Memoirs of Colonel Mosby - Chapters XIII-XV



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CHAPTER XIII 
THE YEAR AFTER GETTYSBURG
   [THE period between the battle of Gettysburg and the arrival of 
Sheridan in Shenandoah Valley, in August, 1864, was one of incessant 
activity on the part of Mosby's command. Scouts, raids, and pitched 
battles followed each other in rapid succession. Mosby destroyed supply 
trains, broke up the means of conveying intelligence, thus isolating 
troops from their base, and confused plans by capturing dispatches, while 
at the same time compelling the use of large numbers of the enemy's troops 
to protect Washington and the Potomac. Attracted by the chance of booty 
and desire for adventure, without the irksome duties of camp life, brave 
and dashing spirits were drawn to Mosby's battalion until the fifteen men 
with whom he had started his partisan warfare became five companies, 
regularly mustered into the Confederate service. The main events of these 
months are told in the following reports which Colonel Mosby made to his 
superiors. 

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Unlike the usual formal report of the War Records, these records are 
permeated by the zeal and enthusiasm for his partisan warfare to which was 
due, in large measure, Mosby's striking success. The spirit of the man, 
his boundless energy, and the unbridled zest with which he made war on his 
country's foes are reflected in every line of his official story.]


[Report, Mosby to Stuart]
July, 1863. 

   I sent you in charge of Sergeant Beattie, one hundred and forty-one 
prisoners that we captured from the enemy during their march through this 
county. I also sent off forty-five several days ago. Included in the 
number, one Major, one Captain and two lieutenants. I also captured one 
hundred and twenty-five horses and mules, twelve wagons (only three of 
which I was able to destroy), fifty sets of fine harness, arms, etc., etc.


[Report, Mosby to Stuart]
Fauquier Co., Va., Aug. 4, 1863. 

   I send over in charge of Sergeant Beattie about 30 prisoners captured 
on an expedition into Fairfax, from which I have just returned. Most of 
them were taken at Padgett's, near Alexandria. I also captured about 30 
wagons, brought off about 70 horses and mules, 

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having only ten men with me. We lost a good many on the way back, as we 
were compelled to travel narrow unfrequented paths. Among the captures 
were three sutlers' wagons.

   At Fairfax Court House a few nights ago I captured 29 loaded sutlers' 
wagons, about 100 prisoners and 140 horses. I had brought all off safely 
near Aldie, where I fell in with a large force of the enemy's cavalry, who 
recaptured them. The enemy had several hundred. I had only 27 men. We 
killed and captured several. My loss: one wounded and captured.


[Report, Mosby to Stuart]
Culpeper, August 20, 1863. 

   On Tuesday, August 11, I captured a train of 19 wagons near Annandale, 
in Fairfax County. We secured the teams and a considerable portion of the 
most valuable stores, consisting of saddles, bridles, harness, etc. We 
took about 25 prisoners.


[Report, Mosby to Stuart]
Sept. 30, 1863. 

   . . . On the morning of August 24, with about 30 men, I reached a point 
(Annandale) immediately on the enemy's line of communication. Leaving the 
whole command, except three men who accompanied me, in the woods, 
concealed, I proceeded on a reconnaissance along the railroad to ascertain 
if there were any bridges unguarded. I discovered there were three. 

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I returned to the command just as a drove of horses with a cavalry escort 
of about 50 men were passing. These I determined to attack and to wait 
until night to burn the bridges. I ordered Lieutenant Turner to take half 
of the men and charge them in front, while with the remainder I attacked 
their rear.

   In the meantime the enemy had been joined by another party, making 
their number about 63. When I overtook them they had dismounted at 
Gooding's Tavern to water their horses. My men went at them with a yell 
that terrified the Yankees and scattered them in all directions. A few 
taking shelter under cover of the houses, opened fire upon us. They were 
soon silenced, however. At the very moment when I had succeeded in routing 
them, I was compelled to retire from the fight, having been shot through 
the side and thigh. My men, not understanding it, followed me, which gave 
time to the Yankees to escape to the woods. But for this accident, the 
whole party would have been captured. As soon as I perceived this, I 
ordered the men to go back, which a portion of them did, just as 
Lieutenant Turner, who had met and routed another force above, came 
gallantly charging up.

   Over 100 horses fell into our possession, though a good many were lost 
in bringing them out at night; also 12 prisoners, arms, etc. I learn that 
6 of the enemy were killed. . . . In this affair my loss was 2 killed and 
3 wounded. . . .

   I afterwards directed Lieutenant Turner to burn the bridges. He 
succeeded in burning one.

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   During my absence from the command, Lieutenant Turner attacked an 
outpost of the enemy near Waterloo, killing 2 and capturing 4 men and 27 
horses.

   About September 15 he captured 3 wagons, 20 horses, 7 prisoners and a 
large amount of sutlers' goods near Warrenton Junction.

   On the 20th and 21st instant, I conducted an expedition along the 
enemy's line of communication, in which important information obtained was 
forwarded to the army headquarters, and I succeeded in capturing 9 
prisoners and 21 fine horses and mules.

   On the 27th and 28th instant, I made a reconnaissance in the vicinity 
of Alexandria, capturing Colonel Dulaney, aide to the bogus Governor 
Pierpont, several horses, and burning the railroad bridge across Cameron's 
Run, which was immediately under cover of the guns of two forts.

   The military value of the species of warfare I have waged is not 
measured by the number of prisoners and material of war captured from the 
enemy, but by the heavy detail it has already compelled him to make, and 
which I hope to make him increase, in order to guard his communications 
and to that extent diminishing his aggressive strength.

[Indorsements]
Headquarters Cavalry Corps, October 5, 1863. 

   Respectfully forwarded, and recommend that Major Mosby be promoted 
another grade in recognition of his 

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valuable services. The capture of these prominent Union officials, as well 
as the destruction of bridges, trains, etc., was the subject of special 
instructions which he is faithfully carrying out.

J. E. B. Stuart, Major-General. 

Headquarters, November 17, 1863. 

Respectfully forwarded. 
   Major Mosby is entitled to great credit for his boldness and skill in 
his operations against the enemy. He keeps them in constant apprehension 
and inflicts repeated injuries. I have hoped that he would have been able 
to raise his command sufficiently for the command of a Lieutenant-Colonel, 
and to have it regularly mustered into the service. I am not aware that it 
numbers over 4 companies.

R. E. Lee, General.   

[Letter to Mrs. Mosby]
Fauquier Co., 
Oct. 1, '63.

My dearest Pauline: 
   Just returned from a raid. I went down in the suburbs of Alexandria and 
burned a railroad bridge in a quarter of a mile of two forts and directly 
in range of their batteries, also captured Colonel Dulaney, aide to 
(Governor) Pierpont. Dulaney lives in Alexandria, - has a son in my 
command, who was with me at the time. . . . It was quite an amusing scene, 

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the interview between Colonel Dulaney and his son. Just as we were about 
leaving the Colonel sarcastically remarked to his son that he had an old 
pair of shoes he had better take, as he reckoned they were darned scarce 
in the Confederacy, whereupon the son, holding up his leg, which was 
encased in a fine pair of cavalry boots just captured from a sutler, asked 
the old man what he thought of that. I am now fixing my triggers for 
several good things which, if they succeed, will make a noise. Old Mrs. 
Shacklett is going to Baltimore next week and I shall send for some things 
for you all. . . . In Richmond I got some torpedoes, which have just 
arrived, and my next trip I shall try to blow up a railroad train. Went to 
see the Secretary of War, - he spoke in the highest terms of the services 
of my command, - said he read all my official reports. Also saw old 
General Lee, - he was very kind to me and expressed the greatest 
satisfaction at the conduct of my command.


[Report, Mosby to Stuart]
October 19, 1863. 

   . . . On Thursday, 15th, came down into Fairfax, where I have been 
operating ever since in the enemy's rear.

   I have captured over 100 horses and mules, several wagons loaded with 
valuable stores, and between 75 and 100 prisoners, arms, equipments, etc. 
Among the prisoners were 3 captains and 1 lieutenant.

   I had a sharp skirmish yesterday with double my 

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number of cavalry near Annandale in which I routed them, capturing the 
captain commanding and 6 or 7 men and horses. I have so far sustained no 
loss. It has been my object to detain the troops that are occupying 
Fairfax, by annoying their communications and preventing them from 
operating in front. . . . I contemplate attacking a cavalry camp at Falls 
Church to-morrow night.


[Report, Mosby to Stuart]
Nov. 6, 1863. 

   I returned yesterday from a scout in the neighborhood of Catlett's. I 
was accompanied by Captain Smith and 2 men of my command. We killed 
Kilpatrick's division commissary and captured an adjutant, 4 men, 6 
horses, etc. Kilpatrick's Division (now reported unfit for duty) lies 
around Weaverville. . . . I sent you 4 cavalrymen on Wednesday captured by 
my scouts.


[Report, Mosby to Stuart]
Nov. 22, 1863. 

   Since rendering my report of the 5th [sic] inst. we have captured about 
75 of the enemy's cavalry, over 100 horses and mules, 6 wagons, a 
considerable number of arms, equipments, etc.

   It would be too tedious to mention in detail the various affairs in 
which these captures have been 

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made, but I would omit the performance of a pleasant duty if I failed to 
bring to your notice the bold onset of Capt. Smith, when, with only about 
40 men, he dashed into the enemy's camp of 150 cavalry near Warrenton, 
killed some 8 or 10, wounded a number and brought off 9 prisoners, 27 
horses, arms, equipments, etc. In various other affairs several of the 
enemy have been killed and wounded. I have sustained no loss. . . .


