Memoirs of Colonel Mosby - Chapters VI-VIII



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CHAPTER VI 
THE STRATEGY OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS
   ON May 24, 1861, the day after Virginia ratified the Secession 
Ordinance, McDowell's army crossed the Potomac on three bridges. McDowell 
made his headquarters at Arlington, General Lee's home, and it should be 
recorded to his credit that he showed the highest respect for persons and 
property.

   One regiment of the New York Zouaves, commanded by Colonel Ellsworth, 
went on a steamer to Alexandria and landed under the guns of the Pawnee. A 
Confederate flag was flying from the top of a house which was owned by a 
citizen named Jackson. Ellsworth went up and pulled down the flag. As he 
descended the stairs, Jackson shot him and was himself shot by a Union 
soldier.

   On June 26, McDowell's total strength present for duty was 153,682 men 
and twelve guns; Patterson's was 14,344 men. Of McDowell's twenty 
regiments, seventeen were three months' men. With the exception of one 
infantry 

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regiment, four companies of cavalry, and three artillery companies, 
Patterson's force was composed of three months' men. Johnston's force at 
the same time was 10,654 men and five or six batteries.

   General Lee had selected Manassas Junction as the point for the 
concentration of the Confederate troops on account of its being in 
connection with the Valley. Beauregard was in command here, while Jackson 
and Johnston with their forces were across the Blue Ridge in the 
Shenandoah Valley. On June 15, Johnston retired towards Winchester, 
because, as he said, Patterson's army had reached the Potomac twenty miles 
above, and he wanted to be in a position to repel an invasion of the 
Valley, or quickly to reinforce Beauregard at Manassas. Johnston thought, 
so he said, that Patterson was making a combined movement with McDowell, 
who was expected to move from Washington on Richmond. If so, Johnston at 
Harper's Ferry had the interior line and the choice of reinforcing 
Beauregard or striking Patterson. As Patterson hesitated, it showed that 
he was afraid to cross the Potomac with Johnston on his flank.

   Johnston's movement to Winchester, which, as I have said, was really a 
retreat, about doubled 

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the distance between him and Beauregard. If he had really wanted to join 
Beauregard, his quickest way to do it would have been to march directly 
from Harper's Ferry to Bull Run. The distance would have been shorter than 
his march from Winchester to the railroad station, on his way to Manassas. 
There he left nearly half of his army for want of transportation. It is 
remarkable, however, that Jackson's biographers, Dabney, Cook, and 
Henderson, regarded the retreat to Winchester as only a strategic move. 
Jackson did not think so.

   Jackson's brigade and Stuart's regiment of cavalry were sent to observe 
Patterson on the upper Potomac. Patterson had no cavalry for outpost duty, 
while Johnston had the regiments of Stuart and Ashby. Jackson's orders 
were to feel out the enemy, but to avoid an engagement. On July 2 
Patterson crossed the Potomac, and Jackson showed sufficient resistance to 
compel him to display his force and retired as his orders required. He was 
sure that Patterson had no aggressive purpose, but was only making a feint 
to create a diversion and retain Johnston in the Valley, when McDowell 
moved against Beauregard at Manassas. Jackson thought that a blow at 
Patterson would have been the best way to 

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cooperate with Beauregard. As Jackson had strict ideas of military 
discipline, he would not criticise his superiors, and, although the order 
to fall back was a disappointment, he did not, like Achilles, sulk in his 
tent. But a letter he wrote at the time to his wife, read between the 
lines, shows the chagrin he felt.

   Colonel Henderson, in his "Life of Jackson", said:

   The Federal army crawled on to Martinsburg Halting seven miles 
southwest, Jackson was reinforced by Johnston's whole command and here for 
four days the Confederates drawn up in line of battle awaited attack. But 
the Federals stood fast in Martinsburg and on the fourth day Johnston 
withdrew to Winchester. The Virginia soldiers were bitterly dissatisfied.

   At first even Jackson chafed. He was eager for action. His experience 
at Falling Waters had given him no exalted notion of the enemy's prowess 
and he was ready to engage them singlehanded. "I want my brigade," he 
said, "to feel that it can itself whip Patterson's whole army and I 
believe that we can do it."

   The truth is that the numerical difference in the strength of the two 
armies was inconsiderable, but Johnston's had a great advantage in morale 
and a superior force of cavalry.

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   On July 15, in obedience to General Scott's orders, Patterson moved up 
the Valley, threw some shells at Stuart's regiment, and then turned 
squarely around and retreated towards Harper's Ferry. The movement was so 
timid that it was more a farce than a feint. Patterson was not seeking a 
fight; his movement was only a blind. If the Confederates had then taken 
the offensive, there would have been a footrace towards the Potomac, and 
McDowell would not have moved against the troops at Manassas.

   The most effective way to aid Beauregard was to strike Patterson. The 
next year Jackson did what should have been done in 1861. He turned on 
Banks and swept him out of the Shenandoah Valley, creating such alarm in 
Washington that McDowell, who was moving from Fredericksburg to join 
McClellan at Richmond, was recalled to save the Capital.

   The following dispatch to McClellan from Mr. Lincoln shows what Jackson 
did in 1862 and what he would have done in 1861, if he had been in command:

May 24th, 1862. 

   In consequence of General Banks's critical position I have been 
compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy 
are making a 

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desperate push on Harper's Ferry and we are trying to throw General 
Fremont's force and a part of McDowell's in their rear.

   The next that was heard of Jackson, he had defeated Fremont and Shields 
in the Valley and then turned off on McClellan's flank at Cold Harbor.

   In July 1861, the larger part of the troops at Manassas should have 
gone to Johnston, instead of his reinforcing Beauregard. That is, if 
Johnston was willing to take the offensive and cross the Potomac. That was 
the best way to defend Richmond.

   On July 17, McDowell began his movement towards the Confederate 
Capital. Mr. Davis telegraphed to Johnston at Winchester to join 
Beauregard, if practicable. He said:

   General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow a 
junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable make 
the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court House either 
by railroad or by Warrenton. In all arrangements exercise your discretion.

   President Davis endorsed on Johnston's report of the battle that his 
order, or rather request to Johnston to join Beauregard gave him 
discretion because Johnston's letters of July 12 and 13 

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"made it doubtful whether General Johnston had the power to effect the 
movement."

   In the letters Johnston said that he had to "defeat Patterson or elude 
him." It would have been impossible for him to defeat Patterson as the 
latter was running; as Patterson was trying to elude Johnston, the latter 
had no trouble in eluding Patterson.

   On July 13 General Johnston telegraphed to President Davis: "Unless he 
(Patterson) prevents it, we shall move toward Beauregard to-day." Up to 
that time Johnston does not seem to have contemplated, nor was there any 
plan for, any concerted action between Johnston and Beauregard.

   The march to Manassas did not begin until noon of the eighteenth. 
Jackson's brigade was in the advance. It waded the Shenandoah, climbed the 
Blue Ridge, and arrived at Manassas by rail on the next day. When the 
troops left Winchester, they could not have been expected to join 
Beauregard at Manassas before a battle, because McDowell's delay of three 
days at Centreville could not have been anticipated. On the seventeenth 
General Scott telegraphed Patterson that McDowell would take Manassas the 
next day, which probably would have been done if 

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Scott's program to cross the Occoquan and turn the Confederate right had 
been carried out. But McDowell changed the plan, waited to make a 
reconnaissance on the Confederate left, and decided to cross Bull Run at 
Sudley. Beauregard was not expecting aid from Johnston, for in a telegram 
to the War Department he said, "I believe this proposed movement of 
General Johnston is too late. Enemy will attack me in force to-morrow 
morning."

   When Johnston left the Valley, Patterson was in camp at Charles Town. 
As late as the nineteenth Patterson insisted that Johnston was at 
Winchester receiving reinforcements; but on the twentieth he acknowledged 
that Johnston had gone. It was then too late for him to give assistance to 
McDowell in the battle the next day. When Patterson was reproached for 
what he had not done, he consoled Scott by telling him that if he had 
attacked Joe Johnston, he (Scott) would have had to mourn the loss of two 
battles instead of one.

   Johnston arrived at Beauregard's headquarters at Manassas at noon on 
July 20, but nearly half of his army was left behind him. Beauregard's 
army was posted on Bull Run at five or six fords stretching from Stone 
Bridge to Union Mills, 

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a distance of eight miles. Bull Run is a creek running through a largely 
wooded country, and is passable anywhere but for its steep banks. 
Johnston's troops were posted behind Beauregard's at the fords, and 
Jackson was placed in the rear of Bonham. McDowell's headquarters were in 
plain view six miles distant at Centreville and also in view of the signal 
station Captain Alexander had established on the Manassas plain.

