm. 
Rec., A. D. 485, June 19, 1775.) One of the sloops, the Katy, was 
subsequently taken into the Continental service under the name Providence. 
The state of Rhode Island afterwards kept a small force cruising in the 
bay.

In the course of the war the Massachusetts navy comprised fifteen seagoing 
vessels and one galley.

The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, after some ineffectual attempts 
in June, 1775, to provide for armed vessels, made a beginning August 21, 
by taking the Machias Liberty and Diligent into the service of the colony 
(Jour. Third Provincial Congress of Mass., June 7, 11, 13, 20, 1775.) The 
actual establishment of a state navy, however, came in the following 
winter, when a committee was appointed December 29, of which John Adams 
was a member, "to consider & report a plan for fitting out Armed Vessels 
for the defence of American Liberty." (Records of General Court of Mass., 
December 29, 1775, January 11, February 7, 8, 17, April 20, 1776; Paullin, 
ch. xi.) In decisive action looking towards a naval force Connecticut 
preceded Massachusetts. Early in July, 1775, two vessels were provided for 
and in August they were purchased. A valuable prize was taken in October. 
Connecticut fitted out twelve vessels during the war, four of them galleys 
(Papers New London Hist. Soc., Part IV, i (1893), 34; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 
264-268; Paullin, ch. xii.)

Pennsylvania began July 6, 1775, by providing for the defense of the 
Delaware River by means of boats and galleys. The Pennsylvania navy 
consisted of about ten vessels and nearly thirty boats and galleys for 
river and bay defense. The fleet was under the command of a commodore (Am. 
Arch., IV, iii, 495, 510, 511, 858, 862, 1811, 1820, 1836, 1839, iv, 515, 
521; Penn. Archives, Series II, i; Wallace's Life of William Bradford; 
Paullin, ch. xiii.) The Virginia navy, authorized by the Provincial 
Convention in December, 1775, comprised first and last seventy two vessels 
of all classes including many ships, brigs and schooners; but apparently 
most of them were small, poorly manned, and lightly armed, and were used 
largely for commerce. The naval duties of the fleet were confined mostly 
to Chesapeake Bay (Southern Literary Messenger, January to April, 1857; 
Virginia Hist. Register, July, April, October, 1848; Va. Mag. Hist. and 
Biogr., July, 1893; Am. Arch., IV, iv, 114, 866, v, 227, vi, 1598; 
Paullin, ch. xiv.) Maryland shared with Virginia the defense of Chesapeake 
Bay, and in addition to one vessel of some size and force, maintained a 
considerable fleet of galleys, boats, and barges (Am. Arch., IV, v, 1509,
1510.) The chief concern of North Carolina was to protect and keep open 
Ocracoke Inlet, connecting Pamlico Sound with the ocean, through which an 
important part of the commerce, not only of North Carolina but of 
Virginia, was carried on. A small fleet for this purpose was stationed in 
the sounds (Ibid., 1357, 1363.) Georgia's navy was small and unimportant, 
consisting mostly of galleys. A schooner, however, was commissioned as 
early as June, 1775 9Paullin, ch. xvi, for Georgia, Maryland, and North 
Carolina.) The defense of Charleston required a considerable force, and 
South Carolina was one of the first states to begin the organization of a 
navy. She appears to have had about fifteen sea-going vessels, some of 
them larger and more heavily armed than any other state or Continental 
ships. The force also included several galleys (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 180, 
iv, 45-54; Paullin, ch. xv.) As regards the two remaining states, New 
York's naval enterprise was confined to organizing a small fleet for local 
defense. The early occupation by the British of New York City and the 
adjacent waters prevented any further operations (Jour. Prov. Congr. of 
New York, i, 228, 349; Am. Arch., IV, v, 1401, 1450.) New Hampshire voted 
in 1776 to build a galley and appointed a committee to procure an armed 
vessel. After this her only naval activity, aside from encouraging 
privateering and setting up a prize court, consisted in fitting out a 
twenty-two-gun ship for temporary service in 1779 (Ibid., 10, 15, 17, 24; 
Paullin, ch. xvii.)