[Report, Mosby to Stuart]
January 4, 1864. 

   I have the honor to report that during the month of December there were 
captured by this command over 100 horses and mules and about 100 
prisoners. A considerable number of the enemy have also been killed and 
wounded. It would be too tedious to mention the various occasions on which 
we have met the enemy, but there is one which justice to a brave officer 
demands to be noticed. On the morning of January 1, I received information 
that a body of the enemy's cavalry were in Upperville. It being the day on 
which my command was to assemble, I directed Capt. William R. Smith to 
take command of the men while I went directly toward Upperville to 
ascertain the movements of the enemy. In the meantime the enemy had gone 
on toward Rectortown, and I pursued, but came up just as Capt. Smith with 
about 35 men had attacked and routed them (75 strong), killing, wounding, 
and capturing 57.

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[Indorsements]
Headquarters Cavalry Corps, February 13, 1864. 

Respectfully forwarded. 
   A subsequent report of subsequent operations has been already sent in, 
this having been mislaid. Major Mosby continues his distinguished services 
in the enemies rear, relieving our people of the depredations of the enemy 
in a great measure.

J. E. B. Stuart, 
Major-General. 

February 15, 1864. 

   A characteristic report from Colonel Mosby, who has become so familiar 
with brave deeds as to consider them too tedious to treat unless when 
necessary to reflect glory on his gallant comrades. Captain Smith's was a 
brilliant and most successful affair.

J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War.       


[Report, Mosby to Stuart]
February 1, 1864. 

   On Wednesday, January 6, having previously reconnoitered in person the 
position of the enemy, I directed Lieutenant Turner, with a detachment of 
about 30 men, to attack an outpost of the enemy in the vicinity of 
Warrenton, which he did successfully, routing a superior force of the 
enemy, killing and wounding several, and capturing 18 prisoners and 42 
horses, with arms, equipments, etc.

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   On Saturday, January 9, having learned through Frank Stringfellow 
(Stuart's scout), that Cole's (Maryland) Cavalry was encamping on Loudon 
Heights, with no supports but infantry, which was about one-half mile off, 
I left Upperville with about 100 men in hopes of being able to completely 
surprise his camp by a night attack. By marching my command by file, along 
a narrow path, I succeeded in gaining a position in the rear of the enemy, 
between their camp and the Ferry. On reaching this point, without creating 
any alarm, I deemed that the crisis had passed, and the capture of the 
enemy a certainty. I had exact information up to dark of that evening of 
the number of the enemy (which was between 175 and 200), the position of 
their headquarters, etc. When within 200 yards of the camp, I sent 
Stringfellow on ahead with about 10 men to capture Major Cole and staff, 
whose headquarters were in a house about 100 yards from their camp, while 
I halted to close up my command. The camp was buried in a profound sleep; 
there was not a sentinel awake. All my plans were on the eve of 
consummation, when suddenly the party sent with Stringfellow came dashing 
over the hill toward the camp, yelling and shooting. They had made no 
attempt to secure Cole. Mistaking them for the enemy, I ordered my men to 
charge.

   In the meantime the enemy had taken the alarm, and received us with a 
volley from their carbines. A severe fight ensued, in which they were 
driven from their camp, but, taking refuge in the surrounding houses, kept 
up a desultory firing. Confusion and 

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delay having ensued from the derangement of my plans, consequent on the 
alarm given to the enemy, rendered it hazardous to continue in my 
position, as reinforcements were near the enemy. Accordingly, I ordered 
the men to retire, which was done in good order, bringing off 6 prisoners, 
and between 50 and 60 horses.

   My loss was severe; more so in the worth than the number of the slain. 
It was 4 killed, 7 wounded (of whom 4 have since died), and 1 captured. A 
published list of the enemy's loss gives it at 5 killed and 13 wounded. 
Among those who fell on this occasion were Capt. William R. Smith and 
Lieutenant Turner, two of the noblest and bravest officers of this army, 
who thus sealed a life of devotion and of sacrifice to the cause they 
loved.

   In numerous other affairs with the enemy, between 75 and 100 horses and 
mules have been captured, about 40 men killed, wounded, and captured. A 
party of this command also threw one of the enemy's trains off the track, 
causing a great smash up.

[Indorsement]
Headquarters Cavalry Corps, 

Respectfully forwarded. February 9, 1864. 
   The conduct of Major Mosby is warmly commended to the notice of the 
commanding general. His sleepless vigilance and unceasing activity have 
done the enemy great damage. He keeps a large force of the enemy's cavalry 
continually employed in Fairfax in 

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the vain effort to suppress his inroads. His exploits are not surpassed in 
daring and enterprise by those of petite guerre in any age. Unswerving 
devotion to duty, self-abnegation, and unflinching courage, with a quick 
perception and appreciation of the opportunity, are the characteristics of 
this officer. Since I first knew him, in 1861, he has never once alluded 
to his own rank or promotion; thus far it has come by the force of his own 
merit. While self-consciousness of having done his duty well is the 
patriot soldier's best reward, yet the evidence of the appreciation of his 
country is a powerful incentive to renewed effort, which should not be 
undervalued by those who have risen to the highest point of military and 
civic eminence. That evidence is promotion. If Major Mosby has not won it, 
no more can daring deeds essay to do it . . .

J. E. B. Stuart, Major-General. 

   [One of those wounded in a fight at Dranesville, February 22, was Baron 
von Massow, who later became the Chief of Cavalry in the Imperial German 
Army. Von Massow was the son of the chamberlain to the King of Prussia and 
came to America to see some fighting. He offered his services to General 
Stuart who sent him to Mosby. In the Dranesville fight Mosby's command 
charged a California regiment from two directions and routed it. The Baron 
was fighting 

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with the rest when he espied Captain Reid of the Californians. Von Massow 
made a rush at Reid, as if he were about to chop his head off with his 
sword - the Prussian clung to the sword in a fight instead of using a 
revolver, as did the rest of Mosby's men. Captain Reid was caught so that 
he could not defend himself and made a motion which the Baron interpreted 
as a sign of surrender. The latter signed for Reid to go to the rear and 
rode on into the mêlée. As he turned his back Reid drew a revolver and 
shot him. At almost the same instant Captain Chapman, who had seen the 
incident and divined the Californian's intention to shoot, drew his 
revolver and shot Captain Reid. Reid was instantly killed, and Von Massow 
was so seriously injured that he was never able to rejoin Mosby's command.]


[Report, Mosby to Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, Assistant Adjutant-General]

September 11, 1864. 

   On March 10th with a detachment of about 40 men, I defeated a superior 
force of the enemy's cavalry near Greenwich, severely wounding 3, and 
capturing 9 prisoners, 10 horses, arms, etc. On the same day Lieut. A. E. 
Richards, with another detachment of about 30 men, surprised an outpost of 
the enemy 

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near Charles Town, killed the major commanding and a lieutenant, several 
privates, and brought off 21 prisoners with their horses, arms, etc. In 
neither engagement did my command sustain any loss.

   During the months of March and April but few opportunities were offered 
for making any successful attacks on the enemy, the continual annoyances 
to which they had been subjected during the winter causing them to exert 
great vigilance in guarding against surprises and interruptions of their 
communications. During most of these months I was myself engaged in 
scouting in the enemy's rear for Major-General Stuart and collecting 
information which was regularly transmitted to his headquarters, 
concerning the movements, numbers, and distribution of the enemy's forces 
both east and west of the Blue Ridge. During this time my men were mostly 
employed in collecting forage from the country bordering on the Potomac.

   About April 15, Captain Richards routed a marauding party of the 
enemy's cavalry at Waterford, killing and wounding 5 or 6 and bringing off 
6 or 8 prisoners, 15 horses, arms, etc.

   About April 25 I attacked an outpost near Hunter's Mills, in Fairfax, 
capturing 5 prisoners and 18 horses. The prisoners and horses were sent 
back under charge of Lieutenant Hunter, while I went off on a scout in 
another direction. The enemy pursued and captured the lieutenant and 6 of 
the horses.

   About May 1st, with a party of 10 men, I captured 8 of Sigel's wagons 
near Bunker Hill, in the Valley. but was only able to bring off the horses 
attached (34 

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in number) and about 20 prisoners. The horses and prisoners were sent 
back, while with another detachment of 20 men who had joined me I 
proceeded to Martinsburg, which place we entered that night, while 
occupied by several hundred Federal troops, and brought off 15 horses and 
several prisoners.

   Returning to my command, I learned that General Grant had crossed the 
Rapidan. With about 40 men I moved down the north bank of the Rappahannock 
to assail his communications wherever opened, and sent two other 
detachments, under Captains Richards and Chapman, to embarrass Sigel as 
much as possible. Captain Richards had a skirmish near Winchester in which 
several of them were killed and wounded. Captain Chapman attacked a wagon 
train, which was heavily guarded, near Strassburg, capturing about 30 
prisoners with an equal number of horses, etc. Near Belle Plain, in King 
George, I captured an ambulance train and brought off about 75 horses and 
mules, and 40 prisoners, etc.

   A few days after I made a second attempt near the same place, but 
discovered that my late attack had caused them to detach such a heavy 
force to guard their trains and line of communication that another 
successful attack on them was impracticable.

   About May 10 I attacked a cavalry outpost in the vicinity of Front 
Royal, capturing 1 captain and 15 men and 75 horses and sustained no loss.