   Beauregard proposed an offensive plan which Johnston approved, but no 
attempt was made to execute it. The battle was defensive on the 
Confederate side. Early on the morning of the twenty-first the signal 
officers discovered McDowell's column marching towards Sudley to turn our 
left at Stone Bridge. They reported the movement to General Evans, who 
commanded there, and to headquarters. Johnston's brigades were in the rear 
of the fords as reserves ready to be moved to any point on the line. As 
Bull Run presented no defensive advantages, it is hard to discover why 
that line was selected. No matter whether Beauregard intended to act on 
the offensive or defensive, his army should have been concentrated at one 
or two fords, instead of being distributed at several.

   Long afterwards Beauregard claimed that Johnston 

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accepted his plan of battle, waived his rank, and consented to act as his 
chief of staff. As there was no emergency that required such an abdication 
of authority, and as there was ample time for Johnston to learn the 
conditions and get all the topographical knowledge necessary, it would 
have been shirking responsibility for him to have done so. His objective, 
McDowell's army, was in sight; he was near Bull Run, and he could easily 
learn from maps where the fords were and the roads that led to them. 
Beauregard and his staff officers could have easily told him how the 
troops were disposed. With such explanation Johnston might, in an hour or 
so, have taken in the whole situation. Very few commanders were ever on 
the ground more than a few hours before a battle; it is not their business 
to act as guides - the country furnishes plenty of them. Of course, 
generals must utilize other men's knowledge.

   But the inconsistency is that Beauregard claims the credit as commander-
in-chief for winning the victory, but makes Johnston responsible for the 
failure to reap the fruit of it. He contradicts his own report, written a 
few days after the battle, which says that the army, after the hard day's 
fighting, was in no condition to pursue. 

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He did not seem to know that he had 15,000 fresh men on the field and that 
the remainder of Johnston's men arrived next morning. In his "Military 
Memoirs", General Alexander, who was chief signal officer and also in the 
evening carried orders on the field, said:

   Not far off Stonewall Jackson, who had been shot through the hand but 
had disregarded it until victory was assured, was now having his hand 
dressed by Doctor Hunter McGuire. Jackson did not catch the President's 
(Davis) words and Doctor McGuire repeated them to him. Jackson quickly 
shouted, "We have whipped them! They ran like sheep! Give me 5000 men and 
I will be in Washington City tomorrow morning."

   Doctor Edward Campbell, a surgeon in Jackson's brigade, told me soon 
after the war that he heard Jackson make that speech.

   But Johnston's endorsement on Beauregard's order of battle shows that 
so far from waiving he asserted his rank as commander. Here it is:

4.30 A.M., July 21st. 

   The plan of battle given by General Beauregard in the above order is 
approved and will be executed accordingly.

(Signed) J. E. Johnston, 
General, C. S. Army. 

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   As Beauregard submitted his program to Johnston's approval, he 
recognized Johnston as his superior officer. Orders are not submitted to 
the approval of subordinates. As a worse plan of operations could hardly 
have been devised, Johnston might have given Beauregard credit for it if 
he had adopted it. As there was no attempt to execute it, however, it is 
immaterial who was the author. The battle was fought on McDowell's plan. 
What was most remarkable was that instead of directing its immediate 
execution by an advance of his columns on Centreville, it instructed 
brigade commanders to hold themselves in readiness to advance but to wait 
orders. None but D. R. Jones received such an order to cross the Run that 
morning, and his was soon revoked. As the enemy was in their front, old 
soldiers like Jackson, Longstreet, and Ewell, ought to have been presumed 
to be ready for combat without instructions. If the Confederates were to 
assume the offensive to turn McDowell, their movement should have been 
begun, as McDowell's was, before daybreak; and as they would have had to 
move through a wooded country, their columns should have been as much as 
possible in sight of and in supporting distance of each other. But what is 
stranger 

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still is that Beauregard's order of battle, although it contemplated the 
offensive, is dated at 4.30 A.M. July 21, long after McDowell's army was 
in motion. McDowell issued his order of battle on the twentieth.

   McDowell saw the danger of keeping the wings of his army so far apart 
and said:

   I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to 
Centreville along this ridge, fearing that while we should be in force to 
the front and endeavoring to turn the enemy's position, we ourselves 
should be turned by him by this road. For if he should once obtain 
possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to 
the foot of the spurs to the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably 
cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in 
force, and sent an engineer to extemporize some field works to strengthen 
the position. . . . The divisions were ordered to march at 2.30 o'clock 
A.M., so as to arrive on the ground early in the day and thus avoid the 
heat which is to be expected at this season.

   If the Confederates had moved in two columns from the lower fords, 
while Evans and Cocke attracted the attention of the enemy above, they 
would have reached Centreville before McDowell reached Sudley, and they 
would have been between McDowell and Washington. In 

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that event McDowell said his army would have been destroyed. McDowell saw 
more clearly than the Confederate generals what they ought to do, but he 
trusted to their not doing it. Beauregard's first plan for a simultaneous 
advance from all the Bull Run fords to Centreville was impracticable in 
the wooded country, and it was well that no attempt was made to execute 
it. His line of battle would have been several miles long.

   Beauregard commanded that day under Johnston as Meade commanded the 
Army of the Potomac under Grant. Beauregard's report said:

   General Johnston arrived here about noon of the both of July, and being 
my senior in rank he necessarily assumed command of the forces of the 
Confederate States then concentrating at this point. Made acquainted with 
my plan of operations and dispositions to meet the enemy, he gave them his 
entire approval and generously directed their execution under my command.

   Beauregard must have forgotten, when he wrote afterwards and claimed 
that he was commander-in-chief at Bull Run, that he had ever written that 
Johnston was.

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   Beauregard said that, being informed at 5.30 A.M. that a strong force 
was deployed in front of Stone Bridge, he ordered Evans and Cocke to 
maintain their positions to the last extremity, and that he thought the 
most effective method of relieving his left was by making a determined 
attack by his right. No doubt that was so. He knew, long before McDowell 
reached Sudley, that Ewell, Holmes, Jones, and Early had not advanced on 
Centreville, and there was then abundance of time for them to have reached 
Centreville before McDowell reached Sudley.

   But he said that the news from the left afterwards changed his plan. As 
it was clear that McDowell was making only a feeble demonstration in our 
front and none on our right, he must have known early in the morning that 
the main portion of his army was moving against our left. He could not 
have expected McDowell to stand still; nor does he give a satisfactory 
reason for a change of plan, but the reverse. McDowell was doing what he 
ought to have wanted him to do.

   At 7.10 A.M., D. R. Jones, whose brigade was at McLean's Ford near 
headquarters, said he received the following order:

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Brigadier-General D. R. Jones, 

General: 
   General Ewell has been ordered to take the offensive upon Centreville. 
You will follow the movement at once by attacking him in your front.

July 21st, 1861
[Signed] G. T. Beauregard, 
Brigadier. 

   Ewell was at the next ford below, with Holmes's brigade in support. It 
was not pretended that any such orders were sent to the brigades at the 
fords above. Longstreet, who was at Blackburn's Ford, with Early in 
support, said that in obedience to orders of the twentieth to assume the 
offensive, he crossed Bull Run early on the morning of the twenty-first, 
but as he immediately came in contact with the enemy and ordered his men 
to lie down under cover from the artillery fire, he does not seem to have 
been ordered to move on Centreville, and does not refer to any such order. 
He must have been waiting for further orders.

   It is clear that Bonham received no orders to cross the Run, as he did 
not attempt it, although the enemy opened fire on him early in the 
morning. He said that before daylight one of his aides, General McGowan, 
brought intelligence 

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that the enemy was moving on his left, and that he arose and with a field 
glass discovered the enemy moving on the pike to Stone Bridge. He said 
that he immediately communicated the news to headquarters and directed his 
command to prepare for action, as he supposed "an assault would be made 
early along our whole line." But no such assault was ordered.

   Early, who was near McLean's farm in support of Longstreet, did not 
mention receiving any order to move on Centreville; neither did Jackson, 
who was supporting Bonham at Mitchell's Ford. He simply got an order to 
place himself in position where he could reinforce either Cocke or Bonham. 
In the meantime Jackson ascertained that Bee, who had been sent with his 
own and Bartow's brigades to reinforce Evans, was hard pressed. He seems 
to have moved, in the exercise of his own discretion, where the sound of 
the cannon indicated that the real conflict was. When he reached the 
plateau where the Henry house stood, he met the shattered brigades of Bee 
and Bartow retreating. Jackson formed his brigade on the crest of the 
ridge, which will forever be associated with his name.

   General Alexander described the scene as follows:

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   A fresh brigade was drawn up in line on the elevated ground known as 
Henry House Hill and its commander, till then unknown, was henceforth to 
be called Stonewall. Bee rode up to him and said "General, they are 
driving us!" "Then, Sir," said Jackson, "we must give them the bayonet." 
Bee galloped among his retreating men and called out to them: "See Jackson 
standing like a stone wall - rally behind the Virginians." It was at this 
moment when Jackson's and Hampton's were the only organized troops 
opposing the Federal advance and Bee and Bartow were attempting to rally 
their broken forces, that Johnston and Beauregard reached the field.