Privateers composed the third and a very important class of vessels 
employed during the Revolution. The word privateer was used at that time, 
and later, too, with the utmost disregard of its true meaning. Persons 
with an understanding of maritime affairs constantly spoke of Continental 
and state cruisers, especially the smaller ones, as privateers. The term 
was often wrongly used even in official correspondence. It is necessary 
that lines should be sharply drawn between these different classes of 
armed vessels. Letters of marque, so called from the letters or 
commissions they carried, were armed trading vessels authorized to make 
prizes. They also were generally, and more properly, called privateers. 
The latter name should, strictly speaking, be reserved for private armed 
vessels carrying no cargo and devoted exclusively to warlike use. All 
kinds of armed vessels, however, during the Revolution, even Continental 
frigates, were employed under special circumstances as cargo carriers.

The General Court of Massachusetts, November 1, 1775, passed "An Act for 
Encouraging the Fixing out of Armed Vessells, to defend the Sea Coast of 
America, and for Erecting a Court to Try and Condemn all Vessells that 
shall be found infesting the same." The preamble of this important 
measure, written by Elbridge Gerry, set forth in detail the justification 
of the colonists in taking up arms. "Whereas the present administration of 
Great Britain, being divested of justice and humanity and strangers to 
that magnanimity and sacred regard for liberty which inspired their 
venerable predecessors, have been endeavouring thro' a series of years to 
establish a system of despotism over the American colonies and by their 
venal and corrupt measures have so extended their influence over the 
British parliament that, by a prostituted majority, it is now become a 
political engine of slavery; and whereas the military tools of these our 
unnatural enemies, while restrained by the united forces of the American 
colonies from proceeding in their sanguinary career of devastation and 
slaughter, are infesting the sea coast with armed vessells and daily 
endeavouring to distress the inhabitants by burning their towns and 
destroying their dwellings . . . and making captures of provision and 
other vessels, being the property of said inhabitants; and whereas their 
majesties King William and Queen Mary by the royal charter of this colony 
. . . did grant, establish and ordain that, in the absence of the governor 
and lieutenant-governor of the colony, a majority of the council shall 
have full power . . . for the special defence of their said province or 
territory, to assemble in martial array and put in warlike posture the 
inhabitants of their said province or territory and to lead and conduct 
them and with them to encounter, expulse, resist and pursue by force of 
arms, as well by sea as by land, . . . and also to kill, slay, destroy, 
and conquer by all fitting ways, enterprizes and means whatsoever all and 
every such person and persons as should at any time thereafter attempt or 
enterprize the destruction, invasion, detriment or annoyance of their said 
province or territory . . .; and whereas it is expressly resolved by the 
grand Congress of America, 'That each colony, at their own expence, make 
such provision by armed vessells or otherwise . . . as their respective 
assemblies . . . shall judge expedient . . . for the protection of their 
harbours and navigation on the sea-coasts,' . . . and it is the duty and 
interest of this colony to exert itself, as well for the purpose of 
keeping supplies from the enemy as for those mentioned in the paragraphs 
of the charter and resolve now recited; therefore . . . Be it enacted," 
etc. This act authorized a majority of the council to commission masters 
of private armed vessels. During the following winter and spring other 
acts were passed supplementing or superseding that of November 1. Courts 
for the trial of prizes were established at Plymouth, Ipswich, and 
Falmouth (Portland); and April 13, 1776, it was provided that in addition 
to these places courts might also be held in Barnstable or Dartmouth for 
the southern district, in Boston, Salem, or Newburyport for the middle 
district, and in Pownalborough (Wiscasset) for the eastern district (Acts 
and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, November 1, 1775, 
February 14, March 19, April 13, May 8, 1776.) Massachusetts probably sent 
out not far from one half of all the American private armed vessels 
commissioned during the Revolution.