   About May 20, with about 150 men, I moved to the vicinity of Strassburg 
with the view of capturing the wagon trains of General Hunter, who had 
then 

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moved up the Valley. When the train appeared I discovered that it was 
guarded by about 600 infantry and 100 cavalry. A slight skirmish ensued 
between their cavalry and a part of my command, in which their cavalry was 
routed with a loss of 8 prisoners and horses, besides several killed, but 
falling back on their infantry, my men in turn fell back, with a loss of 1 
killed. While we did not capture the train, one great object had been 
accomplished - the detachment of a heavy force to guard their 
communications. After the above affair, only one wagon train ever went up 
to Hunter, which was still more heavily guarded. He then gave up his line 
of communication.

   After the withdrawal of the enemy's forces from Northern Virginia, for 
several weeks but few opportunities were offered for any successful 
incursions upon them. Many enterprises on a small scale were, however, 
undertaken by detachments of the command, of which no note has been taken.

   About June 20 I moved into Fairfax and routed a body of cavalry near 
Centreville, killing and wounding 6 or 8, and capturing 31 prisoners, 
securing their horses, etc.

   A few days afterwards we took Duffield's Depot, on the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad; secured about 50 prisoners, including 2 lieutenants and a 
large number of stores. The train had passed a few minutes before we 
reached the place. On my way there I had left Lieutenant Nelson, 
commanding Company A, at Charles Town, for the purpose of intercepting and 
notifying me of any approach in my rear from Harper’s 

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Ferry. As I had anticipated, a body of cavalry, largely superior in 
numbers to his force, moved out from that point. Lieutenant Nelson 
gallantly charged and routed them, killing and wounding several and taking 
19 prisoners and 27 horses. We sustained no loss on this expedition.

   On July 4, hearing of General Early's movement down the Valley, I moved 
with my command east of the Blue Ridge for the purpose of coöperating with 
him and crossed the Potomac at Point of Rocks, driving out the garrison 
(250 men, strongly fortified) and securing several prisoners and horses. 
As I supposed it to be General Early's intention to invest Maryland 
Heights, I thought the best service I could render would be to sever all 
communication both by railroad and telegraph between that point and 
Washington, which I did, keeping it suspended for two days.

   As this was the first occasion on which I had used artillery [sic] the 
magnitude of the invasion was greatly exaggerated by the fears of the 
enemy, and panic and alarm spread through their territory. I desire 
especially to bring to the notice of the commanding general the 
unsurpassed gallantry displayed by Captain Richards, commanding First 
Squadron. Our crossing was opposed by a body of infantry stationed on the 
Maryland shore. Dismounting a number of sharpshooters, whom I directed to 
wade the river above the point held by the enemy, I superintended in 
person the placing of my piece of artillery in position at the same time 
directing Captain Richards whenever the enemy had been dislodged by the 

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sharpshooters and artillery, to charge across the river in order to effect 
their capture. The enemy were soon routed and Captain Richards charged 
over, but before he could overtake them they had retreated across the 
canal, pulling up the bridge in their rear. My order had not, of course, 
contemplated their pursuit into their fortifications, but the destruction 
of the bridge was no obstacle to his impetuous valor, and hastily 
dismounting and throwing down a few planks on the sills, he charged 
across, under a heavy fire from a redoubt. The enemy fled panic stricken, 
leaving in our possession their camp equipage, etc. . . .

   On the morning of July 6, while still encamped near the Potomac, 
information was received that a considerable force of cavalry was at 
Leesburg. I immediately hastened to meet them. At Leesburg I learned that 
they had gone toward Aldie, and I accordingly moved on the road to Ball's 
Mill in order to intercept them returning to their camp in Fairfax, which 
I succeeded in doing, meeting them at Mount Zion Church, and completely 
routing them, with a loss of about 80 of their officers and men left dead 
and severely wounded on the field, besides 57 prisoners. Their loss 
includes a captain and lieutenant killed and 1 lieutenant severely 
wounded; the major commanding and 2 lieutenants prisoners. We also secured 
all their horses, arms, etc.

   My loss was 1 killed and 6 wounded - none dangerously.

   After this affair the enemy never ventured, in two months after, the 
experiment of another raid through that portion of our district.

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   A few days afterward I again crossed the Potomac in coöperation with 
General Early, and moved through Poolesville, Md., for the purpose of 
capturing a body of cavalry encamped near Seneca. They retreated, however, 
before we reached there, leaving all their camp equipage and a 
considerable amount of stores. We also captured 30 head of beef cattle.

   When General Early fell back from before Washington I recrossed the 
Potomac, near Seneca, moving thence to the Little River Pike in order to 
protect him from any movement up the south side of the river. The enemy 
moved through Leesburg in pursuit of General Early and occupied Ashby's 
and Snicker's Gaps. I distributed my command so as to most effectually 
protect the country. These detachments - under Captains Richards and 
Chapman and Lieutenants Glasscock, Nelson, and Hatcher - while they kept 
the enemy confined to the main thoroughfares and restrained their ravages, 
killed and captured about 300, securing their horses, etc. My own 
attention was principally directed to ascertaining the numbers and 
movements of the enemy and forwarding the information to General Early, 
who was then in the Valley.

   At the time of the second invasion of Maryland by General Early, I 
moved my command to the Potomac, crossed over 3 companies at Cheek's and 
Noland's Fords, while the remaining portion was kept in reserve on this 
side with the artillery, which was posted on the south bank to keep open 
the fords, keeping one company, under Lieutenant Williams, near the ford, 
on the north bank. Two were sent under Lieutenant 

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Nelson, to Adamstown, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, for the purpose 
of intercepting the trains from Baltimore, destroying their 
communications, etc. Apprehending a movement up the river from a 
considerable body of cavalry which I knew to be stationed below, I 
remained with a portion of the command guarding the fords.

   Lieutenant Nelson reached the road a few minutes too late to capture 
the train, but destroyed two telegraph lines. On his return he met a force 
of the enemy's cavalry, near Monocacy, which was charged and routed by the 
gallant Lieutenant Hatcher, who took about 15 men and horses, besides 
killing and wounding several.

   We recrossed the river in the evening, bringing about 75 horses and 
between 20 and 30 prisoners.

   Our loss, 2 missing.

   [The battle at Mount Zion attracted great attention at the time - 
especially in the North, and made the already redoubtable figure of Mosby 
an altogether awe-inspiring one. The capture of Major Forbes, "Colonel 
Lowell's fighting Major", was also an important incident in Mosby's life, 
as here began the lifelong friendship between the two families.

   The story of the battle was well told in the official report of Colonel 
Charles R. Lowell, Jr., Second Massachusetts Cavalry. The report reads :]

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Near Falls Church, Va., July 8, 1864. 

   I have the honor to report Major Forbes' scout as completely as is yet 
possible. I have not talked with Lieutenant Kuhls or Captain Stone, who is 
badly wounded, but send what I learned on the ground.

   Major Forbes left here with 150 men (100 Second Massachusetts Cavalry, 
50 Thirteenth New York Cavalry) Monday, P.M. Tuesday, A.M., went through 
Aldie, and found all quiet toward the Gaps. Tuesday, P.M., went by Ball's 
Mill to Leesburg. Heard of Mosby's raid at Point of Rocks, and learned 
that he had sent four or five wagons of plunder through Leesburg, under a 
guard of about 60 men, the afternoon before. Heard nothing of any other 
force this side of the ridge. He returned that night to the south of Goose 
Creek, as directed, and, on Wednesday, A.M., went again by Ball's Mill to 
Leesburg. Still heard nothing of Mosby or any force. From what I learned 
from citizens, I think Mosby passed between Leesburg and the Potomac some 
time on Tuesday, crossed Goose Creek, and moved westward toward Aldie on 
Wednesday; learned of Major Forbes' second visit to Leesburg, and laid in 
ambush for him at Ball's Mill. Major Forbes returned from Leesburg by 
Centre's Mill (4 miles above), came down by Aldie, and halted for two or 
three hours about one and a half miles east, on the Little River Pike; 
when Mosby learned this he moved south and struck the pike about one and a 
quarter miles east of the Major's position, being hidden till he had 
reached about half a mile west on the pike. 

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Major Forbes was duly notified by his advance guard, mounted his men, and 
moved them from the north to the south of the pike. As the rear was 
crossing, Mosby fired one shell from his 12-pounder, which burst entirely 
too high. As Major Forbes formed on the south, his advance guard, which 
had dismounted and fired as Mosby came up, fell back, still keeping a 
little north of the pike, and took an excellent position somewhat on the 
flank. Up to this time, I think, all the dispositions were admirable. 
Major Forbes' two squadrons were formed, his third squadron and rear guard 
not formed but nearly so, and no confusion. Mosby's men, who were not in 
any order, but were down the road in a "nick," had just reached the fence 
corner some 225 yards off, and a few had dismounted, under a fire from the 
advanced guard, to take down the fence. When two panels of the fence were 
down the men trotted through for about 75 yards, and came gradually down 
to a walk, and almost halted. Major Forbes' first platoon was ordered to 
fire with carbines. Here was the first mistake. It created confusion among 
the horses, and the squadron in the rear added to it by firing a few 
pistol shots. Had the order been given to draw sabres and charge, the 
rebels would never have got their gun off, but I think Major Forbes, 
seeing how uneasy his horses were at the firing, must have intended to 
dismount some of his men. At any rate, he attempted to move the first 
squadron by the right flank. The rebels saw their chance, gave a yell, and 
our men, in the confusion of the moment, broke. The two rear squadrons 
went off in confusion. Attempts 

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were made, with some success, to rally parts of the first squadron in the 
next field, and again near Little River Church, one mile off.