   This was the crisis of the battle, as Jackson's heroic bearing 
electrified the troops and saved the day. Jackson selected this place as a 
battleground, and the great struggle was for the possession of the 
plateau. This was crescent shaped, the ridge forming a cover which 
protected his men from artillery fire.

   Jones said that after getting the order from Beauregard to cross the 
Run and follow Ewell, he sent a message to Ewell but crossed and took a 
position on the road from Union Mills to Centreville and waited for Ewell. 
In the meantime he received the following order directing him to return:

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10.30 A.M. 

General Jones: 
   On account of the difficulties in our front it is thought preferable to 
countermand the advance of the right wing. Resume your position.

   Beauregard said that as early as 5.30 A.M. the enemy opened fire on 
Evans at Stone Bridge, and that by 8.30 A.M. he discovered that it was a 
mask to cover a movement around his flank, and Evans promptly moved to 
meet it. So it was then clear that the enemy would be on the left. Instead 
of a change of plans and a retrograde movement, when this was discovered, 
it was the opportune moment to order our right to advance. Only four 
companies were left to hold Stone Bridge against Tyler's division; they 
held it all day.

   The sound of the battle now informed our generals where the main effort 
of the enemy would be made. The "difficulties" in his front, of which 
Beauregard spoke in his note to Jones as the cause for revoking the order 
to advance, instead of deterring should have encouraged him to take the 
offensive. It was now clear that there was only a small force between him 
and the enemy's rear at Centreville. Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions 
reached Sudley Ford, at least 

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eight miles away, about 9.30 A.M. They halted for rest and for the men to 
fill their canteens from the stream. The main body of the Confederate army 
was then about half the distance from Centreville that Sudley is. The 
three brigades of Miles that were in reserve on the road to Blackburn's 
and McLean's fords could easily have been brushed aside before any 
reinforcements could have reached them. Then one of his brigade 
commanders, Richardson, reported that Colonel Stevens, who commanded a 
regiment there, said, "We have no confidence in Colonel Miles, because 
Colonel Miles is drunk;" all of which was in our favor. It was much better 
for the Confederates if Ewell's and Jones's forward movements were delayed 
until nine o'clock by a miscarriage of orders, for by that time McDowell 
had progressed too far to turn back when he heard of it.

   When at Austerlitz Napoleon saw the allies marching towards his rear, 
he told his marshals to be quiet, not to interrupt them. After their 
movement had developed sufficiently, he struck such a blow as Johnston and 
Beauregard might have repeated at Centreville. McDowell dreaded such a 
counterstroke, and in the morning on the road to Sudley he halted Howard 
and kept his 

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brigade in reserve near the pike until noon to meet such a contingency. On 
the field McDowell saw what he might do; and reports from the signal 
stations and heavy firing told Johnston and Beauregard what they could 
do - that the enemy had exposed his rear. But "in my judgment," said 
Beauregard, "it was now (10.30 A.M.) too late for the contemplated 
movement." Napoleon would have thought it was the hour for it to begin. It 
is a mystery why the Confederate generals abandoned their plan - if they 
ever had such a plan.

   Alexander said, "About 8 A.M. Johnston and Beauregard, accompanied by 
their staffs and couriers, rode to the vicinity of Mitchell's Ford, where 
they left their party under cover and took position on an open hill some 
200 yards to the left of the road."

   Richardson was in their front, making a feint by shelling the woods. If 
he had intended a real attack, he would not have halted. The resistance 
made by Evans's small force on the Sudley road showed that, with 
reinforcement of Cocke's brigade at the ford below, McDowell's turning 
column could have been held in check until ours took Centreville. The fact 
is that the roaring guns and the despairing cry for help from Centreville 

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would have stampeded McDowell. General Johnston said the news from our 
left made their plan impracticable. I think it showed not only that it was 
practicable, but a dead sure thing if they had attempted to execute it. 
McDowell thought so too. I am not judging the Confederate generals by the 
lights that are now before me but by what their reports say was before 
them then.

   Again quoting Alexander:

   As he rode out in the morning, Beauregard directed me to go with a 
courier to the Wicoxen signal station and remain in general observation of 
the field, sending messages of all I could discover. I went reluctantly as 
the opportunity seemed very slight of rendering any service. There were 
but two signal stations on our line of battle - one in rear of McLean's 
Ford and one near Van Pelt's house on a bluff a few hundred yards to the 
left and rear of Stone Bridge. Beyond the latter the broad, level valley 
of Bull Run for some miles with its fields and pastures as seen through 
the glass was foreshortened into a narrow band of green. While watching 
the flag of this station with a good glass, when I had been there about 
half an hour, the sun being in the east behind me, my eye was caught by a 
glitter in this narrow band of green. I recognized it at once as the 
reflection of the morning sun from a brass field piece. Closer scrutiny 
soon revealed the glittering of bayonets and masked barrels. It was 

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about 8.45 A.M., and I had discovered McDowell's turning column the head 
of which at this hour was just arriving at Sudley, eight miles away. I 
appreciated how much it might mean and thought it best to give Evans 
immediate notice, even before sending word to Beauregard. So I signalled 
Evans quickly, "Look out for your left, you are turned." Evans afterwards 
told me that a picket, which he had at Sudley, being driven in by the 
enemy's advanced guard, had sent a courier, and the two couriers, one with 
my signal message and one with the report of the picket, reached him 
together. The simultaneous reports from different sources impressed him, 
and he acted at once with sound judgment. He left four companies of his 
command to watch the bridge and the enemy in his front - Tyler and his 
three brigades. With the remainder of his force (six companies of the 4th 
S. C. and Wheat's La. Battalion) he marched to oppose and delay the 
turning column, at the same time notifying Cocke, next on his right, of 
his movement. . . . Having sent Evans notice of his danger, I next wrote 
to Beauregard as follows: "I see a body of troops crossing Bull Run about 
two miles above the Stone Bridge The head of the column is in the woods on 
this side. The rear of the column is in the woods on the other side. About 
half a mile of its length is visible in the open ground between. I can see 
both infantry and artillery."

   This message reached Beauregard in a few minutes. Johnston's report 
said:

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   About 8 o'clock General Beauregard and I placed ourselves on a 
commanding hill in rear of Gen Bonham's left (Mitchell's Ford). Near nine 
o'clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander, reported that a large body 
of troops was crossing the Valley of Bull Run some two miles above the 
bridge. General Bee, who had been placed near Col. Cocke's position, Col. 
Hampton with his legion, and Colonel Jackson from a point near Gen. 
Bonham's left were ordered to hasten to the left flank.

   Alexander continued his account:

   For a long time there was little change and the battle seemed to stand 
still. When Evans and Bee were broken by Sherman's attack on the flank, 
their retreat was specially pressed by the Federal artillery On reaching 
the Warrenton pike they were met by the Hampton Legion and Hampton made an 
earnest effort to rally the retreating force upon his command The ground, 
however, was unfavorable and though Hampton made a stubborn fight (losing 
121 out of 600 men) and delaying the advance near two hours before leaving 
the pike, our whole line then fell back under the enemy's fire.

   Jackson now came to the rescue. He had 2611 men and with the remnants 
of Hampton's 600, they were the only organized troops opposing the enemy's 
advance. Bee, Bartow, and Evans were engaged in rallying their troops as 
Johnston 

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and Beauregard appeared. Johnston took up his headquarters a short 
distance in the rear to direct reinforcements, while the immediate conduct 
of the battle was left to Beauregard. His task was to hold the line until 
fresh troops could be brought upon the scene. McDowell's last chance was 
to crush Beauregard's line at once before any reinforcements arrived. Some 
of his brigades were absent - Burnside's had drawn off for rest and 
ammunition - and his partial attacks only consumed time.

   About three o'clock Kirby Smith's brigade arrived, and it was closely 
followed by Early's brigade and Beckham's battery. Kirby Smith was 
severely wounded just as he was extending his line on our left, and Elzey 
took command. Kirby Smith was the first man I ever saw carried from the 
field on a stretcher. About four o'clock Beauregard advanced his whole 
line, and the 18th Virginia under Colonel Withers, the 8th Virginia under 
Colonel Hunton, and the Hampton Legion with Jackson's brigade swept the 
field and turned the enemy's guns on them. Early, with Beckham's battery 
and Stuart's cavalry, crossed the Warrenton pike and opened on the flank 
and rear of a new line which McDowell had formed. This force had no 
artillery to reply 

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to ours, and it soon broke. McDowell said "The retreat soon became a rout 
and this soon degenerated into a panic."

   Heintzelman said, "Such a rout I never witnessed before."

   Stuart's cavalry had charged and routed the Ellsworth Zouaves on the 
Sudley road as they were coming to the support of the Federal batteries. 
Heintzelman led the Zouaves. His account of this was as follows.