The Continental Congress authorized privateering March 23,1776, and on 
April 2 and 3 adopted a form of Commission for privateers and resolved to 
send copies in blank, signed by the President of Congress, to the various 
colonies, there to be issued to privateersmen giving bonds; a set of 
instructions for commanding officers was drafted (See Appendix III.) 
Several of the colonies or states used these Continental commissions 
altogether, not establishing state privateering. Pennsylvania sent out 
flve hundred vessels under Continental commissions and, it is believed, 
used no others. Six hundred and twenty-six Massachusetts privateers sailed 
under Continental letters of marque, but that state also sent nearly a 
thousand others to sea under her own commissions; it is probable, however, 
that in many instances the same vessel may have sailed at one time under 
one commission and later under the other. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, Maryland, and South Carolina, and probably some of the other 
states, issued their own commissions, but the first four also employed 
those of the Congress - Connecticut and Maryland more than two hundred 
each. Sixty-four Virginia privateers sailed under Continental commissions. 
The American Commissioners in Paris - later the minister to France - and 
the naval agent of Congress in the West Indies likewise commissioned 
privateers. A rough estimate only of the total number and force of 
American vessels engaged in privateering on the patriotic side during the 
Revolution is possible. The Library of Congress has printed a list of 
nearly seventeen hundred letters of marque issued by the Continental 
Congress to privateers carrying, approximately, fifteen thousand guns - 
probably light ones for the most part - and fifty-nine thousand men. After 
deducting duplicates, that is to say, in cases of two or more commissions 
being successively issued to the same vessel, and deducting also armed 
boats and galleys, there remain more than thirteen hundred sea-going 
vessels. The thousand commissions issued by Massachusetts probably 
represented more than seven hundred different vessels, after making the 
same proportionate allowance for duplicates. Several hundred additional 
privateers must have been commissioned by other states and in France and 
the West Indies. Assuming the total number of private armed vessels to 
have been two thousand, and there were probably a good many more, they 
doubtless carried very nearly eighteen thousand guns and seventy thousand 
men. There seem to have been about the same number of British 
privateersmen, according to Governor Hutchinson, who, speaking of the 
difficulty of manning the British navy, says: "Some have proposed pressing 
the crews of all privateers, in which service it is computed 70,000 men 
are employed." (Diary, ii, 264 (June 27, 1779.) Judging from the scanty 
information at hand concerning British privateering, it is probable that 
their vessels engaged in this form of warfare were considerably less 
numerous but decidedly superior in force to the Americans; the latter seem 
to have carried on the average between eight and nine guns and less than 
thirty-five men, the British about seventeen guns and seventy-five or more 
men (Jour. Cont. Congr., March 23, April 2, 3, 1776, May 2,1780; Naval 
Records of Amer. Rev. (calendar), 217-495; Emmons's Statistical History of 
the Navy, 127; Mass. Archives, clxiv to clxxii; Penn. Archives, II, i, 
366; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 27; Sheffield's Rhode Island 
Privateers; Paullin; Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson; Williams's 
History of Liverpool Privateers, App. iv, list of 95 vessels; London 
Chronicle, April 1, 29,1779, lists of 100 privateers from Liverpool and 
121 from New York; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, February 27, 1779, No. 3, 
list of 69 New York privateers. See Appendix VII.)

Valuable service to the country was rendered by the privateers, and they 
contributed in a large degree to the naval defense, and so to the 
fortunate outcome of the war. On the other hand, the system was subject to 
abuses and was in many ways detrimental to the regular naval service. 
William Whipple, writing to Josiah Bartlett from Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire, July 12, 1778, says: "I agree with you that the privateers have 
much distressed the trade of our Enemies, but had there been no privateers 
is it not probable there would have been a much larger number of Public 
Ships than has been fitted out, which might have distressed the Enemy 
nearly as much & furnished these States with necessaries on much better 
terms than they have been supplied by Privateers ? . . . No kind of 
Business can so effectually introduce Luxury, Extravagance and every kind 
of Dissipation, that tend to the destruction of the morals of people. 
Those who are actually engaged in it soon lose every Idea of right & 
wrong, & for want of an opportunity of gratifying their insatiable avarice 
with the property of the Enemies of their Country, will without the least 
compunction seize that of her Friends . . . There is at this time 5 
Privateers fitting out here, which I suppose will take 400 men. These must 
be by far the greater part Countrymen, for the Seamen are chiefly gone, & 
most of them in Hallifax Gaol. Besides all this, you may depend no public 
ship will ever be manned while there is a privateer fitting out. The 
reason is plain: Those people who have the most influence with Seamen 
think it their interest to discourage the Public service, because by that 
they promote their own interest, viz., Privateering." (Historical 
Magazine, March, 1862.)