   Captain Stone was wounded here, and I believe all the non-commissioned 
officers of A and L Companies present were wounded or killed. There was 
little gained. I have only to report a perfect rout and a chase for five 
to seven miles. We lost Major Forbes, Lieutenant Amory, and Mr. Humphreys 
(Chaplain), from Second Massachusetts, and Lieutenant Burns, Thirteenth 
New York Cavalry, prisoners, all unhurt. Captain Stone, Second 
Massachusetts, and Lieutenant Schuyler, Thirteenth New York, very badly 
wounded. Lieutenant Kuhls alone came safely to camp. Of men, we lost, 
killed outright, 7, Second Massachusetts; 5, Thirteenth New York: wounded, 
we brought in 27 and left 10 too bad to move. I fear of the wounded at 
least 12 will die. About 40 others have come to camp half mounted, and 
Mosby reported to have 44 prisoners; quite a number, you will see, still 
unaccounted for. Some of them are probably wounded, and some still on 
their way to camp, and others will be made prisoners.

   Mosby went up toward Upperville with his prisoners and his dead and 
wounded about midnight Wednesday. I reached the ground about 11.30 A.M. 
and remained in plain sight for about three hours; then searched through 
all the woods and moved to Centreville, where I again waited an hour in 
hopes some stragglers would Join us. We only picked up half a dozen, 
however.

   The soldiers and citizens all speak in high terms of 

Page 282

the gallantry of the officers; Major Forbes especially remained in the 
first field till every man had left it, emptied his revolver, and, in the 
second field, where Company A tried to stand, he disabled one man with his 
sabre, and lunged through Colonel Mosby's coat. His horse was then killed 
and fell on his leg, pinning him till he was compelled to surrender.

   More than 100 horses were taken. Accoutrements, arms, etc., will also 
be missing. I cannot yet give the precise number.

   Mosby's force is variously estimated at from 175 to 200, Mrs. Davis and 
her daughter putting it at 250 to 300 men. I think he had probably about 
200. What his loss is I cannot say, as he picked up all his dead and 
wounded and took them off in the night. The Union people in Aldie report 
that he took them in five wagons. A wounded sergeant reports hearing the 
names of 3 or 4 spoken of as killed; one mortally wounded man was left on 
the ground. [Mosby actually lost seven men wounded. His force was about 
175 men.] I think the chance was an excellent one to whip Mosby and take 
his gun. I have no doubt Major Forbes thought so, too, as the wounded men 
say there was not enough difference in numbers to talk about. The chance 
was lost.



Page 283

CHAPTER XIV 
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SHERIDAN
   ACCORDING to Grant's design, Sheridan left his base at Harper's Ferry 
on August 10, 1864, and started up the Shenandoah Valley. Grant's main 
object was to cut Lee's line of communication with the southwest, for, if 
this were accomplished, the inevitable result would be the fall of 
Richmond and the end of the war. It was immaterial whether Sheridan 
secured this result by defeating Early - who was defending the Valley - in 
battle or by pushing him south by flank movements.

   During this campaign of 1864, my battalion of six companies was the 
only force operating in the rear of Sheridan's army in the Shenandoah 
Valley. Our rendezvous was along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, in 
what is known as the Piedmont region of Virginia. Fire and sword could not 
drive the people of that neighborhood from their allegiance to what they 
thought was 

Page 284

right, and in the gloom of disaster and defeat they never wavered in their 
support of the Confederate cause. The main object of my campaign was to 
vex and embarrass Sheridan and, if possible, to prevent his advance into 
the interior of the State. But my exclusive attention was not given to 
Sheridan, for alarm was kept up continuously by threatening Washington and 
occasionally crossing the Potomac. We lived on the country where we 
operated and drew nothing from Richmond except the gray jackets my men 
wore. We were mounted, armed, and equipped entirely off the enemy, but, as 
we captured a great deal more than we could use, the surplus was sent to 
supply Lee's army. The mules we sent him furnished a large part of his 
transportation, and the captured sabres and carbines were turned over to 
his cavalry - we had no use for them.

   I believe I was the first cavalry commander who discarded the sabre as 
useless and consigned it to museums for the preservation of antiquities. 
My men were as little impressed by a body of cavalry charging them with 
sabres as though they had been armed with cornstalks. In the Napoleonic 
wars cavalry might sometimes ride down infantry armed with muzzle-loaders 
and 

Page 285

flintlocks, because the infantry would be broken by the momentum of the 
charge before more than one effective fire could be delivered. At Eylau 
the French cavalry rode over the Russians in a snowstorm because the 
powder of the infantry was wet and they were defenseless. Fixed ammunition 
had not been invented. I think that my command reached the highest point 
of efficiency as cavalry because they were well armed with two six-
shooters and their charges combined the effect of fire and shock. We were 
called bushwhackers, as a term of reproach, simply because our attacks 
were generally surprises, and we had to make up by celerity for lack of 
numbers. Now I never resented the epithet of "bushwhacker" - although 
there was no soldier to whom it applied less - because bushwhacking is a 
legitimate form of war, and it is just as fair and equally heroic to fire 
at an enemy from behind a bush as a breastwork or from the casemate of a 
fort.

   The Union cavalry who met us in combat knew that we always fought on 
the offensive in a mounted charge and with a pair of Colt's revolvers. I 
think we did more than any other body of men to give the Colt pistol its 
great reputation. A writer on the history of cavalry cites 

Page 286

as an example of the superiority of the revolver a fight that a squadron 
of my command, under Captain Dolly(1) Richards, had in the Shenandoah 
Valley, in which more of the enemy were killed than the entire total by 
sabre in the Franco-Prussian War. But, to be effective, the pistol must, 
of course, be used at close quarters.

   As I have said, during this campaign our operations were not confined 
to this valley. The troops belonging to the defences of Washington and 
guarding the line of the Potomac were a portion of Sheridan's command. To 
prevent his being reinforced from this source, I made frequent attacks on 
the outposts in Fairfax and demonstrations along the Potomac. The Eighth 
Illinois Cavalry, the largest and regarded as the finest regiment in the 
Army of the Potomac, had been brought back to Washington, largely 
recruited, and stationed at Seneca (or Muddy Branch) on the river above 
Washington. There were a number of other detachments of cavalry on the 
Maryland side, and two regiments of cavalry in Fairfax. General Augur 
commanded at Washington. Stevenson, at Harper's Ferry, had nine thousand 
men, who were expected

(1. Adolphus E. Richards.)

Page 287

to keep employed in watching the canal and railroad.

   Sheridan wanted to take the Eighth Illinois to the Valley, but Augur 
objected, on the ground that they could not be spared from Washington.


[Sheridan to Augur]
       Harper's Ferry, August 8, 1864. [The day after Sheridan took formal 
command of the Army of the Shenandoah.]    What force have you at 
Edwards's and Noland's ferries? (On the Potomac.) Where is Colonel Lazelle 
posted? Mosby has about 200 cavalry at, or near, Point of Rocks.


[Augur to Sheridan]
Washington, D.C., August 3. 

   Colonel Lazelle is posted at Falls Church (Fairfax County) and pickets 
from the Potomac near Difficult Creek to Orange and Alexandria Railroad. 
Major Waite (Eighth Illinois) has near 600 cavalry along the Potomac from 
Great Falls to the mouth of the Monocacy watching the different fords.


[Sheridan to Augur]
August 8th. 

   Can the Eighth Illinois Cavalry be spared? I find that the cavalry has 
been so scattered up here that it is no wonder that it has not done so 
well.

Page 288

[Augur to Sheridan]
August 8th. 

   The Eighth Illinois is scattered worse than anything you have. The 
headquarters of six companies are in General Wallace's department. Major 
Waite, with four companies, is guarding the Potomac between Great Falls 
and the Monocacy; another company is near Port Tobacco, and another is 
with the Army of the Potomac. I do not see how Major Waite's command can 
be spared, as I have no cavalry to replace it.


[Sheridan to Augur]
August 8th. 

   Your dispatch in reference to the Eighth Illinois received. Colonel 
Lowell left about 600 men of Gregg's cavalry division in support of Major 
Waite. They moved this morning towards the mouth of the Monocacy, and will 
remain in that vicinity. I will not change the Eighth Illinois Cavalry for 
the present.


[Augur to Waite]
Upper Potomac, August 8th. 

   General Sheridan reports that Mosby, with about 300 men, is at or near 
the Point of Rocks. Look out well for him.


[Taylor to Augur]
August 10th. 

   General Sheridan has ordered concentration of the Eighth Illinois 
Cavalry at Muddy Branch to picket 

Page 289

the river from Monocacy to Washington. The river is well guarded from 
mouth of Monocacy to Harper's Ferry.


[Sheridan to Augur]
Charles Town, August 18th. 

   Keep scouts out in Loudon County. I have ordered the Eighth Illinois 
Cavalry to rendezvous at Muddy Branch Station. The line of the Potomac 
should be watched carefully, and information be sent to me should any 
raiding parties attempt to cross.


[Augur to Waite]
August 18th. 

   Mosby is reported to have within reach and control from 400 to 500 men 
and two pieces of artillery. It will be necessary for you to move with the 
utmost caution.

   General Lee apprehended a raid by the cavalry from Washington on the 
Central Railroad, and instructed me, if possible, to prevent it. The only 
way that I could do so was to excite continual alarm in their camps. Their 
outposts were often attacked all along their lines on the same night. This 
was the only way we could keep them at home. On the same day three or four 
different detachments would go out; some to operate on Sheridan west of 
the ridge, some to 

Page 290

keep Augur in remembrance of his duty to guard the Capital.