   In the meantime I sent orders for the Zouaves to move forward to 
support Ricketts' battery on its right. As soon as they came up I led them 
forward against an Alabama regiment, partly concealed in a clump of small 
pines in an old field. At the first fire they broke and the greater 
portion fled to the rear, keeping up a desultory fire over the heads of 
their comrades in front. At the same time they were charged by a company 
of Secession cavalry on their rear, who had come by a road through two 
strips of woods on our extreme right.

   Stuart's charge was not on the rear of the Zouaves but on their front, 
when they were advancing to the support of the batteries. Heintzelman said 
the regiment dispersed and did not appear on the field again; the greater 
portion kept on to New York.

   Porter said:

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   The evanescent courage of the Zouaves prompted them to fire perhaps a 
hundred shots, when they broke and fled, leaving the batteries open to a 
charge of the enemy's cavalry, which took place immediately. . . . Soon 
the slopes behind us were swarming with our retreating and disorganized 
forces, whilst riderless horses and artillery teams ran furiously through 
the flying crowd.

   As McDowell, with the larger part of his army, had moved in a circle by 
Sudley, and as they retreated by the same route, if our troops on the 
field had moved on the straight line on the pike leading over Stone Bridge 
to Centreville, they would have cut off their retreat. This is what 
Jackson wanted to do.

   After the battle had shifted, Alexander joined Beauregard. He said that 
Jackson alone of the Confederate leaders on the field gave any evidence of 
his appreciation of the victory. After the war Doctor Edward Campbell, a 
surgeon of Jackson's brigade, told me that Jackson said to him, "I wonder 
if General Johnston and General Beauregard know how badly they (the enemy) 
are whipped. If they will let me, I will march my brigade into Washington 
to-night."

   Alexander said he heard Jackson tell President Davis the same thing. 
His account concludes:

Page 82

   Jackson's offer to take Washington City the next morning with 5000 men 
had been made to the President as he arrived upon the field; probably 
about five o'clock. It was not sunset until 7.15 and there was nearly a 
full moon. But the President himself and both Generals spent these 
precious hours in riding over the field where the conflict had taken 
place. . . . Johnston and Beauregard both sent orders to different 
commands to make such advances, but neither went in person to supervise or 
urge forward the execution of the order, though time was of the essence. 
[The italics are Alexander's.]

   Kershaw with two South Carolina regiments, Kemper with two guns, and 
some cavalry were all the troops that pursued over Stone Bridge, although 
there were several brigades near that had not been much engaged - some not 
at all. Alexander carried the first order from Beauregard about 6 P.M. in 
checking pursuit. It directed Kershaw to advance over Bull Run carefully, 
but not to attack. Alexander, surprised at his ill-timed caution, asked if 
he forbade any attack. Beauregard replied that Kershaw must wait for 
Kemper and pursue cautiously. It would have been as easy to send half a 
dozen batteries as one. Alexander overtook Kershaw just as Kemper's two 
guns opened on the retreating column and upset a wagon on Cub Run bridge 
that created 

Page 83

a blockade by which a good deal of artillery was lost. On his way back to 
Beauregard, Alexander met a staff officer carrying an order for all the 
troops to return.

   Alexander was at the council of Mr. Davis and the generals that night 
at Manassas. The conclusion was reached to make a reconnaissance the next 
morning. Some cavalry scouting parties were sent, who saw nothing but the 
wreck of McDowell's army. It would have been as easy to have found that 
out before midnight as in the morning, if they had tried, as no attempt 
was made to rally the retreating army.

   McDowell sent a dispatch from Fairfax Court House:

   The larger part of the men are a confused mob, entirely demoralized. It 
was the opinion of all the commanders that no stand could be made this 
side of the Potomac. . . . They are now passing through this place in a 
state of utter disorganization.

   Edwin M. Stanton, afterwards Secretary of War, on July 26, five days 
after the battle, wrote to ex-President Buchanan:

   The capture of Washington now seems to be inevitable; during the whole 
of Monday and Tuesday it might have been taken without resistance. The 
rout, overthrow, and demoralization of the army is complete.

Page 84

   General Johnston afterwards said as an excuse for not pursuing that his 
army was as much demoralized by victory as the enemy's by defeat. Nobody 
suspected it then. We had about 15,000 troops on the field who had not 
been engaged, and a good many arrived the next morning.

   On the caisson attached to one of Kemper's guns, when it swept over 
Bull Run, was an old Virginian, whose long white hair hung over his 
shoulders and gave him the look of a patriarch. When Kemper unlimbered 
near Cub Run, he claimed the privilege of firing the first gun. He had 
done the same when Beauregard opened his batteries on Sumter. When the 
curtain was let down on the last scene at Appomattox, he blew out his 
brains and ended life's fitful fever.

   In his report General Johnston said that "our victory was as complete 
as one gained by infantry and artillery can be." He took no account of 
Stuart's charge at a critical moment when the Zouaves were coming upon 
Jackson's flank; nor of the fact that his army exceeded McDowell's in 
numbers, and had three or four times as much cavalry. The returns show 
that in Beauregard army that day there were 1468 cavalry, and that Stuart, 
who had come from the Shenandoah Valley, had twelve companies. Besides, 
Ashby 

Page 85

arrived the day after the battle with a cavalry regiment. Johnston and 
Beauregard had a total of effectives that day of 31,982 men and fifty-five 
guns, although they sent only two guns over the Run in pursuit. McDowell's 
total was 29,862 men and but seven companies of cavalry. Cavalry is needed 
as much to cover a retreat as to pursue.

   We had enough cavalry to have taken Washington. It is true, as General 
Johnston said, that the city is situated on an unfordable river; but less 
than twenty miles above is a ford at Seneca where Stuart crossed going to 
Gettysburg, and I often afterwards crossed there. Our cavalry were nearer 
Seneca than McDowell's army was to Washington when the retreat began, and 
ought to have crossed the Potomac that night. The next day it could have 
easily moved around towards Baltimore, broken communications, and isolated 
Washington.

   It is paradoxical but true that the Confederate cause was lost at Bull 
Run. Yet the victory reflected on those who won it all "the glory that was 
Greece and the grandeur that was Rome." And no matter now what men may 
speculate as to what might have been, cold must be the heart that can read 
that glorious record and not - 

         "Feel sympathy with suns that set." 



Page 86

CHAPTER VII 
ABOUT FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE
   UNTIL the spring of 1862 we did picket duty on the Potomac, a more 
agreeable duty than the routine of a camp. There were some skirmishes and 
many false alarms. A hog rooting or an old hare on its nocturnal rounds 
would often draw the fire of a vidette. My company went three times a week 
on picket and remained twenty-four hours, when we were relieved by another 
company.

   [The following letters from Colonel Mosby to his wife and his sister 
give the most interesting events of the time between the Battle of 
Manassas and the campaign of 1862.]

Fairfax Court House, July 29, 1861. 

Dearest Pauline: 
   We have made no further advance and I know no more of contemplated 
movements than you do. . . . A few nights ago we went down near Alexandria 
to stand as a picket (advance) guard. It was after dark. When riding along 
the road a volley was suddenly poured into us from a thick clump of pines. 
The balls whistled around us and Captain Jones' horse 

Page 87

fell, shot through the head. We were perfectly helpless, as it was dark 
and they were concealed in the bushes. The best of it was that the Yankees 
shot three of their own men, - thought they were ours. . . . Beauregard 
has no idea of attacking Alexandria. When he attacks Washington he will go 
about Alexandria to attack Washington. No other news. For one week before 
the battle we had an awful time, - had about two meals during the whole 
time, - marched two days and one night on one meal, in the rain, in order 
to arrive in time for the fight. . . . We captured a great quantity of 
baggage left here by the Yankees; with orders for it to be forwarded to 
Richmond.

Fairfax Court House, August 18, 1861. 

My dearest Pauline: 
   I was in a little brush with them one day last week. A party of ten of 
us came upon about 150. We fired on them and of course retreated before 
such superior numbers. We jumped into the bushes to reload and give it to 
them again when they came up, but instead of pursuing us they put back to 
their own camp. . . . When I was last on picket I was within about four 
miles of Georgetown and could distinctly hear the enemy's morning drum 
beat. Some of the Yankees came to my post under a flag of truce - stayed 
all night, - ate supper with me; and we treated each other with as much 
courtesy as did Richard and Saladin when they met by the Diamond of the 
Desert. . . . Our blister plaster doctor affords 

Page 88

us a good deal of fun. He is one of the most pompous fellows you ever saw. 
He went with us on picket one night, - got scared, - ran to us and swore 
he had ridden through a whole regiment of the enemy’s infantry. The whole 
truth was there was not a Yankee in three miles of him.

Fairfax Court House, September 2, 1861. 