As intimated in the foregoing, privateers at times made trouble by seizing 
neutral vessels. In his advocacy of a strong navy in preference to a 
service under private control Whipple was in advance of his time. William 
Vernon, of the Navy Board at Boston, wrote to John Adams, December 17, 
1778, that the Continental ships in port "may sail in Three Weeks, if it 
was possible to get Men, wch we shall never be able to accomplish, unless 
some method is taken to prevent desertion, and a stopage of Private Ships 
Sailing, until our ships are Mann'd. The infamous practice of seducing our 
Men to leave the ships and taking them off at an out-Port, with many other 
base methods, will make it impossible ever to get our ships ready to Sail 
in force, or perhaps otherwise than single Ships." He wishes that "an 
Embargo upon all Private Property, whether Arm'd or Merchant ships, may 
take Place thro' all the United States, until the Fleet is compleatly 
Mann'd.... You can scarsely form an Idea of the increase and groath of the 
extravagance of the People in their demands for Labour and every Article 
for Sale &c; dissipation has no bounds at present; when or where it will 
stop, or if a reform will take place, I dare not predict." (Publ. R. I. 
Hist. Soc., viii, 256.) The expedient of laying a temporary embargo upon 
privateers was occasionally resorted to.

A more favorable opinion of privateering is found in a letter of John 
Adams to the President of Congress, dated Amsterdam, September 16, 1780. 
Speaking of commerce destroying he says: "This is a short, easy, and 
infallible method of humbling the English, preventing the effusion of an 
ocean of blood, and bringing the war to a conclusion. In this policy I 
hope our countrymen will join [the French and Spanish] with the utmost 
alacrity. Privateering is as well understood by them as any people 
whatsoever; and it is by cutting off supplies, not by attacks, sieges, or 
assaults, that I expect deliverance from enemies." (Wharton, iv, 58. On 
the Profits Of privateering, see Channing, iii, 398.)

No doubt what was then needed, as in every war, was a well-balanced naval 
force made up of a sufficient number of fighting ships and commerce 
destroyers in the right proportions. Privateering was more popular than 
the regular naval service on account of the greater freedom from the 
restraints of military discipline and because the profits were larger; for 
privateersmen were devoted almost wholly to commerce destroying and were 
consequently likely to take more prizes in the long run. In addition to 
this and besides having higher pay, the entire value of their prizes went 
to the owners and captors. When the prizes of Continental cruisers were 
ships of war, one half the proceeds went to the captors, and in other 
cases only one third. In October, 1776, Congress increased the shares of 
the captors to the whole and to one half the value of these two classes of 
prizes respectively, in order to put Continental vessels more nearly on 
terms of equality with privateers. Bounties and other inducements were 
resorted to for the purpose of obtaining recruits. It would probably have 
been better if not more than half as many private commissions had been 
issued, provided that a correspondingly more powerful regular fleet could 
have been put upon the sea (Jour. Cont. Congr., April 17, August 5, 
October 30, 1776, March 29, 1777, July 11, 1780. For further discussion of 
privateering and commerce destroying, see ch. XIX.)