   Sheridan was obviously greatly solicitous about preserving his 
communications, for he knew that they were weak and a vital necessity for 
his army He evidently had some information which increased his anxiety 
about his rear. One night, when his headquarters were at Berryville, I 
sent my best scout, John Russell, with two or three men, to reconnoitre, 
intending to deliver a blow at Sheridan's rear and thus cripple him by 
cutting off his supplies. John reported long trains passing down along the 
valley pike. I started for the vicinity with some 250 men and two 
howitzers, one of which became an encumbrance by breaking down. Through 
Snicker's Gap we crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains after sundown and passed 
over the Shenandoah River not far from Berryville. I halted at a barn for 
a good rest and sent Russell to see what was going on upon the pike. I was 
asleep when he returned with the news that a very large train was just 
passing along. The men sprang to their saddles. With Russell and some 
others I went on in advance to choose the best place for attack, directing 
Captain William Chapman to bring on the command. About sunrise we were on 
a knoll from 

Page 291

which we could get a good view of a great train of wagons moving along the 
road and a large drove of cattle with the train. The train was within a 
hundred yards of us, strongly guarded, but with flankers out. We were 
obscured by the mist, and, if noticed at all, were doubtless thought to be 
friends. I sent Russell to hurry up Chapman, who soon arrived. The 
howitzer was made ready. Richards, with his squadron, was sent to attack 
the front; William Chapman and Glasscock were to attack them in the rear, 
while Sam Chapman was kept near me and the howitzer.

   My scheme was nearly ruined by a ludicrous incident, the fun of which 
is more apparent now than it was then. The howitzer was unlimbered over a 
yellow-jacket's nest. When one of the men had rescued the howitzer, a 
shell was sent screaming among the wagons, beheading a mule. The shot was 
like thunder from a clear sky, and the mist added to the enemy's 
perplexity. This shot was our signal to charge, and we met little 
resistance. Panic reigned along their line, and I only lost two men killed 
and three wounded. Before the fighting ended, as I knew that the guard 
would soon recover from the panic, I had men unhitching mules, burning 
wagons, and hurrying 

Page 292

prisoners and spoils to the rear. There were 325 wagons, guarded by 
Kenly's brigade and a large force of cavalry. They had not stopped to find 
out our numbers. We set a paymaster's wagon on fire, which contained - 
this we did not know at the time - $125,000. I deployed skirmishers as a 
mask, until my command, the prisoners, and booty were well across the 
Shenandoah River. We took between 500 and 600 horses, 200 beeves, and many 
useful stores; destroyed seventy-five loaded wagons, and carried off 200 
prisoners, including seven officers.

   The following dispatches illustrate the character and effect of my 
partisan operations in Sheridan's rear.


[Stevenson to Sheridan]
Harper's Ferry, Aug. 17th. 

   Finding all trains threatened by guerillas, and that they are in force, 
largely increased by a concentration of several organizations under Mosby 
[there had been no such concentration], making the vicinity of Charles 
Town their theater of operations, I am of opinion that the only safety of 
our trains and couriers is the posting of a force at Charles Town, with 
General Duffie, at Berryville, and one thousand of Averell's force at 
Charles Town, with orders by constant scouting told, keep the country 
clear. I think we can send forward 

Page 293

everything without loss. As matters now stand no small party of trains 
with small guard is safe.


[Stevenson to Averell]
August 17th. 

   Rebels occupy Charles Town (in Sheridan's rear) with small force this 
evening. Attacked party of couriers coming in about five o'clock, 
capturing two of them; heard nothing of your command. A large supply train 
will start from here in the morning, so as to reach Charles Town by 6 A.M. 
Have but a small guard. If you could have a force at that point before the 
train to join escort and move with it to Berryville, it would secure the 
safety of train. Mosby, with his command, is waiting to attack train, and 
will capture it, if possible. The supplies are needed at the front, and 
will be put through by all means.


[Lazelle to Augur]
Fairfax County, August 9th. 

   I have the honor to report that two parties sent out from this command, 
consisting of thirty men each, met yesterday afternoon at Fairfax Station, 
and that while united and acting together were attacked by a force of 
rebels, variously estimated at from forty to fifty men, and were 
completely dispersed and routed. Citizens report that Mosby himself was in 
command of the rebels. So far as known, our loss is as follows: Captain J. 
H. Fleming, Sixteenth New York Cavalry, missing; thirty-three men missing. 
Thirty-nine 

Page 294

horses missing. The number of the killed and wounded is not yet known. 
Captain Fleming, who at the time of the attack had command of the party, 
is reported killed.


[Captain Harrison to Kelly]
Martinsburg, August 14th. 

   Several of our scouts here say they cannot get through to Sheridan, 
Mosby having driven them back.


[Lazelle to De Russy]
Fairfax County, August 24th. 

   The attack at Annandale has ceased, and the rebels withdrew, perhaps 
with the intention of attacking some other part of my picket line. The 
attacking party is said to have consisted of from less than 200 to 300, 
even to 500 men, with two pieces of artillery, all under Mosby.


[Augur to Sheridan]
Washington, September 1st. 

   Major Waite has returned from Upperville, in the vicinity of Snicker's 
Gap; reports no rebel forces in that vicinity, except Mosby's.


[Lazelle to Augur]
September 1st. 

   Last night at about 10.30 o'clock one of our pickets was attacked near 
this camp; the attacking party was driven off, with a loss to the rebels 
of one horse, and it 

Page 295

is believed one man wounded. About the same hour the picket posts on the 
Braddock Road and on the road to Falls Church and Annandale, were attacked 
simultaneously and driven in. This morning at about 6 A.M., one of our 
pickets, about half a mile west of the village of Falls Church, was 
attacked and one vidette captured. Late to-day two of our picket posts 
between here and Annandale were attacked at about the same time by a force 
of between twenty and thirty men. Five men were captured and seven horses, 
while four men escaped. At about the same hour the picket post on the 
Little River pike, towards Fairfax Court House, from Annandale, was 
attacked, and one sergeant and a horse were wounded; two men and three 
horses captured.


[Augur to Lazelle]
September 1st. 

   I have reliable information that Mosby is still lying in the woods in 
front of your lines, and expects to make an attack to-night somewhere upon 
it. Please have all your men on duty notified of this, that they may be on 
their guard and take proper precautions. If not successful to-night, he 
proposes to remain until he strikes some important blow.


[Gansevoort to Augur]
Fairfax, September 19th. 

   Information considered very reliable has reached here to-day that in 
the skirmish with the Thirteenth 

Page 296

New York Cavalry, on the last scout of that regiment, Colonel Mosby was 
seriously wounded, a pistol bullet striking the handle of the pistol in 
his belt and glancing off in his groin. He was able, however, to ride off, 
but soon fainted, and was carried in a wagon to a place of safety.


[Lazelle to Augur]
September 29th. 

   Private Henry Smith, of Company H, Thirteenth New York Cavalry, is the 
man who wounded him (Mosby). It was a bold deed, and Smith deserves credit 
for it.


[Sheridan to Augur]
Strassburg, September 21st. 

   I wish you to send to Winchester all the available troops possible to 
the number of between four thousand to five thousand, without delay, to 
relieve the troops left there to guard my communication. If necessity 
should require, they can be returned at short notice.


[Stevenson to Stanton]
Harper's Ferry, Sept. 26th. 

   Both of my last courier parties were attacked by Rebel cavalry; 
dispersed part of them, capturing the first party at Strassburg, the 
second at a point between Charles Town and Bunker Hill. Message No. 31 was 
sent by both parties, and both have failed. I shall try another duplicate 
to-night. The country between 

Page 297

this and Sheridan yesterday and to-day seemed to be alive with parties of 
Rebel guerillas and cavalry. Last night they attacked ambulances with 
scout of seventeen men between this and Charles Town; severely wounded 
Sergeant of Sixteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. I doubt if we should be able 
to get any dispatches through without sending much larger body of cavalry 
than I can get hold of. I have but small force for such duty, and it is 
badly worn down.


[Edwards to Neil]
Martinsburg-Winchester, Oct. 2d. 

   The train that left Martinsburg arrived here last night. I have no 
forces here to escort it to the front, except 400 cavalry (and 100 of 
these cannot be relied on); also, some straggling infantry, without 
organization, numbering 300 men. I have detained the train here on account 
of insufficiency in men to properly guard it. A train of its size to go 
through the country where it has to should have an escort of at least 2000 
men with it. Captain Blazer, of the Independent Scouts, comes in this 
morning and reports Mosby's command hovering in the neighborhood of 
Newtown, etc. No escort with dispatches can get through with less than 500 
cavalry.


[Stevenson to Stanton]
Harper's Ferry, Oct. 1st. 

   There are no organized troops of enemy in Valley this side of Staunton, 
except Mosby's guerillas.

Page 298

[Neil to Stanton]
Martinsburg, September 30th. 

   About 300 or 400 guerillas are operating between Winchester and Bunker 
Hill. I do not consider my post safe unless I have stronger force to 
protect the large amount of Government property rapidly collecting here.

   As the Federal dispatches said, I was wounded on September 14, four 
days before the battle of Winchester. But it was hardly the bold deed 
Lazelle described. Two of my men, Tom Love and Guy Broadwater, and myself 
met five of the enemy's cavalry in Fairfax. As we were within a few yards 
of each other, we all fired at the same time. Two of the enemy's horses 
fell dead, and I was seriously wounded. The other three cavalry then fled 
full speed with Love and Broadwater after them until I called them back to 
my assistance. We then left the other men under the dead horses, and I was 
carried, for safety, to my father's home near Lynchburg. Captain William 
Chapman commanded my battalion during my absence.