My dearest Pauline: 
   . . . I received a fall from my horse one day last week, down at Falls 
Church, which came near killing me. I have now entirely recovered and will 
return to camp this morning. I was out on picket one dark rainy night; 
there were only three of us at our post; a large body of cavalry came 
dashing down towards us from the direction of the enemy. Our orders were 
to fire on all. I fired my gun, started back toward where our main body 
were, my horse slipped down, fell on me, and galloped off, leaving me in a 
senseless condition in the road. Fortunately the body of cavalry turned 
out to be a company of our own men who had gone out after night to arrest 
a spy. When they started they promised Captain Jones to go by our post and 
inform us of the fact, in order to prevent confusion, - this they failed 
to do and their own culpable neglect came near getting some of them 
killed. . . . Our troops are gradually encroaching on the Federals, - now 
occupying a position in full view of Washington, - a brush is looked for 
there to-day. . . . I rode out one day about a week ago with our wagon 
after hay, 

Page 89

- came to where our pickets were stationed, - they were in full view of 
the Yankees, a few hundred yards off on the opposite hill. The Yankees 
were firing at our men with long range guns, but ours could not return it, 
as they have only old muskets. I have a splendid Sharp's carbine, which 
will kill at a thousand yards. I dismounted . . . and turned loose on 
them. . . . I had to fire at them most of the time in a thick field of 
corn, - of course, could not tell the effect, - but once, when a fellow 
ran out into the road (in which I stood) to shoot at me, it took several 
to carry him back.

Camp near Fairfax Court House, 
September 17, 1861. 

Dear Liz: [Mosby's sister] 
   Beauregard and Johnston are expected to move their headquarters up to 
Fairfax to-day. . . . Although Captain Jones is a strict officer he is 
very indulgent to me and never refuses me any favor I ask him. I think he 
will be made a Colonel very soon. Aaron [Mosby's negro servant] considers 
himself next in command to Captain Jones. . . . Nobody thinks the war will 
continue longer than a few months. We will clean them out in two more 
battles.

Camp near Fairfax Court House, 
September 14, 1861. 

My dearest Pauline: 
   . . . To-day we go on picket at the Big Falls on the Potomac. One hill 
we occupy commands a 

Page 90

full view of the Capitol. I went to take a view of it with Lloyd. We could 
see it distinctly, with all their fortifications and the stars and stripes 
floating over it. I thought of the last time I had seen it, for you were 
there with me, and I could not but feel some regrets that it was no longer 
the Capitol of my Country, but that of a foreign foe.

Camp near Fairfax, 
September - , 1861. 

My dearest Pauline: 
   . . . The Enemy had come up with three thousand men, artillery, etc. to 
Lewisville, one of our picket stations; when we got there they were still 
there. Three men of our Company (including myself) were detached to go 
forward to reconnoitre. Col. Stewart [sic] was with us. While standing 
near the opening of a wood a whole regiment of Yankees came up in full 
view, within a hundred yards of me. Their Colonel was mounted on a 
splendid horse and was very gaily dressed. I was in the act of shooting 
him, which I could have done with ease with my carbine, when Col. Stewart 
told me not to shoot, - fearing they were our men. . . . I never regretted 
anything so much in my life as the glorious opportunity I missed of 
winging their Colonel. We went back and brought up our artillery, which 
scattered them at the first shot. I never enjoyed anything so much in my 
life as standing by the cannon and watching our shells when they burst 
over them.

Page 91

Camp Cooper, November 21, 1861. 

My dearest Pauline: 
   On Monday I participated in what is admitted to have been the most 
dashing feat of the war. Col. Lee took about 80 men out on a scout, - 
hearing where a company of about the same number of Yankees were on 
picket, we went down and attacked. They were concealed in a pine thicket, 
where one man ought to have been equal to ten outside. We charged right 
into them and they poured a raking fire into our ranks. Fount Beattie and 
myself, in the ardor of pursuit, had gotten separated some distance from 
our main body, when we came upon two Yankees in the woods. We ordered them 
to surrender, but they replied by firing on us. One of the Yankees jumped 
behind a tree and was taking aim at Fount when I leveled my pistol at him, 
but missed him. He also fired, but missed Fount, though within a few feet 
of him. I then jumped down from my horse and as the fellow turned to me I 
rested my carbine against a tree and shot him dead. He never knew what 
struck him. Fount fired at one with his pistol, but missed. A South 
Carolinian came up and killed the other. . . . The man I killed had a 
letter in his pocket from his sweetheart Clara. . . . They were of the 
Brooklyn Zouaves and fought at Manassas.

- 1862. 

My dearest Pauline: 
   Get Aaron to give you a full account of his adventure, - his memorable 
retreat from Bunker Hill, 

Page 92

- his doctoring the sick men(1) during the battle. He is a good deal 
thought of in the company.

   At the end of 1861 occurred an event which greatly disappointed 
Southern hopes. Mason and Slidell had been sent as ambassadors to England 
and France. They escaped through the blockading fleet at Charleston and 
arrived at Nassau, where they took passage on the English steamer Trent. 
The vessel was stopped on the high seas by Captain Wilkes of the San 
Jacinto, and the ambassadors were taken off and confined in Fort Warren, 
Boston. This action was hailed with as much joy in the South as in the 
North. The Confederates thought their ambassadors would be held as 
prisoners and conceived it to be impossible that they would be surrendered 
on the demand of England after the Secretary of the Navy had approved the 
conduct of Wilkes, and Congress had given him a vote of thanks. 
Fortunately for the Union cause, neither Mr. Lincoln nor Mr. Seward had 
committed himself to an approval of it, but both had kept a judicious 
silence until they could hear from England. In the South we all felt sure 
that England would 

(1. The story of the "sick" men concerns the Battle of Manassas. They 
covered themselves with heavy blankets and shivered when the shells were 
flying. When they were not, they would recover and raise up and ask Aaron, 
"Haven't you got a few more of those corn cakes?")

Page 93

never submit to such an indignity and breach of neutrality.

   War between England and the United States was considered inevitable, 
and we could almost hear the roar of English guns dispersing the fleets 
which were blockading our coasts. With England as an ally of the South our 
success was certain. But the Administration wisely yielded to England's 
demand and surrendered the captives. Mr. Seward, in a letter to Lord 
Lyons, ingeniously maintained that he was consistent in so doing, and that 
in demanding their release England had at last claimed for neutrals the 
rights for which the United States had always contended. Mason and Slidell 
were transferred to an English gunboat lying off Cape Cod, and thus 
withered our hopes of having England as an ally. There was no longer a 
casus belli.

   The Richmond Examiner, January 1, 1862, said of this affair: "The year 
which has just begun opens with evil tidings. We fear there is no doubt of 
the fact that the Northern Union has consented to the surrender of Mason 
and Slidell, and with that event all hopes of an immediate alliance 
between the Southern Confederacy and Great Britain must cease."

   It happened that I brought to the camps in 

Page 94

Fairfax the first news of the capture of Mason and Slidell. Fitzhugh Lee 
took a part of my regiment on a scout and we came upon the Brooklyn 14th 
that was doing picket duty. They wore red breeches, so we called them the 
red-legged Yankees. As soon as we got in sight of them we charged. A 
portion of them were in a dense thicket, which we couldn't penetrate on 
horse back, and so a few of us dismounted and charged on foot, with 
carbines, to the point where the reserve had a fire. We took a number of 
prisoners and I picked up a newspaper. It was about sundown; the paper was 
a copy of the Washington Star of that evening, and had an account of the 
capture of Mason and Slidell. When we brought the prisoners to Fitz Lee, I 
said, "Colonel, here's a copy of to-day's paper." Fitz Lee replied, "The 
ruling passion strong in death," referring to my reputation of always 
being the first man in the company to get hold of a newspaper. Colonel 
Jones sent the paper to General Johnston's headquarters at Centreville.

   A popular notion has prevailed that a great benefit would have resulted 
to the South if England and France had received our ministers and 
established diplomatic relations with the Southern Confederacy. I never 
thought so, unless they 

Page 95

had gone further and intervened in our behalf, as France did with the 
Colonies, and sent their fleets to break the blockade. In that event they 
would have become parties to the war. When they proclaimed their 
neutrality and accorded us belligerent rights and the hospitality of their 
ports to Confederate cruisers, they just as much recognized the 
independence of the South as if they had officially received its 
ministers. The human mind cannot conceive of belligerent rights except as 
attached to a supreme independent power.

   There was a great deal of complaint against England for her haste in 
proclaiming neutrality and thus recognizing the belligerent character of 
the contest. But the Congress called by Mr. Lincoln, in July, 1861, before 
Bull Run had been fought, as Webster said about Bunker Hill, elevated an 
insurrection into a public war. It passed an act forbidding commercial 
intercourse between persons living north and south of the Potomac, and 
declaring the forfeiture of goods caught in transit and also the seizure 
of vessels on the high seas as enemy property, if the owners lived in the 
South. It also declared that such seizures and intercourse should be 
governed, not by the municipal law of the country, but by the law of 

Page 96

nations. It thus recognized our sectional conflict as a public territorial 
war and not, like the Wars of the Roses, a contest of factions.