It occasionally happened during the Revolution that vessels built or 
purchased and fitted out for the Continental service subsequently found 
their way into one of the state navies, or perhaps became privateers; and 
the reverse was also true in one or two instances. It was also the case 
not infrequently that two or all three of the different classes of vessels 
cruised together in squadrons or on expeditions. Officers likewise, 
beginning as privateersmen or in state service, were sometimes transferred 
to the Continental navy; and, on the other hand, unemployed Continental 
officers and seamen, especially towards the end of the war, sought service 
in the state navies or in privateers. For these reasons there was to some 
extent a sort of blending of the three classes of sea service, both as 
regards ships and personnel. The narrative therefore will follow a more 
natural course in describing the naval operations of the war to a certain 
extent in a chronological or geographical order and not strictly in 
conformity with the classes of service concerned.

The disparity between the sea power of America and that of England, great 
as it actually was, will be found less marked than mere figures would 
indicate, when we inquire into the true condition of the British fleet and 
of naval administration in England. Our enemy had many difficulties to 
contend with which must be set off against the numbers of ships, guns, and 
men to be found in statistical tables. After the Revolution of 1688 the 
navy was less dependent on the King than it formerly had been and looked 
more to Parliament for favor, which was an advantage in some ways, but 
brought the service more into partisan politics. During the first three 
quarters and more of the eighteenth century the British navy suffered much 
from corruption and mismanagement in civil administration, and at times 
also from incompetent commanders at sea. Before the end of the Seven 
Years' War in 1763 a high degree of efficiency had been brought about, but 
after that a decided falling off took place and continued many years 
(Hannay's Short History of the Royal Navy, ii, 2, 101, 117, 118,133,134,
136.)

It is not easy to make an estimate of the real strength of the British 
navy at the time of the American Revolution, for figures derived from 
different sources vary, and many ships were sent to sea in such poor 
condition that they were by no means able to perform the service to be 
expected from their nominal force. The number of vessels of all classes in 
1775 was stated to be two hundred and seventy, including one hundred and 
thirty-one ships of the line, that is, ships carrying sixty or more guns 
on two or more decks; in 1783 the number was four hundred and sixty- 
eight, including a hundred and seventy-four ships of the line. During the 
same time the number of men increased from eighteen thousand to one 
hundred and ten thousand. In January, 1778, there were supposed to be two 
hundred and seventy-four vessels of all classes ready for immediate 
service, of which ninety-two were on the North American station besides 
thirteen at Newfoundland and forty-one in the West Indies. At the end of 
the year the total effective force was three hundred and seventeen, while 
the numbers in the Western Hemisphere were somewhat reduced. These figures 
seem formidable when compared with those of the Continental navy, 
including Washington's little fleet in Massachusetts Bay, which comprised 
altogether, during the whole course of the war, between fifty and sixty 
vessels in actual service, rating from thirty-two-gun frigates down to 
small schooners and sloops. To these are to be added the small craft on 
inland waters, the state navies, including perhaps forty or more sea-going 
cruisers, and the privateers, numerous to be sure, and capable of 
inflicting serious injury upon commerce, but in no sense a menace even to 
the lighter regular cruisers of the enemy. These American figures of 
course very greatly exceed the number in service at any one time. 
Nevertheless the British were beset with manifold troubles and their ships 
found plenty of occupation. The active and fast-sailing rebel privateers 
required close watching and led their pursuers many a long chase. Supplies 
had to be brought from Europe, and for the convoy of these as well as of 
troop-ships a considerable part of their force must be diverted from 
purely warlike employment. The loss of the seafaring population of America 
as a source of supply for the manning of the British navy was likewise 
severely felt at a time when naval expansion was necessary. In 1778 the 
navy of France and later those of Spain and Holland entered the contest 
against England and threatened her naval supremacy (Hannay, ii, 210-214, 
219; Clowes's Royal Navy, iii, 327, 328; Schomberg's Naval Chronology, i, 
424, 436, 440, 453, ii, 1, 36, 68, 124; Beatson's Naval and Military 
Memoirs, iv, 291; Data collected by R. W. Neeser from Parliamentary 
Reports and other sources. See also Weeser's Introduction to Naval History 
Society Publications, iii.)