   On the day after I was wounded, 400 of Sheridan's cavalry came over the 
Blue Ridge at night, expecting, by aid of a spy, to capture a good many of 
my men. The expedition was 

Page 299

commanded by General George H. Chapman of Indianapolis. He caught several 
of my men and started back, with Captain Chapman in pursuit of the 
General. Captain Chapman did not go on his trail, but took a road running 
along the top of the Blue Ridge in order to intercept the Union troops 
before they got to the Shenandoah River. It was an excessively hot day and 
the Union troops had ridden all night. The General had heard of my being 
wounded and may have calculated that my command was disorganized or would 
be less active. So when the troops reached Snicker's Gap, all lay down in 
the shade and went to sleep. Captain Chapman soon came plunging down the 
mountainside like an avalanche and was firing among the men before they 
were awake. They had not expected an enemy to come like a bolt from the 
sky, and the attack caused a general stampede. All the prisoners were 
recaptured, and many of the enemy were killed, wounded, and captured.

   General Chapman returned to camp and wrote in his report:

   About an hour had elapsed and the men had mostly fallen asleep, when 
they were suddenly charged upon by a force of from fifty to eighty of the 
enemy, and, being stampeded by the surprise, a number were 

Page 300

killed, wounded, and captured before I reached the scene of the encounter 
with the main body. They had approached the Gap across the mountains and 
charged down an easy slope, and they retired the same way, pursued for two 
miles by my men. It was near sundown, and in the exhausted state of men 
and horses, I did not deem further pursuit expedient.

   Captain Tompson had captured twelve of the enemy but they were 
recaptured. From citizens I ascertained that Mosby was wounded some time 
ago and had gone to Richmond. Judging from indications, I should estimate 
the force operating under Mosby and his colleague at from 200 to 250. If 
they have any encampment it must be in the neighborhood and beyond 
Upperville.

   It will be observed that General Chapman did not say that he was 
bushwhacked.

   But these constant raids aroused the Federal officers to such an extent 
that on September 22 they attempted to take revenge by hanging some of my 
men.

   An eye witness described the scene in a Confederate newspaper as 
follows:

   The Yankee Cavalry, under General Torbert, entered the town (Front 
Royal), and drove out the four Confederates on picket, who fell back to 
Milford. At this latter point General Wickham met the Yankee force and 
repulsed it. A part of Mosby's men, under 

Page 301

Captain Chapman, annoyed the enemy very much on their return to Front 
Royal, which, with the mortification of their defeat by Wickham, excited 
them to such savage doings as to prompt them to murder six of our men who 
fell into their hands. Anderson, Overby, Love, and Rhodes were shot and 
Carter and one other, whose name our informant did not recollect, were 
hung to the limb of a tree at the entrance of the village. . . . Henry 
Rhodes was quite a youth, living with his widowed mother and supporting 
her by his labor. He did not belong to Mosby's command. His mother 
entreated them to spare the life of her son and treat him as a prisoner of 
war, but the demons answered by whetting their sabres on some stones and 
declaring they would cut his head off and hers too, if she came near. They 
ended by shooting him in her presence. The murders were committed on the 
22nd day of September, Generals Torbert, Merritt, and Custer being 
present. It is said that Torbert and Merritt turned the prisoners over to 
Custer for the purpose of their execution.

   An account in the Richmond Examiner was as follows:

   On Friday last Mosby's men attacked a wagon train, which was protected 
by a whole brigade, so that their charge was repelled with the loss of six 
prisoners. Two of their prisoners the Yankees immediately hung to a 
neighboring tree, placing around their necks placards bearing the 
inscription, 'Hung in retaliation 

Page 302

for the Union officer killed after he had surrendered - the fate of 
Mosby's men.' The other four of our prisoners were tied to stakes and 
mercilessly shot through the skull, each one individually. One of those 
hung was a famous soldier named Overby, from Georgia. When the rope was 
placed around his neck by his inhuman captors, he told them that he was 
one of Mosby's men, and that he was proud to die as a Confederate soldier, 
and that his death was sweetened with the assurance that Colonel Mosby 
would swing in the wind ten Yankees for every man they murdered.

   This action on the part of the enemy led to my writing the following 
letter: 

November 11, 1864. 

Major General P. H. Sheridan, 
Commanding U. S. Forces in the Valley. 

General: 
   Some time in the month of September, during my absence from my command, 
six of my men who had been captured by your forces, were hung and shot in 
the streets of Front Royal, by order and in the immediate presence of 
Brigadier-General Custer. Since then another (captured by a Colonel Powell 
on a plundering expedition into Rappahannock) shared a similar fate. A 
label affixed to the coat of one of the murdered men declared "that this 
would be the fate of Mosby and all his men."

   Since the murder of my men, not less than seven 

Page 303

hundred prisoners, including many officers of high rank, captured from 
your army by this command have been forwarded to Richmond; but the 
execution of my purpose of retaliation was deferred, in order, as far as 
possible, to confine its operation to the men of Custer and Powell. 
Accordingly, on the 6th instant, seven of your men were, by my order, 
executed on the Valley Pike - your highway of travel.

   Hereafter, any prisoners falling into my hands will be treated with the 
kindness due to their condition, unless some new act of barbarity shall 
compel me, reluctantly, to adopt a line of policy repugnant to humanity.

Very respectfully, 
your obedient servant, 
John S. Mosby, 
Lieut. Colonel. 

   No further "acts of barbarity" were committed on my men.

   Although Sheridan defeated Early in the battle at Winchester, on 
September 19, 1864, and was urged by Grant to move on south, press Early, 
and end the war, he really made no farther progress and spent the winter, 
with an overwhelming force, where he had won a victory in September. On 
September 23, after Fisher's Hill, Grant had telegraphed him, "Keep on and 
you will cause the fall of Richmond."

Page 304

   On the twenty-ninth Sheridan wrote to Grant from Harrisonburg:

   My impression is that most of the troops which Early had left passed 
through these mountains to Charlottesville. Kershaw's division came to his 
assistance and, I think, passed along the west base of the mountain to 
Waynesboro. The advance of my infantry is at Mount Crawford, eight miles 
south of Harrisonburg. From the most reliable accounts Early's army was 
completely broken up and dispirited. It will be exceedingly difficult for 
me to carry the infantry over the mountains and strike at the Central 
road. I cannot accumulate stores to do so, and think it best to take some 
position near Front Royal and operate with cavalry and infantry.

   In reply to Grant's dispatch a few days before he had said, "I am now 
about eighty miles from Martinsburg, and find it exceedingly difficult to 
supply this army."

   Grant rejoined:

   Your victories have caused the greatest consternation. If you can 
possibly subsist your army to the front for a few days more, do it, and 
make a great effort to destroy the roads about Charlottesville, and the 
canal wherever your cavalry can reach.

   If this advice had been acted on, Sheridan's army would have been 
thrown into the rear of General Lee. Grant did not, of course, mean 

Page 305

that Sheridan should stop at Charlottesville. He wanted him first to gain 
a foothold there, accumulate supplies by the Orange Railroad, and make it 
a new starting point for further operations.

   The Orange and Alexandria Railroad runs south by Gordonsville and 
Charlottesville to Lynchburg. From Manassas Junction - twenty-five miles 
from Washington - a branch road runs west through the Blue Ridge to Front 
Royal and Strassburg. It was assumed that if the Northern army held the 
Manassas Gap line, my command would retire south of the Rappahannock. In 
this way a double purpose would be effected; a more convenient line of 
supplies would be secured, as well as the annexation of more territory to 
the United States. The sequel shows that I had not been consulted.

   Without securing the fruits of his victory, on October 6 Sheridan began 
his retrograde movement, no doubt much to Grant's chagrin.

   On October 3 Grant telegraphed Sheridan:

   You may take up such position in the Valley as you think can and ought 
to be held, and send all the force not required for this immediately here. 
I will direct the Railroad to be pushed towards Front Royal, so that you 
may send our troops back that way.

Page 306

[Halleck to Sheridan]
October 3rd. 

   The Orange and Alexandria road was repaired to the Rappahannock, in the 
expectation that you would pursue the enemy through the mountains and 
receive your supplies from Culpeper. By General Grant's order, the workmen 
have been changed to the Manassas Gap road, which will be opened to Front 
Royal.

   On October 4 Halleck said to Grant, with reference to the opening and 
holding the railroad from Alexandria to Front Royal:

   In order to keep up my communication on this line to Manassas Gap and 
Shenandoah Valley, it will be necessary to send south all rebel 
inhabitants between that line and the Potomac, and also to clean out 
Mosby's gang of robbers, who have so long infested that district of 
country; and I respectfully suggest that Sheridan's cavalry should be 
required to accomplish this object before it is sent elsewhere. The two 
small regiments (Thirteenth and Sixteenth New York, stationed in Fairfax) 
under General Augur, have been so often cut up by Mosby's band that they 
are cowed and useless for that purpose. If these dispositions are approved 
and carried out, it will not be necessary to keep so large a force at 
Harper's Ferry and guarding the canal and Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

Page 307

   By sending some of Sheridan's troops to Grant, it was calculated that 
through the sudden augmentation of Grant's strength, he could make a 
successful assault on Lee at Petersburg before Early's troops could reach 
him, or to extend his lines so as to seize the Southside Railroad. This 
combination was defeated.