   The law of nations regulates the relations of alien enemies in war and 
can have no application to citizens of the same country. This act of 
Congress was a declaration of a war inter gentes, as much so as that 
between France and Prussia. The Amy Warwick, owned in Richmond, sailed 
from Rio without notice of the blockade. She was seized on the voyage and 
condemned as a prize of war. It was contended that there was no proof that 
her owner was in rebellion. But the Supreme Court held that international 
law took no notice of the personal sentiments of individuals, but that 
their domicile determined their legal status.

   In the opening of the year 1862 there was a great deal of depression in 
the Southern Confederacy. A considerable amount of this was due to the 
failure of our hopes of having England as an immediate ally, but most of 
it was on account of the expiration, in the coming spring, of the terms of 
enlistment of most of the regiments and the reluctance of the men to 
reënlist before going to their homes. General Joe Johnston issued an 
address urging the twelve-months' volunteers to reënlist, but it had 
little or no effect. He said:

Page 97

   The Commanding General calls upon the twelve-months' men to stand by 
their brave comrades who have volunteered for the war, to revolunteer at 
once and thus show the world that the patriots who engaged in this 
struggle do not swerve from the bloodiest path they may be called to tread.

   The fear that the army would disappear like a morning mist is shown in 
the farewell address of General Beauregard, dated January 30, 1862, when 
he was about to leave to take command in the West. He said:

   Above all I am anxious that my brave countrymen here in arms fronting 
the haughtily arrayed master of Northern mercenaries should thoroughly 
appreciate the exigency, and hence comprehend that this is no time for the 
Army of the Potomac - the men of Manassas - to stack their arms and quit, 
even for a brief period, the standards they have made glorious by their 
manhood.

   The fact that Beauregard italicized the latter part of this sentence 
was an omen of impending danger. Mr. Davis also sent a message to Congress 
in which he said, "I therefore recommend the passage of a law declaring 
that all persons residing within the Confederate States between the ages 
of eighteen and thirty-five years and rightfully subject to military duty 
shall be held 

Page 98

to be in the military service of the Confederate States."

   The conscription law increased the numbers but impaired the esprit de 
corps of the volunteer army that won the victory of Manassas, - the flower 
of Southern manhood had been gathered there. But the law saved the 
Confederacy from the danger of collapse without another battle through the 
disbandment of its army. After the war I heard severe criticism of the 
Conscription Act which, in fact, saved the Confederacy - for a time.



Page 99

CHAPTER VIII 
CAMPAIGNING WITH STUART
   THE last time I went on picket was on the 12th of February (1862). By 
this time Stuart had been made a brigadier-general, and Jones was colonel 
of the regiment. The road from our camp to the outpost passed through 
Centreville, where General Joe Johnston and Stuart had their headquarters. 
On that February day Stuart joined us, and I observed that an empty 
carriage was following, although I did not understand the reason. When we 
arrived at Fairfax Court House, Stuart asked Captain Blackford to detail a 
man to go in the carriage with some ladies. There was a fine family in the 
place, who always gave me my breakfast when I was on picket and, as one of 
the ladies in the party was a member of the family, I was detailed to go 
as an escort several miles inside our lines. They did not like being on 
the picket line where there were frequent skirmishes. So I left my horse 
for my messmate, Fount Beattie, to bring back to camp the next 

Page 100

day, and took my seat in the carriage with the ladies. It was a raw, cold 
morning, and it soon began to snow. We arrived at our journey's end in the 
evening, and I then started for Stuart's headquarters. When I reached 
there it was dark, and the snow was still falling. Although I had been in 
Stuart's regiment from the beginning of the war, I had no acquaintance 
with him and no reason to suppose that he had ever heard of me. So I went 
into the house, reported to him that I had left the ladies at their 
destination, and asked him for a pass, as my camp on the Bull Run was 
several miles away. The sentinels would not let me go back without one.

   Now the weather would not have been any more severe on me if I had 
walked back to camp that night than if I had stayed on picket. I never 
dreamed of Stuart's inviting me to spend the night at headquarters, or 
that I should ever rise to intimacy with him. There could have been 
nothing prepossessing in my general appearance to induce him to make an 
exception of me, for I was as roughly dressed as any common soldier. But 
he told me the weather was too bad and to stay there that night. Of course 
I obeyed and took my seat before a big, blazing fire. Both of the generals 
were sitting there, but I felt so small 

Page 101

in their presence that I looked straight into the fire and never dared to 
raise my head. I would have felt far more comfortable trudging back to 
camp through the snow. Presently a boy announced that supper was ready. 
The generals arose and, as Stuart walked into the supper room, he told me 
to come in and get some supper. I was astonished and kept my seat. Stuart 
observed my absence from the table and sent for me. So I obeyed, went in, 
and took a seat with the generals. I do not think I raised my eyes from my 
plate, although they chatted freely. When it was time to go to sleep 
Stuart had some blankets spread on the floor, and I was soon snoring. The 
same thing happened in the morning - a boy announced breakfast - Stuart 
told me to come in, and I again stayed behind - and he had to send for me.

   It has always been a mystery to me why Stuart made me his guest that 
night and did not put me with his couriers - which would have been more 
agreeable to me. After breakfast Stuart sent me, mounted, to my camp, with 
a courier to bring back the horse I rode. So here began my friendship for 
Stuart which lasted as long as he lived. It is a coincidence that it began 
on the very day I received my first promotion. I had 

Page 102

scarcely reached our camp when a message came from the commander of the 
regiment, Colonel Jones, to come to his tent. I went, and he offered me 
the position of adjutant. I was as much astonished as I had been the night 
before to be asked to sit at the table with the generals. Of course I was 
glad to accept it, and Jones wrote to the War Department requesting my 
appointment. The Journal of the Confederate Senate shows that I was 
confirmed to take rank from February 17, 1861. I have always had a 
repugnance to ceremonials and was not half so much frightened in the 
battle of Bull Run as I was on the first dress parade I conducted. On such 
occasions the adjutant is the most conspicuous figure. I never could 
repeat the formulas of the regulations, and for this reason I remember the 
few weeks I served as an adjutant with less satisfaction than any other 
portion of my life as a soldier.

[Undated fragment of a letter to Mrs. Mosby.]
   We are suffering the most intense anxiety to hear the final result from 
Donelson, - if we are defeated there it will prolong the war, I fear, but 
the idea of giving up or abandoning the field now should never enter a 
Southern man's head. To be sure there must be a costly sacrifice of our 
best blood, but the coward dies a thousand deaths, the brave man dies but 
one.

Page 103

   When news came to Richmond that Grant's attack on Fort Donelson had 
been repulsed, Confederate hopes of final success were raised to a high 
pitch. But they sank to zero the next day when a dispatch came announcing 
the fall of Donelson and the surrender of most of the garrison. Kentucky 
was now lost to us and most of middle Tennessee.

   A greater blunder was never committed in war than when General Albert 
Sidney Johnston sent Floyd, Buckner, and Pillow down the Cumberland River, 
with about 17,000 troops, to hold a fort situated in the angle made by the 
confluence of the Cumberland and a deep, unfordable creek. There was no 
line of retreat open by land and no transportation provided for escape by 
water, in case of defeat. The Confederates were caught in a trap, and 
their surrender was, of course, inevitable. The first attacks of the 
gunboats under Commodore Foote were repulsed, and in the evening the 
situation was about the same as it had been in the morning. But Buckner 
and Pillow seemed to think that their men would not fight any longer, 
although they had an abundance of rations, and Floyd swore that he would 
not surrender either himself or his brigade. Floyd was the senior officer, 
and it was agreed that he should turn over the command to Pillow, 

Page 104

who was next in rank, and that he, in turn, should turn it over to 
Buckner. Floyd with his brigade escaped at night on two steamboats that 
happened to come down with supplies from Nashville that evening. Pillow in 
some way got to the opposite bank of the river and left his troops behind 
him. It has never been explained why a few boats were not on hand to set 
the Confederates over the river, when resistance became hopeless, or why 
the two which Floyd took were not used during the night to convey the army 
to the other bank.

   At daybreak Buckner ordered a parley to be sounded and capitulated to 
Grant without conditions. He did not even get as good terms as General Lee 
got for the fragment of his army at Appomattox. Mr. Davis relieved both 
Floyd and Pillow of command, but with strange inconsistency he praised 
General Johnston for putting them in a hole where they fought for two days 
to get out. The affair of Donelson was a most discreditable thing to our 
side of the war.

Camp of 1st Cavalry, 
March 1, 1862. 

Dear Pauline: 
   Nobody here is the least discouraged at our late reverses; that they 
will prolong the war I have no 

Page 105

doubt. But they have not made the first step towards subjugation. Nothing 
can reverse my own decision to stay in the foremost ranks, "where life is 
lost or freedom won." I want to see in Southern women some of that Spartan 
heroism of the mother who said to her son, when she buckled on his armor: 
"Return with your shield or return upon it." Our army is now falling back 
from Centreville, but whether to Manassas or Gordonsville I don't know. We 
haven't moved our camp.