Yet a foe to the British navy more malign than foreign navies was found in 
the Admiralty at home, and that was maladministration. In 1771 the Earl of 
Sandwich, who had previously been first lord of the Admiralty for two 
short terms, was again appointed to the office and held it until 1782. The 
administration of the navy under Sandwich was not only weak, but reached 
nearly the lowest depths of corruption. In 1778, "embezzlement, larceny, 
swindling" and other like abuses prevailed in the dockyards. Money was 
voted for repairs and the ships were not repaired. "Vessels reported as 
well found and ready for sea lay in the naval harbours rotting." From 1775 
to 1782, seventy-six vessels of the navy, including fourteen of sixty-four 
or more guns, "capsized, foundered, or were wrecked." The nation was 
charged with four thousand more men than were rated on the books of the 
navy. There was collusion between dockyard officials and shipowners; the 
former would inspect and condemn vessels and the latter, having bought a 
ship, would change her name and appearance and sell her back to the 
government for transport service (Belcher's First American Civil War, i, 
290-292.) Some of the admirals participated in the fruits of embezzlement, 
and the management of naval affairs at New York under Arbuthnot was 
corrupt. Maltreatment of seamen, bad food, scurvy, and other evils were 
due largely to the dishonesty of pursers. Insubordination and disaffection 
resulted, and it was said that from 1774 to 1780 forty-two thousand men 
deserted from the navy. During the same time eighteen thousand died of 
disease. Incompetent medical service was the rule, and the mortality, 
especially in tropical seas, was appalling; but an exception to this is to 
be found in the fleet of Admiral Rodney, whose surgeon brought about 
reforms which saved countless lives (Belcher, 295-297, 304-308; 
Publications of Navy Records Soc., xxxii, 80-83; Hannay, ii, 205-210, 214-
216; Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc., xliv, 364-368; Data collected by R. W. 
Neeser.)

Charles Middleton, the comptroller of the navy, in the course of 
correspondence with Sandwich, spoke very plainly of the abuses in naval 
administration (Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 2-10, 16-30.) In 1779 he writes, 
"The desertions from ships and hospitals are beyond imagination. The 
discipline of service is entirely lost, and to a great measure owing to 
admiralty indulgences, but still more to admiralty negligence. The want of 
vigour at that board has weakened its authority to such a degree over the 
officers of the fleet, that no respect is paid to its orders . . . For 
want of Plan, for want of men of professional knowledge used to business 
to assist at the admiralty, and for want of method and execution, one 
error has produced another, and the whole has become such a mass of 
confusion, that I see no prospect of reducing it to order. All I can do at 
the navy office will avail but little if the admiralty continues what it 
is at present. It is, indeed, so wretchedly bad, that if I waited for 
official orders and kept within the mere line of duty without pressing or 
proposing what ought to come unasked for, we must inevitably stand still
. . . The whole system of the admiralty is rotten . . . The dockyards, 
from want of proper attention to appointments, are in wretched disabled 
state, without spirit, without discipline." (Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 4, 
5, 6.) In another letter he says: "For want of proper men to conduct the 
business at the ports, no expedition is used in refitting the ships. The 
officers are not kept to their duty. The men are daily deserting in 
scores, and those who remain are inclined to mutiny." (Ibid., 7.) Again, 
February 3, 1781, after relating much of the same sort, he observes: "I 
cannot be an acquiescent witness of the present weak state of the yards, 
and likely to continue so, according to the current arrangements, at a 
crisis when the utmost efforts of every officer in every department of the 
navy from the highest to the lowest, are most loudly demanded." (Ibid., 
26.) To this Sandwich replies: "I have neither leisure nor inclination to 
enter into a discussion upon the subject of the letter with which you have 
favoured me." (Ibid., 27.) In 1786, Middleton, speaking of Sandwich's 
administration, says that "all his successors, notwithstanding their great 
pretensions to a regard for the public service, have proceeded in the same 
way; and I find politics have got too great a hold on this branch of the 
navy for me to withstand it." (Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 30.)

It may be inferred from all this that the British navy was less formidable 
than the imposing array of ships on the printed lists would indicate; and 
yet service traditions of the right sort and fitness for the sea gave the 
English a superiority as a fighting force over other European navies out 
of proportion to their numbers.