   The following dispatch (October 4) from Stevenson at Harper's Ferry, to 
Edwards at Winchester, is significant as showing the dangers that beset 
Sheridan's line of supply.

   Escorts with dispatches have to cut their way and generally lose half 
their men. I think a train of 200 wagons should have an escort of one 
thousand infantry and 500 cavalry going to the front. The train going out 
this morning will have nearly 1500 escort. I do not think I overestimate 
the danger between here and there.

   Although I was still on crutches, I had now resumed command of my men. 
On October 4 a body of infantry, with construction force, came up on the 
Manassas road; they could not have anticipated any resistance, as they had 
only a single company of cavalry for couriers, and General Augur did not 
accompany them. The next day I attacked this force, and General Lee 
reported the results to the Secretary of War:

Page 308

   Chaffin's Bluff, October 9, 1864.
   Hon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War:

   Colonel Mosby reports that a body of about a thousand of the enemy 
advanced up the Manassas road on the 4th, with trains of cars loaded with 
railroad material, and occupied Salem and Rectortown. He attacked them at 
Salem, defeating them, capturing fifty prisoners, all their baggage, camp 
equipage, stores, etc., and killed and wounded a considerable number. His 
loss, two wounded. The enemy is now entrenched at Rectortown, with two 
long trains of cars. The railroad is torn up and bridges burned in their 
rear, and all communications cut.

   All work repairing the railroad was stopped, and both the soldiers and 
workmen went to building stockades for their own safety. A courier was 
sent immediately to Gordonsville with a telegram to General Lee informing 
him of the movement on the railroad. In reply General Lee said, "Your 
success at Salem gives great satisfaction. Do all in your power to prevent 
reconstruction of the road."

   [The following undated fragment of letter to Mrs. Mosby probably refers 
to this action, - see page 331.]

    . . . at Salem, and completely routed them. Captured fifty prisoners, 
and all their baggage, tents, rations, etc. Yesterday in a fight near the 
Plains my 

Page 309

horse (or rather yours) ran entirely through the Yankees in a charge. He 
was badly shot and tumbled over me, but we whipped them. They are camped 
all along the railroad. Bowie, Ames, have both been killed. I don't think 
the Yankees will be here long. I will bring you all over as soon [as they 
leave the Manassas railroad].

   The intentions of the enemy were now plainly developed, and it was my 
duty to do all I could to defeat them. To do so with my slender means 
looked a good deal like going to sea in a saucer. The troops at Salem fled 
to Rectortown, where the railroad runs through a gorge. Here they took 
shelter. On the sixth and seventh we shelled them to keep them on the 
defensive. My guns could not be depressed sufficiently to do them much 
damage, but the enemy kept under cover.

   On the seventh of October, from Woodstock, Sheridan sent the following 
dispatch to General Grant:

   I commenced moving back yesterday morning. I would have preferred 
sending troops to you by the Baltimore and Ohio Road. It would have been 
the quickest and most concealed way of sending them. The keeping open of 
the road to Front Royal will require large guards to protect it against a 
very small number of partisan troops.

Page 310

   At the same time Sheridan requested Halleck not to send railroad 
transportation to Front Royal, as he might be delayed. It will be 
remembered that in his dispatch to General Grant on September 29, he had 
suggested falling back to Front Royal and operating from there as a base. 
Unless he used the railroad, his supplies would have to be brought by 
wagons from Harper's Ferry. On the same day he said to Halleck:

   I have been unable to communicate more frequently on account of the 
operations of guerillas in my rear. They have attacked every party, and I 
have sent my dispatches with a view of economizing as much as possible.

   Sheridan went to Front Royal to see to the embarkation of 10,000 troops 
for Grant, but he found nothing but a roadbed without iron. The troops 
remained there for three days waiting for Augur to build the road, but he 
could not do it; his troops had all they could do to take care of 
themselves, for my men were rather active those days.

   In the following dispatch to Halleck, Sheridan admitted that he did not 
use the railroad because Augur could not repair it:

Page 311

October 12th. 

   I have ordered the Sixth Corps (except one brigade now at Winchester) 
to march to Alexandria to-morrow morning. I have ordered General Augur to 
concentrate all his forces at Manassas Junction or Bull Run until he hears 
from me. He could not complete the railroad to Front Royal without 
additional forces from me, and to give him that force to do the work and 
transport the troops by rail to Alexandria would require more time.



Page 312

CHAPTER XV 
THE GREENBACK RAID
   THROUGHOUT the fall and winter of 1864 I kept up an incessant warfare 
on Sheridan and his communications. On October 12 I wrote to my wife:

Near Middleburg. 

My dearest Pauline: 
   I have been engaged in a perpetual strife with the Yankees ever since 
my arrival. They are now engaged in repairing the railroad (Manassas). I 
attacked a camp of 800. . . .

   As we operated in Sheridan's rear, the railroad that brought his 
supplies was his weak point and consequently our favorite object of 
attack. For security it had to be closely guarded by detachments of 
troops, which materially reduced his offensive strength. We kept watch for 
unguarded points, and the opportunity they offered was never lost.

   Early in October one of my best men, Jim Wiltshire, afterwards a 
prominent physician in 

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Baltimore, discovered and reported to me a gap through which we might 
penetrate between the guards and reach that railroad without exciting an 
alarm. It was a hazardous enterprise, as there were camps along the line 
and frequent communication between them, but I knew it would injure 
Sheridan to destroy a train and compel him to place stronger guards on the 
road. So I resolved to take the risk. Jim Wiltshire had a time-table and 
we knew the minute when the train was due and so timed our arrival that we 
would not have to wait long.

   There was great danger of our being discovered by the patrols on the 
road and our presence reported to the camps that were near. The situation 
was critical, but we were so buoyant with hope that we did not realize it. 
The western-bound passenger train was selected from the schedule as I knew 
it would create a greater sensation to burn it than any other; it was due 
about two o'clock in the morning. Wiltshire conducted us to a long, deep 
cut on the railroad. No patrol or picket was in sight. I preferred 
derailing the train in a cut to running it off an embankment, because 
there would be less danger of the passengers being hurt. People who travel 
on a railroad in a country where military operations are 

Page 314

going on take the risk of all these accidents of war. I was not conducting 
an insurance business on life or property.

   It was a lovely night, bright and clear, with a big Jack Frost on the 
ground. I believe that I was the only member of my command who went 
through the war without a watch, but all of my men had watches, and we 
knew it would not be long before the train would be due. Videttes were 
sent out, and the men were ordered to lie down on the bank of the railroad 
and keep quiet. We had ridden all day and were tired and sleepy, so we 
were soon peacefully dreaming. I laid my head in the lap of one of my men, 
Curg Hutchinson, and fell asleep. For some reason - I suppose it was 
because we were sleeping so soundly - we did not hear the train coming 
until it got up in the cut, and I was aroused and astounded by an 
explosion and a crash. As we had displaced a rail, the engine had run off 
the track, the boiler burst, and the air was filled with red-hot cinders 
and escaping steam. A. good description of the scene can be found in 
Dante's "Inferno." Above all could be heard the screams of the 
passengers - especially women. The catastrophe came so suddenly that my 
men at first seemed to be stunned and bewildered. Knowing that the 
railroad guards 

Page 315

would soon hear of it and that no time was to be lost, I ran along the 
line and pushed my men down the bank, ordering them to go to work pulling 
out the passengers and setting fire to the cars.

   By this time Curg Hutchinson had recovered from the shock and had 
jumped on the train. When the train came up, he was snoring and dreaming 
that he was in Hell; and when he was awakened by the crash, he found 
himself breathing steam and in a sparkling shower. He had no doubt then 
that his dream was not all a dream. But he recovered his senses when I 
gave him a push, and he slid down a bank.

   It did not take long to pull out the passengers. While all of this was 
going on, I stood on the bank giving directions to the men. One of them 
reported to me that a car was filled with Germans, and that they would not 
get out. I told him, "Set fire to the car and burn the Dutch, if they 
won't come out." They were immigrants going west to locate homesteads and 
did not understand a word of English, or what all this meant. They had 
through tickets and thought they had a right to keep their seats. There 
was a lot of New York Heralds on the train for Sheridan's army. So my men 
circulated the papers 

Page 316

through the train and applied matches. Suddenly there was a grand 
illumination. The Germans now took in the situation and came tumbling, all 
in a pile, out of the flames. I hope they all lived to be naturalized and 
get homes. They ought not to blame me, but Sheridan; it was his business, 
not mine, to protect them.

   While we were helping the passengers to climb the steep bank, one of my 
men, Cab Maddux, who had been sent off as a vidette to watch the road, 
came dashing up and cried out that the Yankees were coming. I immediately 
gave orders to mount quickly and form, and one was sent to find out if the 
report was true. He soon came back and said it was not. The men then 
dismounted and went to work again. I was very mad with Cab for almost 
creating a stampede and told him that I had a good mind to have him shot. 
Cab was quick-witted, but, seeing how angry I was, said nothing then. But 
he often related the circumstance after the war. His well-varnished 
account of it was that I ordered him to be shot at sunrise, that he said 
he hoped it would be a foggy morning, and that I was so much amused by his 
reply that I relented and pardoned him. Years afterwards Cab confessed why 
he gave the false alarm. He said he heard 

Page 317

the noise the train made when it ran off the track and knew the men were 
gathering the spoils and did not think it was fair for him to be away 
picketing for their benefit. He also said that after he got to the burning 
cars he made up for lost time.