   When Johnston retired from Centreville, in the spring of 1862, our 
regiment was the rear-guard of the army. Johnston fell back leisurely; 
first to the Rappahannock and then to the Rapidan, where he waited for 
McClellan to develop his campaign. In December, 1864, I had dinner with 
General Lee at his headquarters near Petersburg, and he told me that 
Johnston should never have moved from the Rapidan to Richmond; that when 
it was discovered that McClellan was moving down the Potomac, he wrote 
Johnston and urged him to move back against Washington. Lee was confident 
that such a menace of the capital would recall McClellan to defend it.

   A considerable Union force followed our regiment as we withdrew along 
the railroad, and when it got near our picket line on Cedar Run, it 
deployed in an open field and made a great display. 

Page 106

Jones was on the picket line that day, and I was with him and witnessed 
the exhibition. The pickets withdrew, and the enemy occupied the ground on 
which we had been for several days. That night my regiment camped near 
Bealeton Station.

   The next morning I rode there and met Stuart. The enemy was already in 
sight and advancing. I had become pretty well acquainted with Stuart after 
I became an adjutant and had already conducted several scouting 
expeditions for him. As we met that morning, he said to me very 
earnestly, - he seemed puzzled, - "General Johnston wants to know if 
McClellan's army is following us, or if this is only a feint he is 
making." Evidently Stuart wanted me to find out for him, but did not like 
to order me. I saw the opportunity for which I had longed and said in a 
self-confident tone, "I will find out for you, if you will give me a 
guide." He gave me one who knew the road, and with two others of my party 
I started around the flank of the hostile column and got in its rear while 
it was advancing to the Rappahannock. As the enemy moved south and we went 
north, my party was in its rear when the Union column reached the 
Rappahannock and began shelling the Confederates who had just crossed.

Page 107

   As we were behind the enemy, we soon discovered that an isolated body 
was following Johnston, and that it kept up no line of communication with 
Washington. It was clear that the movement was a mask to create a 
diversion and cover some operation. Of course, I was proud to have made 
the discovery, and I rode nearly all night to report it to Stuart. When we 
got near the river, we halted at a farmhouse, for there was danger of 
being shot by our own pickets if we attempted to cross the river in the 
dark. As soon as it was daylight, I started, leaving my companions asleep. 
A picket halted me when I got halfway across the river, and it was with 
great difficulty that I could persuade him not to fire. At last I made him 
ashamed of himself when I told him I was only one man and asked him if he 
was afraid of one Yankee. He told me to come on, but he kept his gun 
levelled at me.

   I went on at a gallop and found Stuart with General Ewell, whose 
division was in line of battle expecting the enemy to attempt to cross the 
river - a heavy fog concealed their backward movement. I told Stuart that 
there was no support behind the force in front, and that it was falling 
back. A curtain of cavalry had been left behind to cover the retreat. Our 
cavalry was 

Page 108

immediately ordered in pursuit, and I went with it. In the rapture of the 
moment Stuart told me I could get any reward I wanted. His report confirms 
this statement about the information that was obtained - but I got no 
reward.

Culpeper Co., 
April 1st, 1862. 

My dearest Pauline: 
   . . . Although I do not belong to that Company (Blackford's), being on 
the regimental staff, I went with them into the fight. . . . The 
appearance of the enemy when they crossed Cedar Run was the most 
magnificent sight I ever beheld.... We let them [advance guard of cavalry] 
cross, when, dismounting, we delivered a volley with our carbines which 
sent them back across the deep stream in the wildest confusion. One fellow 
was thrown into the water over his head; and scrambling out ran off and 
left his horse; another horse fell, rose, and fell again, burying his 
rider with him under the water. We ceased firing, threw up our caps, and 
indulged in the most boisterous laughter. . . . Col. Jones speaks of some 
service I have recently rendered. At one time, with four men, I passed 
around, got to the rear of the enemy. discovered that they were making a 
feint movement on the railroad, while they were really moving in another 
direction. I rode nearly all night to give the information, which resulted 
in General Stuart's ordering our regiment in pursuit and the capture of 
about 30 

Page 109

prisoners, 16 horses, arms, etc. General Stuart was so much pleased with 
my conduct that he wrote a report to General Johnston commending me very 
highly and also recommending my promotion.

   When our regiment got to the vicinity of Yorktown, it was reorganized, 
and Fitz Lee, who had been a lieutenant-colonel, was elected colonel. 
Stuart invited me to come to his headquarters and act as a scout. I got no 
commission and stayed with his couriers. In this ambiguous condition I 
remained for a year, or until I took up my independent command.

April 25, 1862. 

My dearest Pauline: 
   Our regiment was reorganized day before yesterday. Col. [Fitzhugh] Lee 
was elected over Col. Jones. Col. Jones left immediately for Richmond. He 
expects to be a Brigadier-General. Immediately after the election I handed 
in my resignation of my commission. The President had commissioned me for 
the war, but I would not be adjutant of a Colonel against his wishes or if 
I were not his first choice. General Stuart told me yesterday that he 
would see that I had a commission.

Richmond, June 2, 1862. 

My dearest Pauline: 
   The papers will give you about as much as I know of the fight [Battle 
of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines]. 

Page 110

I went down over the battlefield yesterday. Our men were all among the 
enemy's tents, which were still standing, their camp kettles on the fire, 
etc. We whipped them in their fortifications. . . . General Lee is now in 
command, General Johnston being wounded. . . . There is so much confusion 
in Richmond that I do not know whether I can get your memorandum filled to-
day. There is nothing like a panic, everybody being engaged in preparing 
to take care of the wounded.

   In June (1862) McClellan was astraddle of the Chickahominy; his right 
rested on the Pamunkey, but there was a gap of several miles between his 
left and the James. The two armies were so close to each other that the 
cavalry was of little use, and it was therefore kept in the rear.

   One morning I was at breakfast with Stuart, and he said that he wanted 
to find out if McClellan was fortifying on the Totopotomy, a creek that 
empties into the Pamunkey. I was glad to go for him and started off with 
three men. But we found a flag of truce on the road and turned off to 
scout in another direction - I did not want to go back without doing 
something. We did not get the information for which we were sent, but we 
did get intelligence of even more value. 

Page 111

We penetrated McClellan's lines and discovered that for several miles his 
right flank had only cavalry pickets to guard his line of communication 
with his depot at the White House on the Pamunkey. Here, it seemed to me, 
was an opportunity to strike a blow. McClellan had not anticipated any 
such move and had made no provision against it.

   On discovering the conditions, I hastened back to Stuart and found him 
sitting in the front yard. It was a hot day - I was tired and lay down on 
the grass to tell him what I had learned. A martinet would have ordered me 
to stand in his presence. He listened to my story and, when I had 
finished, told me to go to the adjutant's office and write it down. At the 
same time he ordered a courier to get ready to go with him to General 
Lee's headquarters. I did as he requested and brought him a sheet of paper 
with what I had written. After reading it, Stuart called my attention to 
its not being signed. I signed it, although I had thought he only wanted a 
memorandum of what I had said - General Lee had never heard of me. Stuart 
took the paper and went off with a courier at a gallop. As soon as he 
returned, orders were issued to the cavalry to be ready.

Page 112

   General Lee's instructions authorizing the expedition were dated June 
11. I had reported the day before. On the morning of the twelfth with 1200 
cavalry and two pieces of artillery Stuart passed through Richmond and 
took the road towards Ashland. I was at headquarters when Stuart was 
leaving. The officer in charge asked him when he would be back. His answer 
was, "It may be for years, it may be forever." His spirits were buoyant.

   The column moved on to Old Church in Hanover where two squadrons of U. 
S. regular cavalry were stationed under the command of Captain Royall. 
When the pickets were chased in, Royall heard the firing and went to their 
support. He had no cause to suspect the numbers he was meeting, for 
McClellan had never even considered the possibility of a force breaking 
through his lines and passing around him. A squadron of the Ninth Virginia 
Cavalry led our column. Captain Latané was in command. A charge was 
ordered, and in the combat Royall was wounded and routed, and Latané was 
killed. We could not stay to give him even a hasty burial. Our forces soon 
had possession of the abandoned camp and, as the enemy had had no time to 
pack up, there was a festival.

Page 113

   We were now on the flank of the enemy but nine miles from the railroad 
which was his line of communication. The question which Stuart had to 
determine was whether to go on or turn back. We were near the Pamunkey, 
and if we kept on, the road would soon be closed behind us. The only way 
of return would then be to pass around McClellan. I felt great anxiety for 
fear that Stuart would halt, for I realized that there was a chance for 
him to do something that had never been done. His decision to go on showed 
that he possessed true military genius.

   Just before Stuart gave the order for us to move, he turned to me and 
said, "I want you to go on some distance ahead." "Very well," said I, "but 
give me a guide." Two soldiers who knew the roads were ordered to go with 
me. I was proud to be selected for such a duty and was full of enthusiasm. 
We had not gone far before Stuart sent one of his staff to tell me to go 
faster and increase the distance between us. As we jogged along two miles 
in advance of the column, we came upon a cutler's wagon. It was filled 
with so many tempting things which we had not seen for nearly two years 
that we felt as if the blockade had been raised. We exercised the 

Page 114

belligerent right of search. At the same time I could see, about a mile 
away in the Pamunkey River, a forest of masts of schooners which were 
unloading supplies into a train of wagons ready to carry them to the army. 
So I sent one man back to tell Stuart to hurry and capture the prizes and 
put the other as a guard over the sutler. I then went on alone. When 
Stuart came up, he sent a squadron to burn the schooners and the wagon 
train. Capturing watercraft was a novel experiment in cavalry tactics. At 
a bend in the road, I came upon a vidette and a cutler's wagon; they 
submitted quietly. Just then a bugle sounded, and I saw a body of cavalry 
a few hundred yards away. Fugitives from the camp we had captured had 
given the alarm, and the second troop was getting ready to leave. As soon 
as the head of our column appeared, the enemy's force at once disappeared.

   A Confederate newspaper described my part as follows:

   Appreciating the public interest in the recital of everything connected 
with the recent exploit of General Stuart's cavalry in his reconnaissance 
through the enemy's lines, we have gathered, from reliable participants in 
the affair, these additional particulars. After destroying the enemy's 
camp near the old church, 

Page 115

Lieutenant John S. Mosby, aid to General Stuart and who had been most 
daring and successful as a scout was sent on in advance, with a single 
guide, towards Tunstall Station, to reconnoitre and ascertain the position 
and force of the enemy. On his way he met two Yankees whom he took 
prisoners and sent to the rear in charge of his guide. Alone he pushed on 
and overtook a cavalryman and an artilleryman of the enemy's forces, 
having in charge a quartermaster's wagon and stores. Lieutenant Mosby 
dashed up and, drawing his pistols, demanded their surrender. The New 
Yorker surrendered at once, but the Pennsylvanian, beginning to fumble for 
his pistol, the lieutenant made a more emphatic demand for his surrender, 
and at the same moment compelled him to look quite closely into the muzzle 
of his pistol. All this time there was drawn up, not four hundred yards 
distant, a company of Yankee cavalry in line of battle. In a moment a 
bugle sounded as for a movement on him, when, anxious to secure his 
prisoners and stores, Lieutenant Mosby put spurs and galloped across the 
field, at the same time shouting to his imaginary men to follow him, when 
none of the Confederate cavalry were in sight and the swiftest more than a 
mile in the rear. The Yankees, hearing the word of command and 
apprehending the descent of an avalanche of Confederate cavalry upon them, 
broke line, each man galloping off to take care of himself. The wagon, 
prisoners, and stores were then secured and among them were found forty 
splendid Colt's pistols with holsters, besides boots, shoes, blankets, 
etc., etc.

Page 116

   About sundown we reached the York River Railroad, and the column still 
went on. The only way to get back to Richmond was now to recross the 
Chickahominy near its mouth and pass by McClellan's left flank. As some 
evidence of the consternation that prevailed among the Union troops, I 
remember that, after we left the camp, a sergeant and twenty-five men of 
the regular cavalry followed on under a flag of truce and surrendered to 
the rearguard. That night was a feast for Stuart's cavalry. On all the 
roads were burning trains with supplies and sutlers' goods. Champagne and 
Rhine wine flowed copiously.

   A force was sent in pursuit of us under the command of General St. 
George Cooke - Stuart's father-in-law. Although the march of our column 
was slow, we never saw an armed foe after we left Royall's camp, except a 
small guard at the railroad. General Warren, who commanded a brigade 
behind us, said, "It was impossible for the infantry to overtake him and 
as the cavalry did not move without us, it was impossible for them to 
overtake him." Fitz-John Porter regretted that "When General Cooke did 
pursue, he should have tied his legs with the infantry command." As there 
were six cavalry regiments, 

Page 117

including all the regulars, with a battery, on our track, it is hard to 
see why they wanted infantry.

   Although more than forty-eight hours elapsed between the time when we 
passed McClellan's right flank and back around his left, he made no 
attempt to intercept us. In making the circuit of his army, the 
Confederate column was at all times within five or six miles of his 
headquarters, with two navigable rivers enclosing it, and another river 
over which we had to build a bridge in order to cross. McClellan was a 
soldier of great organizing ability and trained in the science of war - I 
mean in those operations that can be regulated by rules. But he had none 
of the inspiration that decides and acts instantly, and he was now 
confronted by a condition without a precedent. So he was helpless.

   About daylight we reached a ford of the Chickahominy, a narrow crooked 
stream which meanders between the Pamunkey and the James. We had crossed 
it on the morning before. Stuart had expected to be able to ford this 
stream, but at this point it was overflowing. A guide told us of a bridge 
a mile below - or where one had been - so the column was headed for that 
point. 

Page 118

When we got there, we found that the bridge was gone, although the piles 
were standing Near by were the remains of an old warehouse; which 
furnished material for building another. It was soon constructed - it 
seemed to rise out of the water by magic. It may not have been so good a 
bridge as Cæsar threw over the Rhine, but it answered our purpose. While 
the bridge was building, Stuart showed no anxiety and was in as gay a 
humor as I ever saw him. During the night I had provided for our 
commissary department a lot of stores from the sutlers' wagons, and these 
were soon spread about on the grass. We had not been disturbed on the 
night march, but just as the bridge was finished a body of lancers came in 
sight and halted. They had captured one of our men, a German, whom we had 
to leave behind, as he was too full of Rhine wine to travel. When we 
reached Westover, the command was halted to rest and get forage, for we 
knew that the road to Richmond was open. Stuart now left Fitz Lee in 
command and rode on to report to General Lee. The column moved on by 
moonlight and at daybreak was in sight of Richmond. The game was won.

   I had ridden several miles ahead of the 

Page 119

column and met Stuart returning. Of course, he was delighted to hear that 
the cavalry was safe.

   To excuse himself for what he had not done, McClellan, in a dispatch, 
tried to belittle this affair by saying that Stuart's cavalry did nothing 
but gain a little éclat; but it can be said with more truth that he 
himself lost a good deal. It was the first blow at his reputation.

   The Comte de Paris, one of McClellan's staff officers, said with more 
truth, "They had, in point of fact, created a great commotion, shaken the 
confidence of the North in McClellan, and made the first experiment in 
those great cavalry expeditions which subsequently played so novel and 
important a part during the war."

Richmond, Monday, 
June 16, 1862. 

My dearest Pauline: 
   I have just received your letter this morning. I returned yesterday 
with General Stuart from the grandest scout of the war. I not only helped 
to execute it, but was the first one who conceived and demonstrated that 
it was practicable. I took four men, several days ago, and went down among 
the Yankees and found out how it could be done. The Yankees gave us a 
chase, but we escaped. I reported to General 

Page 120

Stuart, - suggested his going down, - he approved, - asked me to give him 
a written statement of the facts, and went immediately to see General Lee, 
who also approved it. We were out nearly four days, - rode continuously 
four days and nights, - found among the Yankee camps and sutlers' stores 
every luxury of which you ever conceived. I had no way of bringing off 
anything. General Stuart gave me the horses and equipments I captured. 
What little I brought off is worth at least $350. Stuart does not want me 
to go with Floyd, - told me before this affair that I should have a 
commission, - on returning yesterday he told me that I would have no 
difficulty in doing so now. I met Wyndham Robertson on the street to-day. 
He congratulated me on the success of the exploit, and said I was the 
hero, and that he intended to write an account of it for the papers, - 
made me promise to dine with him to-day. I send you some captured 
things, - the carpet was in an officer's tent. . . . There is no prospect 
of a battle here, - heavy reinforcements have been going to Jackson. . . . 
I got two splendid army pistols. Stuart's name is in every one's mouth 
now. I was in both cavalry charges, - they were magnificent. . . . I have 
been staying with General Stuart at his headquarters. . . . The whole 
heavens were illuminated by the flames of the burning wagons, etc. of the 
Yankees. A good many ludicrous scenes I will narrate when I get home. 
Richmond in fine spirits, - everybody says it is the greatest feat of the 
war. I never enjoyed myself so much in my life. . . .

Page 121

Headquarters Cavalry Brigade, 
June 20, 1862. 

Hon. Geo. W. Randolph, 
Secretary of War. 

General: 
   Permit me to present to you John S. Mosby, who for months past has 
rendered time and again services of the most important and valuable 
nature, exposing himself regardless of danger, and, in my estimation, 
fairly won promotion.

   I am anxious that he should get the Captaincy of a Company of 
Sharpshooters in my brigade, but the muster rolls have not yet been sent 
in. I commend him to your notice.

Most respectfully, General, 
Your obedient servant, 
J. E. B. Stuart, 
Brigadier General Commanding Cavalry.