   A great many ludicrous incidents occurred. One lady ran up to me and 
exclaimed, "Oh, my father is a Mason!" I had no time to say anything but, 
"I can't help it." One passenger claimed immunity for himself on the 
ground that he was a member of an aristocratic church in Baltimore.

   Just as Cab dashed up, two of my men, Charlie Dear and West Aldridge, 
came to me and reported that they had two U. S. Paymasters with their 
satchels of greenbacks. Knowing it would be safer to send them out by a 
small party, which could easily elude the enemy, one of my lieutenants, 
Charlie Grogan, was detailed with two or three men to take them over the 
ridge to our rendezvous.

   Whether my men got anything in the shape of pocketbooks, watches, or 
other valuable articles, I never inquired, and I was too busy attending to 
the destroying of the train to see whether they did. We left all the 
civilians, including the ladies, to keep warm by the burning cars, and the 

Page 318

soldiers were taken with us as prisoners. Among the latter was a young 
German lieutenant who had just received a commission and was on his way to 
join his regiment in Sheridan's army. I was attracted by his personal 
appearance, struck up a conversation with him, and rode by him for several 
miles. He was dressed in a fine beaver cloth overcoat; high boots, and a 
new hat with gilt cord and tassel. After we were pretty well acquainted, I 
said to him, "We have done you no harm. Why did you come over here to 
fight us?" "Oh," he said, "I only come to learn de art of war." I then 
left him and rode to the head of the column, as the enemy were about, and 
there was a prospect of a fight. It was not long before the German came 
trotting up to join me. There had been such a metamorphosis that I 
scarcely recognized him. One of my men had exchanged his old clothes with 
him for his new ones, and he complained about it. I asked him if he had 
not told me that he came to Virginia to learn the art of war.

   "Yes," he replied.

   "Very well," I said, "this is your first lesson."

   Now it must not be thought that the habit of appropriating the enemy's 
goods was peculiar to my men - through all ages it has been to 

Page 319

custom of war. Not long after this incident I had to suffer from the same 
operation - was shot at night and stripped of my clothes. Forty years 
afterwards a lady returned to me the hat which I was wearing. She said 
that her uncle, Lieutenant-Colonel Coles of the regiment that captured it, 
had given it to her as a relic of the war. That is war. I am willing to 
admit, however, that in a statement of mutual accounts at that time my men 
were largely in debt to Sheridan's men.

   Before we reached the Shenandoah River, a citizen told us that a 
Captain Blazer was roving around the neighborhood looking for us. He 
commanded a picked corps, armed with Spencer carbines - seven-shooters - 
that had been assigned by Sheridan to the special duty of looking for me. 
My men had had an easy time capturing the train, and, although they were 
not indifferent to greenbacks, their mettle was up when they heard that 
"Old Blaze", as they called him, was about. They were eager for a fight in 
which they could win more laurels. It was not long before we struck 
Blazer's trail and saw his camp fires where he had spent the night. I 
could no longer restrain the men - they rushed into the camp "as reapers 
descend to the harvests of death." But 

Page 320

Blazer was gone! He was a bold but cautious commander and had left before 
daybreak. But this only postponed his fate for a few weeks, when Captain 
Dolly Richards met him near the same spot and wiped him out forever.

   We crossed the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge before noon and found Grogan's 
party with the greenbacks waiting for us at the appointed place in Loudoun 
County. The men were ordered to dismount and fall in line, and three were 
appointed - Charlie Hall, Mountjoy, and Fount Beattie - to open the 
satchels and count the money in their presence. I ordered it to be divided 
equally among them and no distinction to be made between officers and men. 
My command was organized under an act of the Confederate Congress to raise 
partisan corps; it applied the principle of maritime prize law to land 
war. Of course, the motive of the act was to stimulate enterprise.

   The burning of this train in the midst of Sheridan's troops and the 
capture of his paymasters created a great sensation. Of course, the 
railroad people thought that Sheridan had not given adequate protection to 
their road. The following dispatch shows what General Lee thought of the 
importance of the blow I struck.

Page 321

Chaffin's Bluff, 
October 16th, 1864. 

   On the 14th instant Colonel Mosby struck the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad at Duffield's, destroyed U. S. military train consisting of 
locomotive and ten cars, securing twenty prisoners and fifteen horses. 
Amongst the prisoners are two paymasters with $168,000 in Government funds.

(Signed) R. E. Lee, General. 
Hon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War. 

   The paymasters and other prisoners were sent south to prison, and one 
of them, Major Ruggles, died there. They were unjustly charged with being 
in collusion with me, but their capture was simply an ordinary incident of 
war. As the Government held them responsible for the loss of the funds, 
they had to apply to Congress for relief. After the war, Major Moore came 
to see me to get a certificate of the fact that I had captured the money. 
The certificate stated that my report to General Lee of $168,000 captured 
was based upon erroneous information and was sent off before I had 
received the report of the commissioners appointed to count and distribute 
the money. The sum captured was $173,000.

   The attack was made on the train on the night of October 13 between 
Martinsburg and 

Page 322

Harper's Ferry. During the day, as the following dispatch shows, we had 
operated on the Valley Pike and moved at night to the railroad.


[Seward, at Martinsburg, to Stevenson, at Harper's Ferry]
   Four scouts have just arrived and reported that they were attacked 
about eight miles this side of Winchester by a party of fifty guerrillas 
this afternoon. They all seem to be positive that they were attacked by 
Mosby's men and that Mosby with one foot bound up was with them.
   It is true that I was there and with one foot bound up. In fact I had 
on only one boot. I suppose the scouts heard this from some citizen who 
saw me. A few days before my horse had been shot in a fight, and a Yankee 
cavalryman rode over me. His horse trod on my foot and bruised it so that 
for some time I could wear only a sock and had to use a cane when I 
walked. I was in this condition when we captured the train.


[Stanton, Secretary of War, to Stevenson, Harper’s Ferry]
Washington, October 14, 1864. 

   It is reported from Martinsburg that the railroad has been torn up and 
a paymaster and his funds captured. 

Page 323

When and where did this occur and have any measures been taken for 
recapture? Immediate answer.


[Stevenson to Stanton]
   Just heard from captured train. The attacking party was part of Mosby's 
command. They removed a rail, causing train to be thrown off track, then 
robbed the passengers and burned train. The point of attack was about two 
miles east of Kearneysville, about 2.30 A.M. Paymasters Moore and Ruggles 
with their funds were captured and carried off. . . . General Seward 
telegraphs that his courier parties were attacked last night twice by 
Mosby's command between Bunker Hill and Winchester and dispersed.


[Stevenson to Stanton]
   The cavalry sent out in pursuit of Mosby's guerrillas, who burned the 
train, have returned. Report they failed to overtake them. They learned 
that they moved off in the direction of the Shenandoah and having several 
hours' start, succeeded in getting away with their prisoners and plunder.
   At that time there were a number of paymasters at Martinsburg on their 
way to pay off Sheridan's soldiers, and they were now in a state of 
blockade. One of them who was shut up there said in a dispatch:

   I have my funds in the parlor of the United States Hotel here, guarded 
by a regiment. The express train 

Page 324

was burned eight miles west of Harper's Ferry between 2 and 3 o'clock this 
A.M. Major Ruggles' clerk escaped and is now with me. . . . General 
Seward, who is in command here, says he will use all his efforts to 
protect us and our money. I shall make no move till I can do so with 
safety.

   The following telegram from Stevenson to Sheridan shows his anxiety 
about the safety of the trains and that Sheridan had as much cause to give 
his attention to his rear as to his front:

   Mosby has now concentrated his guerrillas in your rear and commenced 
operations; burning railroad trains, robbing passengers, which without 
cavalry I am powerless to prevent. He at the same time threatens all your 
supply trains.


[Stevenson to Halleck]
   At least 1000 good cavalry should be attached to this command to 
protect us against the sudden dashes of the guerrilla organizations 
infesting this part of the country. [My battalion was the only Confederate 
force in that region.] If I had this cavalry I could safely say Mosby 
could not reach the railroad.
   But our operations that day were not confined to the Shenandoah Valley, 
but extended east of the Blue Ridge to the vicinity of Washington, where 
preparations were made to keep us south of the Potomac. Later in the same 
day we 

Page 325

captured the train ten miles west of Harper's Ferry. Captain William 
Chapman, with two companies of my battalion, crossed the Potomac a few 
miles east of it and struck the canal and railroad in Maryland. The alarm 
caused by the burning of the train in the morning had not subsided before 
news came of a fresh attack on the road at another point, and troops were 
hurried from Baltimore and other places to meet it. But, of course, when 
the troops got there, the damage had been done and my men had gone.


[Stevenson to French]
   Move with all your available cavalry at once to Point of Rocks, Md.; 
unite your force with the forces in that vicinity and attack a body of 
rebel cavalry near Adamstown.


[Lawrence, A. A. G., to Halleck]
Bal't., Oct. 14th, 1864. 

   The enemy was at Buckeyestown, four miles from the Monocacy, at 4 P.M. 
this evening.

   Another dispatch said:

   All lost. Even citizens were passing through here from Poolsville with 
horses to get away from the rebels. They report 2000 rebels between there 
and Monocacy.

Page 326

[Prescott Smith to President Garrett of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad]

October 15. 

   We have no fresh alarms but the two affairs badly damaged the working 
of the road and will involve an immense loss to the company in every way.

   This meant that the railroad must be more strongly guarded if 
communication was to be kept up between the Shenandoah Valley, Washington, 
and Baltimore. Troops were rushed from many points to guard the railroad 
and the canal. My object had then been accomplished.